

the satanic force



EBOOK

VOLUME 1

PART 3

SWEDISH GROUP APPEALS ON EELAM TAMIL

REPORT

Full text of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Sweden with copies to all parties concerned by Svenska Multi-Etniska Foreningen for Sri Lanka (SMES) expressing its concern over the Eelam Tamil problem and calling upon Mr. Carlsson to take it up with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. 'As a Swedish based voluntary group which is working towards peace, democracy and ethnic harmony in a united Sri Lanka, we are gravely concerned about the continuing unhappy state of affairs in Sri Lanka.

The expectation that the New Delhi government would restore peace and offer protection to the hapless minorities in Sri Lanka has not only failed to materialise but these so called Indian peace keeping forces have themselves taken up arms against the people of Sri Lanka. They have lost the trust which the different ethnic groups in the Island placed in them

While condemning these actions of the 'peace-keeping forces' which have led to untold sufferings to the people, we are also painfully aware that a limited presence of these troops, at least for a short period of time, will be necessary for the task of ensuring peace in that country. For this to be accomplished it is necessary to restore the faith of the people and in our view this is only possible with the help of a neutral peace keeping force of international stature, namely a United Nations peace-keeping force.

We envisage that the Indian troops will work together with the UN peace-keeping forces and set about the task of restoring peace and

bringing about normalisation.

A pre-requisite for this process, however, would be the immediate withdrawal of a major part of the Indian 'peace-keeping troops'. In its pursuit of the policy of non-alignment India has on several occasions declared itself opposed to the presence of foreign troops on the territory of another sovereign nation. We urge Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to apply to his own actions this principle to which not only India but also Sweden and all other peace-loving nations in the world subscribe.

Our association appreciates the endeavours of Sweden in championing the cause of oppressed people without regard to colour, race or religion. We urge upon you to use the occasion of your forthcoming talks in Stockholm with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to persuade him that:

1. (a) The only way to restore the people's faith in the peace-keeping efforts in Sri Lanka is to remove immediately a major portion of his government's troops.

(b) To request the Secretary General of the UN to send a United Nations peace-keeping force which would then work jointly with the remaining Indian peace-keeping forces to restore peace and harmony and to pave the way for normalisation. That such a request to the UN Secretary General be made jointly by the governments of Sri Lanka and India — the two parties to the 29th July peace accord which was expected to grant the minorities their human rights while preserving ethnic harmony and security for all peoples of Sri Lanka.

2. That he in turn prevail upon the President of Sri Lanka to take action

PROBLEM

to fulfil the conditions of the 29th July peace accord, namely,

(a) the declaration of a general amnesty and the release of all political prisoners, both Tamil and Sinhalese, now held in camps in the South of Sri Lanka.


(b) to lift the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) brought into effect in 1979, which allows the government of Sri Lanka to arrest and detain people for great lengths of time without any charges being brought against them before a duly constituted court of law.

3. That he further prevails upon the President of Sri Lanka to

(a) permit the International Red Cross to help the refugees who have been exposed to severe physical and mental suffering in the affected areas.

(b) Grant citizenship without delay not only to the so-called 'Indian Tamils' or 'Plantation Tamils' whose applications for citizenship have been accepted, but also to all the other 'Indian Tamils' whose applications have been rejected despite the fact that they and their ancestors have made enormous contributions to the economic life of Sri Lanka for over a century and that they were born and have lived all their life in Sri Lanka and have known no other land including India to which they are threatened with 'repatriation'.

We end this plea with the hope that you will fulfil the faith of an oppressed people who look to independent nations like Sweden to champion their cause and relieve their sufferings.



BLOOD IS THICKER THAN WATER !

EDITORIAL

'From the rubble and ashes, there can only arise the total alienation of an entire people, more determined militancy, more extreme options. The time to desist from a military occupation of Jaffna is now. Later may be too late.'

No matter who wrote it or in what context it was written, the above is an ever-living assertion in that it transcends the bounds of time and space. It is from that the Americans in Vietnam, and the Russians in Afghanistan learned their lessons, and the Indians in Sri Lanka are in the process of learning their lesson.

Significantly underlying the lesson is the fact that any atrocities, no matter in what measure, by whom or against whom they are perpetrated, cannot succeed against a people's unity and determination to resist them. For more than four years, Sri Lankan authorities incessantly indulged in blood-curdling brutalities against the Tamil people, only to know, though belatedly, that nothing could successfully stand before the people's united will. In the past few months, Indian authorities have repeated, following on the Peace Accord, the same atrocities in rather greater measure against the same Tamil people with a view to destroying their legitimate rights and aspirations. They have, however, experienced the same reality, that is, in no way could military measures weaken a people's resolve to oppose at any cost whatsoever was injurious to their interests.

The failure of India's military measures against the Tamil people, and not allowing them to have any se-

rious role in the Peace Accord, is patently manifest in the political manoeuvres they have time and time again employed.


These manoeuvres were for the purpose not only of vindicating their atrocities in the absence of any impartial or neutral organisations such as International Red Cross and Amnesty International but also of splintering the Tamil community into several factions, thereby weakening their determination for resistance. As part of their manoeuvres they created quislings among Tamil people and turned them into armed bandits to inflict as much suffering as possible on the Tamil civilians. They have not scrupled to arbitrarily dump the responsibility for the debacle of the Peace Accord into the lap of the Tamil Tigers in the hope of deflecting Tamil opinion in their favour; they vainly resorted to various strategies such as unilateral ceasefire and offer of incentives (bribes) to the freedom fighters.

It is by no means out of place to state here that India's package of inducements to the fighting youths points to the fact that Indian authorities, particularly Rajiv Gandhi, have failed to comprehend the true objectives the Tamils are fighting for; they are fighting because they and their people want to live with honour and dignity in their own land.

Nearly six months have lapsed since the Peace Accord was signed to end the conflicts in Sri Lanka. The rhetoric of the Indian authorities, 'We have crushed the Tigers' is reaching its periodic crescendo; but the first

phase of the Accord — the disarming of Tamil youths — has not yet been accomplished despite the extravagant presence of more than 50,000 Indian troops. The Tamil Tigers continue to maintain that they will give up arms only in a secure situation for their people. To say that the IPKF has not succeeded in disarming the Tigers is not so much to assert that the force is not competent enough to do so but to emphasise that the Tigers receive unshakeable support from their own people whose interests they are fighting for. It is true that the relentless atrocities by the IPKF against the Tamils have created an implacable hatred in the minds of the Tamil community as a whole against the Indian authorities, thus ensuring its unqualified support for the Tamil Tigers. It is also true that the Tamil people share with their freedom fighters the view that in no way does the Peace Accord guarantee their safety and security to live with honour and dignity. Above all these, the people's determination to throw their weight behind the Tigers at any cost whatsoever stems from the fact that it is the sons and daughters of these ordinary people who are poised to fight for the dignity of their parents and grandparents, as well as of future generations. If anyone says, on the basis of isolated and solitary evidence, that it is the Tamils' turn to accept the IPKF in Sri Lanka, to counter this we can do no more than say that you need a lot to prove that 'water is thicker than blood' but little or nothing to say that blood is thicker than water.

1 February 1988



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times



DOCUMENT A memorandum submitted by LTTE to the U.N. Conference on human rights.

The accord which was said to be a historical achievement in bringing about peace and ethnic reconciliation to the Tamil issue, has miserably failed in its spirit and its objectives. Contrary to everybody's expectations, the Indo - Sri Lankan accord has brought war, violence, death and destruction.

It is a tragic paradox that it is the oppressed people of Tamil Eelam for whom the Accord pledged, to bring peace and justice, suffered immensely with a massive loss of life. What deeply shook the innocent Tamils was that India, who relentlessly championed their legitimate cause, whom they regarded as their guardian and saviour has turned to be their oppressor. The Indian peace keeping force (IPKF), which was sent to Tamil homeland to protect the Tamil people, to maintain peace and to ensure ethnic harmony, has assumed itself as an army of invasion fighting a bloody war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the vanguard movement of the Eelam Tamils which spearheaded an armed resistance campaign for more than ten years to defend the Tamil people against state repression and terror. Apart from the incalculable damage done to Tamil life and property, the Indian military action has further complicated the complex problem and destroyed all hopes of an early settlement of the Issue.

What went wrong with the Accord? Why is that the pledges given to the Tamils by the Indian Prime Minister that the Accord would bring them full-regional autonomy with sufficient devolution of powers for self-rule could not be fulfilled? Why did the Government of India, which has been mediating over the issue for several years for a peaceful negotiated political settlement and was vehemently critical of Sri Lanka's attempt to resolve the problem by military means, launched a ruthless war in callous disregard to civilian life and property seriously violating all norms of human rights? What prompted India to resort to the extreme measure of armed confrontation against a popular liberation organisation to whom she has been providing sanctuary, moral and material assistance, whom she recognised as the dominant political movement of the Tamils? These are some of the pertinent questions raised

by those who are genuinely concerned about the present predicament of the people of Tamil Eelam.

The critics of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord would agree that one of the serious mistakes made by the Government of India was the extra-ordinary hurry and haste in which the Accord was signed without eliciting popular discussion and consent both from the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. This gave rise to suspicion, fear and opposition to the Accord among the wider sections of the popular masses in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government which has been mediating on the ethnic problem for years with painstaking tolerance and patience suddenly rushed through the Accord as a miraculous breakthrough to the Tamil issue without giving any credence to the wishes and aspirations of the people who are directly affected by the Agreement. Apart from the President and some of his cabinet colleagues the Accord stands opposed by prominent ministers of the ruling party including the Prime Minister, the main opposition parties and the powerful Buddhist sangha and the Sinhala extremist organisations. The Sinhalese fear that the Accord has infringed upon the sovereignty of the country. The Tamil community too is seriously disappointed since the Provincial council proposals envisaged in the Accord fall short of their political aspirations.

The Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on several occasions, has assured the Tamils that the Accord would bring them full regional autonomy short of an independent state. But in practice this has not taken place. The two enactments passed in Sri Lankan Parliament recently-the Provincial Councils Bill and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution - do not contain necessary provisions to fulfil the basic political demands of the Tamils. Firstly, the crucial question of merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single regional unit is not yet resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamils. There is no constitutional guarantee for the merger of these Tamil Provinces apart from the verbal assurance given by President Jayewardane. Secondly, the powers devolved to the Provincial councils are extremely limited. The Councils have not been given adequate powers on crucial subjects like Land, Agriculture, Fisheries, Education, Employment etc., which are reserved for the centre. Furthermore, the President and the Parliament are vested with extra-ordinary Powers over and above the legislative and executive authority of the Provincial councils. A Presidential proclamation or an ordinary legislation in Parliament could dissolve the provincial councils. Therefore, contrary to Indian Prime Minister's assurances, the devolution package granted to the Tamils is an empty shell devoid of any political authority. India too agrees that the provincial framework fails to meet Tamil aspirations but has expressed hope that Sri Lankan President would grant more concessions in the course of time. The Tamils do not have such hopes. They feel cheated and betrayed.

The Government of India has to be blamed for this sorry state of affairs. India, which took the active mediatory role on behalf of the Tamils should have pressurised Sr. Lanka and secured adequate constitutional guarantees for Tamil rights and sufficient powers of autonomy for Tamil

provinces. What disillusioned the Tamils was that India instead of persuading Jayewardene to carry-out his obligations and commitments in the Accord, launched a sudden, unexpected war against the LTTE to disarm the organisation by force. This hasty decision on the part of India further complicated the situation and contributed to the consolidation of Jayewardene's intransigence. The decision to launch a full-fledged war against the LTTE in the back-ground of a peace initiative - when the moral obligation on the part of India was to seek the smooth implementation of the Accord - was a grave and serious mistake. What prompted the Indian policy makers to make this controversial decision with its disastrous consequences still remains a mystery. It can only be attributed to the superficial and myopic vision of the Indian Leadership to a very complicated historical problem.

The arguments advanced by India that LTTE's reluctance to accept the Accord unconditionally and its refusal to surrender the arms are the factors that compelled India to resort to military action are unconvincing and untenable. These vague generalisations cannot justify the massive military onslaught with a heavy toll of civilian casualties against a war-torn population who fervently hoped that India would bring them peace and solace.

LTTE's stand on the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and on the issue of surrendering the arms have been explicitly stated in our several letters to the Indian Prime Minister and in our official statements and documents. The LTTE did not oppose the Accord nor it refused to surrender the arms. We have serious reservations on the Accord particularly on the provincial Council proposals set-out in the Agreement to resolve the ethnic problem. We are of the opinion that these proposals have serious limitations and fall short of Tamil aspirations. But we are aware that there are other aspects of the Accord that deal with India's strategic interests. Our organisation fully recognises India's pre-eminent role in South Asia and respects her geo-political sensitivities and strategic compulsions. The LTTE also supports India's policy of declaring the Indian ocean as a zone of peace and her opposition to the penetration of international forces of subversion in the region. Therefore we support the aspects of the Accord which deals with India's bilateral relations with Sri Lanka and her regional policies. In our letters to the Indian Prime Minister we pledged to co-operate with India in the implementation of the Accord if it promotes the interests and protects Tamil life. This is our position in so far as the Accord is concerned. We were under the impression that India fully appreciated our position. Though the LTTE was not a party to the Accord nor was it consulted in the framing of the Agreement, we pledged to co-operate with India with the objective of avoiding any conflict with Indian interests.

In so far as the arms issue is concerned the LTTE never refused to surrender its arms. During his lengthy discussions with the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in July last year, the LTTE leader Mr. V. Prabhakaran pledged to surrender the arms in stages following certain assurances given by the Indian leader. Accordingly the LTTE surrendered a substantial portion of its arms to the IPKF. The rest of the weapons were to be surrendered

once an Interim Government is formed with a majority role for the LTTE. The LTTE's pledge to hand over the remaining weapons and the LTTE's role in the proposed Interim Administration are clearly stated in a written Agreement entered between the Government of India and the LTTE on the 28th. Sept. 1987.

The crucial question that can be posed now is why did the Government of India choose to wage a disastrous war against the LTTE when our organisation pledged to co-operate with the implementation of the Accord and has been surrendering the arms according to modalities worked-out with India. Any rational thinking person will not accept India's contention that a war was necessary to disarm the LTTE and to implement the Accord. Everybody will agree that the war is counter-productive hence it brought heavy casualties on both sides, caused untold sufferings to ordinary citizens and obstructed the implementation of the Accord.

The war against the LTTE was unwarranted, unjust and unwise. By opting for such ruthless and highhanded action India fell a prey to the shrewd and cunning manipulations of Jayawardene's regime. Sri Lankan diplomacy from the inception was aimed at creating a conflict between India and LTTE. Sri Lanka manipulated the events in such a devious manner that India was finally caught in to that diplomatic trap and was compelled to do Sri Lanka's dirty job of liquidating the Tamil freedom fighters.

It should be noted that following the signing of the Accord, the Sri Lankan Government has neither carried out her obligations nor co-operated with India to implement it. On the contrary, Sri Lanka took certain measures that seriously violated the terms of the Accord.

Though a General Amnesty was proclaimed by the Sri Lankan president for political and other prisoners held in custody under the Prevention of terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws, Sri Lanka did not release all the political prisoners. Sri Lanka also failed to carry-out her obligations of withdrawing Emergency regulations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and disarming the Home Guards.

What angered the Tamils most was that Sri Lanka, immediately following the signing of the Accord, launched a massive programme of colonising the Tamil areas with Sinhalese settlers under the cover of rehabilitation and re-settlement. Thousands of new Sinhalese settlers were brought to Trincomalee, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya areas and settled in Tamil villages. These villages were deserted by Tamil peasants who were up-rooted from their traditional lands by racial violence and state terrorism. To further provoke the Tamils, Sri Lanka started opening up police stations in Tamil areas with Sinhala personnel. Alarmed over these developments we registered our protest with India but no action was taken.

One of the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister was the formation of an interim government with LTTE playing a dominant role. It was also assured to us that the problem of re-settlement and rehabilitation of Tamil refugees and the formation of a Tamil police force would be the responsibility of the Interim Administration. But neither Sri Lanka nor India took any concrete steps to form the Interim Government. There was a calculated delay

in this matter and Sri Lanka continued with her colonisation programme and started inducting a Sinhalese police administrative machinery in the North.

What was more disturbing at that time was the arrival of armed Tamil groups from South India who with the patronage of the IPKF, established bases in the North and East and started harrasing the LTTE as well as the public. We were rather shocked and surprised why the Government of India choose to arm these groups and despatched them to Tamil areas at a sensitive time when peace process was introduced and disarming of the LTTE was taking place. This is one of the reasons that led to our disenchantment with Indian policy on the Tamil issue.

Because of these negative developments, the LTTE launched a fast-unto-death campaign spearheaded by our political wing leader Mr. Thileepan seeking redress to our grievances. The campaign soon expanded into a mass non-violent movement with the active participation of the popular masses. At the initial stages the Indian Government ridiculed the non-violent campaign of the LTTE but soon realised that it was turning into a massive national up-rising with mounting anti-Indian feelings. The Indian High Commissioner Mr. Dixit rushed to Jaffna to listen to our grievances on the 9th day of the fasting when Thileepan was reaching the brink of death. Mr. Dixit offered vague assurances which failed to meet our demands. The fast continued and Thileepan died. It is after Thileepan's death and when the mass agitation took a serious turn into a national - out cry. Mr. Dixit came with proposals to set-up an interim administration. If the Government of India had acted without delay Thileepan's life would have been saved.

The proposed interim administration soon ran into serious difficulty when President Jayewardene announced the list of names contrary to the order of preference suggested by the LTTE. Sri Lanka demanded from us a list of names for the chief Administrator as well as the members of the council. The list was given in the order of preference giving larger representation to the people of the Eastern Province. Jayewardene deliberately changed names and rejected LTTE's nominees for the Eastern Province. This gave rise to a controversy and Jayewardene refused to appoint LTTE's nominee for the chief administrator. Finally, the proposed Interim Government was dropped. Sri Lanka Government deliberately sabotaged it and blamed the LTTE for its 'intransigence'. The Government of India supported Sri Lanka's stand. Once again, the Tamils were betrayed.

It was during this time, a tragic incident occurred with far reaching consequences which further added to the estrangement of relations between India and the LTTE. It was the incident in which two LTTE regional commanders and ten senior members were compelled to commit suicide in the custody of the IPKF. Though these LTTE leaders were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy on the coastal waters of Point Pedro, they were kept in the protective custody of the IPKF at Palaly camp. Sri Lanka demanded that these LTTE men should be taken to Colombo for 'interrogation'. But the Government of India gave us assurance they would be released soon. The arrested Tiger leaders had already warned both Sri Lanka and India that

they would swallow cyanide capsules and kill themselves rather than facing torture and possibly death in the hands of Sri Lankan security forces. We argued with the Government of India that the arrest of these LTTE leaders constitutes a serious violation of the Accord since LTTE men were given General Amnesty. We also insisted that the protection of the lives of our members was the responsibility of the IPKF which assumed the role of avoiding conflicts between Sri Lankan Security force and Tamil guerillas. We also warned India of a possible outburst of violence if LTTE men were massacred. Our plea to secure the release of our leaders was a minor concession we demanded from both India and Sri Lanka who have just entered into a major agreement to resolve the ethnic conflict. But Jayewardene was very obstinate. The Indian high commissioner Mr. Dixit, who held lengthy discussions with Sri Lankan President failed in his diplomatic endeavour. The result was a great tragedy. The massacre of twelve prominent LTTE men, who were great heroes of the Tamil liberation war, out-raged the Tamil sentiments. Pulendran, the regional commander of Trincomalee and Kumarappa, the former regional commander of Batticaloa, were highly respected leaders in the Eastern Province who spearheaded a courageous residence campaign against Sri Lankan security forces in defence of the people. The tragic circumstances in which they were killed angered the Tamil population and there was widespread violence and racial clashes in the Eastern Province which resulted in the death of several Sinhalese civilians. Ignoring the out-raged sentiments of an angry people and the provocative circumstances which led to the out-break of spontaneous mass violence, both Sri Lanka and India accused the Tigers of masterminding racial conflict. What followed was a top level conference in Colombo between India and Sri Lanka in which a series of tough measures, including military action against the LTTE were decided upon.

While the LTTE and the people of Tamil Eelam were mourning over their dead heroes the Government of India mobilised its peace keeping force for a bloody war against the Tamils. Neither the Tamil people nor the LTTE anticipated, even in their wildest dreams, a war with India. For the Tamils India was their protector, guardian and saviour and the presence of the Indian troops was looked upon as an instrument of peace and love. For the LTTE, India was their promoter, a friendly power who provided sanctuary and armed assistance, an ally who respected its role in the liberation war and recognised its political importance. Therefore, the Indian decision to launch a war against the LTTE shook the Tamil nation by surprise and anguish.

What horrified the Tamil people was the brutal and ruthless manner the Indian troops conducted the military campaign in callous disregard to human life and property. The war was a nightmare. To break-through the LTTE's stiff resistance and to capture Jaffna town, which took nearly two weeks, the Indian troops used all its available fire-power in a most ruthless manner in the densely populated areas of the peninsula. The most deadly weaponry that caused heavy casualties among the civilian population was the mortar and artillery shells. From all

the military camps mortar and artillery shells were rained on the people from every direction for 24 hours a day continuously for weeks. There was no escape. People were killed everywhere. The civilians who took shelter in temples, schools, and even refugee camps were not spared. Dead bodies were littered everywhere. The injured bled to death. Yet the Indian army kept on shelling irrespective of the mass killing of civilians. Bombers and helicopter gunships continued pounding civilian targets adding to the death and devastation. When the Indian troops advanced interior they brought havoc. Innocent civilians, including women and children were massacred in a most barbaric manner. Houses were destroyed, temples desecrated, and shops looted. The worst crime committed by the Indian troops was the rape of Tamil women. Hundreds of Tamil women were raped brutally and most of them were done to death after sexual violence. This brutality deeply wounded the sentiments of the people and the hate for the Indian army became widespread. The IPKF received the motto as the **Innocent People's Killing Force**. Among the most brutal massacres committed by the IPKF was the mass killing at the Jaffna General Hospital. The Indian troops stormed into the hospital and killed in cold blood over a hundred sick and injured people. Four doctors were senselessly slaughtered and several nurses raped and murdered. In this ruthless military campaign one thousand four hundred innocent Tamil civilians were killed and several thousands injured. Colossal damage was done to Tamil property.

The Indian Government's thesis that the LTTE fighter used women and children as human shields were baseless lies. The IPKF propaganda that old women were armed with pistols, children carried handgrenades and young girls hid their sub-machine guns under their skirts were nothing but fabricated tales concocted to justify the unacceptable rate of civilian casualties. The truth is that the Indian army intelligence miscalculated the LTTE's strength, fire-power and its fierce determination to resist. When pressurised by Delhi policy makers to do a quick job, the IPKF thrust in using maximum fire-power in total disregard to civilian casualties. Apart from the casualties inflicted, the IPKF brought extreme hardships to the civilian population. The electricity was cut-off purposely for more than two months, which plunged the entire Jaffna peninsula into darkness and paralysed all industrial works. Water supply too was cut-off. IPKF banned public and private transport putting a halt to food and medical supplies reaching the Peninsula from southern Sri Lanka. There was a ban on fishing. Such harsh measures drove the civilian population to the brink of the socio-economic life of the people. The other unpopular measure that brought immense suffering to the civilian population was the round the clock curfew imposed on the peninsula which lasted for more than two months. Even today, after three-and-a-half months of the declaration of war, dusk-to-dawn curfew continues.

The inhuman brutalities and other cruel crimes committed on our people by the Indian troops could not be brought to notice of the world community because of the total black-out of news by India. International media was prevented from entering the 'war' zone. The occasional press

notes released by the LTTE was branded as malicious distortion of truth. On the first day of the war itself the Jaffna local newspapers were forcefully silenced. The Indian troops stormed into these newspaper offices, arrested the Journalists and blasted the printing machinery with explosives. The Tamils were shocked beyond belief to see India, which claims to be the guardian of democratic liberties, had adopted this high-handed method to muzzle the local media which functioned as the only voice of our people. Having suppressed the local press and blocked the international media, the Government of India effectively utilised the state controlled media to put fabricated stories about the war and to malign the LTTE. We pleaded with India to send a team of observers from Amnesty International and international commission of Jurists to investigate the violations of human rights and extra Judicial killings but our request was turned down.

Today, after nine months of the signing of the Accord the war continues with its violence and destruction of life. The Indian claim that peace and normalcy are returning to Tamil areas is far from truth. The conditions of war prevails and human suffering continues. The IPKF and LTTE guerillas are engaged in violent confrontations. Cordon-off operations, house-to-house searches, search and destroy missions, mass identification parades, arrest, detention and torture of Tamil youth continues unabated by the IPKF. The deployment of several thousand troops has turned the Jaffna Peninsula into a massive military encampment. There are military sentry posts in every junction and main road, where vigorous check-in systems operate. There is no freedom of public mobility. The Tamil areas are placed under a rigid military administration. This situation cannot be categorised as normalcy.

The Government of India assumes that the time is ripe for the induction of a political process and polls in Tamil areas. But the Tamils feel that this artificial normalcy achieved by military occupation and domination is not the congenial atmosphere for democratic political practice.

The LTTE has been pleading with the Government of India, since the beginning of the war, to call-off the military offensive operation to declare a ceasefire, to initiate a dialogue, to bring about peace and normalcy. The LTTE asks for a status-quo-ante, the return of the Indian troops to pre-offensive position and the re-activation of the 28th September agreement which allows the formation of an interim Government. The Government of India has rejected out-right LTTE's suggestions and demands total surrender and unconditional acceptance of the Accord.

The Indian position is unfair, unjust and undemocratic. This intransigent attitude will prolong the conflict and perpetuate the agony of our people.

It is the Tamil people who have the liberty to decide their own political destiny. The Government of India has no right to super-impose a political framework which the Tamil opinion feels totally inadequate and falls short of their legitimate political aspirations. But if the Government of India attempts to do so it will amount to a grave injustice done to our people.

**POLITICAL COMMITTEE
LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM**



'PEACE CAN'T BE BOUGHT BY SUPPRESSION'

LETTER

Says People's Forum

The PEOPLE'S FORUM of Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka, a body established for the exchange of views and moulding enlightened public opinion, with its office at 21/4, Stanley Road, Jaffna, has made a strong plea to the Indian Prime Minister to desist from the course hitherto followed by his government and to 'create the necessary atmosphere for the understanding and acceptance of the Accord by the aggrieved Tamil people'.

In its third letter addressed to the Prime Minister, dated 15 February 1988, the Hon. Secretary of the Forum, Mr. T.S. Kumaresan, has said:

'During the vicious Vadamarachchi onslaught by Sinhala armed forces, and before that during the past years of violence and atrocities perpetrated on the Tamil people by the Sri Lanka government, they had in your Excellency and the people of India someone to whom they could complain, and through you to the world for redress and justice. Today they have nobody, not even the IPKF that came with the avowed commitment to protect and safeguard them, but has turned against them suddenly transforming itself into an army of aggression. Can the victims complain to the wrong-doer and his minions? The Sinhala chauvinist leaders and other elements opposed to the peace accord are gloating at the misery of the Tamil people. It is a great pity that the arrival of the IPKF was greeted with happiness and relief by an overwhelming section of the Tamil people in the Sinhala provinces. Their hopes and aspirations have been shattered. Their unbearable experience even drove them to think whether the IPKF offensive was the final phase of the 'Operation Liberation' planned by the Sri Lanka government and against which India voiced her protest vehemently and openly indicating that she had reached her limits of patience.

'One can understand the motive of the Sinhala government — genocide of the Tamil people — but not that of the IPKF or India whose avowed commitment was all along for a negotiated political settlement to meet the aspira-

tions of the Tamil people and against the imposition of a military solution in which the tottering fascist regime of President Jayewardene believed. In the IPKF military offensive thousands of houses had been completely destroyed and razed to the ground; temples, churches, schools, hospitals, public institutions, and even the Jaffna University and refugee camps were not exempted. In the panic and fear which ensued a great many civilians (almost the entire population of Jaffna) left their abodes and kept wandering to places of safety, even to places like Colombo. This exodus is continuing. This is the chimera of freedom that the Tamil people in this country are chasing after. Your Excellency's government in dealing with the phantom of violence unleashed in Punjab has not resorted to killing of innocent civilians and destroying their properties.

'In the result, quite apart from the loss of lives and property, many people have been forced to live in conditions of abject squalor and poverty, having lost their means of livelihood. Education, the priceless possession which the Tamil people have always held dear to them, suffered a serious setback during this period. For the last four to five months children had been forcibly kept out of schools. Even now many children refrain from attending their schools in fear. The Courts, government offices and other public institutions remain closed for the last five months. Water and electricity were cut and the entire peninsula was thrust into total darkness. All these only show that the military operation too has failed to meet with the success that was intended. Thus, the vulnerability of the Accord is manifesting itself in all spheres of its implementation. Whether any benefit can flow from this Accord to the Tamil people remains a matter of doubt . . .

'The assumption that the present proposals for a Provincial Council set-up in Sri Lanka is parallel to the State set-up in India is most misleading. The efficacy of the Accord depends entirely on the terms of the solution envisaged


to meet the crucial and fundamental issues of the struggle of the Tamil people. Unless such solution is based on real autonomy to a single Tamil region comprising the North and East with powers on matters like law and order, the police, land and land settlement and other features of autonomy it could prove illusory, and the aggrieved Tamil people could feel that their tremendous sacrifice and suffering have been in vain. Their's is a long tale of woe littered with promises, duplicity and deceit followed by violence and genocide. Nationalism feeds on oppression.

'The picture that has emerged calls for a reappraisal of values. Should the Indian government continue with its military operation causing further havoc and disaster to the common people, or should a new approach be made towards rectification of errors already committed? This is the question looming large . . .

'To the Tamil people the events of the last three of four months were full of nightmarish experiences. Never in the wildest dreams would the Tamil people have come by the phenomenon that their Indian saviours turning to be their killers or destroyers. The psychological impact has been tremendous; they never before felt such an intense sense of betrayal. Their tales of woe and suffering are no doubt bound to debilitate the image of India in the eyes of the world. The wounds inflicted may be healed in the passage of time, but the scars will remain as important landmarks in their recorded history. Time has still not run out for doing what should be done to alleviate the sufferings of the Tamil people. This is the challenge facing the Indian government today. How the Government of India will react to meet this challenge, only the future will unfold.

'We conclude with the following passage from the speech made by Your Excellency's mother, the late Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Indian Students' Association of Washington in Washington on November 5, 1971:

'We all know through history that men have been killed, men have been wounded, crushed and suppressed, but the spirit of man and the ideas of freedom, of human dignity, have never been crushed in the history of man. We have been through this in India and every country which fought for freedom has been through it. It is this spirit of man which has helped man to progress and to rise to new heights. India certainly cannot be a party to the suppression of this spirit of freedom and human dignity. Nor do we believe that peace can be bought by such suppression. Perhaps you can delay freedom but you cannot prevent it.'





அனாதையாய் என் அம்மா எங்கிருக்கிறாள்?
காற்றே, நீ தான் அறிவாய், சொல்
எல்லாவற்றையும் இழந்து என் தங்கை
எந்த முகாமில் நடைப்பிணமாய்த் திரிகிறாள்?
வதைக்கடத்தின் இருட்டறையில் அண்ணனின்
கதறலைக் கேட்டாயோ நீ?
விடும் வேலையும் சைக்கிளும் எரிய,
பூவரசம்பூ கருகக் கண்டிருந்தாயோ?
உறைந்த ரத்தத்திற்கும் கவிந்த புகைக்கும்
எழுந்த ஓலத்திற்கும் நீயே சாட்சி.
இரும்புக் கழுதுகள் வட்டமிடும் வானம்
நெருப்பில் நடக்கிறது என் காலம்.
துயரத்தின் கழலில் நீயும் நானும்
புயலாகும் நேரம் வருகிறது.







உறுமியே செல்லும் ராணுவ உந்துகளின்
உள்ளிருந்து இயங்கும் துவக்குகளாலே
எந்தநேரமும் இவர்தலை சிதறலாம்
எந்தச் சமயமும் எம்தலை உருளும்

இப்போதெல்லாம்
எமது நகரத்து வீதிகள்
காவற் கருவிப் பேய்களுக்கென்றே
எழுதப் பட்டதாய்ப் போனதே போனும்.
'எவரையும் கட்டலாம் விசாரணையின்றியே
எரிக்கலாம் அன்றிப் புதைக்கலாம்' என்று
இயற்றப்பட்ட புதிய விதிகளால்
குருதியில் தோயும் நிகழ்வுகள் இங்கே.
இருளுக்கும் இருப்புலையர்க்கும் என்றே
விடப்பட்டுப் போன எங்கள் வீதிகளில்
வெளிப்படுவோரெல்லாம்
கடப்படலாம் தெருநாய்களைப்போல.
எக்கணமேனும் எக்கணமேனும்
எமக்கிது நிகழலாம்.



IT HAPPENED IN JAFFNA REPORT

**3000 CIVILIANS FORCED TO
SQUAT UNDER SCORCHING
SUN FOR NINE HOURS**

We carry below a translation of a special report published in the JUNIOR VIKATAN, a popular Tamil-language weekly of Madras in its issue of 24 February.

The question whether the military offensive ordered against the Liberation Tigers was justified or not may be left aside for the moment as a debatable issue. There could be pros and cons. Okay, let us even grant for the sake of argument that there were good reasons that motivated the action. But how in the name of humanity could anyone condone or justify the high-handed and brutal way in which the ordinary citizens of Jaffna were treated? asked a prominent newspaperman speaking to us in Madras. He had just come from Sri Lanka.

He continued: 'Why did Indian newspapers who prattle time and again about freedom and democracy in their own country maintain a monumental silence and callous indifference when in the stupid hope of disarming the Liberation Tigers in a day or two, the Indian forces went about killing innocent peaceful citizens and treating them as a herd of cattle?'

'Imagine the plight of the people. Not knowing when a shell might burst, and take away whose life, at what place, the dazed citizens of Jaffna were running helter-skelter in search of shelter, and having found it, hiding in fear wondering whether it would be safe enough? The Liberation Tigers were living mingled with the people it was being shouted. So what? Where else could they live? Does that mean that the entire population has to be put to sword and fire because the Indian Army does not understand the concept of a "degree of war"?'.

'There was this incident in the "Mudassakkadai" junction (a commercial and business area) in the Jaffna town,' he said. 'A Liberation Tiger had taken a pot-shot at an Indian jawan and killed him. Within a short time a whole battalion of Indian soldiers moved into the area, cordoned off all the environs, marched every man, woman and child found in the area and ordered them to squat on the tarred roads in the hot sun. This began around 9 a.m. and very soon they had lined up nearly 3000 persons. There was absolutely no consideration whether they were old folk, elderly men or women or the sick or the young. Until about 6 p.m. they were kept there, without food, without

drinking water, with not even the facility to ease themselves, until all shops and roads and lanes and nooks and corners were flushed in search of the lone Tiger guerrilla.

'Any young Tamil, irrespective of who he was, and without any questions being asked, was promptly assaulted with rifle butts. In some instances even elderly people were shabbily man-handled.

'One group of soldiers who entered the office of the Tamil daily newspaper, the EELANADU, pushed and dragged all the members of the staff to the road outside. Interestingly, the editor in charge, Mr. Perumal is a person of recent Indian origin from the plantations and one who was closely associated with the elderly and respected one-time editor Mr. Haran (He was an Indian national who passed away later in India — Ed.) Mr Perumal himself was dragged out and when he tried to explain, he was beaten with a belt and a piece of wire.

'Next, Indian soldiers stormed into the well-known Tamil Hindu educational institution, the Vaidheeswara Vidyalayam, also in the same area, and pulled out both the men and women teachers and roughed them up in the presence of their own students. Some of them suffered face injuries as a result of being pushed and hit by rifle butts.

'Humiliated as they were by being forced to sit on the public road like convicted criminals, the suffering people were not even allowed to leave the place to ease themselves, despite several pleas.

'Repeatedly the soldiers went up to the group of squatting people and threatened them: "You should know the fellow who killed our soldier. It could not have happened without someone here knowing the identity of the person. Tell us, tell us ... or else ...", they kept shouting at them.

'Unable to endure the tormenting any longer, an elderly citizen spoke up: "Sirs, we come to the town not to observe what is happening here. We come here on business, urgent business for our living, and once we finish it, we get out of this problematical place as fast as we came in. We don't like to remain here one moment longer than is necessary. We do not have the time (because of the daily evening curfew) nor the mind nor the authority to look with suspicion at everyone else who is here. As for you, you have sentry points here every 50 yards. You should be having at least 100 jawans in this area guarding, watching, questioning, examining all of us. Are you fair in asking us this question that should properly be

addressed to your own sentries?"

'The elderly man who spoke up, paid the price for it. He was slapped and kicked.

'Only vehicles, whether buses or cars or two-wheelers, which have been issued IPKF passes could carry people. Even if you have a woman with childbirth pains to be rushed to hospital you have to find a vehicle with a pass. Getting a pass is not that easy anyway. It would be like boring into a mountain to catch a mouse. Many people who have waited vainly in queues for these passes decide that it would be easier to walk the miles.

'On the appeal made by the Liberation Tigers, or maybe because of their threats, government officers have refused to attend offices. As a result essential government business is paralysed. Only the Jaffna General hospital is functioning somewhat.

'Out of the Jaffna newspapers, only the "Eelanadu" has been given permission to come out, since January 15, and that too under a specific condition; that no news relating to happenings in Jaffna could be published without IPKF clearance. The publishers were told that the imposition of this condition itself should not be published. (Since then, the publication had again ceased with the blowing up of the Eelanadu office building by a Tamil militant group on February 29 — Ed.TT).

'On top of all these, the harassment that Tamils undergo at the hands of some supposed Tamil militant group of youths on the Jaffna-Colombo road, at a spot barely 50-100 yards from the IPKF and Sri Lanka army checkpoints has been causing untold misery. When they identify merchants and business people they are promptly abducted from the place and ransom demands are made; apart from this, all travellers are questioned and treated with disrespect. The funny thing is that such high-handed behaviour, extortion and robbery take place in such close proximity to the IPKF camps. One does not know whether a part of this loot goes into the hands of the IPKF personnel. Jaffna businessman V.K.Rajaratnam who deals in radios, Television sets, Tape recorders etc. was recently identified by these youths and a ransom demand of Rs.3 lakhs was made in return for his freedom. Only after a sizeable portion of the ransom money was paid was he released.

'The Jaffna residents are convinced in their own minds that any attempts to hold elections without arriving at a political settlement with the Liberation Tigers would only result in a volcanic eruption of violence in Jaffna. Will the Government of India, and its officials grasp this reality?

AFFIDAVIT

Mr. KATHIRIPPILLAI SINNATHAMBY (52),
Mason, Vannichchi Amman Kovilady, Valvetty, Valvettiturai.

I was at home on Wednesday, 1st February, 1989. At about 9.30 a.m. some Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers entered my house and dragged me out. I was taken to a spot near the Vannichchi Amman temple. I was hit all over my body by the soldiers with the fists and kicked on my back with their feet which were wearing boots. I was then pushed to the ground and assaulted on the body, hands and legs with wooden rods. It was alleged that the telephone wire of the IPKF had been cut near my house and therefore the people of the area were punished. I suffered the following injuries:

1. Multiple contusions all over.
2. Swelling of right wrist.
3. Swelling of right knee.

Subsequently it was found that a bone in my right wrist was fractured and I am still taking treatment to heal the wound. Consequently, I am unable to do any work and earn a living for more than 1 1/2 months. I request that some financial assistance be given to me.



SINNATHURAI RASANAYAGAM (47),
Painter, Nedungkanni, Valvetty, Valvettiturai.

I was at home on Wednesday, 1st February 1989. At about 9.30 a.m. some Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers entered my house, got hold of my shirt and dragged me out of my house. I was taken to a spot near the Vannichchi Amman temple. I was pushed down and then assaulted by about a dozen soldiers. At the same place, there were about 25 persons who were also assaulted by the soldiers. It was alleged that the telephone wire of the IPKF was cut near my house and the people of the area were punished. I suffered bleeding injuries. I was treated for the following injuries:

1. Swelling and tenderness of left arms.
2. Abrasion on right side forehead.
3. Contusion on back.



MRS. SINNIAH SELLAMMAH, Mannanddy, Alvai West, Alvai
I am the wife of late Mr. Konammalai Sinnaba.

During the army operation (IPKF) at Jaffna area my husband who was a farmer went to buy some parts for the water pump was sustained shell blast injury and died by the result of shock and hemorrhage caused by blasting of shell, on 2.2.88.

I took charge of the body of husband and cremated at Thikam cemetery. My husband was the sole breadwinner of the family of myself and two daughters and two sons.

P. G. A. SELLAMMAH



MRS. THEVARATNAM DANIEL NEE GNAMA-RAGASAM born
1948-08-29, St James Lane, Illavalai, Sri Lanka.

I am the wife of Vaithy Daniel (49) who was arrested by the IPKF men on 5.2.88 and whose dead body was found the next day.

My said husband was working as a Packer in the Packing Section of the Kankesanthurai Cement Factory of the Sri Lanka Cement Corporation since 1969.

On 5.2.88 he left home for work as usual at 9 a.m.

At about 1.30 p.m. the same day my brother-in-law, Vaithy Massilamany, a native physician came and told me that he had been informed by certain people that my husband had been arrested by the IPKF.

My said brother-in-law and I went to meet Rev Fr Patrick, the priest in charge of St James Parish and told him of the arrest of my husband.

The priest advised me to go to the IPKF camp at Tellipallai and appeal to the Commander there.

I sent my brother-in-law Vaithy Massilamany to the IPKF Camp at Tellipallai that evening.

At the camp my brother-in-law met an officer of the IPKF who gave his designation and name as Major Shantha.

The said officer had told my brother-in-law that my husband would be released the next morning after interrogation.

The next morning my brother-in-law came and told me that he received information that my husband's body was found tied to a lamp post and had gun shot injuries.

I arranged for the body to be removed and the body was buried the same evening.

My husband was in receipt of a salary of Rs 1200/- per month working as a Packer at the Cement Factory.

The dependants are three persons



பி. கெ. வ. ரா. காமாட்சி

SUBRAMANIAM THURAI SINGAM, (50)
Palliyawatte, Valvetty, Valvettiturai.

I am a mason by profession. On Monday, 6.2.89 I was returning from Kamparmalai along with a co-worker at about 6.30 p.m. Just then some IPKF soldiers were coming from the opposite direction. They asked us from where we were coming. We told them that we were masons and that we were returning after work. We showed them our equipment. Without any reason they assaulted us severely. I was pushed to the ground and the soldiers trampled and kicked me with their boots. I was assaulted with wooden rods while standing and also while fallen on the ground. I lost a tooth in the assault. I also sustained the following injuries :

1. Tenderness over lower abdomen.
2. Difficulty in walking.

3. Multiple contusions all over the body.

I was warded in the Valvettiturai Government Hospital for 5 days - B.H.T. No. 342/56. I am still taking out door treatment. As the injuries sustained by me have still not healed, I am unable to do any manual work and consequently I am unable to earn a living and look after my family.



VELAN RASAN (35) Pathanai, Alaveddi.

I have been living with my wife, children and my father "Thampan Velan"

On 9.2.88, in the evening, my father, "Thampan Velan" was shot dead during the shelling and firing by the IPKF in the course of their searching and dis-arming operations.

His body was brought home and, in turn, removed to the Kernipiddy Crematorium at Alaveddi and was cremated there after a short ceremony of last rites.

Under the prevailing situations, there was no possibility of holding an inquest in to the death of my father or to conduct a post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased.



M. GANNAMAH, Karaveddi North, Karaveddi.

I am the husband of the late Niclean Marian or Selathurai.

During the army Operation at Vadamarachchi on 9.2.88 my husband died by the result of shell attack.

I who have made the cremation at the Keripalli. cemetery.

My husband was the bread winner of the family.



NIRMALADEVY D/O SINNATHURAI BALASINGAM No. 40/4, Ramanathan Road, Jaffna

I am the daughter of late Balasingam Pushpamalar who died under tragic circumstances on 10.2.88.

As there was wide-spread tension with shell attacks etc., all around the place, my late beloved mother and the other members of the family left our home and on the way, an artillery shell fell and one of the splinters struck my mother Pushpamalar, injuring her very seriously, on 14.2.87.

Subsequently on 10.2.88 my beloved mother died owing to the injuries sustained by her.

My late beloved mother, Pushpamalar was providing for the family by working as a dress-maker and earned about Rs 2,000/- per month.

My younger sister, younger brother and I were depending on the earnings of our beloved mother.

Owing to her fatal death we the three children of her are undergoing immense distress for our living now.

We have no other source of living and the three of us are students.



LANKATHEVY W/O, THARMALINGHAM, Moththenry, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

I am the wife on late Vyeramuthu Tharmalingham.

During the army operation of the IPKF at Yakkarai area my husband was shot by the army at Karaveddy West on 10th February, 1988, and died at the spot.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of my family of myself two sons age 14, 12 and a daughter in the age of 9 years.

I am Pregnant of seven months and have no income to my family.



MRS. SARASWATHY RAJAKULENDRAN (35) Mathoni, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

The deceased Sinnadhurai Rajakulendran (43) is my husband. He was a Labourer.

Our house is situated close to the Yakkarai IPKF camp.

On the 12th of February 1988 my husband who was at home received gun shot injuries when the IPKF opened fire from the camp after certain incidents.

My husband died on the spot.

The dead body of my husband was cremated at Sonappu cemetery on 12.2.88 evening.

My husband leaves behind myself and a daughter Sumithra aged 3 years. I am also expecting my second child in September.

My husband was able to earn about Rs. 40/- per day when work was available.

My child and I have now been deprived of the maintenance and support given by my husband who was the sole breadwinner of the family.



Mrs. RAJEEKA BALENDRARAJAH (18) Thaneerthavlyu, Kadduvan, Tellipalai.

On 13.02.88 my husband who was in vegetable business left home at about 8.00 a.m. on his push cycle for the purchase of vegetables from farms in Erialai.

On the day (13.02.88) the Indian Army was conducting searches in Erialai for the approaches of terrorists in the area.

At about 12.30 p.m. while my husband was on his way back home some youths ran along the road in seeing the Indian Forces in ambush.

Indian troops opened fire at the youths who were running when my husband was caught up in the range and was hit by bullets.

His body was taken home at about 6.00 p.m. in the evening when the forces had withdrawn from the area.

He dropped dead on the kerb of the road while the bicycle fell on the main road.

His body was taken home at about 6.00 p.m. in the evening when the forces had withdrawn from the area.

The funeral took place on the following day and his body was cremated at about 11.00 a.m. in the crematorium at Erialai East.

I find it extremely difficult in bringing up my 6 months old baby as I haven't the means for the purchase of milk foods apart from my own survival.

I do not own a house or lands and I live in a rented house. Besides I do not have any financial resources. to pull back upon.



JACOB THAVATHAS RITAMMAH (38) widow, 19/2, 2nd Cross Street, Passayoor, Jaffna.

The deceased Jacob Thevathas alias Mohan aged 40 years was my husband.

He was a fisherman.

On 14.2.88 at about 11.00 a.m. my late husband left home to go to fishing.

He was accompanied by ten others in an out board motor powered boat.

He did not return home that evening and I thought that he will return home as the following day due to the curfew which was imposed from 7 p.m.

On 15.2.88 three of those who had gone along with my husband came home and informed me that my husband died on the previous day as a result of bombing by the plane near Iranathievu.

His body was not brought home.

I came to know it was recovered after five days and was buried at Valapadu.

I have five children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support received from my husband.

செ. நிதிமுகலி

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Rev. Fr. VEERAVAGU NATHANIEL THARMAKULASINGAM, (47) Jaffna Road, Udupiddy.

I am a Priest. On Wednesday, 15.2.89, I was staying in my house at the above address. My two brothers, two sisters and two nephews were also staying with me on this day. We were all confined to the house the whole day, which was the Parliamentary elections day. None of us went out to exercise our franchise. At about 5.15 p.m. that day, after the closing of polling, ballot boxes were to be taken along that road to Jaffna. IPKF soldiers were stationed along the road for a distance of about 500 metres from Udupiddy junction. Some soldiers were seen going westwards from Udupiddy junction along the rear compounds of the houses. They were making their way cutting the fences and scaling the walls. One of the soldiers while going through the rear compound of my house all of a sudden started shooting at random.

Just then some soldiers entered the house from both the rear and front.

Frightened, most of us stood in the corners of the house. But, my brother Balasingam was standing near the door frame carrying his young son in his arms. One of the soldiers who entered the house went near him and told him, "you LTTE, I will shoot you". My two sisters wept and begged the soldier with folded hand telling, "he is our brother, do not do anything to us". But the soldier fired at him. Fortunately the bullet went past his head brushing it but slightly injuring his young son whom he was carrying in his arms. He fell down with his son. Then the soldier fired at my two sisters. Both fell down with abdomen injuries. My nephew whom my pregnant sister was carrying was injured in his right thigh. My brother Kanagasasingam went near my two fallen sisters and found them dead. He then went towards the soldiers weeping and told them, "you have done this injustice without any provocation. You could have committed these murders if you had recovered any weapons here or if Tigers were found here or if Tigers had done something against you". The soldiers then picked the spent bullet casings and left the place. I took my nephew who was injured in the right thigh to the IPKF camp at Udupiddy junction where he was treated in their hospital post and given some medicines. While I was there, an officer told me to give him a signed written statement to the effect that the Tigers killed my two sisters. I told him, "I am not such a fool. Your IPKF only committed these murders. The Tigers never came to my house. I will never give a distorted version" and walked out of the camp with my nephew.

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SATHASIVAM YOGAMMAH (55) 151/J, Santhanamatha Church, Colombogam Road, Colombogam.

The deceased Kanthiah Sathasivam, aged 37 years was my son.

My son was employed as a lorry driver.

On 19.2.88 at about 11 a.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Paranthan while he was going to Kilinochi to unload some cement.

On hearing the news I rushed to Kilinochi Hospital when his body was taken by the army.

On 21.2.88 we brought his body home.

His body was cremated on the same day at Thundi cemetery Colombogam.

I have an unmarried daughter S. Parameswary aged 24 years at home besides my husband.

It was my late son who supported my family.

After his demise we are undergoing untold hardships.

ச. சுவாமி

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SUBRAMANIAM ANJAMMAALM Andavallavu, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

My husband was a coolie who helps the farmers in their farms.

On 24.2.1988 my husband Mr Markandu Subramaniam when he was coming back from the fields at Karathivu he was shot by the IPKF Armed Forces of Yakkari and died at the spot.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of my family of myself one daughter of age 13, and a son age 09.

சி. ச. சுவாமி

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MANIKAVALLI VELAYUTHAM (51) Ganavairavar Kovilady, Pathameni Atchuvally.

The deceased Velayutham Ravikanthan, aged 21 years was my son.

He was an advance level student and used to assist my eldest son who was a farmer.

On 25.2.88 at about 10 a.m. my son left home in his bicycle.

At about 2 p.m. army arrived at our area and began a cordon and search operation.

At about 6 p.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army near Thoppu cemetery.

On hearing the news I rushed to the scene of incident and found his body which bore a gaping wound on the right shoulder.

His body was cremated on 26.2.88 at Thoppu cemetery Navakiri.

My eldest son was also shot and killed by the army twelve days before the latter incident in which I lost my youngest son.

We are undergoing untold mental agony due to these double tragedies.

I have two daughters.

My eldest daughter was rendered a cripple after being affected by Polio while she was a child.

My husband is an invalid.

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Mrs. MANUEL VICTORIA (54) Vaalkaipaddankandal, Murunkan in Mannar District.

I have been living at the above village with my paralysed husband and four children.

My oldest daughter 39 year old is disabled as she is lamo.

It was my son Sobamalai Nicholas aged 25 years, a cultivator by profession, who was providing for the entire family.

On 10.01.1988 as usual he went out to the paddyfield to keep watch over the crops from being damaged by wild animals and while he was there, he was shot dead by the security forces who had gone there on a combing out operation.



RATNASINGHAM POOMANI (47) 139, Temple Road, Nallur.

The deceased Thambiyah Nadarajah, aged 39 years a bachelor was my brother.

He was a casual labourer.

I came to know on 2.2.88 that my brother was accidentally shot and killed by the army on 11.1.88 near the Kombayan Manal cemetery while he was on his way to Anaikoddai.

I also came to know that his body was cremated by some persons at the spot when he was killed.

Gramasevaka's letter is also attached herewith.

My late brother used to contribute to our family as my husband died during a tragic accident few years ago.

I have two daughters.

செ. யு. சி. சி.



ANBURAJAH GNANARANJITHAM (27) Indu Ilaijar Veethy, Avarangal, Puthur.

I am the bereaved wife of Sellar Anburajah, aged 34 years who died on 14.1.1988.

He was working as a Video Photographer.

On 14.1.88 at about 9 a.m. my husband left home in his bicycle for Neervely on an assignment.

At about 2 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Sirupiddy West, Neervely.

His body was brought home by the army and handed over to me.

The cremation took place at Karathadi Avarangal.

I have three children.

After my husband's unexpected death we do not have any other income or support.

We are undergoing untold hardship at present.



அ. க. ரமணி

GANESHALINGAM DHARSHIKA (20) C/o P. Rasiah, Kalasalai Veethy, Thirunelveli.

The deceased Thambiyah Ganeshalingam, aged 30 years was my husband.

He was employed as a driver.

We were residing at Tellipalai when the incident occurred.

On 19.1.88 at about 6 a.m. my husband was standing outside our gate.

Then I heard sounds of gunfire coming from the direction of the road.

I went outside and found my husband's lifeless body near the gate.
He had two head wounds.

I also saw an army patrol passing along the road.

At the time there was a 48 hours curfew imposed in our area.

His body was cremated at the Tellipalai cemetery on the same day.

I have an infant son named Premadasa, aged 9 months.

My child and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

I do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

க. சி. சி. சி.



Mrs. PREMALADEVI RATNANANDAN (31) Anivilunthan off Palaly Road, Thirunelveli.

The deceased Miss Velayuthapillai Nirmaladevi, aged 33 years was my sister.

She was residing at 30, Sivan Pannai Road, Koddadi at the time of her death.

Both our parents were killed on 7.1.87 when their house was shelled by the army.

ON 26.1.88 I was informed that my sister died due to drowning on the night of 24.1.88.

I came to know that some informed men entered her house during the night and she ran and fell into the well and drowned.

I immediately rushed to her house and found her body floating in the well.

On the same day her body was removed from the well and postmortem was held at the General Hospital Jaffna.

Her body was cremated at Vilundi Cemetery on 26.1.88

P. Ratnanandan



THAMOTHARAMPILLAI ACHCHIPILLAI (51) Palaly, Vasavilan.

The deceased person Sinnappu Thamotharampillai (59) was my husband. He was a retired Hospital Attendant.

On 30.1.88 at about 8.00 a.m. my husband left home saying that he is going to the Tellipalai Rural Bank to withdraw his pension.

At about 1.30 p.m. I was informed that my husband was knocked down by an army vehicle near the Myliddy Ice Mill while on his way back from the Bank.

Immediately I went to the Palaly Army Camp where I was allowed to see my husband who was admitted in the Army Hospital unit.

He had sustained multiple injuries after being knocked down by an army truck.

At about 5.00 p.m. I accompanied my husband to the Tellipalai Hospital in an army vehicle.

On 31.1.88 morning my husband was taken to the Jaffna General Hospital in an ambulance.

He succumbed to his injuries on 3.2.88 at about 8.00 a.m.

His body was cremated at Palaly cemetery on 5.2.88.

I have two sons.

தா. சி. சி. சி. சி.



என்னிடம்
 ஒரு துண்டுப் பிரகரத்தைப் போல்
 நம்பிக்கையும் முடிவும் சொல்லக்கூடிய
 வார்த்தை இல்லை.
 இரவு,
 இரவினால் அதிகாரமிடப்பட்ட பகல்
 நாளை காலையில்
 ரூபன் உதிக்குமா என்பதில் கூட
 சந்தேகம் கொண்டுள்ள என்னிடம்
 கனவுகள்
 தம் அர்த்தத்தை இழந்தவைதான்
 இந்தச் சமூகத்தின் தொப்புள் கொடிக்கு
 துப்பாக்கி நீட்டப்படும்போது
 ஒரு மெல்லிய பூ துனியில்
 உட்காரக் கூடிய
 வண்ணத்துப் பூச்சியின் கனவு
 எனக்கு சம்பந்தமற்ற
 ஒரு சம்பவிப்பு மட்டுமே
 நான் மனிதனாய் வாழும் முயற்சியில்
 பூக்களை மரத்துடன் விட்டுவிட விரும்புகிறேன்
 எனக்கு பகலால் உருவமைக்கப்பட்ட அழகிய
 இரவே
 கனவாய் இருக்கிறது.
 — சி. சிவரமணி



CONFRONTATION

1

Some 3,000 Indian soldiers in Batticaloa district were being reinforced with troops from Trincomalee district to deal with increasing rebel resistance in the area, officials here said.

Reuter adds: Indian troops detained 134 Tamil separatists in a massive weekend operation in Sri Lanka's northern Jaffna peninsula, security sources said today.

13 soldiers injured: Thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers were wounded, two of them seriously, when Tamil militants blasted their vehicles with a landmine at Moneky bridge on the Trincomalee-Habarana road in the East today, official sources said.

Meanwhile, the IPKF shot dead a member of the LTTE in Jaffna yesterday and seized 80 grenades and some machine guns, the sources said.

A Sri Lankan Army Truck with soldiers was destroyed by mine attacks by LTTE on Kandy road in Trincomalee. All soldiers in the truck were killed.

2

COLOMBO, Feb. 2. (PTI) — The Indian Peace Keeping Force and Sri Lankan police repulsed a four-hour extensive mortar attack by LTTE cadres in Eastern Batticaloa district late last night causing considerable casualties among the militants, official sources said here today.

A police station building was damaged but there were no casualties among the Sri Lankan police or the IPKF.

Police said the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam might have suffered "considerable casualties" but did not give any specific figure as the bodies of those killed or wounded were carried away by the rebels in the jungles nearby under the cover of darkness.

The rebels, who attacked the police station with mortars and other automatic weapons, were forced to beat a retreat shortly after midnight, the sources said.

COLOMBO, Feb. 2. (PTI) — At least three members of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) were killed in a major confrontation yesterday with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in eastern Batticaloa district, the English daily *Island* reported here today.

Quoting security sources, the paper said six members of the EPRLF were abducted by the LTTE during the confrontation.

The two Tamil militant groups have

fought many fratricidal battles in both north and east Sri Lanka, and on almost every occasion, the LTTE has inflicted heavy casualties on the EPRLF.

The island said that several EPRLF members had sought protection in Indian Peace Keeping Force camps in Batticaloa.

A landmine attack was carried out by LTTE in Kumpirupiti on IPKF; casualties were not known.

In poratheevu village at Mattakalpu dt. — IPKF personnel who came in a helicopter were killed by LTTE attack.

The IPKF rounded up the village Pulipainthakal, burnt down more than 60 huts, took around 200 innocents to their camp.

3

COLOMBO, Feb. 3.

An Indian soldier and three Tamil militants were killed in separate incidents since last night in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces, according to official sources here today.

An Indian soldier was killed and two others were wounded when an IPKF foot patrol was caught in a "terrorist Claymore mine blast" at Velapanmalai yesterday in Eastern Trincomalee district, the sources said. An LTTE member was killed during an encounter with the IPKF at Pungudutivu in Jaffna Peninsula yesterday.

After the encounter, the IPKF seized some ammunition rounds, Claymore mines, two AK 47 rifles and one 9 mm pistol from Tavadi, Telipillai and Pungudutivu areas.

In another incident at Rugamkulam in Eastern Batticaloa, Indian troops attacked a terrorist hideout and killed a fleeing Tamil rebel identified as "Johnny". One militant committed suicide during the operation, the sources said.

4

In Mannar Erukalampitti 5 IPKF men lost their lives in a confrontation with LTTE and in Vilankulam 2 more IPKF men were killed.

5

COLOMBO, Feb. 5. (UNI) — At least 19 people, including one Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan and 13 militants were killed in continuing IPKF operations to disarm the Tamil militants and inter-group clashes between two rival militant groups in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern provinces during the last 24 hours, official reports said today.

The reports also indicated stepped-up operations by the IPKF in the eastern Batticaloa district against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with the arrival of additional troops during the past few days.

With the IPKF mounting pressure on the LTTE in the district, the group retaliated today by killing a police

AUSTRALIAN BUREAU CONDEMNS BRUTALITY

In a communique issued last month, the Asian Bureau Australia suggests that pressure should be exerted on India to allow into Sri Lanka, ICRC, Amnesty and foreign journalists. They must be allowed access to the Northern and Eastern Provinces. India must be condemned for the brutality shown against the civilians in the recent offensive. Efforts should be made to encourage India to lift the censorship and news restrictions in Tamil Nadu. There should also be attempts to communicate with politicians in Tamil Nadu in all the main parties, informing them of the Indian atrocities, and calling them to act.

Tamil refugees should not be returned to Sri Lanka against their will. The situation there is still insecure and uncertain for Tamils.

The International Community must continue to watch the events in Sri Lanka carefully.

constable and an employee attached to the Batticaloa police station for allegedly co-operating with the administration.

The bodies of the two men were found near their village at Thalkudah. A note found near the bodies said they were killed for co-operating with the civil administration in defiance of LTTE's call, the reports said.

The group also killed two alleged informants, a man and a woman, at Kulakkadu and hung their bodies on lamp-posts.

An IPKF team exchanged fire with the LTTE at Karadippoval following the arrest of an LTTE member this morning. One IPKF jawan and an LTTE man were killed in the encounter.

SHOT DEAD: The reports said another LTTE member was shot dead by the IPKF when he tried to hold up a passenger bus at Wellaveli, while a third was killed in an encounter at Chenaikudiyiruppu in the neighbouring Amparai district.

Official sources said seven militants were shot dead when the LTTE and the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) clashed at Cheddikulam in the northern Vavuniya district on Thursday.

The clash followed an ambush by the LTTE of a van carrying PLOTE members, killing four men. The remaining PLOTE members in the van returned the fire, killing three LTTE members.

At Echantivu (Batticaloa), two sections of the IPKF shot at each other in misfire and lost three of them. Out of frustration they wantonly shot dead 9 civilians.

In a confrontation at Mallagam of Jaffna dt. 30 IPKF men were killed. 3 wounded severely. The defeated IPKF men burnt down 30 houses and killed 7 civilians.

Indian Mirage planes raided Mannar - Iluppaikadavai fishing boats on the sea. Two dead and five wounded. The raid lasted over two days.

7

COLOMBO, Feb. 7. (PTI) — Four persons — two LTTE militants and two civilians — were killed in Sri Lanka's disturbed northern and eastern provinces yesterday.

The national news agency **Lankapuvath** reported today that during IPKF mopping-up operations in the Jaffna sector, one LTTE leader named Prasad was shot dead at Chullipuram. Two pistols, 75 rounds of ammunition and a walkie-talkie were recovered from him.

In an encounter in a jungle in northern Killinochi District, another LTTE militant was killed, while his fellow-activist escaped with injuries.

the news agency added. Four "terrorists" were also arrested.

Two civilians were shot dead yesterday by LTTE guerillas at Ganeshpuram in northern Mannar and at Thopur in eastern Trincomalee District. One of them, K.G. Sivalingam, was a teacher, the news agency said.

From RITA SEBASTIAN

Colombo, Feb. 7: Elayathamby Seelamanickam, 54, Assistant Government Agent of Potuvil in Batticaloa district, was killed on Sunday, allegedly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

According to reports from Batticaloa, Mr. Seelamanickam was shot dead around 12.30 p.m. at Kallady junction, three kilometres from Batticaloa town, while he was cycling home to Navatkudah.

Landmine blast claims 9 IPKF men: According to informed sources, nine IPKF soldiers were killed in Malawi, in Mankulam, about 40 km from Vavuniya on Friday in a landmine explosion. In retaliation 25 houses are reported to have been burnt down in the vicinity of the explosion by the soldiers.

COLOMBO, Feb. 7.

Four civilians were killed and three were wounded by crossfire in clashes between Tamil rebels and the Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers in Eastern Sri Lanka, police said today.

Four civilians injured in clashes on Friday died in hospital on Saturday, police in Batticaloa town said.

The crossfire wounded three persons when gunmen of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ambushed an Indian military jeep at Kalmunai in Batticaloa district on Saturday, police said. A 40-minute gunbattle ensued. — **Reuter**

8

COLOMBO, Feb. 8.—Three Indian soldiers, including a JCO were injured in a landmine explosion at Juvelli in Sri Lanka's Northern sector yesterday, as the IPKF carried on search and combing operations against the Liberation Tigers guerrillas, reports PTI quoting Indian High Commission sources here today.

The IPKF also recovered one LTTE van and apprehended several militants from the North and East yesterday.

9

In a IPKF attack with mortars on a minibus near Aathickmalai, Batticaloa 2 innocent tamil passengers were killed and 6 wounded.



Two IPKF men were killed by LTTE in Mannar - Tarapuram area. Many soldiers wounded.

In an ambush at Amparai-Thambiluvil 2 IPKF men and 'Nithi' of LTTE lost their lives.

10

COLOMBO, Feb 10—Tamil guerrillas blew up a police truck killing nine constables and three civilians in north-eastern Sri Lanka today, reports AFP.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam exploded three landmines under the vehicle just outside a police post at the coastal village of Kuchavelli in Trincomalee district.

After the blasts killed eight policemen and two unidentified civilians, two naval ratings from a nearby camp were wounded when rebels set off a surface mine and fired.

Today's 10 killings were the worst single attack against Sri Lankan forces this year. Three landmine explosions have killed four Sri Lankan soldiers and wounded about 15 in the past two weeks.

A Sri Lanka patrol ran into a landmine set up by LTTE at Kuchavelli in Trincomalee dt, 8 of them were killed along with 2 paramilitary men. 5 navy personnel were seriously wounded in the rescue attempt.

11

MADRAS, Feb 11.

The Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) today accused the ENDLF (Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front) of kidnapping three of its members in Kilinochchi district in Sri Lanka and killing them.

According to Mr. Madhavan, a spokesman of EROS here, the three EROS members were kidnapped by the ENDLF men from Paranthan in Kilinochchi in the North on February 4. They were tortured and it was believed they were dead, he added. Two of them — Subramaniam Masilamani and Velupillai Chandran — belonged to Murasumodai in Paranthan. The third member's name was not known.

Mr. Madhavan said that PLOT (People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) had already killed four EROS members in Vavuniya in September, 1987 and another two EROS men in January this year.

COLOMBO, Feb 11—The Indian Peace-Keeping Force tonight launched a major operation to flush out and disarm Tamil Tiger rebels, soon after an indefinite curfew was imposed in the eastern Batticaloa district, reports PTL.

The imposition of the curfew from 6 p.m. (local time) was announced tonight over the State-owned Sri Lankan Television, amidst reports of a fresh build up of the IPKF in sufficient strength, for a major search and arrest sweep against members of the LTTE.

12

Official sources today denied that six IPKF men were killed in the search operation. However, they said the deaths as reported in a section of the press, occurred in other areas.

Three IPKF men were killed when their boat met with an accident and the other three lost their lives when they were fired upon in Mulaithevu, they clarified.

Colombo, Feb. 12 (UNI): Indian troops, in massive search operations throughout Sri Lanka's curfew-bound Batticaloa district on Friday, took into custody a large number of suspected LTTE men, informed sources here said.

They said no estimate of the number apprehended was available. But a Sri Lankan police source said 87 were arrested in Batticaloa town alone. House-to-house searches were also conducted at different places for concealed weapons.

In an attack by LTTE on IPKF at a bridge near Pulipainthakal at Matakallappu IPKF suffered casualties figures not known.

13

New Delhi, Feb. 13: Three senior LTTE leaders surrendered to the IPKF in Batticaloa yesterday during search operations in the eastern province. The three LTTE leaders are Joseph Kingsley, alias Niranjana, Punathurai, alias Vijayan, and Rathnayia Narendra Kumar. The search operations are continuing.

Two LTTE boats were sunk just off the coast near Batticaloa by naval helicopters from INS Udaigiri. The fibreglass boats, carrying LTTE cadres' were damaged and sunk when fired on by the naval helicopters. The occupants of the boat were believed drowned.

An external affairs spokesman described press reports that the LTTE leader, Mr V. Prabhakaran, was being guarded by 150 armed men as "fanciful and speculative." He also denied that Mr Prabhakaran had been arrested.

In the northern province, one EPRLF member was killed in an attack by the LTTE. In another LTTE attack, one PLOT member was injured.

According to agencies reports, over 100 Tamil guerillas have been taken into custody by the IPKF. At least 50 militants, belonging to TELO and EPRLF, have surrendered with their arms.

R.Premadasa (Prime Minister)

"As long as we depend on external assistance and external protection we will be living in a state of mental slavery. If we are not to be subservient we should have faith in our own country; in our own resources; in our own people and in ourselves."

(Daily News - 1st Feb.1988)

Col Ranjan de Silva, southern commander, Sri Lanka army

"If you can only catch a terrorist after killing 20 other people, the whole operation is counter-productive. In 99.9 per cent of operations this is what happens, and now it looks like the Indians are doing the same thing."

(Independent, 13-1-88)



"I've got nothing to hide...!"

Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, 19.2.88

EROS leader injured: A top Sri Lanka militant, Mr. V. Balakumar of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisations (EROS) was injured in an attack yesterday in northern Killinochi district by another smaller group.

A sniper attack on IPKF camp near Pulugunavai, Batticaloa LTTE killed 2 IPKF men and wounded 2 soldiers.

14

According to informed sources, during operations over 3,058 persons had been screened in mobilised mass screening and house-to-house searches. Though no estimate of the number of men apprehended was available, reports said more than 150 suspected Tamil militants had been detained and these include 40 hardcore LTTE men.

Sources made it clear that search operations in which helicopter gunships and large number of troops are taking part would continue in the Batticaloa lagoon area and in nearby jungles where it is believed most of the militants are holed up.

On Friday, an LTTE activist, Kingsley Niranjan, had given himself up along with a second local leader indentified as Vijayan.

BATTICALOA, February 14
(Reuters).

THE IPKF and the LTTE men fought a fierce gunbattle near here today in which 12 rebels were killed, according to residents here.

They said the clash occurred at Eravur, 15 km north of here, while soldiers were searching for rebels. No other details were available.

15

FOUR KILLED: Four LTTE men were killed in the past 24 hours in northern Sri Lanka and 55 other LTTE "hardcore" members were apprehended by the IPKF in eastern Batticaloa in the past three days of search operations.

30,000 screened: He said 30,000 men were screened between Friday morning and Sunday evening during the operations which were mainly concentrated in the urban limits. There were no civilian casualties, but nine LTTE men were believed killed when IPKF helicopter gunships destroyed the boats in which they were trying to get away across the lagoon.

Four militants held: Today, four top LTTE leaders were apprehended during a surprise swoop in a Batticaloa suburb. Informed sources said two had been identified as "Francis" and "Zimbo", while the other two were believed to be "Sitta" and "Sabesan". They were in the company of the Batticaloa trade union federation president, Mr. Kingsley Wasanayagam,

who was also taken into custody.

"Francis" was the LTTE's political wing leader for Batticaloa till recently. While "Sitta" is commander of the group for Batticaloa town, the positions held by "Zimbo" and "Sabesan" were not known.

However, the latest reports said "Sabesan" committed suicide by swallowing cyanide while being arrested but that the IPKF foiled a similar attempt by "Sitta".

Official sources said three IPKF men and an LTTE activist were killed and five IPKF men wounded in an exchange of fire in the Vanni area in the North yesterday.

Attack beaten off: In another encounter, the IPKF and Sri Lankan forces today repulsed a Tamil militant attack on the Muttur police station in Trincomalee district, authoritative reports here said.

In a landmine attack by LTTE on IPKF jeep near Tanna munai 5 soldiers were killed on the spot. Many wounded.

19

NEW DELHI, Feb. 19 (UNI)—An IPKF gun-ship sank a fast-moving boat 25 nautical miles south of Batticaloa when it failed to respond to warning shots, official reports received here today said.

The boat's four occupants, who were drowned, included LTTE leader Gandivan. Naval patrol vessels had discovered the boat during the IPKF's operations to disarm LTTE in and around Batticaloa in the east during the past 24 hours.

Five local LTTE leaders in the Batticaloa area were arrested and one, identified as Suri, was killed. Those arrested were Vasu, Stanzi, Jaffer, Hero and Bala. The IPKF seized six AK-47 assault rifles and large quantities of arms and ammunition.

In the North, the IPKF, with the help of local civilians, kept up its search for arms and ammunition stashed away in LTTE hideouts and recovered nearly 7,000 rounds during the past 24 hours.

Two Tamil militants and two home guards were killed in separate armed clashes in Anuradhapura and Mannar districts on Thursday, PTI reports from Colombo.

20

Killed: Meanwhile Tamil militants killed a Sinhalese home-guard and unsuccessfully attacked a Sri Lankan army camp in separate incidents on Wednesday, a military spokesman here said.

LTTE militants kidnapped the homeguard during a raid on Awarantalawa village in northern Vavuniya district and later killed him, the spokesman said.

In the pre-dawn raid on an army outpost in the village, the troops did not suffer any casualty



Unny, The Hindu, 18.2.88

the spokesman said, adding he did not know whether any Tamils were killed or wounded.

In a cylinder landmine attack by LTTE or the IPKF infantry at Palai village, 5 soldiers have lost their lives.

21

COLOMBO, Feb. 21.

Two Indian soldiers, including a major, were killed and four others were wounded in two land mine blasts in eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa, official sources said here.

Mr. Subramaniam Nadarajan, a former Senator and a representative of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in the Jaffna District Development Council (DDC), was also shot dead yesterday at his home at Mallakam in the peninsula, the official Lankapuvath news agency said.

The two Indian Peace Keeping Force men were left dead when a land mine, reportedly laid by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, exploded at Ambuvellipuram in Trincomalee around 7-30 p.m. yesterday. — PTI

22

COLOMBO, Feb 22 (PTI)

Three fishermen at Welioya in Eastern Trincomalee district were yesterday reported to have been killed by LTTE militants, the national news agency Lanka Puvath said today, quoting officials.

They were killed when a gang of "LTTE terrorists" fired upon a group fishing in the Kokilai lagoon, the agency said. Two of the five fishermen escaped the bullets, reached the security post at Maradankondavil and reported the incident.

The body of Police Sargeant P S Sathasivam, who was abducted allegedly by LTTE militants last week, was found yesterday in a cemetery at Point Pedro in the Vadamarachchi area of Jaffna.

LTTE encountered IPKF at many places and killed more than 12 soldiers.

IPKF losses:

Mullaitheevu - Udayar kattu : 9

Matalalappu - Kathankudi : 1

Trincomalee - Kanya : 3

Kilinochi - Udayarkattu : 6

Mannar - 4th mile post : 6

Vavuniya - Tandankulam : 1

In the above skirmishes, one LTTE cadre Mr. Kumaran was killed; Two innocent civilians were want only killed by IPKF. Many soldiers wounded.

23

COLOMBO, Feb. 23.

Eighteen persons, including four Indian Peace-Keeping Force personnel and an equal number of Tamil militants, were killed in separate incidents in Sri Lanka today, reports received here said.

Four IPKF personnel, including an officer, and a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militant were killed in an ambush and exchange of fire in Sri Lanka's north eastern Mullaitivu district early today, Indian and Sri Lankan sources said.

They said the incident took place near Pudukudiyiruppu but details were not available. Earlier reports had said that 22 LTTE men were killed in the encounter but this could not be confirmed.

Five civilians killed: DPA quoting police sources in Batticaloa, said five civilians including two women were killed in an exchange of fire between IPKF and the Tamil militants at Kathankudy, near Batticaloa town. The report said fighting broke out when the LTTE men exploded a landmine under a IPKF vehicle injuring several soldiers.

Three persons said to be Tamil militants were killed by Peace Keeping Forces in Batticaloa town earlier today when they opened fire on a gang of curfew violators. According to police, three of the dead men had robbed a shop and were haggling over the goods when the IPKF opened fire.

Youths rounded up: During a six-hour curfew imposed in the area, the IPKF also rounded up nearly 100 youths for questioning, as part of a hunt for the elusive LTTE men, sources said.

Meanwhile, two Tamil women from the "Mothers' Front" continued their fast unto death for the fourth day in a temple in Batticaloa. They are demanding an end to military action against the tigers and talks between the LTTE and the Indians.

LTTE killed one IPKF soldier at Vavuniya in an encounter. Out of frustration IPKF indiscriminately killed 5 innocent civilians. At Mannar - Thumpiruvil 6 IPKF - men were killed; one of them was an officer.

24

In a bitter fight between IPKF and LTTE in Pankulam - Trincomalee 3 IPKF men were killed and 3 injured.

The IPKF burnt down two houses at Iluppaiakadavai, Mannar dt.

25

In Mudalikulam at Trincomalee 6 Lankan army men were killed by landmines set by LTTE. 3 wounded.

26

7 Indian army men killed in a landmine attack by LTTE. 13 injured at Sukankeni of Batticaloa.



Talk to Prabhakaran

A REPORT in a Colombo based newspaper, the *Daily News*, speaks of apparent fissures in the LTTE. If the report is to be believed then a dissident faction of the Tamil Tigers will not participate in the hartal called on February 4 (Sri Lanka's Independence Day) by the militant group's leader V Prabhakaran. The *Daily News* even suggests that the 'rebel' Tiger group has come to a "tacit understanding" with some Sri Lankan ministers who are agreed with the LTTE that the Indian Peace-Keeping Force's (IPKF) presence in the island is not in the best interests of either the Tamils or the Sinhalese.

The latest news of dissent in the LTTE is bound to gladden the hearts of the IPKF battling the Tigers in Lanka and may also spark optimism in New Delhi which has been taking a lot of flak over the Indian misadventure in Jaffna. The obvious and happy conclusion to jump to is that dissent in the LTTE spells the beginning of the final disintegration of the militant group. Such an inference however may be misleading because we have heard stories of

dissent among the militants before. A few months before the signing of the Indo-Lankan Accord there were rumours in Madras that there were "serious differences" between the political wing operating from the relative safety of Tamil Nadu and the guerrillas fighting it out in Jaffna. The rumours as we know had very little basis in truth for when the LTTE leaders took what many observers then felt was a suicidal stand on the Accord their cadres in Lanka backed the political leadership to the full. On that occasion, as in the past, the prophets who predicted doom were proved wrong. The Tigers have always rallied around Prabhakaran and it is likely that the present 'crisis' will also blow over. And as for dissenters we are quite aware of the ruthless manner in which the Tigers have dealt with them — public execution of 'traitors' has often been reported in the press to be repeated here. Suffice to say that the LTTE has in the past belied its critics by proving that they are great survivors. Gen Sundarji will vouch for the fact that the Tigers are not "boys" but are hardened guerrillas.

In the light of past experience it would be wrong for New Delhi to even remotely presume that the latest report of infighting in the LTTE means that the Tigers will tame themselves. No such thing may happen, at least not in the next few months. Meanwhile the Indian peace keeping effort in Lanka which is already involving financial inputs to the tune of reportedly Rs 2 crores a day will have to continue. This is not a burden that the country can shoulder for long.

Peace, we have learnt the hard way, cannot be achieved by force. We also know by now that any bid to bring normalcy in Lanka has to involve Prabhakaran and his Tigers. New Delhi, from the time of the drafting of the Accord, has attempted to side-step Prabhakaran rather than come to a settlement with him. But it is still not too late to reopen talks with the LTTE and the Prime Minister would indeed be doing a great salvaging act if he invites Prabhakaran and other militant leaders to Delhi to talk things out.

In this context, if the *Daily News* report is true (concession has to be made for the fact that it is a state-owned newspaper), and there is dissension in the LTTE, then the time seems ripe to start a dialogue with the militants. It is quite likely that the so-called 'rebels' in the LTTE leadership who feel that the situation in Jaffna is getting out of hand because of the bloodshed may prevail upon Prabhakaran to respond positively to a call for peace talks with New Delhi.



27

Two IPKF men killed: Two IPKF personnel were killed and many others wounded when the LTTE blew up their vehicle with a landmine at Muttur in the Eastern Trincomalee district today, the national newsagency Lankapuwath reported.

Quoting official sources, it said in another landmine blast yesterday three IPKF men were wounded when their vehicle, going from Batticaloa to Kiran, ran into a landmine at Ottamavadi.

At Mudur — Pachanur, LTTE attacked IPKF by setting landmines, killing 10 soliders and wounding 14. At Pudukudiyiruppu, the LTTE Leader Mathaiya's house was burnt down by IPKF and another house was blown up.

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COLOMBO, Feb. 28.

Five IPKF personnel were killed and 16 wounded, four of them seriously, when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by the LTTE at Pachchnur in eastern Trincomalee district yesterday, Sri Lankan military sources said today. Earlier reports had said that three IPKF men were killed and 18 injured in the blast.

The sources said one IPKF officer and two soldiers were seriously wounded when their vehicle ran into a landmine at Chavakacheri, 20 km east of the northern Jaffna town.

In another incident yesterday, an LTTE hardcore member, "Vicky," was arrested during search operations.

The sources also said a local leader of the LTTE at Mullaitivu, who went by the name of "Sri" killed himself by swallowing a cyanide capsule on being apprehended by the IPKF.

In an encounter between LTTE and IPKF at Mallavi, Kilinochi 3 IPKF men were shot dead. One innocent civilian was killed by IPKF.

TAMILS PREVENTED FROM SETTLING DOWN

Tamil families which were uprooted from their homes during the recent wave of violence are continuing to roam from place to place as destitutes and vagrants. Hundreds of hill-country Tamil families that went and settled down in Thambalakamam Pier area after the 1977 communal violence were driven away from their homes during the 1983 communal riots. These families tried to get back to their homes after the signing of the peace accord. But they were not allowed to do so.

The lands in which they were living have been vested with the Port Development Authority. These families remain in refugee camps.

வீர வீணாக்கம்

LITTE MARTYRS

Suresh 5.2.88	Capt. Nathan 18.2.88
Gnani 2..2.88	Nithi 9.2.88
Prasad 5.2.88	Capt. Thiruchelvam 18.2.88
Soori 18.2.88	Capt. Bharath 18.2.88
Kumaran 18.2.88	Capt. Sabesan 18.2.88
Lt.Col. Pandian 18.2.88	Capt. Rathish 18.2.88
Maj. Murali 18.2.88	Capt. Gandhi 18.2.88
Maj. Ashok 18.2.88	Dharmendra 14.2.88
Maj. Paseelan 18.2.88	Murali 24.2.88
Maj. Prasad 18.2.88	Durai 5.2.88




2nd Lt. Gnani


உடைவளை கடுப்ப மலர்ந்த காந்தள்
அடைமல்கு குளவியொடு கமழும் சாரல்
மறப்புலி உடலின், மான்கணம் உளவோ?
மருளின விசம்பின் மாதிரத்து ஈண்டிய
இருளும் உண்டோ, ஞாயிறு சினவின்?
அச்சொடு தாக்கிப் பாருற்று இயங்கிய
பண்டச் சாகாட்டு ஆழ்ச்சி சொல்லிய,
விரிமணல் ஞெமரக், கல்பக நடக்கும்
பெருமிதப் பகட்டுக்குத் துறையும் உண்டோ?
எழுமரம் கடுக்கும் தாள்தோய் தடக்கை
வழுவில் வன்கை, மறவர் பெரும!
இருநில மண்கொண்டு சிலைக்கும்
பொருநரும் உளரோ, நீ களம் புகினை?
ஒளவையார்



2nd Lt. Sivam 1.2.88



Maj. Prasad



Lt. Col. Pandian



Durai 5.2.88



Nithi 9.2.88

claims	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
	IPKF	LTTE	S.L. ARMY	OTHER MILITANTS	CIVILIANS					
IPKF		1	134 _c	13						
LTTE										
MEDIA									6 _c	

11							3 _c			

22				1*				3*2*		
	26							2		

12	6			87 _c *						
							12 32 _c			

23	4	6	2	3					5	
	7								5	

2							3* EP	6 _c EP		
		1								

13				3 _c			1	100 _c		
	2	2								

24										
	3	3								

3	1	2	3							
										19 _c

14			12	40 _c				110 _c		

25							6	3		

4										
	7									
										15 _c

15	3		5	55 _c						
	5									

26										
	7	13								

5	1		13						5	
	32	3	2						18	
									27	

16										
								12	20	

27	2	3*								
	10									
	14									

6										
										40 _c



28	5*	16*	1*	1 _c *						
	3								1	

7	9*		2*						3*	

18										
				13						

29										
	2	1 _c	11							

8		3								

19			7	4	2					

30										

9										
	4		1						2	6


20							1			
	5									

31										

10				9					3	
				10	5					

21	2	4							1*	


TOTAL	33	34	67	232 _c	100	13	4	219	20	2
	111	35	17		16	8			27	6
	2	1 _c	23	32 _c					39	20 _c



CHAPTER 9

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping



Maifcjh



REPORT

The Indians will never be able to win this war

BY CHRIS EAMES

THE lives of Tamil refugees will be placed in jeopardy if they are deported back to Sri Lanka.

This was the finding of Swiss journalist Erich Schmid when he went to Sri Lanka to report for the opposition newspaper 'Die Wochenzeitung' (Woz).

His visit was organised after the Swiss government announced that 1,500 Tamil refugees in the country would be repatriated in April.

He managed to get to the Tamil homeland in the north of the Island, and has produced the first truthful account by a foreign journalist of the atrocities by the Indian army, which invaded in October 1987.

The Indian forces were sent to the north to do the job which the goons of Sri Lankan president Junius Jayewardene failed to do, crush the liberation struggle for Tamil Eelam.

Schmid reports, however, that the Indian forces, who expected their job to be over in a matter of days, 'will never be able to win this war', as the whole Tamil people support the LTTE fighters.

'Since October 1987, at least 5,000 Tamils have lost their lives in the artillery and tanks fights of the dirty war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)', Schmid writes in a report of his visit.

'In January 1988, we from the "Woz" manage to get to Jaffna and to have a look around the capital of the peninsula and its surroundings.

'Before the massive attacks by the Indians, ab-

out one million people used to live in that area.

'What we see is in total contrast to all the existing reports, both from Sri Lanka and Indian sources.

'Since October 1987 about half a million Tamils have fled and taken refuge either overseas or with relatives in less dangerous districts of the country.

'Around 20 per cent of all the buildings in Jaffna Town, a place where 200,000 people dwelt once, have been totally destroyed. In the suburbs the percentage may rise up to 80 per cent.

'The people... are afraid of the Indian troops behind their sandbags at every street corner, controlling the passers-by and apparently willing to stay on for a long time...

The Sri Lanka police and armed forces have disappeared altogether. People find themselves at the mercy of Indian Special Forces, trained in the riots of the Punjab, Nagaland and Bangladesh.'

Schmid writes that: 'People can neither communicate nor move about freely, with the exception of a few who have got special passports issued by the IPKF.'

'So people in general at the best know what is happening in their neighbourhood, in the area between two checkpoints.

'People live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, dread and fear, afraid that it would be their turn again on the very next day.'

'Before the attacks on the LTTE controlled areas on October 10, 1987, the Indian radio stations had ordered the inhabitants of Jaffna to go to the checkpoints. But people had looked for refuge in Hindu temples and schools.

Those who had a radio set had stayed at home. Those who managed to run away in time were gunned down in the street.

The reason for this given by the Indians was that from mid-October to the end of November there was a total curfew for 24 hours

a day. In those days everything moving in the streets was shot at, even those people fleeing out of their collapsing houses.

'Almost all the people one meets today in the streets of Jaffna could name at least 10 people who died in this way.

'During this one month curfew many people entirely lacked food, water and medicines. In the camps a lot of children thus died of diarrhoea.'

Schmid visited Jaffna District Hospital where no-one was willing to speak about the events of October.

'Eventually we get a whispered report from a doctor: "While the IPKF artillery grenades hit the surgical department on October 21, all the 400 patients fled to the entral department, many had to be carried, there was absolute chaos.

"We had fled there already the other three times before, when the Sri Lanka Armed Forces had shot at the hospital.

'The patients were lying on the floor and the staircase when the Indian soldiers made an assault at the hospital on October 21. Like mad they shot at the crowd with scattered fire. Nineteen nurses, three doctors and 47 patients died, dozens were injured.

'The Indians had thought the Tigers had hidden among the patients. As a matter of fact they had only passed by the hospital on their retreat. When the Indians arrived the guerillas had run off long ago.'

'Indian Brigadier Manjit, responsible for that district gives us a totally different account of the incident: According to him the Tigers shot at his men; and as the Tigers did not wear any uniforms they looked exactly like doctors, nurses and patients. "So the soldiers just fired at everybody around".

'On the second day of our horror-trip through Jaffna, on January 4, 1988, the IPKF — known among the people here as the Innocent

Peoples Killing Forces — ordered the reopening of the schools in order to show that everything is back to normal.

'The LTTE, on the other hand, called for a boycott. And so the schools remain empty.'

Schmid reports that 'the IPKF is met by the local Tamils with nothing but hatred, which is hidden, however. No one wants to be alleged of LTTE-sympathies.

Yet, inspite of all the IPKF's repression, arrests, controls and searchings they quite clearly sympathise with the well-organised LTTE, who have never any difficulties in finding hide-outs, from where they can launch their next mortar-attacks at IPKF strongholds

'Nowadays it seems as if the Indians will never be able to win this war. The battle has been going on for three and a half months now, without anybody being able to see light at the end of the tunnel.

'Quite clearly peace will only be reached by means of political negotiations with the LTTE-leaders. Prabhakaran has offered them several times — each time they were rejected by Rajiv Gandhi.'

Schmid passed on his information to the Swiss ambassador in Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital in the south of the Island.

He agreed that Schmid's reports were accurate and: 'He utters the opinion that Switzerland would have "exposed itself to severe ridicule" throughout the world if a greater number of Tamils had already been repatriated.

Schmid took a camera crew to Sri Lanka and has brought back a video of what he saw in the north.

He told News Line that he would protest against the decision of British Tory Home Secretary Douglas Hurd to send six Tamil refugees back to Sri Lanka.

'I hope that it is not a test case to send more back' Schmid said. 1.3.88.

SRI LANKAN SITUATION CONCERNS THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

LETTER

THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, DR EMILIO CASTRO HAS SENT SEPARATELY THE FOLLOWING APPEAL TO H. E. AMBASSADOR RODRIGO, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SRI LANKA, GENEVA AND H. E. AMBASSADOR TEJA, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA, GENEVA:

"Your Excellency, You may recall the statement issued by the World Council of Churches on 15th October 1987 in which we expressed our concern on the situation in the Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka. We have now received the following information from sources which we fully trust. The information was sent on 2nd November but it reached us only the last week-end:

1. The whole of Jaffna peninsula is without electricity for more than three weeks, with all consequences that follow from it.

2. There has been a perpetual 24 hour curfew in the peninsular from the 15th October. It has been relaxed only for a few hours a day for the last few days within the Jaffna Municipal limits. This has meant a serious problem for the wounded. The dead cannot be given a decent burial or cremation. People are unable to obtain their provision. There is a standstill of all transport. All communications have been paralysed.

3. The Indian forces, contrary to all public statements put by the official media, have engaged in indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks. At least 500 civilians have been killed so far and about 8000 injured. To mention a few instances:

a) The Government hospital was attacked by Indian army and one of the victims who escaped with serious injuries told us that at least 200 were killed in the hospital. This included a few nurses and few doctors.

b) A refugee camp in Kokuvil Hindu College was attacked and about thirty were killed.

c) Passengers at a jetty in Araly travelling to cross over to the island on the other side for safety were attacked by air and about 30 of them were killed.

d) Hospitals including the Government hospital at Tellipalai and private hospital and mission hospitals have been shelled and forced to close down. Mission hospital at Manipay was shelled and one staff

member was killed. There were more than 300 refugees at that time, in addition to the patients and staff. The hospital remains closed for the last few weeks.

4. The indiscriminate shelling has led to nearly 400,000 refugees within the peninsula. The homes they fled from have been damaged by shelling and often looted. Because of the curfew the NGOs including the churches which are trying to help are unable to get provisions for the refugee camp.

5. Since banks and post offices are closed, there is an acute problem of money transaction.

All this will convince you that the innocent civilians are the victims of this operation.

We request you to be kind enough to transmit this information to your government, conveying our deep concern about the suffering of the people in the region.

We appeal to your government to take immediate steps for reconciliation and relief and to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to the people in the area.

We reiterate our appeal to seek ways to end the fighting and to renew efforts for negotiations and political settlement.

We are making a similar letter to the permanent representatives of the Governments of India and Sri Lanka.

Assuring you of our highest consideration."



EDITORIAL

Sri Lankan imbroglio

THE KILLING OF scores of Sinhalese civilians by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam last week, the 17-day-old fast by a member of the Mothers Front at Batticaloa and the Indian army's resort to extreme measures to foil a hostile demonstration are all grim reminders of the explosive situation that prevails in Sri Lanka. Indian condemnations of the LTTE's senseless acts are beginning to sound hollow. Indeed, the Government of India has virtually forfeited the right to condemn the LTTE's excesses.

It is good that Colombo and New Delhi have dropped the pretence that they are in a position to go through with the provincial council elections in the island. The elaborate charade that began with President J.R. Jayewardene's visit to New Delhi for the Republic Day celebrations was an exercise in self-deception. On his return to Colombo Mr. Jayewardene announced dates for filing of nominations for the provincial councils to create the impression that the stalled process of implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan pact was being revived. The harsh reality of the Sri Lankan situation is that conditions for holding free and fair elections do not exist. While provincial councils are proposed to be set up all over the island, the whole concept was evolved in order to satisfy the Tamil minority's demand for autonomy. Since even the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front found the scheme for devolution of powers unsatisfactory, it was necessary to improve upon it before holding the elections. Moreover, the Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern provinces are now virtually under the occupation of the Indian army. The search-and-destroy operations that are still being conducted, mostly under curfew, belie the official claim that its role is one of peace-keeping. Even in the Sinhala-majority areas genuine elections are well-nigh impossible. The main Opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, has stated that it will not participate in the elections. This leaves the field clear for the ruling United National Party, but it cannot find enough brave men willing to offer themselves as candidates, knowing that the extremist Janata Vimukti Peramuna's gunmen will be looking out for them. This explains why Mr. Jayewardene has decided to hold elections in only four of the nine provinces. It should cause no surprise if he abandons the polls in these provinces too. There is little point in constituting provincial councils for them alone.

The Government of India should give serious thought to the situation in which it finds itself. Some recent statements by responsible individuals, pointing to the heavy casualties suffered by the Indian army as justification for prolonging its stay in the island, are extremely disturbing, for they are predicated on imperial notions which are hard to sustain in today's conditions, as even the world's mightiest powers have discovered at great cost to themselves. Getting Tamils in Jaffna to line up before the television cameras and hail the Indian soldiers as saviours may be passable as an essay in psychological warfare, but we should guard against becoming victims of our own propaganda.

Even after the virtual decimation of its cadres by the Indian army, the LTTE holds the key to the ethnic problem in the island. This is why powerful elements in the Sri Lankan establishment are willing to explore the possibility of a settlement with it. In the circumstances the oft-repeated Indian position that there can be no dialogue with the LTTE until its leadership comes in sackcloth and ashes is untenable. Prudence demands that India should encourage the Sri Lankan Government to set up an interim administration for the Tamil areas which is representative of all sections of opinion so that conditions are created for the return of our troops with honour.

NEWS

A break with custom for IPKF

Express News Service

Madras, March 1: A spurt in the entry of dutiable goods brought from Sri Lanka by some Indian army officers has led to the introduction of unusual Customs check at the military airbase at Tambaram.

Informed sources said the Defence Department requested the Customs to send a team of officers to check the average six military flights a day arriving from Jaffna, mostly carrying middle level IPKF officials.

There is considerable resentment among the defence officers, most of whom land at the Tambaram airbase in normal weather. Defence officials are puzzled by the continued arrival of dutiable goods from Jaffna even after the markets there closed in the wake of armed conflicts with LTTE.

Soon after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, many electronic items like VCRs, stereos and television sets of Japanese make were available at throwaway price in the Jaffna markets. Indian army officers were welcomed by the Tamils and even given discounts for purchases they made with Indian rupees. Bringing them to the mainland was not a problem as Tambaram was a 'free' air base.

Since October 1987, however, Jaffna shops have been closed, some even destroyed in the conflict. Even essentials are scarce, and their prices have shot up.

The Tambaram Customs post, however, came into force only recently, "on the invitation of the Defence Department", according to Customs sources. Three officers are posted there. Navy officers who visit foreign ports routinely face Customs check when they return. At Meenambakkam airport, however, senior defence personnel can pass through a special enclosure without Customs check. Indian Express 1.3.88

EDITORIAL

NO TIME FOR POSTURING

The last few weeks have witnessed, even by Sri Lanka's standards, a spectacularly high rise in the killing and counter-killing of civilians in the eastern province, and more so in the Trincomalee district. Defenceless infants, children, men, women and old people have been ruthlessly killed in an orgy of unparalleled savagery. Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese have been killed. Many people have fled from their homes in fear and thousands have been added to the ever-rising refugee population. But the attacks and counter-attacks have continued unabated.

Whatever may be the objective of these killings, they cannot be justified under any circumstances. Whoever may be their perpetrators, they must be condemned unconditionally. Neither the excuse that it is inevitable that in a war some civilians deaths are inevitable, nor the explanation that some members of the present generation have to pay with their lives in the interest of future generations can be accepted in the case of the present wave of killings. The victims have neither died in a cross-fire nor have they died in the course of a struggle for a better future. They have been killed in their homes or in buses while travelling.

These killings have continued to occur despite the presence of thousands of troops belonging to the Indian Peace Keeping Force. Up to now the Sri Lankan troops in the Tamil areas have been confined to their barracks under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. However the escalating body count of civilian victims and the high turnout of refugees from the eastern province have created an atmosphere in which the clamour for the deployment of Sri Lankan troops for the protection of the civilian population has become more and more strident. The recent visit by Minister Gamini Dissanayake accompanied by Service Chiefs to New Delhi and their discussions with Indian leaders would appear to have been aimed at urging New Delhi to agree to such deployment of Sri Lankan troops in the eastern province. Although not confirmed in New Delhi, reports in the Sri Lankan media indicate that India has agreed to allow the Sri Lankan troops to play a role in support of the IPKF. In other words, contrary to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, they are to be permitted to go out and engage in military operations under the guise of protecting the civilians. This constitutes a dangerous development to the people of the eastern province. They have experienced

almost four years of death and destruction at the hands of the Sri Lankan troops. Hundreds of villages and thousands of homes were destroyed. People taken into custody disappeared without trace. People were shot in the streets and homes. Such incidents were a daily routine. The people of the eastern province do not deserve a repeat performance.

Although brought to end under questionable circumstances, the fast unto death by the 58-year old Mrs. Annamalai David of the Batticaloa Mothers' Front was poignantly symbolic of the deep desire of the people for a return to peace after years of trauma and tragedy. The Front's two demands, namely that there should be a cease-fire in the fighting between the LTTE and the IPKF and that negotiations between India and the LTTE should restart are an unambiguous manifestation of the people's thirst for peace. The wide support the action of this self-sacrificing woman received, reflected the deep-felt heartache of the people for an end to the fighting and violence. The profound significance of this action and the genuineness of the demands it advanced have not been diminished by the suspicious circumstances in which the fast was brought to an end.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has accepted the Front's demands and in a letter to the Indian Prime Minister has pledged to cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord and expressed its readiness for unconditional talks. Indian leaders have repeatedly asserted that they too are seeking political solution. If that is what they want, it is not beyond them to arrange for a cease-fire and recommence negotiations. This is no time for political posturing for propaganda purposes by either party. This is not the time nor the Tamil areas are the place for the IPKF to experiment or gain experience in the art of combating urban guerilla warfare. Nor can the Tamil people endure a prolonged display of the capacity by Tamil militants to wield their AK47s, Kalashnikovs and landmines. The body count of Tamil militants, IPKF personnel and above all of the defenceless unarmed civilians are mounting daily. The tragedy has been played too long. India and the LTTE have a duty to put an end to this ongoing tragedy and give peace and the people a chance.



Calcutta Diary

ANOTHER economic survey, another budget. Window-dressing with words, window-dressing of figures. The usual comments by economists and financial experts, conventionally so described. The usual discussions will duly take place in parliament, much in the manner of canned music.

The estimates in the budget and the excruciating pressures the economy is being subjected to are related as much to the gory carnival in Punjab as to the expansionary ambitions of our humble great Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. Our high commissioner in Sri Lanka has showed his fangs: peace will not be allowed to break out in that island, the people of the island, the Tamils and the Sinhalese, cannot reach any private deals unless these are in conformity with our pan-imperial goals. Few amongst our political parties or their representatives in parliament will dare to draw attention to the causality existing between events and events, even if such parties are labelled as the opposition and are at the moment busy organising a nation-wide strike to protest against the government's alleged venality and incompetence. There is a code of behaviour whose transgression Hindu religious formalism will frown upon. You have created a mess within; to cover up for that, create a mess across the Straits of Palk, the cost to the nation is no consideration. A theory is at work. Never mind if you are not in fact strong, you must behave as if you are. This conforms to a hoary old feudal tenet: appearances are all. The distinction between what is affordable and what is not therefore disappears. One-half of this nation may every night go to bed—or to the apology of a bed—hungry and horrendously under-nourished, the nation's military expenditure must nonetheless mount year by year. Defence spending is the pretence of strength; such subsidiary functions as that it helps the lining of private pockets are only incidental. The bravado of those in charge is the deciding factor, and it bleeds the nation to debility. As long as the nation does not learn to protest, defence expenditure will continue to expand, and words and figures will continue to be so woven as to demonstrate to the neighbourhood innocents that retrogression is progress and across-the-border aggression is genteel peace-keeping.

Punjab, which produced some of the greatest heroes and martyrs during the nation's struggle for freedom, has been almost written off. About everybody agrees that she is in agony, about everybody agrees that the policy pursued over the years has proved totally counter-productive, but, since in our end is our beginning, nothing changes, the killings

COMMENT

Ashok Mitra

go on, the young people who are bailed out have their bail cancelled, and a minister pompously declares that it is a war which has to be fought to the finish. A war against whom? Against our own young men and women? Will it not then make more sense to declare the war more formally, so that at least some segments of this great nation are made aware that there has been a mix-up, they do not really belong here, the government has declared war on their children, and since their children belong to them and they belong to the children, they are aliens in this country, each one amongst them is a suspect? Some of them bitterly complain in private that they indeed are treated as suspects and criminals at large. Some of them even go the length of wryly suggesting that, yes, it is indeed war, a patriotic war between an external power and their own people, and a quising from amongst them has been installed as home minister.

The pattern does not vary. The same elements, who have made a hash of things at home, proceed across the Palk Straits to repeat the folly. The hypothesis remains unchanged: the terrorists in Punjab are a bare couple of thousands, the general populace hates them; similarly, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are bereft of any influence amongst the Sri Lanka Tamils; if they still succeed in closing down Jaffna and Batticaloa, that is because they are bullies, and ordinary citizens are mortally afraid of bullies. On a lilliputian scale, but it is still megalomania at work. Messrs Reagan and Gorbachev are both extraordinarily deferential to us, one praises our economic policy, the other goes into raptures over our foreign policy, we have a standing army of over a million, we have tested successfully air to ground missiles as well as sophisticated delivery systems, we are therefore entitled to forget the niceties of international behaviour and treat Sri Lanka as just another Punjab or another Tripura. The possible susceptibilities of other people do not bother us. After all, it is our own backyard, so, says Reagan, it is agreed to by Gorbachev, we therefore make our own rules here. Sri Lanka's regular army consists of a bare twelve thousand men; we have already hauled across fifty thousand—or is it seventy thousand?—of our troops to that hapless island, and more are supposed to land soon. The situation is analogous to what it would be should four or five million American or British or French or Chinese army personnel go on the rampage in our country. Whether they did so with the prior approval of our president or prime minister would then be a minor point. If four or five million foreign troops make

a habit of settling down in our India, it would be pure, proud patriotism which will impel the countrymen, and display an activism more than simply the catharsis of emotions. But Sri Lankans are not Indians; it is presumptive on their part to claim to be subject to the same metabolism as ours.

They may have their pride, but we have our ego, therefore Sri Lanka has to be destroyed. We, once upon a time, started a certain game in Punjab; gradually, we lost control over it. But, we, the government of the sovereign socialist secular democratic republic of India, cannot afford to admit this fact even to ourselves. Punjab too therefore has to be bled to death. What implications Punjab's slow bleeding to death will have for the rest of the nation is a matter of conjecture which need not detain us; a government which works faster cannot afford the luxury of philosophising on the consequences of its actions. It has other occupations and preoccupations. Such as, for instance, Tripura. Now that the elections are over and the state has been snatched back from the left infidels, the TNV insurgents have disappeared like magic. The coincidences are truly remarkable. Murder and mayhem herald the prime minister's pre-election visit; the prime minister is incensed, a pall of righteous indignation hangs over his countenance, he returns to New Delhi and orders the army in just two days before the onset of the poll, the army succeeds in restoring law and order, it succeeds in managing the election too. No TNV marauders raid Tripura hamlets any more, no dogs bark either. Made-to-order disturbances follow by made-to-order peace. Who knows whether the Ghising phenomenon up in Darjeeling does not bear the same inspiration, yet another simulation of the original Bhindranwale model? The model did not quite click in Punjab, but one non-swallow does not make a non-summer, it has apparently succeeded in Tripura, and it might yet do the trick in West Bengal. The nation marches on.

The opposition is befuddled. The terrorists in Punjab, it has been decided unanimously, are a threat to the nation's integrity. The opposition must not fall into the trap, they must not, by their act and demeanour, ever provide hostage to the suspicion that they are less patriotic than the government. Barring ritualistic references to the need for a political initiative in addition to what is being currently done, they accordingly keep their silence. Apropos of Sri Lanka too, our troops obviously cannot be let down. A wise decision or a bad one, they are already there in the island, and to criticise their presence could contribute to demoralisation, the sovereign socialist secular democratic republic's loyal opposition cannot be a party to the eventuation of such a possibility. Their uneasiness is therefore confined to raising a few tepid

questions on the floor of parliament, or not even that. As for Tripura, there is an attitude of ambivalence; since the leftists have been brought down a peg or two, whatever the method followed, why not savour the situation for one or two brief moments, consideration of the implications over the long run might as well wait?

The institutions are there, but they reduce themselves to irrelevance. As everybody knows, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission these days concerns itself with the grave issue of distribution of fake degrees. The opposition similarly is there, but it has rendered itself irrelevant. An emboldened government will therefore increasingly take the lawless road, the logo of amorality will be planted as its emblem, adventurers operating under the government's protection, flustered initially by exposes of their shady doings, will vacate their public office, but, having gauged the will and strength of the opposition, will return as all-conquering shahenshahs. Their ethos will in due time capture the imagination of the nation's young; their apparel already has. A school boy, barely sixteen years of age, will murder his class-mate in cold blood for an altogether frivolous reason; he will plead that he has imbibed the lesson of instant justice from the current box office hit of a feature film, and is not the dispenser of instant justice the confidant of the nation's highest? A judge will remonstrate with a police constable who has come to give evidence without bothering to don the proper uniform; the constable will return to the barracks, collect a crowd of his peers and come back to beat up the judge. Somewhere else in this noble land of ours, another batch of policemen, out on a night's romp, will raid a village, drive away the menfolk and rape the women, as if such pastimes belong to the most natural order. Neither scruples nor laws nor rules nor conventions will matter any more. You will be allowed to utter the most outrageous inexactitudes in the economic survey, you will be expected to fudge your figures all the way in your presentation of the annual budget. Characters in the proximity of the government, nearly everybody will agree, have filched hefty sums, either as bribes or as commission; but the pretence has to be kept up, you cannot call the corrupt crowd corrupt, they, do not you know, follow the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi; at long last, Mahatma Gandhi has received his just deserts.

The point has been missed. Even an exasperated Shankar Dayal Sharma only offers to resign. He does not resign. None under the Indian sun dares to leave the lawless road. I belong, you belong, they belong, we will, together, proceed towards our collective doom. Meanwhile, in parliament, there will be a general discussion on the budget, attention will be drawn to its production-stimulating features.

LETTER

UNITARY STATE - A COLONIAL LEGACY

J. Visvanathan, Harrow

President Jayewardene, in that famous BBC World Service Phone-in on February 7, stated, "Sri Lanka has been a Unitary State from time immemorial, from 6th century BC."

I should like to tell him that the **TAMILS had a separate kingdom in the Northern and Eastern parts of Ceylon from about 350 BC, over 2200 years ago.** They held suzerainty over these areas for almost 2000 years until 1591 AD, except for two brief periods from 161 to 137 BC, and 1169 to 1186 AD. Thereafter their suzerainty continued uninterruptedly till the arrival of European powers. Briefly, European involvement lasted 443 years, as follows:-

A.D. 1505 - The Portuguese captured the western maritime provinces from the Sinhalese Kings.
1591 - The Portuguese captured the Tamil Kingdom which was ceded to them by the Nallur Convention.
1638 - The Dutch captured Trincomalee.

1640 - The Dutch captured Negombo and Galle.

1658 - The Dutch captured the Tamil Kingdom after a siege of Jaffna for 3 1/2 months.

1795 - Jaffna, Trincomalee and Kalpitiya surrendered to the British.

1796 - Colombo surrendered to the British.

1802 - British conquest of Ceylon confirmed by the Treaty of Amiens.

1815 - The Kandyan Kingdom surrendered to the British. (The last King of Kandy was a Tamil), Until

1815, Ceylon had between one and four kingdoms at various times, always including a Tamil Kingdom.

1833 - The British commenced ruling the whole island as a single administrative unit instead of two or three separate units as had been the case up to that time. The "Unitary State" is really a colonial legacy, and the so-called unity of the country was only a union of administrations rather than an integration of two peoples.



R.K. Lakshman, Times of India 24.3.88

TAMILS ADDRESS RAJIV

LETTER

Agreement.

An appeal to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was submitted by a cross-section of Sri Lankan Tamils, calling for, among other things, cease-fire, protection of LTTE cadres and Tamil civilian population, release of political detainees, establishing a unified provincial administration for North and East, early resettlement of refugees, stoppage of Sinhala colonisation of North and East. The signatories include prominent politicians, academics, professionals, clergy and others. The full text is reproduced.

This memorandum comes to you signed by a cross-section of Sri Lankan Tamils, who in the past represented varying shades of Tamil opinion; but in submitting this appeal to you **we are united on certain common ideals, assessments and viewpoints.**

We share the firm conviction that the future of the Tamils is inextricably linked with India's geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean region. We consider it an article of faith that we the Tamils should help safeguard these interests of a country which from time immemorial has been our emotional motherland and which has nourished our culture and our ethos.

While we appreciate that **the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provided a basis for the protection and furtherance of Tamil rights, and though the Tamils were not without reservations in regard to the adequacy of certain features,** in the overall context, and particularly in view of your enunciation in Tamil Nadu on the 2nd August, 1987, of the content of the political entitlement of the Tamils under the Agreement, the Tamils felt reassured.

It is in this spirit that the **Tamils indicated a willingness to co-operate in the implementation of the Agreement, the signing of which was in no small measure the consequence of a 30-year old struggle for Tamil rights.** We also believe that the success of the Agreement hinges upon a just resolution of the Tamil question.

While assuring Your Excellency of

our deepest respect to you personally, to the mighty nation that you head, and to the Indian people with whom we are linked by religious, ethnic and cultural ties, **we wish to express our profound distress and feelings of anguish over happenings on our soil in recent times.**

The state of confrontation between the LTTE and the IPKF - whatever the chain of circumstances that led to it - has resulted in:-

- (a) Death and injury to a considerable number of civilians;
- (b) Severe deprivation and suffering to hundreds of thousands of civilians;
- (c) A regrettably large destruction of civilian property;
- (d) Death and injury to hundreds of IPKF and LTTE cadres;
- (e) A traumatic experience for Tamils living in their own soil, as well as thousands of their kith and kin scattered in all parts of the world.

These unfortunate happenings notwithstanding, we assure you, your Excellency, that **our firm faith in the Government and people of India remains unshaken.**

While we hold that the tragic situation in which our people find themselves today has been brought about by a series of acts of bad faith and breaches of the Agreement by the Sri Lankan government, we are also made painfully aware that the present confrontation in the North-East **has provided the Sri Lanka Government the required distraction to further default in the fulfilment of its obligations under the**

With a view to ending the present impasse, and to arrest a growing sense of alienation among the Tamil people (a process that will eventually harm our own interests), we fervently make the following appeal to you:-

(1) That the healthy and helpful climate that was brought about by the 48-hour suspension of operations following the handing over of the IPKF personnel be restored. We

believe that at this point of time, a magnanimous gesture on the part of your government through the declaration of a further suspension of operations, but of a longer duration, could provide the ripe opportunity for efforts towards a peace process to gather momentum, and to help evoke a positive and unequivocal response on the part of the LTTE.

(2) That to facilitate such a response from the LTTE -

(a) **the Government of India guarantee the protection of LTTE cadres, all militants and the civilian population;**

(b) **the Government of India guarantee the restoration of the amnesty to LTTE cadres and the revocation of the monetary reward offered for the arrest of the LTTE leader.**

(3) That the Government of India ensures that the amnesty provisions are duly observed and **all political and other prisoners held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws in respect of offences related to the ethnic problem be released.**

(4) That the Government of India ensure that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the para-military forces are not deployed for any purpose whatsoever in any part of the Northern-Eastern provinces.

(5) That steps be taken for the establishment of a unified popular administration for the territory comprising the Northern-Eastern provinces, to facilitate early resettlement



and rehabilitation of the refugees and to exercise all other functions related to the needs of the people.

(6) That India ensures that **civil apparatus** such as Committees to monitor Reconstruction work, Refugee resettlement, etc. **be set up or permitted to function except by, or under the aegis of, the duly appointed unified popular administration.**

(7) That the Sinhala colonisation in some parts of the Eastern-Northern Provinces since the signing of the Agreement be dismantled, and that further colonisation of Sinhalese in traditional Tamil-majority areas in the guise of resettling Sinhalese refugees—who are very much lesser in number than Tamil refugees—be stopped forthwith.

The Tamil people strongly feel that India should ensure that the Sri Lanka Government guarantees, by adequate constitutional provisions, **autonomy to the Tamil people comparable to States in India, in a single territory comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces.** We respectfully submit that this would be the acid test of the Sri Lanka Government's commitment to its obligations under the Agreement.

We are addressing the LTTE on this matter and we annex a copy of that letter. We are also forwarding the LTTE a copy of this letter.

Signed: Rev. Fr. Guy de Fongalland ■ K. Satchidanandan
■ S. Sivanayagam ■ R. Namasivayam ■ A. Sivanandan
■ M.K. Eelaventhian ■ R. Sivalingam ■ S. Kugathasan
■ V. Sittampalam ■ Sis. M. Pushpam Gnanaprakasam
■ Ms. Poongothai Somasundaram ■ S.K. Velayuthapillai
■ K. Thatchanamoorthy ■ Dr. V. Ramakrishnan
■ V. Perambalam ■ S. Ruthiramoorthy ■ Rev. Fr. J. Thiruchelvam ■ Dr. P. Ragupathy ■ R. Sampathan
■ S. Ganeshalingam ■ Dr. Shanthi Rajasundaram
■ M. Sivasithampuram ■ S.C. Chandrasekaran ■ K.S. Kandasamy ■ P. Eelathunathan ■ A. Amirthalingam ■ V. Anandasangaree ■ S. Thiruvattampalam ■ R. Padmanathan
■ A. Thangathurai.

EDITORIAL

12.3.88

INDIA IN LANKA

The fiasco of the elections to Sri Lanka's provincial councils and the abrupt postponement of an important parliamentary by-election are further reminders that President Jayewardene's authority has been effectively immobilized by the dual pressure exerted by Tamil militants and Sinhalese zealots. It is also sufficiently clear that there is no domestic consensus—either Tamil or Sinhalese—behind the Constitutional amendment establishing the provincial councils, and that a large section of the population views the evolution plan as the expedient strategy of a regime that has lost its moral and political right to govern. But whereas President Jayewardene and his Cabinet are fully aware that the "long Parliament"—elected in 1977—has lost all legitimacy and that a fresh mandate is overdue, they are too unsure of the results to risk going to the people.

The situation might arguably have improved if efforts by the Prime Minister, Mr R. Premadasa, and the Minister for National Security, Mr Lalith Atanathudali, to enter into direct negotiations with the LTTE emissary, Mr Selvakumar, had made some progress. But the manner in which the Government called off the initiative following comments by the Indian High Commissioner, Mr J. N. Dixit, did not exactly enhance its reputation. Indeed, President Jayewardene now suffers from a devastating image problem caused by the popular belief that he is both a puppet and a prisoner of India. Whether New Delhi realizes it or not, the IPKF is now the Sri Lankan President's foremost electoral liability; in fact, India runs the risk of suffering a serious diplomatic setback if

it is not seen to be more responsive to Sri Lankan sensitivities. And the defeat may not be confined to diplomacy. The LTTE's adroit move in setting up the Baicaloa Mothers' Front to conduct its proxy war against the IPKF has already yielded impressive propaganda dividends and conveyed the impression of a peace-loving people desperately trying to resist unnecessary interference by an alien power.

In short, a no-win situation has emerged, and the only hope India has of salvaging its credibility is by withdrawing its forces from the island and leaving the Tamils and the Sinhalese to sort out their own differences. Perhaps this is not as far-fetched as may initially appear, for both the Sinhalese hard-liners and the Tamil separatists are now bound by a common antipathy. Moreover, any deal that Mr Premadasa or Mr Athulathmudali strikes with Mr Velupillai Pirabhakaran is likely to enjoy much more popular acceptance among all Sri Lankans than any accord under foreign aegis that is forced down the throats of a recalcitrant population. Indeed, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's bold initiative in Afghanistan which promises to extricate the Soviet Union from a situation that is comparable in some respects should offer valuable lessons to New Delhi. The unilateral announcement of a date for withdrawal coupled with the guarantee of complete non-interference in Colombo's internal affairs so long as India's own interests are not compromised by the entry of a third power may yet salvage Mr Rajiv Gandhi's damaged pride and, more important, bring the warring antagonists together so that they can jointly carve out the common future.

IPKF: political pawns

Ajit Bhattacharjee

REPORT

"WE don't know who we are here to protect, who to oppose; we don't know who is on our side, who is not; we don't know who tells us the truth, who lies; we don't know how long we must stay here and for what purpose."

The articulate subedar escorting me in Trincomalee put succinctly what other jawans hinted. He probably did not know that I was a journalist and took me for one of the civil officers visiting the IPKF for some unstated reason.

Perhaps I should have told him, but it was a relief to hear someone telling me plainly what others presumably felt. Indian army officers were polite and helpful, but none would say a word about their job. Only the PRO, a junior officer with no combat experience, was entitled to spout the banal official hand-outs that I had not come all the way to hear.

Even jawans were reluctant, to be photographed (I had to use a telephoto lens). They believed that to publicise their names could merit a court-martial.

An outsider would have thought that the IPKF had something to hide, that it was engaged in some shady operation that had to be kept secret: as some foreign newsmen have concluded. I might have been tempted to believe the same if I had not seen at first hand the excellent, if unrewarding, job they were doing on the ground.

MUM'S THE WORD

Even Major-General Jameel Mahmood, who is entrusted with the command of nearly 20,000 men and their equipment, is obviously barred from talking about his mission to newsmen. He was polite and invited me to lunch, and arranged for my safe return to Colombo in the light plane of a Sri Lankan brigadier (who was far less inhibited). As far as the work of the IPKF was concerned, however, he said that I would have to make my assessment from what I heard from civilians.

Fortunately, some of the things told to him in my presence indicated the character and sensitivity of his assignment. At one point, for instance, another officer asked for permission to celebrate a regimental raising day on April 1. He did not turn it down

because it was All Fools Day, but because it was Good Friday and a celebration could hurt Christian sentiment.

After lunch, another officer on his staff informed the general that they had been able to pinpoint an LTTE position by getting a fix on a radio transmission. His immediate reaction was to ask what action had been taken. He was reassured that a helicopter force had been despatched to the spot.

CHILD LABOUR

There was no point in my asking for details, or to inquire about the outcome later. He was not authorised to tell me. But I learnt from others that the LTTE operate in groups of three or four and are expert in mining roads with explosives that can immobilise a tank or incapacitate a platoon. Their radio communications are excellent. They ensure against capture by forcing villagers to inform them of approaching IPKF patrols. Children are used to relay warnings to them.

My journey by bus through the countryside had impressed me with the difficulty of locating terrorist hide-outs, and so I could envisage the problems the IPKF faced. But without this experience, it would have been difficult to appreciate why more than 70,000 men (the figure I gathered elsewhere) were unable to eliminate a terrorist group numbered at a few hundred. Had the general and his officers been able to put across their problems, the IPKF's morale would have been much higher.

A previous insight into the Defence Ministry's self-defeating approach to public information, however, had prepared me for such stupidity. An excellent PTI-TV documentary on Sri Lanka had been robbed of its credibility because all references to gaps in information, preliminary mistakes and other problems had been censored. Among the victims was Maj. Gen. Mahmood.

The Defence Ministry has always preferred news management to truth. But the blanket of secrecy cast over the IPKF's operations is darker than usual. No casualty lists, giving name and unit have been issued, as is usual practice. It did not take too much time to realise why: the men of the IPKF are paying the price in blood for political ambitions and miscalculations, and the unstated and unreal

strategic objectives envisaged in New Delhi.

Colombo has made no such mistake. In fact, President Jayewardene has boasted more than once that thanks to the Accord, Indian soldiers are dying instead of Sri Lankans.

The IPKF's mission lacks precise objectives, a calculable time-frame, even a clear idea of whom to protect and whom to punish. Flown in at short notice to protect Tamil interests in the Accord, our best combat units are bogged down in killing, and being killed by, Tamils.

And although the Tamils now want the IPKF to stay on to protect them from Sinhala reprisals, the Indians get little gratitude. Instead they are blamed for liquidating the LTTE who fought Tamil battles earlier, and could protect them later.

Nor do they get many thanks from the Sinhala residents of Trincomalee. The impression that their primary mission is to protect Tamil interests survives. At President Jayewardene's urging, some additional 2,000 Sri Lankan soldiers and policemen — all Sinhalese — were inducted in the last fortnight on the plea of giving Sinhala residents a sense of security. That the IPKF is not regarded as capable of doing so is implicit in the decision, to which New Delhi is party. And that the lower ranks to both sides do not trust each other was told to me by no less an authority than Brigadier Kopkadewa, Commander of Sri Lankan Forces in Trincomalee.

On the ground, the protection of Sri Lanka forces is another burden on the IPKF. At the height of the tension over the Tamil bus killings, I heard the brigade major instructing IPKF units to make sure that Sri Lankan personnel were not harassed or humiliated.

SCRUPULOUS

The IPKF has also been scrupulous in dealing with local officials and civilians. No buildings or facilities have been commandeered or requisitioned. Even Gen. Mahmood's divisional headquarters is rented. It is located in a deserted angling club. Until a lease was arranged, taking two months, it was under canvas.

When the IPKF was flown into Trincomalee in the beginning of October last year, nearly 100 buildings



were burning and the smoke limited visibility to yards. No civilian ventured into the streets. Hundreds had fled. Most of the damage had been done by the LTTE in reprisal for previous destruction of Tamil dwellings.

The Tigers initially resisted the IPKF, leading to casualties. Order was restored in two days. But it took a month for the bazaar and schools to reopen. Several hundred refugees (mostly Sinhalese) returned. Many are still in camps since their houses were destroyed.

WHOSE DESIGNS?

Some Sri Lankan officials feel that India has long-term designs on Trincomalee, a suspicion strengthened by the known views of New Delhi's many armchair strategists about the strategic value of the port. Initially, it was suggested that India must protect Trincomalee from US designs, even though the United States has spent billions of dollars on preparing Diego Garcia for just such a role. Nobody has seriously argued that the Soviets have their eyes on Trincomalee, but denying it to Pakistan has been mentioned. Yet, the idea of Pakistan spending millions on reconstructing Trincomalee's rusting port facilities within easy bombing range from India, and easier interdiction by India's navy, can only be fancied by non-military theorists.

As for India's own strategic interests in the area, they are amply secured by its own ports and defence installations on the south-east coast and in the Andamans. The need for nearer facilities dates back to World War II, when neither aircraft, naval ships nor submarines had the range, and the long-distance weapons, they have now. But some thinkers in New Delhi still belong to that era.

In any case, the idea of spending so much money to refurbish a port in another country is highly risky. There is little reason to believe that President Jayewardene's successors will honour the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, or even he if it becomes inconvenient. If it is abrogated, is New Delhi prepared to occupy the island indefinitely? It is the poverty of such so-called strategic thinking that has bolstered the vacuous search for instant political solutions that has landed the IPKF in the unenviable position it is in.

18.3.88

From AJIT BHATTACHARJEA

COLOMBO, March 10. — While casualties from insurgency are now routine, official attention and concern are focussed on the east-coast port of Batticaloa where a Tamil mother lies dying. Mrs. Annamah David has been fasting for 18 days and is in a coma.

Mrs. David's death is regarded as imminent and inevitable and is bound to revive the waning hold of the LTTE and strengthen its position in negotiations with the Indian Peace-Keeping Force and Sri Lankan officials.

Other members of the Mothers Front and their sympathisers are threatening to go on sympathy hunger-strike if she dies and the IPKF fails to cease fire and begin talks. This demand was earlier turned down unless the LTTE surrendered their arms.

About 2,000 women and children are reported to have already begun a sympathy fast in Kalmunai. Others in the north and northeast districts are planning to join them.

The Mothers Front evolved before the IPKF came on the scene to protest against the torture and harassment of Tamil youth by the Sri Lankan army and police. Now the protest is focussed on the IPKF. The Mothers Union split some time ago, when local political influence on the Tamils splintered, but is reuniting under the impact of Mrs. David's prolonged fast.

CONFUSION: Differing details about the insurgency in different papers and the Government-owned television and radio heighten the prevailing confusion in Sri Lanka.

Fewer casualties are reported from the south, where the neo-fascist Janata Vimukti Peramuna is trying to terrorise the countryside. But, the situation can be judged by the Sri Lankan Government's decision to postpone indefinitely the parliamentary bye-election scheduled for March 21 in Homagama, less than 30 km from here. This was after a party activist and a local official were killed.

The postponement casts a shadow on the chain of elections scheduled for this year, beginning with the district council elections which are an essential element of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

The Opposition parties interpret the postponement as an admission by the ruling United National Party that it would lose Homagama by a large margin if the bye-election is held. This could have domino effect on the later elections.

The time-table for elections allows little room for manoeuvre. The district council, parliamentary and presidential polls are all to be held by the end of 1988.

Mother on fast gives militants a boost

REPORT

Since the Constitution debars President J.R. Jayewardene from seeking re-election, he must ensure that all these steps are taken before he quits. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord also hangs in the balance. If the district elections and other measures envisaged in it are not completed while he is in office, they may never be completed.

EXTENSION OF TERM: Mr. Jayewardene's opponents suggest that the "wily fox" may be preparing plans for the eventuality of his being unable to complete the process in time. His recent decision to overlook the claims of the seniormost judge of the Supreme Court and appoint a relative junior to the office of Chief Justice is seen as a move to make sure of judicial approval in case he has to seek an extension of his term by amending the Constitution.

Second only to the President in gaining the attention of the press and of political gossip-mongers is India's High Commissioner J.N. Dixit. Every movement, including his departure for New Delhi last weekend, is front-page news. The new spate of rumours concerning a deal with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is connected with his consultations in New Delhi.

So much attention in the press is not always welcome. Exception has been taken to his criticism of the reported moves by some Sri Lankan Ministers to work out their own agreement with the LTTE. "Can't Lankans talk to Lankans, Mr. Dixit," is the headline over a column in *The Island*. Belated explanations that Mr. Dixit meant only that any such agreement must conform to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord has not stanchied the criticism.

"MR. FIXIT:" Mr. Dixit is nicknamed "Mr. Fixit" here. A light column in *The Island* says: "Big brothers came here in large numbers to help us settle our dispute with Prabha. Now, at long last Prabha is willing to talk to us and come to terms. Should not our Big Brothers be happy?"

"No, says Mr. Fixit. We must help you solve the problem. How dare you talk to each other without us."

Sri Lankans fortunately have a sense of humour. But, the impact on Indian diplomats, and even more on the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, is far from funny. Seldom has an army been given a mission abroad in which friends and enemies keep changing.

No joint operations with Sri Lankan Army: Natwar Singh

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, March 18

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, has said there was no question of joint operations by the Sri Lankan Army and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. Putting at rest speculation on the score, Mr. Singh said that during the visit of the Sri Lankan Minister for Land and Mahaveli Development, Mr. Gamini Dissayanake, the Sri Lankan side had raised the issue of LTTE attacks on Muslims and Sinhalese in the Trincomalee area and the fear created among the many refugees there. The possibility of Sri Lankan forces confined to their barracks under the Agreement being asked to defend against such attacks was raised and it was decided that these were matters that could be gone into by the armed forces of the two countries and a solution arrived at that would be within the ambit of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement.

Strongly defending the Government policy in Sri Lanka, the Minister said that the situation today had not altered since the time the Agreement had been signed. The same geo-political situation obtained with regard to India's security environment as did the concern for Sri Lanka's unity and integrity. He said there had been some slippages with regard to the implementation of the Agreement. But the reasons for that were complex and it could not be forgotten that the LTTE had resiled from an important agreement of September 29 which delayed the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the Interim Administrative Council and the provincial elections.

'Great job'

Strongly refuting attacks on the functioning of the IPKF the Minister said that the IPKF was doing a 'great job' in difficult and complex circumstances and it had a marvellous record. He said the IPKF members were "soldiers of a great country called India" and not any State or region and the issue had to be looked at from the point of view of the whole country and not any region or State.

Mr. Singh said that many of the views he had heard from members were expressed without any alternative policy being suggested. He said it was easy to criticise. He said the Government was aware of the difficulties of the Sri Lankan Government and of the IPKF, and "surely no one thinks we have sent the army to kill civilians," he added.

Rejecting the contention that the Government had slammed shut the doors of negotiations with the LTTE, the Minister said that at no time had the communication between the Indian authorities and the LTTE broken down. Referring to the March 9 letter of Mr. V. Prabhakaran, however, he said "We have studied the letter and it doesn't break any new ground." He reiterated the stand of the Government of India as enunciated by the Prime Minister that an acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and a surrender of arms were the basic preconditions for any workable solution. He said as yet no clear 'unequivocal signal' had been received from the LTTE that it would be willing to come to the negotiating table after surrendering its arms.

When Mr. V. Gopalasamy and Mr. Aladi Aruna

pressed the Minister to show some 'relaxation' and be magnanimous, Mr. Singh responded that at one level there was talk of "unconditional talks and at another, a demand for the pullback of the IPKF to the October 9 positions." "The great Indian Army," he declared, "will not be dictated to by the LTTE."

Earlier, members especially Mr. Gopalasamy, Mr. Aladi Aruna and Mr. G. Swaminathan criticised the handling of the Sri Lanka issue and the role of the IPKF there. Mr. Gopalasamy pleaded with the Government to utilise the offer of unconditional talks made by Mr. Prabhakaran through his letter of March 9. He said that the use of Sri Lankan army in the North and East would be very dangerous because according to him, 70 per cent of them were members of the chauvinist JVP. He urged the Government to order an immediate ceasefire and initiate negotiations with the LTTE which had no basic quarrel with India. He warned against any military thrust to liquidate Mr. Prabhakaran and said that if he was killed, "the name India would be a curse in the mind of the Tamil people."

Mr. V. Narayanaswamy (Cong-I) seeking clarification on Mr. Natwar Singh's statement yesterday in Rajya Sabha blamed the LTTE for undermining the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. He said the allegation that Mr. Prabhakaran was not consulted before the signing of the agreement was a "mere propaganda." The LTTE had initially agreed to cooperate with the Government.

Mr. Ram Awadhes Singh (LD) asked the Government to come out of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy (Janata) said that there should not be any precondition for surrender of arms for talks with the LTTE. A parliamentary mission should be asked to talk to the various interested parties to work out a solution to the ethnic problem.

Mr. V. Swaminathan (AIADMK) said if the Sri Lanka military was allowed to enter Tamil majority areas there would be repression and exodus to India.

Mr. Madan Bhatia (Cong-I) said the LTTE was being instigated to destroy the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement by those forces which had been busy in "military encirclement" of India.

Mr. Chitta Basu (FB) said that the Government had failed to force the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene to implement his part of the agreement.

Gen. J. S. Aurora (Akali) said that the IPKF and the Sri Lankan army working together would have an ad-

verse effect on the Tamilians. The final answer to the problem had to be a political solution.

Mr. Pramod Mahajan (BJP) demanded a parliamentary committee to assess the situation in Sri Lanka and to chalk out a common and comprehensive policy with regard to the island nation.

Mr. P. N. Sukul (Cong-I), who had recently been in Geneva, said that the LTTE leaders had met him and expressed the desire that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi should have direct talks with Mr. Prabhakaran.

Mr. Chaturanan Mishra (CPI) urged the Government to force the Sri Lankan Government to release all the political detainees and declare a unilateral ceasefire.

— UNI





The Amnesty International presented the documents relating to the violation of human rights in Sri Lanka to the Sri Lankan President on the first day of March 1988. Some of these violations are long standing, concerns about grave abuses by the Sri Lankan security forces, reported for several years such as reprisal killings of Tamil civilians by the security forces, torture and disappearances. Over six hundred and eighty Tamils have reportedly disappeared between 1983 and Aug. 1987. No substantive attempts appear to have been made by the Government to establish what happened to them.

Now the situation in Sri Lanka is entirely different. Following the signing of the accord between India and Sri Lanka on the 29th July 1987 there were no further allegations of disappearances in Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan security forces. Now disappearances of Tamils by the Indian army have been reported in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Other new concerns are an increasing number of allegations that the members of the Indian army have been responsible for rape and other acts of brutality, as well as for the extra judicial killings of unarmed civilians. This report lists eight recommendations for the protection of human rights in Sri Lanka. The main one is that the Government should establish an independent commission to investigate all classes of torture and disappearances in Sri Lanka impartially that such independent commission should also be established to investigate all complaints of reprisal killings by the IPKF.

The Amnesty International received substantial information from independent reports about the human rights violations, in particular members of the IPKF were accused of raping Tamil women and of the deliberately killing dozens of unarmed Tamil civilians, among them elderly people, women and children. Even though the spokesman of the Government of India said those civilians who have been killed were in cross-fire, the

evidence showed in several cases the victims were civilians apparently shot without provocation or in reprisal for the killing of the IPKF men by the LTTE. For example on the night of 12/13th October, 1987, the Indian Commandos descended by helicopter to capture an LTTE base near the Jaffna University two miles away from the Jaffna Town in the course of the major military operation launched to obtain control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE. Twenty-nine Indian commandos were shot dead by the LTTE in the course of the fighting while several others fled and allegedly estimated forty non-combatant Tamil civilians living in this area, were shot at point blank range including women and children in their homes at "Pirampadi Lane, Kokuvil" as a reprisal for the death of the Commandos.

On the 27th October, 1987, the Indian Forces launched their first aerial attack on the LTTE strong hold of Chavakachcheri and an Indian Journalist present in the area reported that the IPKF had deliberately struck at civilian target. At least twenty-five civilians were reported killed at the local market.

In the Eastern part of Sri Lanka Tamils and Muslims were alleged to be the victims of such indiscriminate or reprisal killings. In many cases there were conflicting reports about the nature of these killings as to who carried them out. This was so because of denial of access to outsiders by the IPKF. For example, the local Citizen Committee was denied access to the village of 'Kalavanchchikudi', 16 miles South of Batticaloa, to investigate allegations that the civilians had been killed in reprisal by the IPKF after four IPKF soldiers have been killed in a landmine explosion. Although a spokesman of the Government of India claimed that only three people had been killed in fighting not as a measure of reprisal but an independent observer present in the village said that the Indian soldiers had got out of control and the civilians had been killed as a result.

The Government of India assumed responsibility for one of these alleged extra

judicial killings. On the 22nd of November, 1987 court martialled soldier on the previous day killed two Muslims and wounded five others when he fired at a crowd near Trincomalee clock tower. In another incident at least twenty-five Muslim Civilians were shot dead in the Eastern Village of "Ottamawadi". On the second of December, 1987, the IPKF maintained that the victims were killed in cross fire, but the residents said villagers were indiscriminately killed after nine Indian soldiers were killed by the LTTE in an ambush. To the knowledge of the Amnesty International this is the only instance of a Sri Lankan Government investigation into the IPKF activities, and in no instance has an impartial body attempted to carry out investigations into these alleged killings by the IPKF.

There have been also an increase in the number of allegations that the lower ranking IPKF personnel had raped Tamil women and some of them who needed hospital treatment have testified on oath that they were raped by the IPKF personnel. For example in "Kondavil" in the North and "Sathurkodanan" and "Morakottanchennai" villages in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka several of these allegations had been investigated by the IPKF although the Government of India continue to deny any such charges. But in December, 1987, a local Magistrate reportedly found the IPKF responsible for seven cases of rape. In January, 1988, four Indian soldiers were discharged and sentenced by an Indian Court Martial one year's imprisonment for raping women.

1. That the Government undertake a review of the implementation of the Human Rights provision in the July, 1987 Accord to ensure that its provision for an amnesty for all prisoners detained or charged and convicted under the P.T.A. and other emergency Laws are implemented particularly in respect of innocent persons. Amnesty international believes, such a review should be taken because arbitrary arrest had been made under the P.T.A. and innocent men and

women had been detained under its provisions. A High Court Judge has commented that the partial implementation of the Accord has been unfair in that certain groups of detainees had been released but the others in similar situations remained in detention. Amnesty International also wishes to draw attention to additional protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts which reads in Article 6 section 5.


2. That the Government should make public list of individuals arrested under the emergency regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act and immediately inform their relations of the arrest, reason for the arrest and their whereabouts of the arrested person and the Government create Up-to-date centrally maintained registers with the names of arrested and their whereabouts.
- 3 a. That the Government must amend existing special emergency legislation so that all arrested persons are in future brought before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of the ar-

rest.

- b. That the Government must issue strict instructions that under no circumstances are relatives to be arrested if a wanted person cannot be found.
4. That the Government must create a system of independent supervision of the places of detention by a judicial and other Authoritative body and relatives and Lawyers be allowed prompt and subsequent regular access to all arrested persons. "Incommunicado detention is always dangerous".
5. That the government must review the rules of evidence under the prevention of Terrorism Act and bring these in line with the normal values of evidence under the evidence act.
6. That the government must establish an independent commission to investigate impartially all cases of disappearances and torture in Sri Lanka in order for it to work effectively. It recommended that such commission consist of persons

known for their impartiality and integrity and representative of the various Sri Lankan communities and should have the power to enforce the attendance of witnesses.

7. That the Government must abolish emergency regulations 55 B-G permitting the disposal of bodies in secret and without a post-mortem examination and to follow the normal rules of inquests laid down in criminal procedure code.
8. That the Government must establish an independent body to investigate all complaints of reprisal killing by the Sri Lankan security forces and the IPKF, the latter having been accused of several such violations in the Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. The Committee must have powers to carry out such investigations, hear witnesses in confidence, assess allegations and recommend remedies. It is important that the members of such commissions have the confidence of the various communities and parties involved.



DMK president M. Karunanidhi exhorts volunteers to campaign against the IPKF 'hunt for LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran', before flagging off a convoy of 40 vehicles at Periyar statue. The four-day rally to Kanyakumari was organised by the confederation for protection of the rights of Eelam Tamils.

RELENTLESS DEBATE ON THE PEACE ACCORD ROCKS THE INDIAN LOK SABHA

Mr. V. GOPALSAMY, M.P., vehemently confronts Mr. Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, with a volley of questions in the Lok Sabha in response to the latter's comment on the India's outrageously treacherous and precipitate involvement with the Sri Lankan Tamils:

Mr. Gandhi:- It is a matter of great regret that the LTTE threw away all this. They went back on every commitment they had given to us.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- May I ask the Prime Minister to substantiate this charge? What are the instances, one by one, when they went back? What are the commitments they made? You should substantiate because it is a serious charge.

Mr. Gandhi:- The LTTE have set out to wreck the agreement.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- I repeat the same categorical and specific question that I did put to Mr. Natwar Singh on an earlier occasion. Did the LTTE give their consent for the Accord before our Hon. Prime Minister did put his signature in Colombo? Here is the statement the chief of the LTTE stated before a mammoth public gathering of his own people, where more than hundred journalists and pressmen from many parts of the world were present:-

"You are aware that this Agreement, concluded suddenly and with great speed between India and Sri Lanka, without consulting us and without consulting our people's representatives, is being implemented with expedition and urgency. Until I went to Delhi I did not know anything about this Agreement. Saying that the Indian Prime Minister desired to see me, they invited me and took me quickly to Delhi. This Agreement was shown to us after I went there. Accordingly, we made it emphatically clear to the Indian Government that we were unable to accept this Agreement. But the Indian Government stood unbudging on the point that whether we accepted or did not accept the Agreement, it was determined to put it into effect. We firmly objected to

the conclusion of this Agreement without consultation with our people and without seeking our views. However, there is no point in our objecting to this. When a great power had decided to determine our political fate in a manner that is essentially beyond our control, what are we to do? This Agreement disarms us suddenly, without giving us time, without getting the consent of our fighters, without working out a guarantee for our people's safety and protection. Therefore we refused to surrender arms. In taking from us our weapons - the only means of protection for Eelam Tamils - the Indian Government takes over from us the big responsibility of protecting our people. The handing over of arms only signifies the handing over, the transfer, of this responsibility. I wish very firmly to emphasise here that by virtue of our handing over our weapons to it, the Indian Government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils.

The time is not very far off when the monster of Sinhala racism will devour this Agreement. Let me make it clear

to you here, beyond the shadow of any doubt, that I will continue to fight for the objective of attaining Tamil Eelam."

This, continues Mr. Gopalsamy, is the history of the Accord. It was not between the warring parties, not between the oppressor and the oppressed; but it was between the mediator and aggressor. Therefore, when you say they (the LTTE) went to wreck the Accord, you (the Prime Minister) should substantiate the charge and say in what way they sabotaged the Accord. It was Mr. Jayawardene who gave the first mortal blow to the Agreement, because he, immediately after signing the Agreement, when the minds of the whole Tamilian population were agitated over the issue of the merger of the two Units - that is the North and the East - publicly said, "I myself will go and campaign against the merger of these two Units." So, it is he who tried to sabotage the Agreement, not the LTTE. I would like to know from the honourable Minister whether the Government of India did protest against the statement made by Mr. Jayawardene.

'Protest Journey' to protect Tamils' rights

A contingent of political leaders, intellectuals, cine artistes and students began a 740-km 'Protest Journey' on March 26 from Madras to Kanyakumari, demanding protection of the rights of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and urging that the life of the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran, be safeguarded.

The journey, which began in a convoy of cars and vans, was organised under the auspices of the Confederation for Protection of the Rights of Eelam Tamils. Led by Mr. V.C. Kuganathan, the journey was inaugurated by the DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, near the Periyar statue on Anna

Salai.

Speaking on the occasion, Mr. Karunanidhi charged that a large number of Tamils were being killed in Sri Lanka daily without any let-up. A fight had been launched against the Tamil race on the island. The various political parties in the State had raised their protest, he said and hoped that the Central Government would pay heed to their feelings.

The participants raised slogans criticising the IPKF's 'hunt' for Mr. Prabhakaran, and its role on the island. The participants passed through Tiruchi, Madurai and Tirumangalam before reaching their destination on March 29. Public meetings were held all along the route.

All these years, argues Mr. Gopalsamy, they have been fighting over the question of state-aided colonization. But, immediately after the Agreement was signed, state-aided colonization was speeded up in the Eastern province with the package of the Government. It was pointed out even by such moderates as the TULF. In some parts of the North, too, the colonization went on. Where is the Accord here?

When the Sri Lankan Government itself engineers colonization of the eastern parts - the traditional homeland of the Tamils - where is the Accord?

The Accord was torn to pieces by the Sri Lankan Government itself.

Mr. Gandhi:- All the Tamil demands have been met and they have got more than what they wanted.

When the Sri Lankan Government itself engineers colonization of the eastern parts - the traditional homeland of the Tamils - where is the Accord?

Mr. Gopalsamy:- What are the demands? The basic demand for Eelam? You do not agree on that, all right. Then, where do they stand, including the TULF? They said the traditional homeland should be one Unit, it should be treated as one Unit - that is the north-east. That is their basic demand which the president of Sri Lanka had totally objected to, saying that there is no question of "traditional homeland." If there is no question of traditional homeland, then what has been the demand of the Tamils all these years?

Mr. Chairman, Our Prime Minister says that the demands of the Tamils have been accepted. What happened to their demand for the right of self-determination? This was not accepted. Even the TULF, the moderates, and others have pointed out that these bills already introduced did not meet the aspirations of the Tamils and that the devolution of power

which was assured would never satisfy them or any of their groups.

One more point on the question of colonization. Mr. Chairman, 200 army camps were not dismantled as per the Agreement. Police stations were opened in the Tamil areas. So, the situation became very tense.

Mr. Dhileepan, the propaganda secretary of the political wing of the LTTE, started his fast-unto-death. After 12 days he died, at a tender age. Sir, our All India Radio ridiculed the fast-unto-death. Is it a Gandhian attitude? This is the attitude of the Indian Government. Let me ask a simple question. The Government's statement says that Mr. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, rushed many times in relation to the fast. Did he go to the place where he was fasting? Did he persuade him not to carry on the fast? Did he make any request with an eye to ending the fast? If the demands had been conceded, or had some effective steps been taken to stop the colonization, his precious life would have been saved.

Another unfortunate tragic incident took place that created a turning point in the relationship between the LTTE and the Indian authorities. That is, 17 LTTE men were arrested by the Navy off Point Pedro.

Mr. Gandhi:- They were arrested in the boat when they were having mounted machine guns.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- All right, I accept it. But, let me put this question. They did not care about death. Most of our friends also say that they have become fanatics and they simply welcome death. All right. When they were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy, why did they not fight? Instead of taking cyanide they could have died by fighting. They didn't fight because they thought that political amnesty had already been given to them by Mr. Jayawardene, that by mistake the Sri Lankan Navy was arresting them, and that the IPKF was there to which the responsibility of protecting them had already been entrusted. It is only with this hope and confidence that they did not fire nor fight.

Mr. Gandhi:- The 17 LTTE men were taken by the Sri Lankan army.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- Here is the Agreement. According to the agreement, the Sri Lankan navy and armed personnel should be confined to their barracks as from July 29, 1987. Then, how were the LTTE men arrested by the Sri Lankan forces? Why did the IPKF allow them to be taken to Colombo? Was it because of the instructions from the Sri Lankan government? This tragic incident triggered off the whole explosion. This is the major cause of the conflict. This is the major cause of the present bloodshed. This is the cause of the killings of the Tamils. This is why I maintain that it is a major question and has created a turning point.

Mr. Gandhi:- You could link the suicide (of the 12 LTTE men) with the repercussions. It might be a deliberate attempt on the part of the LTTE men.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- I never expected such words from our Hon. Prime Minister. I never expected to hear such discourteous words against those who died. Sir, I remember, when Smt. Indra Gandhi was assassinated, there were riots and people were killed. I could understand that was the reaction of the public and I remember the words of the Hon. Prime Minister to the effect "when a big tree falls, the earth is bound to shake." Of course, these LTTE commanders were loudly by their people. Mr. Pulendran and Mr. Kumarappa, on many occasions, had protected the Tamils of the Eastern Province from the attack of the Sinhalese army. They had defeated the Sinhalese army in many battles. They were the immortal heroes of their own masses. When people heard the news that their heroes were made to die, there was a spontaneous reaction and the killings were there. I do not justify the killings. But, even two days back, killings were there. 200 people were killed and it is because of the J.V.P.'s action, I am told. What did you do then? Why didn't your guns turn that side?

(The above is an edited version of the debate)

THE GOVERNMENT SOLUTION - A CRAFTY SUBTERFUGE

by Wakely Paul, B.A.(Law), M.A.(Cambridge, England), L.L.M.(Stanford, California); Attorney-at-law.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of last year sought to solve the Island's ethnic problem by granting to the Tamil minority some measure of autonomy in the North and East, through the creation of Provincial Councils with legislative power in those regions. This was intended to free them from the legislative control of the Sinhala-dominated Central Parliament in designated areas. The Sri Lankan government has now obliged with the **Thirteenth amendment to the Constitution creating such Provincial Councils.**

The irony of this Bill is that it proves once again the reluctance, if not refusal, of the Sinhala-dominated government to lose any control over the predominantly Tamil regions, and grant them any degree of genuine autonomy. The Bill permits Tamil Provincial Councils to make statutes (which in the ethnic-charged context of Sri Lanka) can never become law. By encrusting this in the Constitution, it perpetuates Tamil subjugation to Sinhalese will.

In order for a Tamil statute to become law, it has to overcome two vetoes by two sets of Sinhala elected institutions. It must first be agreed by every one of the seven other Sinhala Provincial Councils, and then be submitted to Parliament for their majority approval. If Sinhala elected politicians to regional bodies or the central government were that empathetic to the Tamil exercise of power, they could have made federal concessions many times in the last 40 years. If, in fact, they were that understanding of the Tamil grievances, they could have remedied them in the national Parliament which would have made this Bill moot. The reality of their reluctance to approve of Tamil exercise of autonomy makes the clearance of these two hurdles a virtual impossibility. The other alternative method of turning a statute into law is more bizarre still. If any one Provincial Council disagrees with the Tamil Provincial Bill, it requires a 2/3 majority of Parliament to make it law. With proportional representation governing future elections, not even a Sinhalese Bill benefiting the Sinhalese public could be passed by such a majority, since no party could conjure up such

parliamentary control.

This Bill is therefore no more than a crafty subterfuge, tightening Sinhala control over Tamil provincial power under the pretext of a devolution of power.

The controls do not end here. The Provincial Governor (a Presidential appointee who holds power at his pleasure and is directed in certain instances to execute his direct commands) can before assenting to a provincial bill, refer it to the supreme court. He could inter alia contend that this is a matter which should be reserved for nationwide legislation (154-G(10)) as demanded by Parliament. The supreme court in turn could hold that the determination as to what is appropriate for national legislation should be deferred to Parliament being a matter more appropriate for legislative than judicial determination. **This acts as a third possible bar to legislation of a Tamil provincial statute.**

Assuming that by some miracle a Tamil statute overcomes all three hurdles, there is another provision enabling the Governor to refuse to implement the Bill or implement it to suit his mentor's desires if Sinhala mass mood surfaces to show their disapproval of the statute.

The Governor who shall implement statutes in accordance with the advice of the board of ministers of the Council can ignore that and use his discretion (154-F(1)) if the constitution requires him to do so. His exercise of this discretion cannot be challenged in a court of law (154-F(2)). Even if the Governor purports to execute the will of the ministers, he has wide latitude to interpret their intent as he wishes, since the advice tendered by the ministers cannot be adjudicated (154-F(3)).

Another serious impediment is the right of the President to proclaim an emergency and reinvest the Central government with Provincial power (154 J, K, L and M); and once again this proclamation remains unchallengeable. In a nation ruled more often than not under emergency regulations, **this hardly augurs well for the exercise of Provincial Power.**

Finally, the last major straw lies in the central control of Provincial Finances unrelated to the Provincial Councils' needs. Their finances are determined by a finance commission on which there is no Provincial representation and to whom they cannot present estimates of need (154-R1). The allocation of funds shall be on considerations quite independent of their legislative program (154-R(4)&(5)) and are not adjudicable (154-R(8)).

To add to these controls is the power of the President to proclaim the nation or region financially unstable, for him to have immediate control of the financial disbursements in the province through his Governor (154-N). This includes the power to reserve the use of provincial funds voted for certain uses and the power to cut provincial salaries, making provincial servants beholden to him rather than the council for their continued existence on secure terms. The question that looms as obvious is how difficult is it to declare a region of a third world nation financially unstable especially when it is unchallengeable.

All of the above comments do not even touch on the controls maintained over supposedly devolved subjects.

Conclusions

We have then a Bill which the government of Sri Lanka will claim was designed to satisfy the demands of the Accord and the Tamil minority. **Tamil refusal to fall into the trap of accepting this pretence of devolution will be interpreted as indicating that the Tamils are extremist fanatics, unwilling to compromise or accept anything short of a separate Tamil homeland - Eelam.** The reality as reflected in this Bill is the Sinhalese refusal to compromise by granting any meaningful federal concessions to the Tamils. It demonstrates once again the unreality of hoping for the relinquishment of the Sinhalese desire to colonise and dominate the Tamil regions. **It gradually convinces one that EELAM is the only solution to escaping Sinhalese discrimination.**

Force hundred thousand

Another 30,000 are being sent

OPINION

THE ministry of external affairs has, from the start of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, been understating the number of troops involved. The reasons for this are unclear. They certainly do not involve security, as the deployment there is well known even to the Indian press. Perhaps, the ministry has public relations objectives in mind, but this is foolish because once the units in the IPKF are known, it is a simple matter to count the manpower.

There have been five major inductions of troops into Sri Lanka. First, when the initial IPKF was sent. Second, when Prabhakaran turned against the accord. Third, during Operation Pawan, when additional forces were required. Fourth, when in December the government decided that the militants had to be overawed by a massive show of force. Last, in March when reinforcements were being sent for the elections.

The troop deployment at the end of the fourth induction was estimated depending on how many support troops were assigned for the planned force of 17 brigades and four division HQs. The ministry has been insisting that the total is around 50,000. How do we explain the discrepancy?

It is an insult to the public to pretend that a 17-brigade force can be maintained with 50,000 troops and the ministry is guilty of an outright lie, which it has repeated with unimaginative regularity.

First, consider the force itself. By the end of the fourth induction it included four complete divisions (4, 36, 54 and 57) and five separate brigades which, as best as I can estimate, were the 55 and 340 independent brigades, and one brigade each of the 18, 22 and 24 divisions.

An Indian infantry division has 17,000 men and a mountain division (57) about 15,000 men. All the divisions are without most of their artillery and integral armour. (The one tank regiment there may be integral to a division but we will count it separately.) These omissions allow the reduction of an infantry division to 13,500 men and a mountain division to 12,000. That gives 66,000

men. An independent brigade group has about 4,000 men, leave the artillery out and we get about 3,500 for each. A brigade from an infantry division, with its signal company, brigade HQ, and a few minor attachments, will be 3,000. So the five brigades add up to another 16,000 men, for a total of 82,000 men.

To this add the Provisional Corps HQ in Madras, which is located there only because the infrastructure in Jaffna is inadequate (2,000 men including two signal regiments), and one tank regiment and three mechanised battalions (3,000 plus) for a grand total of 87,000 army men.

This is the easy part. The difficult part is calculating support troops. An infantry corps in the plains, when mobilised for war, counting corps troops, line of communications units, and allocations from command, is about 1,00,000 men. In other words, for every man within three divisions of a standard corps there is one man outside.

Clearly, however, the Sri Lanka ratio is much less because this is a police

action, not a combat operation. So extra armour, artillery, engineer, etc. are not needed, and supply, transport, maintenance, ordnance, military police, etc. are not needed to that extent. Conversely, the administration will be heavy. For a rough calculation, give 0.33 men outside the above units per man in the 17 brigades and extra armour battalions. This adds another 27,000 men, for a total of 1,14,000.

But not being a wartime situation, units will not be at full or at over-strength. Men will be away on leave, for courses, manning the home bases and so on. To allow for this and for inadvertent exaggeration, reduce the figure by 20 per cent, or 23,000, for an actual realistic total of 91,000.

To this must be added other forces: CRPF (2,500), ITBP (2,000), Railway Protection Force (1,000), National Security Guard (500), air detachments (varying between 1,000 and 2,000), navy, coast guard and marines afloat (varying between 2,000 and 4,000, take 3,000). This gives another 10,000 men.

Put the two figures together, and we get a rounded-off 1,00,000.

At the time I made this estimate in a letter to *The Times of India*, I had explicitly stated that in my view this force was inadequate and that another 50,000 men were required.

Now another two divisions (possibly the rest of 18 and 22 divisions) are in the process of being sent, plus additional paramilitary troops and battalions of the Tamil Nadu Armed Police. The details are not with me yet, but I would provisionally estimate that the overall total in Sri Lanka will cross 1,30,000 troops, inclusive of paramilitary and armed police.


The reasons for this enormous deployment are beyond the ken of this discussion. More to the point should be questions of why the ministry has not realised, after four decades of independence, that it is only a servant of a democratic state, not a master of a colony, and why the ministry is being allowed to get away with its lies.

MAR. 12-19, 1988

—RAVI RIKHYE



Not the last. Indian armyman






இன்றைய இரவை அவனிடம் இழந்தோம்.
இனிவரும் பகலும் எம்தென்பதில்லை;
எங்கள் விதியை அவனிடம் இழந்தபின்
எங்கள் முன்றிலும் எம்தென்றில்லை.
எங்கள் முன்றிலும் எறித்த நிலவுமாய்
இன்புறு நாட்கள் எங்கோ தொலைந்தன
இருட்டுள் சிவியம் எத்தனை நாட்கள்?







.....
நாளாந்த நாகரீகத்தின்
ஒளிச்சுதும் உடைந்து
விட்டினுள் சிதறுகிறது
சட்டத்தின் கரம் எறிந்த
பெட்ரோல் வெடி.
மீதியின் எல்லை
குழந்தைமை கற்பிழந்து
பயங்கரம் முதிர்கிறது
உலகின் ஊமைச் சட்டங்கள்
விறிட்டு அழும்
பெண் குரலைச் சுற்றி
உதவியற்ற
அமைதிப் பிராந்தியமாகின்றன.
விடிவின் திசையற்று
ஒரு சமூகத்தின்
உயிரைச் சூழுகிறது
இருபத்துநானு மணி நேர
இருள்

Sri Lanka : Crisis Deepens

COMMENT SUMIT CHAKRAVARTTY

GAMINI DISSANAYEKE's sudden visit to New Delhi is learnt to be aimed at conveying to the Government of India the urgency of associating the Sri Lankan security forces with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the operations against the Tamil militants in the eastern part of the island-state. This, according to the Minister for Lands and Land Development of Sri Lanka, has become imperative in the context of the IPKF's failure to prevent the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from killing the Sinhala civilians in the eastern province.

Dissanayake's second objective is to impress upon the authorities in New Delhi the necessity of inducting Indian troops in the southern regions of Sri Lanka as a supporting standby to combat the Sri Lanka Government's operations against terrorism unleashed by Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). The significance of the presence of Cyril Ranatunge, the Chief of Sri Lankan joint operations command, in Dissanayake's delegation becomes obvious from these aims.

The whole purpose of the Sri Lankan administration is to draw, more resolutely, the Indian army into the Sri Lankan quagmire. It would be foolhardy on the part of New Delhi to positively respond to these requests at a time when Colombo has yet to call a halt to its policy of colonisation in the Tamil areas.

Is it coincidental that Dissanayake's visit to New Delhi is taking place just when the Government of India has launched a massive operation against the LTTE? Even without holding any brief for the LTTE, it is essential to raise one's voice against the senselessness of such an offensive if its goal is, as it definitely appears to be at the moment, to exterminate the LTTE leadership. For the short-sighted Rajiv Gandhi administration, despite being fortunate to be guided by such able diplomats as J.N. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, is unable to realise that Prabhakaran dead would be potentially much more dangerous than Prabhakaran alive. Any development to that effect will doubtless raise the level of hostility of the Sri Lankan Tamils — especially those in the north — to the Government of India to a point of no return, and result in a new round of intractable problems in Tamil Nadu.

In this situation it becomes imperative to demand, more vociferously than before, that the Government of India should call a halt to the IPKF operations and withdraw its troops from Sri Lanka at the earliest (through a phased pull-out in case a sudden withdrawal has debilitating effects for the local Tamils). The Government of India must wash its hands off and allow the Sri Lankans to settle their own future themselves. The consequences cannot be worse than what we have been witness to since the signing of the July 29 Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

The Government of India, it must be admitted on all hands, has miserably failed to force J.R. Jayewardene to implement his part of the accord. For example, there has been no effort by the Sri Lankan Government to fulfill the commitments made in the

letters that JRJ exchanged with Rajiv Gandhi specifically with regard to the presence of foreign intelligence agencies in Sri Lanka detrimental to India's security interests. The result: there has been a marked increase in the number of Israeli (Mossad) elements in the island since the signing of the accord.

While the LTTE has undoubtedly queered the pitch, the contribution of JRJ towards that end cannot be overlooked either. The Sri Lankan President has done precious little to remove the "undemocratic" odium from his regime, something a liberal like Ronnie de Mel found revolting enough to resign from the JRJ Cabinet. The octagenarian leader's reluctance to go for parliamentary elections that could help divert attention from JVP terrorism and facilitate the "letting off of steam" has been squarely responsible for the current deteriorating conditions in the whole of Sri Lanka adding to the worsening scenario in the north and the east. As for the devolution of powers to the provinces, the Sri Lankan President has declined to take any step in that direction on the plea that such a move would attract displeasure of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court and invite a referendum that would result in the masses scrapping the accord.

But what is the value of the accord today anyway? Has it not been already turned into a scrap of paper?

Rajiv Gandhi must forthwith shed all illusions about JRJ and refuse to back him politically and do his dirty work in the north and the east as he has been doing so far. There could be a rethinking only if JRJ carries out his commitments specified in the accord. There must at least be a threat to call off the IPKF operations.

As for those who want to describe the accord as a document that "smashed the imperialist conspiracy", the less said the better. One is appalled at their naivete, being innocent of the machinations of imperialist forces. These persons are totally blind to the reality that what has happened in effect is that the imperialist conspiracy has been strengthened several folds following the accord. The enhancement of the Mossad strength in Sri Lanka since the conclusion of the agreement does not need any elaboration before those who have eyes to see.

It is time to frankly acknowledge the mistake of the course pursued by India in the last eight months since the end of July 1987 and undertake a candid self-critical introspection. Such an introspection alone can lead to the evolution of a clearer long-term approach to the ethnic crisis in the island-state, one that precludes direct involvement but guarantees peace and stability in that country while ensuring security for the Sri Lankan Tamils through the use of the enormous political clout that India does enjoy in this region. How effectively such a clout was wielded by Indira Gandhi in her lifetime!

Let us not march blindfold from setback to disaster. □

March 19, 1988

INDIA INDICTED AT UNITED NATIONS

Human Rights Commission -44th Sessions

Our special correspondent in Geneva covering the 44th Session of the U.N Commission on Human Rights, held during February 1 to March 11, reports on proceedings. Extracts from addresses made are reproduced.

International Federation of Human Rights. (F.I.D.H.)

Mme.Fabienne Rousso-Lenoir

"On July 29, 1987, the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and the President of the Republic of Sri Lanka, Junius Jayewardene, signed an agreement with the intention of bringing the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to an end. **This agreement was made up of two aspects of the question:** The first concerning the cessation of hostilities between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan armed forces; the second concerning the institution of an autonomous administrative regime in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

We shall concern ourselves here only with the first aspect of the agreement. According to the terms of the agreement, the **Indian Government contracted to send troops, called the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), to Sri Lanka, with a triple mission, viz.**

- to organise and maintain a cease-fire between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the groups of Tamil militants;
- to ensure the protection and security of the Tamils as well as the members of other communities residing in the northern and eastern provinces;
- to ensure the total surrender of arms by the militant Tamil groups.

After a few days of wavering, all the groups making up the Tamil guerilla force accepted to lay down their arms. However, the IPKF authorities, basing their decision on uncorroborated information that one of the groups of the guerilla force, namely, the LTTE, had not observed the terms of the agreement, launched military operations against the members of the latter group, right from the beginning of October 1987. From this date onwards **IPKF repeatedly**

violated its obligations entered into in the 29 July 1987 agreement.

And so, since early October 1987, under the pretext of effecting a cease-fire, the Indian troops have undertaken military operations with the aim of bringing under their control the areas held by the LTTE militants.

As far as the civilian population was concerned, the IPKF operations have been extremely lethal, marked by atrocities committed by the Indian military personnel, in no way justified by the needs of maintaining order.

According to information and corroborated testimony that the International Federation of Human Rights holds at the disposal of the Commission, **the IPKF launched massive air and mortar bombardments, especially at night, indiscriminately aiming at civilian housing where the militants were supposed to be found, particularly public buildings such as schools and temples where the civilian population thought fit to find refuge.** The intensity and the deadly nature of the battles have caused numerous civilians to flee the Jaffna peninsula to seek 'refuge' in the hope of ensuring their safety, in the Vavuniya region. This exodus often took place under extremely difficult conditions. Since the IPKF helicopters shot at sight any moving vehicle by day or by night, the refugees avoided all means of road transport. The civilians also chose to avoid the main thoroughfares for fear of being bombarded. As a result, the journey through jungle, in this period of the year, from Jaffna to Vavuniya took between twenty to forty days.

Moreover, the IPKF has prepared a blockade of the Jaffna peninsula, thus making it impossible to provide the civilian population with fresh supplies which precipitated a situation of dire want. During the period of hos-

tilities, it is to be noted, the civilian population was deprived of even the basic nutritive elements. Even if the IPKF had subsequently proceeded to distribute food supplies, it was undertaken in such a discriminatory way that the supposed sympathisers of the LTTE were deprived of them.

In addition, it is an incontrovertible fact today that **the IPKF were guilty of murderous acts committed without any justification.** So it was that under the pretext of regaining control of the Jaffna Hospital, **nurses and doctors were executed cold-bloodedly.** Deserted civil buildings - a direct consequence of the embattled situation - were ransacked. Acts of rape too have been perpetrated. It is therefore clear that the IPKF has not respected one of the terms of the agreement underwriting the security of the civilian population. **The IPKF may not therefore shift the blame on to the LTTE who, it is presumed, refused to lay down their arms.**

First of all, some Westerners who were able to visit Vavuniya in December 1987 witnessed that certain militant groups presumed to have laid down their arms were still armed to the teeth. These militants regrouped under the banner of **"Three Stars" behaved as though they were the militia and summarily executed, rightly or wrongly, suspected individuals thought to be LTTE militants.** Citizens' Committees have testified that these groups operated with the backing of the IPKF. Arrests and disappearances of persons are rife. The families of persons so concerned have no clue whatsoever as to where or why they may have been detained.

One cannot but be skeptical about the Indian Government's declarations since it systematically refuses to let the CICR into Jaffna where it might perform its invested, hum-

anitarian mission. Likewise, no international observer has been authorised entry into the region in order to verify, as the case may be, if there had been human rights violations. The F.I.D.H. is seriously worried about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Sri Lanka and of the state of permanent insecurity that the civilian population is subjected to.

The F.I.D.H. requests the Commission on Human Rights to plead with the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to take the following measures:

- to respect their obligations, taken under the terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and to permit without delay and without any limitation the presence of the CICR over there;
- to authorise without condition the right of access of the H.C.R. in all the provinces of Sri Lanka.
- to authorise the entry of non-governmental international observers into the Jaffna peninsula and the eastern provinces in order that they may freely investigate the state of the rights of man in these areas.
- to permit the HCR, the ICRC and other N.G.O.s the right to visit detainees and prisoners-of-war.
- to proclaim immediately a cease-fire and to commence at once negotiations with the participation of international observers.
- to abrogate the Prevention of Terrorism Act, a law which enables the security forces, both military and police, to arrest any one, at any time, without the observance of any judicial procedure, a law which is the cause of numerous disappearances.
- to liberate all Tamil prisoners, whether political or otherwise."

International Indian Treaty Council

Robert Cruz

"Since our leaders visited Sri Lanka in 1979, we have been concerned with the Tamil indigenous population in that country. We welcomed the July

1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord as a step forward for peace and justice for Tamils. Tragically, Tamils continue to suffer because of the war against them and the atrocities committed by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. **We ask all to join us in urging India to accept the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) offer of a cease fire that can lead the way to guarantee Tamils all their rights as a People."**

Disabled Peoples' International

Karen Parker

"The Commission, in its resolution 1987/61, requested the parties to the Sri Lanka conflict to comply with humanitarian norms and to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to fulfill humanitarian activ-



Geneve - Palais Des Nations

ities regarding the victims of the armed conflict. Unfortunately, **Sri Lankan civilians now suffer violations of humanitarian law with a devastating effect on life and limb. In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross has not yet been granted the requested access to victims.**

Of particular concern to Disabled Peoples' International in any armed conflict situation are armed attacks on hospitals in violation of Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In the Sri Lanka conflict, Manipay Green Hospital, Tellipalai Hospital and the Philip Nursing Home were shelled by the Indian Peace Keeping Force

in October, 1987. The large government hospital in Jaffna was also attacked, and an eye-witness who escaped with serious injuries reported that at least 200 patients died. Several doctors and nurses were also killed. Eye-witnesses said most wounded bled to death because there was no one to attend on them.

We immediately expressed our concern to representatives of the Government of India, who in admitting the attack, alleged to us that members of the opposition forces had sought shelter in the hospital. Our information indicates that several members of the opposition forces may have been at the hospital.

However, Article 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is patently clear: **protection of hospitals only ceases if the hospital is used to**

commit acts harmful to the enemy, and then only after "due warning" and a "reasonable time limit." The mere presence of some opposition combatants is insufficient cause. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights agreed with us on this point, when in its decision of 17 April 1986 in our case 9213 (reprinted in the 1986/87 Annual Report of the IACHR), it found admissibility based on prima facie violations of

the right to life in spite of Respondent Government's assertion that enemy soldiers were at the hospital in question.

Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires the parties to a conflict to search for and attend to killed and wounded persons. The Indian Peace Keeping Force abandoned the sick and wounded in these hospitals, even though they were responsible for their injuries.

Another incident occurred at Punalai Bridge, where **at least 15 fleeing refugees were killed and 15 injured.** The injured sought aid at Moolai Hospital, subsequently bombed on November 8. Violations at the hands of opposition forces are certain

to have occurred, though verification of responsible parties has been extremely difficult.

The events we describe and many others we could present have been verified to us beyond doubt through direct communication with, inter alia, the highest Church officials in the region, Representatives of European Organisations on the scene, the families of numerous victims (Tamils and Sinhalese), and the foreign press.

We urge the Commission to request the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Disability to investigate these and other incidents involving the parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka with an aim of ameliorating suffering. We sincerely regret the loss of life and injuries on all sides - rehabilitation needs will be difficult to meet. **We ask all Members and Observers to urge a cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the disputes between the parties in Sri Lanka and to assist with humanitarian aid for the victims.**

Minority Rights Group

*Martin Ennals of
International Alert*

"I speak on behalf of the Minority Rights Group to recall to the Commission its resolution on 12th March 1987 on the subject of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

In that resolution the Commission unanimously voted to recommend - inter alia - that the International Committee of the Red Cross should be enabled to fulfil its mandated functions of protecting victims of conflict visiting prisoners, and providing relief and rehabilitation without prejudice or discrimination.

In the 12 intervening months there have been many developments in Sri Lanka, but **strife and killings continue, human rights are violated and the ICRC is still unable to visit places of detention, meet the victims and dispense relief.**

There has been however the Peace Accord between Sri Lanka and India which was initially accepted by all parties and which left many of those concerned about Sri Lanka in a state of euphoria believing that

the future was secure. The 29th July 1987 was the date on which the Indian Peace Keeping Force was invited to Sri Lanka as an interim instrument towards a constitutional settlement providing regional elections for Provincial Councils. The militant Tamil groups agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF and peace seemed possible. The hopes were premature. Violence recommenced. Violence attracted violence and the syndrome of conflict was repeated.

Violations of human rights, by the IPKF, by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and by Security Forces were reported in abundance. International NGOs, individual observers, newspaper reports and official statements **all acknowledged that extra-judicial killings, murders of civilians, and countless other violations were carried out by all those involved in the conflict.**

The purpose of this intervention, Mr. Chairman, is not to point a finger at any of the parties to the conflict as being specifically responsible. All are probably guilty of excesses which have been documented. Reports have been received from Asdia Watch, the Canadian Churches, International Alert, Amnesty International and many others. The press, both in India and Sri Lanka, and internationally, have all carried stories which justify concern no matter which side of the conflict is being reported.

The purpose of this intervention is to highlight the role which the international community can play - a responsibility recognised by the Commission in 1987 which cannot be simply ignored or forgotten in 1988.

There are several elements on international community involvement in the conflicts of Sri Lanka.

1. Refugees; The UNCHR is operating in Sri Lanka and is well placed to understand the situation and to advise both refugees and governments on the problems which confront returnees or those who decide to seek asylum. Refugees have been returned from Europe against their will and despite the advice of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. More European governments are threatening to do the same. The Indian government is encouraging those Tamils who have sought san-

ctuary in Madras to return and many are confused as to whether their return is required or voluntary. The UN can surely amongst its members agree to respect the right of asylum to which refugees are entitled, and to which governments are committed. Of course, it is essential that people return to their homes so that the Accord can be fulfilled and elections held. But while violence continues so does fear.

The Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law are quite clear that the International Committee of the Red Cross is independent, neutral and charged with the implementation of the conventions. To admit the Red Cross (ICRC) is to fulfil obligations; not to concede criticism. **The Human Rights Commission of the UN in 1987 recognised this and addressed recommendations to the Sri Lanka government with the endorsement of India. The plight of the victims has not changed and the role of the ICRC deserves the same backing in 1988 as in 1987.**

Conflict cannot be resolved without dialogue. Today there are women on hunger strike in Batticaloa to persuade those responsible that dialogue should re-commence. There can be no peace without talk; no settlement without dialogue. **If the alternative to talk is killings, then talk must be the preferred option.** The UN rapporteur, HE Mr. Amos Wako referred to Sri Lanka in his report which was presented on March 1st. A positive response from the Commission would reflect the anxiety and policy reflected by the 1987 resolution and endorse the positive initiatives taken by India and Sri Lanka since 1987, while reflecting an appreciation of the political and physical fears felt by minorities seeking protection of their rights to life and safety."

Joint submission by fifty nine Tamil Organisations

Fifty nine Tamil Organisations representing the International Tamil Community have jointly appealed.

'We are aware that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam made an offer of a cease-fire and peace negotiations on 24 February 1988 to the Prime Minister of India, the Honourable Shri Rajiv Gandhi. We are also aware that the offer for peace talks was made unconditional in a telex statement by the LTTE dated 26 February 1988 in which the fast unto death of Tamil women was raised.

We are Sri Lankan Tamils who, because of the tragic events in our country of birth, have been forced to flee. Our organisations represent thousands of Tamils around the world. These organisations have represented a wide variety of views concerning strategies to improve Tamil rights in Sri Lanka.

We are united now in this appeal to you to assist the Government of India, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to achieve a cease-fire and meaningful negotiations regarding what is obviously our fate and the fate of our families and friends in Sri Lanka who remain at great risk."

SWISS FEDERATION OF TAMILS

The Swiss Federation of Tamils organised a demonstration in Geneva which was well attended. At the end of the rally a public meeting was held.

A memorandum was submitted to the Chairman of the 44th Session of the Human Rights Commission.

"The whole world now knows that the **Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord has not led to peace for us but has instead led to more war, death and destruction in our Tamil homeland.** We appeal to you and to the whole world to consider how we can solve the Tamil situation by peaceful means.

The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr. Premadasa, has himself pointed out that 'genocide is now being enacted by the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) instead of Sinhala army, a tragedy for the Tamils." The government of India which championed the Tamil cause up to the signing of the accord is now committing genocide. We are sure you join our distress over what has taken place since 10th October, 1987:

1. Killing of more than 2,000 innocent civilians, mostly elderly;
2. Injuring thousands of civilians in their houses, places of refuge, etc.;
3. Raping of Tamil women and girls in a mass scale;
4. Destruction of houses, schools, temples to the extent that Tamil homeland had never witnessed in known history;
5. Making 500,000 persons (more than half the population of the North).

homeless;

6. Removal of the belongings of the people such as gold, jewellery, electrical and electronic goods, furniture, etc.

We hand over a copy of a video tape and copies of photographs which may provide at least some account of the situation caused by the IPKF, together with a few documents received from our sister organisation in Paris and a copy of a memo from the LTTE.

We appeal to you to use your good offices to bring about a political solution to save the Tamils. **We rely on your immediate intervention to save us."**

18 NGOs APPEAL TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

"We appeal to the Members of the Commission to support initiatives for a cease-fire and dialogue between the parties involved in the conflict in Sri Lanka. Additionally, we appeal to the Members to prevail upon the parties to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to fulfill its activities in conformity with Commission resolution 1987/61."

Athletic Site Provides Gruesome Sight

Chettipalayam MV, the head school in a cluster of schools, in the Batticaloa District in the East Sri Lanka had its athletic annual meet in the school grounds on 18-03-88. The pupils in the area, teachers and the officials and a large gathering of parents and wellwishers of the area were all involved in the festive mood which was moving happily towards the climax when suddenly and least expected a tension engulfed the entire situation. The crowd is restless.

A band of armed youngsters descends swiftly on the grounds, having armed by private mini-omnibuses. A young man who was till then enjoying the sports events and was still absorbed in that particular mood was, in a flash, subjected to beating by short, thick sticks resembling lathi. The public speaking instrument in the sports field ordered to

converge and sit down. The contingent of the IPKF arrived at the scene. The armed youngsters and the Indian soldiers quickly dispersed into the crowd that was seated, pulled out people pointed out by the special identifiers, put them on their stomach and beat them mercilessly with the heavy sticks and butts of rifles. This continued for some time. There is moaning, yelling with pain in agony under this attack. Some students and a teacher were also subjected to inhuman treatment. Some young men brought from a neighbouring house are shouted as 'tigers' and are given gruesome treatment. There is profuse bleeding from some of their heads. The crowd is nonplussed and helpless. There is also some faint wailing from the females there. An armed young ferocious attacker appears on the scene, pointing his gun at the writhing victims. Suddenly as if by an instantaneous impulse throws away his gun, disappears and appears as sudden again with a sword. He alights on the body of the injured victims and deals a few blows

on the still arms of the young man under his foot. This attack lasting about one and a half hours, as the sun went down. Ropes are brought now and the victims' hands tied. They are marched to the military truck and forced into them. The unconscious victims carried to a truck by betrayers from tristar. The soldiers and their allies, the tristar march off vociferously after a grand conquest. It was near dark and with a sad darkness of sorrow prevailing and tears running down the cheeks the crowd silently disperses. Thus is happened that the athletic site provided a gruesome site.

I was also informed by an eye witness that the Parish Priest after coming back from his order was again questioned and abused. I also got complaints that there was several cases of rape by Jawans when they went into the Tannamunai Colony. I shall gather all their complaints in detail and submit their testimony and if possible bring them before a committee of inquiry in person.

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

EYE-WITNESS

An eye-witness account given by a nurse in a hospital in Jaffna during the Indian army's operation to capture Jaffna. Names of people and places have been changed or left blank in order to protect the identity of the writer.

My experience of the events of the post-peace accord period

I was working in Colombo from 1969 and was away in New Delhi from July 1986 to August 1987. At the end of August, exactly a month after the signing of the Peace Accord I returned to Colombo and was told that Jaffna would be the place for my future activities. With the good wishes and blessings from my friends in Colombo I arrived in Jaffna in mid-September. My friends were glad that I was going to Jaffna at the beginning of a new era, blessed with peace and promise of prosperity.

I found Jaffna to possess the same calm, peaceful and friendly nature. But the destruction wrought by the recent military offensive has left a permanent scar in the land as well as in the hearts of the people of Jaffna. As I listened to the tales of woe I felt like an outsider who has not shared with them their pain and sorrow, their courage and fortitude in times of crisis.

The so-called peace lasted only for a week of my coming to Jaffna. There were hartals, demonstrations, hunger-strikes, fast-unto-death etc. The trains stopped operating, there was no postal service, and no newspapers were available at our door.

Following the arrest and violent death of 17 militants, a widespread destruction and wanton



killings of Sinhalese in the North and East took place. In this holocaust Mr. Anthony muthu, the Government Agent of Batticaloa was caught, and the charred remains were brought to Jaffna for interment.

It was 10th October. The funeral of Mr. Anthony muthu was to take place around 4 p.m. Mary, Kamala and myself were to attend the funeral service. Already by 1-30 p.m. I heard the helicopters droning and the sound of bomb blasts. AT 2-30 p.m. when I was ready to leave the house, I found Kamala busy with six patients injured from shell blasts, and she said that it was not advisable to leave the house as some shells have fallen very close to the Convent. Mary, who was in Jaffna during the worst Sri Lankan offensive assured me that we could safely attend the funeral. As we left our house through the rear gate, we were told that a person had been killed down that lane due to bomb blast. With the helicopters hovering over our heads we reached the funeral house. Around 5-45 p.m. Father Felix Ariam announced that the Holy Mass would not be conducted as programmed earlier. With a very short prayer service, the remains of Mr. Anthony muthu were removed to the cemetery and laid to rest. When we came back to the house along the Beach Road, we saw crowds of people moving out from Gurunagar and going towards Passaiyoor. There had been some damage in Gurunagar and people who had experienced similar situations during 'Operation Libera-

tion' were fleeing from their homes, carrying their children, bundles of clothes, buckets, utensils, etc. Some were pushing hand-carts loaded with bundles. **I was reminded of the Exodus of old.** The difference is that there was no one to lead them and there was no hope of the 'promised land'.

In the evening a 36-hour curfew was announced. **Sunday 11th October** remained calm except for a few helicopters hovering in the sky. From our house we could watch the helicopters land and take off from the island just opposite - on the other side of the lagoon - Mandaitivu.

On Monday 12th October, there were shell blasts from morning, and at about 8 am I was called to the out-patients department as there were many casualties from shell blasts. When I went to the O.P.D. I saw two Doctors (one of them Dr. Ganesh who was later shot dead at the General Hospital) and six nurses busy attending on the injured. The sight was terrible. - a girl of 18 with an injury on the abdomen and half her bowels out, was lying on a bench, dead. - a man of 60, had no apparent injuries, but was sweating profusely, died after 15 minutes, probably of a myocardial infarction. - a boy of 8 with a head injury shifted to General Hospital, died later. - another boy of 8, with an injury at the back sustained a pneumothorax. - a woman of 50 had a fracture of the femur. - two brothers aged 7 and 5 were miraculously saved. One had a piece of shell in the neck which had just missed his windpipe by one mm. The other had a wound in the chest wall exposing two of his ribs. In all there were 17 wounded and we had to send six of them to the General Hospital as we could not handle them at our hospital.

The worst tragedy is the relatives, had no place to keep the dead to give a chance for relatives to pay their last respects. The dead man was removed to the cemetery, and the girl was taken to a hut close by and

was kept there till evening. Around 10-30 a.m. on the same day, we received the news that Camillus, the nephew of one of our nurses, was killed in another incident. He was 18 years old. His sister is also a nurse in our hospital and his father is also employed here. Curfew was on and it was not safe for anyone to be on the road, but since we had to get the body from the General Hospital I went with Cutty and on our way we informed Selvam, and he accompanied us. It took more than two hours to go through the formalities in the Gen. Hospital to release the body.

I walked into the mortuary and I regretted for doing so. I will never be able to forget that scene. One corpse was lying without the head; one woman had a big hole in the abdomen; a new-born infant was lying in a corner dead. The whole room was strewn with bodies. When we checked at the police post we found out that there had been 29 deaths that morning. Camillus was the 30th according to the register. There was no one to claim some corpses; the identity of some was not known. I was beginning to understand what the people of Jaffna had been through during the previous 'Operation Liberation'.

Tuesday, 13th October, dawned with one casualty. A man from Ariyalai was brought with a hole in the abdomen through which the loops of intestines were protruding. After doing the necessary treatment we packed him off to the General Hospital without any delay. The funeral of Camillus took place around 9 a.m. The atmosphere seemed to be quiet. But when we were at the cemetery helicopters hovered over us and we were told that the curfew was on from 10 a.m. So we hurried home. We had no electricity from the 12th, Monday.

DEEPAVALI 'FIREWORKS'

From 14th to 20th it was a common sight to see one or two helicopters

accompanying a bomber. For me it was something new. But others seemed to be very familiar with the sight. They had their own name for each. The helicopter which accompanies the bomber is known as the 'task bearer', for it instructs the bomber about the places to be bombed. One which hovers alone for sometime is the 'spy'. The sea 'plane' is the 'photographer'. When we tune our radio, the FM band, we could clearly hear the instructions. The people were sure that the 'bomber' could not stay for more than 45 minutes. They had listened to the conversation "The stuff is over, I am returning. Follow me to". So, it is either the fuel or the explosives that do not last for more than 45 minutes.

It was with horror I watched the bomber dip low, drop something like fire balls and move away with lightning speed. Everyday we had some injured people coming for treatment, and during that week we had four deaths.

The 20th and 21st October are days of feasting for the Hindu majority of Jaffna citizens. Every Hindu celebrates the festival of lights 'Deepavali'. This year these two days saw the worst military offensive. Instead of crackers there were shell blasts. Around 11 a.m. we saw bombs being dropped at a place very close to our house. Several bombs were dropped at the same place, and there was fire and thick black smoke. Later we heard that the target was a five-storeyed building and the jetty. Some thatched huts close by caught fire. A child of five was killed on the spot and five of them were brought to our place for treatment. Around 4 p.m. I was standing at the OPD and I saw a man throwing his bike away and rushing towards us shouting, "He is alive..... He is breathing ...We are bringing him..." As I was wondering what he meant another cyclist came in with a man doubled over his bike soaked in blood. We carried him to the OPD

and as we put him on the table he passed away. He was found lying on the road probably injured about half an hour before. There was a wound in his thigh hitting his femoral artery and he had bled to death. No one seemed to know who he was and it took about half an hour to get in touch with his relatives. He was 35 years old, father of two children, and the third baby was due any time then.

We had a few more casualties in the evening and by 8 p.m. we gathered in our hall for an hour of quiet prayer. At 8-40 p.m. all the hospital staff were called out to the OPD. **Two shells had fallen at Girls' High School, Chundukuli, where about 20,000 people had taken shelter.** It was pitch-dark and the people had been running for shelter. **Four had died on the spot and 35 injured.** One van was hired to take the injured to the Government Hospital. Three of the injured were brought here, one on a motor-bike, the other two on cycles; and we were asked to be ready to receive the others. Another five arrived after some time. There were no vehicles available to bring the other injured. With the curfew on, no one wanted to take the risk. After an hour, four arrived in a handcart. Can you imagine our feeling at that moment? Did we ever dream that we would be forced to use a handcart to take a seriously injured patient to hospital? A child of three was carried by his grandfather, dead in his arms. When he learnt that the child was dead he left him there and ran back to see the other children. We just could not see where the injury was.

SHELLING FROM EVERY DIRECTION

Later, after we finished attending on the patients, we examined him closely and found a small wound at the back. A tiny piece of shell had found its way to the heart. He was lying on a bench all alone, so beautiful and peaceful

and I was wondering how his mother would accept his death.

Two of the injured arrived at 11-30 p.m. Since the shelling continued fiercely even at midnight, we removed all the patients to the in-patient section, and even brought all those who were upstairs to the ground floor. Some of them were sitting up and there was no space even to stretch themselves comfortably. All the nurses crowded into an adjoining building which had an upstairs floor, and the people from the neighbourhood took shelter in the verandahs. Mothers and children sat up almost the whole night, kept awake by the onslaughts of the mosquitoes and bomb blasts.

That was the story of the 20th and 21st. There was more in store for us. In the morning everyone in the hospital was kept busy dressing wounds and cleaning up the place. Though the bomb blasts continued we had no casualties that day till 3 pm. We had just gone to our house for prayers and as we started we were called out. **There had been shell blasts at the Ayurvedic Orthopaedic clinic as well as at St. Patrick's College.**

At the Orthopaedic Clinic about 25 people had taken shelter. At about 2-30 p.m. a shell fell near the well killing two girls on the spot and injuring one. As the others ran towards the well to help the injured, another shell alighted almost at the same spot. And another fell near the gate. On the whole there were five deaths and eleven people were injured. Those who sustained serious injuries were packed off to the General Hospital, and others came to our place for dressings. At St. Patrick's College, where over 8,000 people had taken refuge two shells struck around 3 p.m. injuring about 15 people. Some of the injured were taken to the G.H. and four of them were brought by car to our hospital. Among the wounded was Mr. Benjamin, brother of Mr. Jesudason of our hospital. He had taken shelter at St. Patrick's College.

He sustained a fracture of his right arm and a deep wound in his abdomen. Another old man had fracture of both the right hand and leg and was bleeding profusely; later he succumbed to his injuries.

There was no way of sending the injured to the G.H. as heavy shelling continued. There was no respite till 5 p.m. We could see shells falling just in front of us into the sea and behind our hospital. One fell in our compound just behind the laundry and two in the temple compound close by. Unlike in the Sri Lankan military offensive, shells were now coming from all directions. The Sri Lankan military was stationed in the Fort and were shelling from there; and people could run away to safer areas. But now the Indian army was coming into Jaffna from all directions and as they were advancing they were shelling. We could clearly see shells coming from at least three directions. We removed all the patients to the ground floor of the in-patients' block.

"LEFT AMMA WITHOUT HER HEAD"

Around 4-30 p.m. Sister Allen came to tell us that there were patients being brought through the rear gate of the hospital. There was such a thick cloud of smoke that I could not see her clearly. As I was watching her coming towards the hospital a shell fell just behind the laundry, and she shook off her slippers and ran towards us. Matron Muthu was in the canteen with the girls getting dinner ready for the patients and we shouted for her to come to the hospital.

About 25 injured people arrived within half an hour. There was hardly any space available and we put them on the floor in the labour room, operating theatre, and in the corridor between. The two to arrive first were shouting at the top of their voices, "I saw her.... I saw her... She is without her head... He is burning..." Moving among them with splints, dressings and bandages was bad enough. We had no time to listen to their tales of woe. At about 5-30 p.m. when the shelling abated we got dinner ready, managed to give a cup of hot tea to all the people, collected water and tried to make the patients as comfortable as possible. I

also managed to go back to our house and found all the nurses safe in the hall reciting prayers.

The shelling started again at 7 p.m. and continued till 9-30 p.m. Thank God, there were only two casualties during that time. We neither had the space nor the strength to face another emergency. **The shells were falling all around us and those of us in the hospital thought that they were falling on the Trainee Nurses' Hostel; and those in the hostel thought that the hospital was being damaged. For more than two hours everyone chanted prayers, amid groanings and moanings and screams of pain.** Many of us prepared to face the life hereafter. We had no place to sit even on the ground. Moving among the patients to observe bleeding or to adjust the position of broken limbs and accommodating ourselves between them, we also joined them in prayer. During the two hours some of us tried to reach our house as we were worried about the safety of the nurses there, but it was not possible. Around 9-45 p.m. too scared even to flash a torch light, we found our way to the house. Thank God, everyone was safe. **All of them including the trainees and working girls had gathered in the hall and were chanting prayers.** We had a quick dinner and I went back to the hospital to relieve the others.

Around 10-30 p.m. a five-year old girl walked up to me and asked, "Sister, will you let me go home?" Knowing that her father was also injured and in the hospital I told her that she could stay with him. Then she told me the pathetic story of how she had left her mother, and said, **"We have left Amma in the cattle shed. She is lying there without her head. I want to go and see her."** She lives just behind our house. Seeing the shells damaging a brick- and-tile house close by they had run to the cattle shed thinking that the damage caused by collapsing mud walls would be minimal. Her mother, who was 8 months pregnant, was holding her to her chest and was lying face downwards. A shell fell severing her head and the head of her nephew who was lying close to her. Her mother, sister, husband and nephews were all injured. A

little further away her brother-in-law had been killed. Her sister escaped with minor injuries. When everyone was shouting and calling for help the little girl had crawled out from under her mother. She had a superficial injury on her scalp. She saw her mother lying without her head. Will she ever be able to forget the incident? Forget the scene?

When I went to see the little girl's aunt, I learned that she was a victim of polio and had a deformity in her left leg and now her right leg had been fractured. She had lost her husband and her elder son of 15, and her second son had been injured badly and might need an amputation. Only her third son had escaped with minor injuries.

22nd morning brought more news of the dead. In our neighbourhood, among the people we knew about 10 had been killed. There was no news of the 14 taken to the G.H. We had so many patients to be sent to the G.H. for further treatment; we had neither the staff nor the equipment to attend on them. But no one was allowed to go to the General Hospital.

The curfew continued indefinitely and the people were starving literally. No one was prepared for such an ordeal. After the signing of the Peace Accord everything had seemed so rosy that the people had not stocked any foodstuffs as they had done during the past four years. On Sunday, 25th, five of us plucked up enough courage to go out during the curfew hours. As we passed the five-storeyed building temporarily occupied by the Indian army, some army officers called us and spoke to us, trying to convince us that they were there to help us.

They were friendly and could speak English; and we found ourselves expressing our views about them and about the present happenings, and even went to the extent of telling them the new version of IPKF (Innocent People Killing Force). They allowed us to move freely within their territory, i.e. the area covering Dr. Philips' Nursing Home to Girls' High School, Chundikuli. So, during the next four days we managed to visit the refugees in Holy Family Convent, St. Patrick's College, Cathedral, St. Charles Mahavidyalayam, Ashram, etc. About 90% of the population were in camps. Others were coming there to spend the night. During these visits I met the Red

Cross officials and with them I visited the people in St. Anthony's Church, St. Joseph's Church, St. Joseph Mahavidyalayam, and in the three seminaries. In all there were 20,000 refugees in all these 6 places. Fever, diarrhoea, dysentery and scabies were rampant. Since the Red Cross officials did not know Tamil I worked with them for five days. There were check points at every 100 yards almost and the soldiers did not know Tamil or English and they found it extremely difficult to communicate with us.

On 29th the curfew was lifted for four hours. We visited the Hospital on 29th and 30th. Only on the 29th did we learn about the brutal killings of nearly 100 people including doctors and patients, nurses, attendants, etc. I had the chance to speak to some doctors and patients; and here is an account given by a Doctor:- "On 21st, at about 4 p.m. some Sikh soldiers walked into the Hospital shooting at random. I was trying to get into the doctors' lounge, but was thrown to the ground by the people who were running all over for safety. I remained there for quite a long time, as long as the shooting lasted. When everything was quiet I tried to crawl back to my room; and as I did so I realised that I was crawling over some dead bodies. I remained in the room till morning.

When I heard that Dr. Sivapathasundaram, Consultant Paediatrician, had come to the Hospital I tried to come out of the room. Dr. Sivapathasundaram and two nurses were walking with raised hands and shouting, "We are Doctor and nurses, we are surrendering." They were shot at point blank range. I also learnt that my good friend and colleague, Dr. Ganesh, had been shot dead the previous evening when he came out of the doctors' lounge. Later on we were called and asked to remove the dead bodies. Dr. Parimelalathan was also among the dead. We were given three hours to dispose of the bodies. Dr. Sivapathasundaram lives within a mile and we begged of the Indian officers to hand over the body to his wife, but they refused. We tried to get the identity of those killed by searching their pockets and cutting away pieces of clothing. It was humanly impossible as there was so much of mutilation, disfigurement, blood and smell.

The official count of the dead is less than the number actually killed. According to

official number, among the dead were 3 Doctors, one Matron, two nurses, eleven attendants, one driver. In all there were 62 bodies inside the hospital compound, and another 25 outside the hospital gate and along Stanley Road. All the bodies within the hospital compound were burned inside the premises. A shell blast in ward 8 killed one and injured many. Those brought in from outside were not attended to on Wednesday and on Thursday and these died due to haemorrhage and shock.

On Friday we attended on the injured. There were 22 of us including the interns; and we were not allowed to go out as the curfew was on. Even today I am not allowed to go out. I hear my house has been bombed. I am unable to go and see what has happened. I prefer to stay in a refugee camp than in the Hospital which cannot give shelter and safety."

One of the patients who was injured in the shell blast in St. Patrick's College related her experience: "After the shell blast my sister and I were brought here along with other injured people. My brother also accompanied us. Soon after I was admitted to the ward, may be at about 10 p.m. I heard the sound of shooting and it continued for hours. My brother stayed with us. There was no one to attend on us. Even the next day there was no one. Meanwhile my sister succumbed to her injuries. I was given rain water to drink. I heard whispers that many patients had been shot dead in the hospital. My sister's body was burned in the hospital itself along with the others killed in the hospital. After two days I was put in plaster. Since the curfew was on I thought that my parents were safe in the College. But I hear that they had come to see us on 22nd morning. Since my mother cannot walk this distance and my father is unable to bring her on his cycle, one of my cousins accompanied them. They did not reach the hospital and we do not know what has happened to them. Hearing that there were about 15 bodies lying about along Stanley Road, and close to Subhas Hotel and even up to Gnanam's, my brother went to check. But he could not find my parents. Just now someone said that there were three bodies and two cycles lying along Attiady Road. How can I send my brother alone there to check? It is not a safe place to go to. How can we lose both our parents together? Not even to see

their bodies?"

One of the ladies who tried to go to the Hospital on the 22nd, Thursday, related as follows: "After the shell blast in the clinic we put all the injured into the van. There were eleven of them. Two other boys also got in to be of help. So, including the driver there were 14 of them. Since we had no further news of them all morning seven of us, all mothers, walked up to the army camp, each one carrying a white flag. The officer allowed us to go to the hospital. When we went in we saw a lot of bodies lying all over and blood spilled everywhere. When we inquired about our children we were told that none of them had come there. The attendants who knew us scolded us for coming to the hospital. "Even Doctors and nurses are being killed here; have you also come here to be killed?" they asked. We were shouting and crying aloud and the soldiers ordered us out. We were brought to the gate, with guns pointing at our backs, and were directed towards an old church. I stayed there with the refugees for three days and had nothing to eat or drink. Since I wanted to be with my people I jumped over walls and reached home. I did not know what had happened to all our children. I was told that the children were burned with the van."

On the 30th I saw this van in front of one of the hospital gates. I was too scared to go near it. Sisters Renu and Ruby who were with me went up to the van and they saw some skulls and bones lying inside and outside the van. Crows were pecking at the bones and dogs feasting on them. And that was the fate of the 14 taken to the G.H from the Ayurvedic Clinic.

The curfew which was relaxed for

four hours was further relaxed to 6 and 8 hours gradually. But no vehicular transport was allowed, including bicycles. No passes were being issued. Since there was no transport no food supplies reached Jaffna. People had to go on foot to find food. Everyday when we walked up to the Main Street to buy food or visit someone or to go to the Kachcheri (Government offices), we saw people on the road searching for places to get rice and vegetables which they could not find anywhere. Even if the prices were very high they could not purchase them. Luckily for us, since we stayed along the Beach Road, we were able to get some prawns and crabs from those who dared to go for shallow-water fishing. The people in the interior could not have even that.

What we had seen for the past 10 days were long queues in front of the Premier Bakery (the only bakery functioning) for bread, in front of grocery shops in the Grand Bazaar for food-stuffs, in front of YMCA building for medicine, in front of the Kachcheri for passes either to go to Colombo, or for a vehicle or get food for the refugees. There was also a queue for free rice. You were lucky if you managed to get 250 grams. of rice after standing in a queue for three hours in the hot sun. Without any distinction everyone was made to walk along the road with a begging bowl. Of course thieves and robbers made the best use of the chance.

St.Patrick's Road had become a mini-market where we could get some food items at exorbitant prices; A Kg. of beet root, the only available vegetable, cost Rs.20; tapioca Rs.12 to 17; onions Rs.15 to 20. The price of rice went up to Rs.35 per Kg. and at the moment it is around Rs.22 to 25. Sugar was not available even for Rs.40. The same was true of flour.

Today, a month after the first shell blast, we are still without electricity, post or transport. A bottle of petrol costs Rs.50; a litre of kerosene Rs.28.

an Eveready torch battery Rs.10; a medium-sized candle Rs.3. How can the people who have no jobs, pensions, salaries, who cannot go fishing, driving, etc.; and who cannot walk up to the places where these commodities can be purchased afford to have the luxury of lighting up their homes? We have also learned to walk five miles to Grand Bazaar, stand in queues for an hour or two, buy whatever is available and carry these things home on foot.

This is what I have seen and experienced in the small section of the Peninsula where I live; that is the area in and around Passaiyoor, Koiyathottam, Eachamoddai, Gurunagar and some parts of Chundikuli. If hundreds have perished in this small section

we can imagine what has happened in every other part of the Peninsula; the intensity of the suffering of our people; the loss of thousands of lives and property. It will take many days for anyone to compile from all over the Peninsula's statistics on these losses. It will make a formidable volume of the tales of woe of the Northern people.

As the camps are being emptied and the people start normal life, refugees are pouring in from Manipay, Anaicottai, etc. Some of the refugees I have spoken to told me that they had left their homes about a month before and had been going from one camp to another.

The Peace Accord was signed on 29th July; and we still have to get to know what it means to have peace. May the God of Peace - at whose birth the angels brought the good news 'Peace on earth and goodwill to all men' - grant us the taste of what peace really is.

Cartoon by AJIT NINAN



REPORT

Separate Strategy

Colombo tries to cut New Delhi's role



IN diplomacy—as is the case in medicine—extreme complications call for extreme measures. Thus, the Jayewardene Government in Colombo has embarked, since the start of this year, on what can only be termed bypass surgery in its attempts to find a cure for the island's terminal ethnic problem. But as every doctor knows, such operations often create additional complications and, in the context of the Sri Lankan situation, they could be fatal.

For one, Colombo's decision to hold direct and secret talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has given the impression that the objective is to sideline New Delhi, its partner in the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, and thus regain the diplomatic advantage. If the operation was a success, it would allow Jayewardene to ask the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to quit the island rather than leave New Delhi with that option.

But the end-result is that Colombo and New Delhi have taken different forks in the ethnic road and are busy trying to trump each other's high cards. Having realised, somewhat belatedly, the game Colombo was playing, New Delhi moved quickly to sabotage it. Its High Commissioner in Colombo, J.N. Dixit, announced that any attempt to keep India out of the picture "can be misunderstood". Simultaneously, New Delhi started holding its own direct, secret talks with the LTTE to broker a political settlement. Admits Minister of State for Exter-

nal Affairs Natwar Singh: "We have been talking to them (the LTTE) almost every day for the past two weeks."

But what that indicates is that the right hand no longer knows what the left

hand is doing. It also means that India-baiters like Lalith Athulathmudali, the Sri Lankan minister for national security, are back in positions of influence in Colombo. According to sources in Sri Lanka, Athulathmudali and Sri Lankan Lands Minister Gamini Dissanayake have been negotiating with LTTE chief Pirabhakaran through three key intermediaries—Dr Selvaku-mar, a Tamil expatriate in the US and a classmate of Pirabhakaran, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, former Colombo correspondent of *The Hindu* who has wide contacts with the Tiger leadership; and Kumar Ponnambalam, general secretary of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress Party in Jaffna.

What Colombo is offering is a package deal whereby the Tigers will be given control of the northern province through an LTTE-dominated interim administration on condition that they abandon their claims to the eastern province. They have reportedly been promised more devolution of power than that laid down in the accord.

New Delhi, meanwhile, has let the LTTE know that without Indian support,

any deal it strikes with Colombo will be doomed. "The LTTE has a Jaffna-based cadre and they might be tempted to accept the deal. But without Indian support, they cannot hope to achieve their political ends. Their mistrust of the Sri Lankan Government has deep psychological roots," says a top External Affairs Ministry official.

New Delhi is thus hoping to strike its own deal with the Tigers by persuading them to participate in the electoral process for the postponed provincial council elections—without LTTE participation, the elections will have no standing. New Delhi's intermediary has been Kittu, the LTTE's Jaffna commander, now recovering from a leg amputation in Madras. He is in radio contact with Mahatiya, the number two man in the Tiger hierarchy.

But New Delhi's bargaining position has been weakened. Despite an estimated IPKF strength of 70,000 in Sri Lanka, the Tigers are far from whipped. Now, with both Colombo and New Delhi desperately wooing Pirabhakaran, the LTTE is in a position to dictate its terms. This is precisely what is happening. The initial Indian stand was that any talks

Sri Lanka and India have taken different forks in the ethnic road and rather than acting in concert are trumping each other's cards.

with the LTTE would be unconditional and entail laying down all arms. Now, Pirabhakaran has made it clear that any talks with the Indian Government can take place only if the IPKF withdraws to its "pre-offensive positions" and ensures the establishment of an interim administration in the northern province with majority representation to the Tigers. Pirabhakaran has also refused to hand over all LTTE arms, insisting that a cer-

tain amount of weaponry be retained by the Tigers for their protection.

What this really means is that the LTTE is now in a position to play one side against the other. That situation has been made possible by the fact that Colombo and New Delhi have started marching to different drummers. The prospect that the process could end in some sort of an agreement with the Tigers is welcome. But that also means that the much-vaunted Indo-Sri Lankan accord is now becoming increasingly meaningless—as will be the sacrifice of the 400-odd Indian soldiers who have died on Sri Lankan soil.

MARCH 31, 1988

—DILIP BOBB

BY THE INDIAN

PEACE

6.3.88
6.3.88
8.3.88

Thambalakamam/Trincomalee
Arioddai/Batticaloa
Visuvamadu/Killinochchi

4 women
one young girl
10 girls

RAPED

KEEPING FORCE





HE IS AN HONOURABLE MAN!

COMMENT

R.Narendran, Ph.D.

"... I rather choose to wrong the dead, to wrong myself and you, Than I will wrong such honourable men...." (Marcus Antonius after Caesar's murder)

It is almost seven months since the much vaunted Peace Agreement, which according to the Honourable Mr. Rajiv Gandhi guaranteed the Sri Lankan Tamil minority "more than what they wanted" was signed.

In these seven months the "Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)" which launched a vigorous campaign to disarm the LTTE accusing that they have set on a course to wreck the agreement, have claimed to have killed 1100 Tigers and accepted the surrender of scores of others, from an estimated total of 3000 Tigers in the LTTE cadres. The weaponry of all descriptions, ammunition, mines, etc. claimed by the IPKF to have been recovered from the LTTE in the above time span is too mind-boggling to contemplate. The IPKF consisting of only 7000 soldiers at the outset has swelled according to recent reports, to 75,000 soldiers. In addition, other Tamil Liberation groups willing to abide by the agreement have been armed and allowed to operate among the Tamil population in an exercise meant to introduce them to the ways of democracy. The daily expenditure incurred by the Indian government in this exercise to give the

Tamils more than what they wanted has been estimated to be around, US\$ 3,000,000 per day.

If the Tamil population resident in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka is assumed to be around 1.5 million, the ratio of the IPKF soldiers to the Tamils would be an incredible 1:20 !! The Tamils of Sri Lanka never had this much protection in their history. The Indian government is spending U.S.\$ 2 per day (equivalent to Indian Rs.26 and Sri Lankan Rs.60) to protect every Tamil resident in the north and east of Sri Lanka. This expenditure would amount to an incredible sum of U.S.\$ 730 per year per Tamil and is definitely almost triple the per capita income in India! Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is indeed an Honourable Man. He has definitely given us Tamils more than we asked for! It is no wonder that President Jayewardene has expressed so much satisfaction with the efforts of the Indian government on returning from his recent visit to India.

During the recent Independence Day merry making in New Delhi, in which the Sri Lankan Tamils were also an item in the agenda, the Honourable Prime Minister of India and Chief guest President Jayewardene, agreed that elections to the Provincial Council for the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka will be held before June 1988. Simultaneously, it was also announced that two additional divisions of Indian troops would be inducted to serve with the IPKF in Sri Lanka. No one can blame any one for perceiving a link between these two decisions. Every 12 Tamils (assuming that 60% of the population is of voting age) resident in the north and east of Sri Lanka will have the protection of one soldier from the mighty Indian army, to ensure that they exercise their 'democratic right', free from thuggery, coercion and fear that have been features of Sri Lankan elections in the recent past! There will definitely not be any opportunities for electoral frauds such as substituting ballot boxes and mass impersonations which were evident in the

District Council elections held in the north and east of Sri Lanka a few years back! It would be impossible for such things to happen as **an IPKF soldier will be right behind each eligible Tamil as he/she casts the ballot!** We never had it so good! No other people in history have been given so much protection by one of the most disciplined armies in the world to exercise their franchise! We as a people have to be really thankful to Prime Minister Gandhi for his determination to ensure that we exercise our democratic rights correctly in a country which in the words of its own Finance Minister has long ceased to be a democracy!

There are also recent reports emanating from Jaffna of Indian soldiers marrying local Tamil girls with the blessings of their superiors. This development too is definitely in our interest. Honourable Prime Minister Gandhi should further encourage this trend as we Tamils of Sri Lanka are in urgent need of a fresh infusion of genes from the superior stock in mainland India to invigorate us as a people! Even in the heat of the battle IPKF soldiers apparently did not miss an opportunity to carry out this divine mission and it was really ungrateful of our people to have called it 'Rape'. We ordinary mortals sometimes lack the intuition to perceive the 'benefits' that are being bestowed on us by men ordained by fate to improve our lot.

Those of our near and dear, including my mother, brother and gardener, killed by the IPKF in its drive to provide Peace, Security and Protection must have been discovered by the IPKF to be part of a sinister plot to deprive us Tamils of our franchise. We have been naive enough not to know who our enemies were and have to be thankful that the IPKF, on the instructions of Mr. Gandhi, was able to swiftly discover and mete out the punishment they justly deserved! To ascribe any other motives to these killings and other activities carried out by the IPKF would be the height of ingratitude on our part. **We never had it so good and we seem not to**

recognise it!

Honourable Prime Minister Gandhi is also an extremely modest man. He is a practitioner of the art of *The right hand not knowing what the left hand does.* If not, why should he have taken the pains to prevent the international community coming to know the **Goodies** he has bestowed on our people, Santa Claus style, over the past several months? The **Honourable** Prime Minister of democratic India - the champion of the rights of the Palestinian people and the South African **blacks** - would not be doing anything dishonourable that the world should not know! It will be heresy on our part to even think so! He has effectively prevented even the 60 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu from learning **details** of his benevolence and has done everything short of prostrating himself at the feet of the leaders in Tamil Nadu in order to prevent them telling their people the **details.** *This century has definitely not seen a self-effacing person of the calibre of honourable Mr. Gandhi!*

Thus, it is indeed surprising that the **Arab News**, a premier English daily in Saudi Arabia, should have editorialised (on 8th Feb. 1988), "But when you talk of Indian external problems, the first thing that springs to mind is the country's stalemated involvement in Sri Lanka. Until India succeeds in extricating itself from its predicament there, Sri Lanka gives the impression of being a quagmire which Gandhi has blundered into." The **Arab News** surely cannot be right? Hasn't **Honourable** Mr. Gandhi done everything he possibly can to help us Tamils in Sri Lanka? Is it our ingratitude that is creating all the problems for **Honourable** Mr. Gandhi? Unfortunately, despite stupendous efforts to convince myself of **Honourable** Mr. Gandhi's services to us, the lament of Julius Caesar, "Et tu, Brute?" on being stabbed by Brutus, keeps ringing in my ears.

EDITORIAL

PACT WITH TIGERS?

23.3.88

Mr Natwar Singh may have been sending a veiled signal to the LTTE to begin "unconditional" negotiations with New Delhi when he assured Opposition M.P.s that there were no plans to involve the Sri Lankan army in the "peace-keeping" operations in the Eastern Province, but in the process he has further undermined President Jayewardene's authority. That the Sri Lankan President despatched Mr Gamini Disanayake to New Delhi last week for unscheduled consultations should have informed Mr Rajiv Gandhi's Government how worried Colombo is at the IPKF's failure to protect Sinhalese civilians from the LTTE in the Eastern Province. But instead of responding sympathetically to this justified anxiety, New Delhi sent Mr Disanayake back empty-handed, thereby further reinforcing the popular impression that the Sri Lankan Government's sovereignty, even within its own borders, was irrevocably compromised by the July 29 accord. What makes matters worse is evidence that New Delhi is attempting a unilateral deal with the LTTE leader, Mr V. Pirabhakaran, only a month after Mr J. N. Dixit vetoed a not dissimilar effort by a section of the senior UNP leadership to settle directly with the Tigers.

Judging from the manner in which Mr Krishnakumar "Kittu" and his close aide, Mr Rahim, are involved in the secret negotiations, it is also impossible to escape the conclusion that Mr Rajiv Gandhi is desperately anxious to get Mr Pirabhakaran to make a token gesture which will enable the IPKF to declare a ceasefire and thereby enhance the Congress(I)'s political prospects in Tamil Nadu. The suggestion that the LTTE may collude with Indians in staging yet another token surrender of arms is not likely to enhance the prospects of an enduring peace in the island. If anything, it will convince the LTTE leadership that it can get its own way by playing off New Delhi and Colombo against each other. Mr Pirabhakaran may be fortunate that M. G. Ramachandran's death and the resulting instability in Tamil Nadu has whetted the State Congress(I)'s political appetite, and Mr Rajiv Gandhi is, therefore, unlikely to do anything that might suggest that New Delhi is in any way anti-Tamil.

Mr Pirabhakaran is thus in the happy position of being able to dictate the terms of a short-term settlement from both parties. True, the LTTE's bargaining position would not have been so good if the Indian authorities were able to view events in Sri Lanka without an eye to Tamil Nadu, but the chances of this happening are remote. Indeed, New Delhi's latest moves might tempt many Sinhalese into suspecting that Mr Rajiv Gandhi has chosen completely to ignore the pressures on President Jayewardene and to deal with the Tamil problem in a way that almost suggests that the Northern and Eastern provinces are a part of his own electorate and that he is preparing for the forthcoming general election. He might succeed in negotiating a temporary ceasefire which would be to Mr Pirabhakaran's political advantage, but such a deal could have a damaging effect on India's position in the Sinhalese areas and certainly in Sinhalese thinking.

KANIAHPILLAI PUNNIAMOORTHY (52),
Kolavil South, Akkaraipatti.

AFFIDAVIT

On 5.3.1988, I received a message from the IPKF Camp asking me to report at their camp at Puttambai on 6.3.88.

As requested I reported at the camp on 6.3.88. The IPKF soldier at the sentry asked me to report in the evening.

When I reported at the camp at 4.00 p.m. I was taken into the camp, before a lean tall IPKF Major, whom I learnt was Major Das. He told me that I had gone abroad and brought arms. He asked me to return all the arms.

I told Major Das, that I did not go anywhere other than India. I left for South India on 29.3.87 with a passport and stayed there as a refugee. I returned to Sri Lanka as a refugee after the Peace accord on 24.9.87. I told Major Das that I did not bring any arms or ammunitions. I am not a militant.

Thereupon Major Das began to beat me up with a baton like very thick stick. I was beaten up from 4.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. The blows fell all over my body, the back, the legs, hands, the buttocks and shoulders.

At 7.00 p.m. they connected me to a motor and generated current, I was burnt on both the hands.

After all their tortures of beating, burning and electric treatment they discovered that I was innocent.

I was unable to walk or talk. The IPKF Major Das sent me home in a tractor. I was unable to sit up. I was taken to local physician, who treated me till 8.3.88.

As I was seriously ill, I was taken to Government Hospital, Akkaraipattu and then to Kalmunai.

Dr. M.A.A. Rakeesthy, Medical Officer, Akkaraipattu treated me.

I am now a sick person consequent to the torture in the IPKF Camp.

RANJITHAMALAR, (23) South, Chunnakam;

The deceased Anandarajan was my husband.

He was a labourer. He went for work on 10.03.1988 at about 8.30 a.m. but he did not return home for lunch. At about 3.00 p.m., I was informed that my husband was shot by some armed persons and his body was lying at the culvert at Chunnakam. I immediately rushed to the place and found that my husband's body was lying at Chunnakam near the culvert and bleeding from his head. I checked and found that he was dead.

I brought his body with the help of the neighbours to my house and was later cremated on the same day.

I have two children and my late husband was the sole bread-winner of the family. The parents of my husband too are staying with me and as such they also will have to be maintained by me.

I am undergoing great hardship as I have no other means to support my family and the parents of my late husband.

ERAMPOO POOPALASINGAM (50) Vakaiyadi Lane, Madduvil,
South, Chavakachcheri.

The deceased Poopalasingam Sandirakumar, age 22 years was my son.

He was a Bachelor and a Farmer.

On 12.3.88 at 9.00 a.m. my late son left home to Chavakachcheri market to purchase some food items.

He did not return home till noon on that day.

Worrying about his safety I started searching for him.

While searching, a known person of the area informed me that my son was shot dead by the IPKF and his dead body was lying on the Kandy Road at Nunavil.

Immediately I rushed to the spot and found the dead body of my son with gun shot injuries on his shoulder and hip.

The dead body was brought home and was cremated on 13.3.88 morning at Kuchchapiddy crematorium.

செ. ஹனவாசா

SELLAMUTHU widow of the late Sinnappu Vinayagar alias Vinasithamby aged 74 years, at Kalluvembadi.

At about 4 a.m. on 14.3.88 Indian Army personnel came into my house on a search operation when my son Sivakumar fled the house through fear.

Some of the army personnel ran after and fired at him while he was on the bund of a pond about 50 yards away from my house.

I preceded to the scene at about 6 a.m. to find my son lying dead on the bund with gun-shot injuries on his head.

The Indian Servicemen present at the site refused permission to take the body of my son home.

Later his body was removed to the Indian Army Camp at Chulipuram by the Servicemen.

At about 9 a.m. on the day Indian Army men called at my house and told that I could have the body removed from the camp.

I visited the camp and the dead body of my son was released to me after I signed a document given by an Army Officer. I did not know the contents of the documents and it was not even explained to me.

The body of my son was taken home at about 10 a.m. 14.3.88.

The body was cremated at Thiruvadinilayam crematorium at about 2 p.m. on 14.3.88.

My deceased son aged 36 years was unmarried and was a tractor-driver who earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1500/-

He was the bread-winner of the family supporting and maintaining me and my other three children two unmarried daughters and a son who is mentally deranged.

Since my son's death I am left with no financial assistance or any other form of support for our existence.

செ. வெள்ளையன்

KARTHIGESU KANDASAMY (58) Chanthai Walawu, Chunnakam,
North, Chunnakam.

The deceased person Kandasamy Rajitha, aged 17 years my daughter.

She has employed at a Toffee Factory.

On 21.3.1988 at about 11.00 a.m. I returned home from the market.

I found and daughter's lifeless body lying in our verandah with gun shot injuries.

செ. கந்தசாமி

NICHOLAN SEBASTI (51) Pathima Kovilady, Pondaterippu.

The deceased person Sebasti Hubert aged 21 years my son.

He was employed as a mechanic.

On 25.3.88 at about 7.00 a.m. he left for his cycle repair shop at Illavalai.

At about 7.00 p.m. I was informed that my son's lifeless body was lying near the St. Annes Church at Illavalai.

I rushed to the scene of incident.

My son's body bore gunshot wounds.

The army was present at the scene of incident and they brought my son's body home.

His body was buried at the Roman Catholic burial grounds
-Pandatherrippu on 26.3.88.

I have four children.

I am a casual labourer and chiefly depend on my son's income, to maintain my family.

நீ. இ. ப. எ. து



GANESH GNANESWARY (33) Havakiri Puttur West, Puttur.

The deceased person Seenipillai Ganesh, aged 43 years was my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

On 28.3.88 at about 8.00 a.m. my husband left home for Puttur.

I was informed at about 11.30 a.m. that my husband was shot and killed by the army while he was working in a farm.

His body was brought home and cremated at Puttur cemetery on the same day.

I have six children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and the support we received from my husband.

We are undergoing untold hardships.

சு. க. க. க.



LTTE blames Delhi for militant's death

From Our Special Correspondent

MADRAS, March 25. — The LTTE on Wednesday said India was squarely responsible for the death of "Lt. Col." Johnny at the hands of the IPKF in Vavuniya on March 5.

Johnny, who was taken along with another LTTE leader Rahim from here to Palaly in Jaffna by an IAF plane and from there to Vavuniya by a helicopter, was killed while he was proceeding to establish contact with LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran.

A couple of days ago, an External Affairs Ministry spokesman had said in New Delhi that Johnny was caught in a cross-fire and killed.

In a press release here, the LTTE said that though it had been pleading for a ceasefire and unconditional talks,

it reluctantly agreed to the Indian Government's request that Johnny and Rahim be allowed to meet Mr. Pirabhakaran in a bid to break the ice.

The LTTE alleged that the Indian Government did not even give the two men identity cards. On the other hand, they were told that if they encountered any IPKF party on the way, they could ask it to get in touch with the Vavuniya camp.

While Rahim stayed at the camp, Johnny moved out to make contact with Mr. Pirabhakaran. It was during this period that the IPKF launched the operation to hunt down Mr. Pirabhakaran in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts.

Mr. Johnny, the LTTE, claimed, was unarmed. He was stopped by an IPKF patrol, and though he revealed his identity, he was shot dead, it added.

The LTTE called it "an act of betrayal," and said it had only strengthened its suspicions about India.



C R P

Torture and Inhuman Treatment of Detenus by IPKF

The IPKF is holding detenus in crowded and ill-ventilated conditions. In one instance an underground air raid shelter serves as a place of confinement. A number of persons arrested by the IPKF are stated to have subsequently died in custody. In a case reported from Chavakachcheri, a youth was arrested by the IPKF on 22.12.87. This youth was beaten right through the night of 22.12.87 in full view of other arrested persons. By morning the skin in some parts of the body of this youth had peeled off. A week or so later, he died in IPKF custody. The IPKF is also merciful in that before they disposed of the body, they called the father and allowed him to see only the face of his dead son. The father was also told that his son died by his own hand taking cynaide.

"Disappearances" and Missing Persons

Parents and spouses have reported the 'disappearances' of their children and married partners. In a specific case from Jaffna Town, a man has not been able to trace so far his wife and three daughters taken away by the IPKF in full view of his neighbours on 12.11.87. Another case is that of Mr. Renganathan, Government School Teacher. The IPKF took him away from his Kopay residence on 16.11.87 in spite of the pleas of his weeping wife and children. The wife and children together with relations have paid innumerable visits to IPKF camps without any encouraging news. Seventeen year old Yasotharan Thangarajah a GCE Advanced Level student of Central College, Jaffna and who excelled in studies as evidenced by his GCE O/L results was taken from his jaffna residence by the IPKF on the morning of 17.12.87. His distraught mother, a widow has yet not found him. A married woman with five small children from Vaddukoddai complained about the 'disappearance' of her husband who was arrested by the IPKF on 08.01.88. An IPKF officer gave evasive replies and tried to console her by sending her free rations. Quite a number of persons are reported missing during October 1987.

Harassment of Tamils by frequent search Operations by IPKF and the Lankan Security Forces.

In Batticaloa: Apart from the on-going IPKF operations in the East, a special day and night curfew lasting 84 hours beginning 6 P.M. on 12.02.88 was declared. During this period a house to house search for 'Tiger' militants was made. Nearly 43,000 male residents were required to assemble at a central spot to be screened by the IPKF with the collaboration of cadres from a rival militant group. Thirty two 'Tiger' militants were picked up it was reported; a further 12 died in a confrontation with the IPKF at Eravur near Batticaloa it was claimed. Indian helicopters sank three boats in the Batticaloa sea.

In North Sri Lanka: Search operations in the north are so frequent that not a day passes without some part of Jaffna peninsula coming under day curfew declared suddenly over loudspeakers. The curfew may last 2 days or even 2 hours depending on the size of the area searched. Young Tamil Males are required to stand in the hot sun, for hours. On 13.02.88 a part of a very crowded area of Jaffna Town was searched. Only one person was allowed to remain at home. All others, men, women and children were ordered to assemble at a particular open space. The assembled people were paraded before

C R P

IPKF top brass seated in a Truck with some informers hidden from view. Meantime, IPKF lower ranks went searching every house and premises in the area under search. On 25.02.88 two different parts of Jaffna Town came to be searched by the IPKF - one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. In the second search a number of School boys were required to stand in pouring rain.

A Major of the IPKF in Sri Lanka arriving on leave at Chandigarh airport in Punjab was nabbed by police. He was found to be carrying 100 sovereigns of gold in broken pieces of jewellery. His explanation was that he bought the jewellery. Police believe he snatched it from Lankan Tamils. The Major had earlier flown from Lanka via Madras. — Reported in 'The Island' of 22.02.88.

March 1988

Fides' the International Catholic News Agency reporting from Vatican City states that the IPKF in Sri Lanka lacked sensitivity to ecclesiastics and to places of worship. That censorship and travel restrictions were being imposed by the IPKF in Tamil regions especially Jaffna. Foreign journalists were not being allowed into areas under the control of the IPKF. If ever permission was given it was only to Indian journalists. Reported in the *Daily News* of 20.02.88

Torture by IPKF:

The IPKF while interrogating arrested persons was known to torture them. One form of torture was the passing of electric current. Several victims are afraid to report their ordeal. Of three cases recorded, one said that from the electric power point two wires were lead and electric current applied to this body for two to three seconds at a time. This victim was also hung up by his thumbs. He had deep cut wounds on his thumbs caused by the nylon cord by which he was tied and hung up. On being released the medical institution which he entered could not cure one of the thumbs otherwise than by amputating it. Two other victims described how the current was generated to be passed into their bodies. The instrument would appear to be a field telephone which is wound to power it temporarily. This was used with two wire leads. One lead was attached in one case to the genital and the other lead was stroked on his navel. In the other case one lead was stroked on his chest. The victims also described the violent shudder that passed through their bodies when the current was passed through their bodies.

Attack on Civilians:

On 5.3.88 a lorry transporting Sinhalese from the North-Western Province for settlement in the Eastern Province struck a land mine as it was entering the Eastern Province. 27 Sinhalese in the lorry are reported to have died consequently. The Lankan President responded promptly the next day by ordering 10,000 Lankan troops to Trincomalee for the defence of the Sinhalese. On 11.3.88 a bus load of 45 passengers, the majority being Tamils and the rest Muslims were travelling from Vavuniya in the North Trincomalee. While passing Suhandagama, a Sinhala Village town, masked men threw bombs and set the bus alight. Escaping passengers were stabbed to death. The Colombo English and Sinhala newspapers falsely attributed the massacre to the LTTE. Strangely they also failed to mention the ethnic composition of the dead passengers which they are wont to unfailingly when Sinhalese are the victims. There was no response from the President either.



WHO IS TELLING THE TRUTH?

Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Natwar Singh said in the Lok Sabha recently: "There would be no joint operations with the Sri Lankan forces. To agree to that would lead to the charge that the Indian government is conniving with the forces of extreme Sinhala chauvinism in the attempted genocide of the Tamil people."

In contrast, Colonel Wijeratne, when interviewed by a western reporter in Trincomalee, said: "The Sri Lankan army in their joint operation with the Indians killed eight Tigers in a hide-out in Trincomalee."

HARTAL IN JAFFNA

"Please have your shops open, otherwise you will not be allowed to open them for one whole month." This announcement was made over loudspeakers fixed in an open army truck by the IPKF in Jaffna on March 15. Paying scant heed to the implied threat, almost all the shops in the Jaffna Bazaar stood firmly closed for five days continuously in support of the hartal organised by the LTTE.

BLACK-BADGE CAMPAIGN IN VADAMARADCHI

A black-badge campaign is being carried out by students in Vadamaradchi demanding the withdrawal of the IPKF troops and the resumption of talks between India and the LTTE without any preconditions.

C R P

Highway Robbery and Murder :

Since December 1987, bus travellers to and from Colombo have noticed IPKF men almost all along the Jaffna - Vavuniya trunk road. Yet, lorries have been relieved of the entire goods on sections of this road under the control of the IPKF. The latest of such incidents took place within the last fortnight. There are also, close to Vavuniya, check points manned by an unofficial peace keeping force, popularly called 'Three Stars' by travellers. This group stop vehicles, harangue passengers, extort money, take off youths whom they suspect to be sympathisers of rival groups and on occasions have summarily executed the youths so taken off buses.

A business-man from Vavuniya complained last week that he was almost relieved of a large sum of money he had just then withdrawn from the bank by this group. Having failed in the first attempt, the group tried to summon the businessmen to the group's camp. Having failed in that also, the group made arrangements to close the businessman's establishment. All these happened under the very nose of the IPKF. The businessman has sent written complaints to the Indian and Sri Lankan authorities.

The IPKF is seen going about its operations accompanied openly with militants opposed to the LTTE. The Muslims of Kalmunai in the East have stated that the IPKF came along the EPRLF cadres to search Muslim homes. The EPRLF having taken note of rich Muslim houses, subsequently conducted robberies from such homes.

Killings of Mr A. Velmurugu of Kalmunai & Mr S. Nadarajah of Mallakam.

Mr A. Velmurugu (48) Chairman of the Citizens' Committee of Kalmunai and former Chairman of the District Development Council, Batticaloa was kidnapped from his home at Kalmunai and killed on 20.03.88. Kalmunai is a predominantly Muslim town on the East Coast. The Colombo news media made out that the LTTE killed Mr Velmurugu and added that there was fear of a backlash in Kalmunai. The media's suggestion of a communal backlash was not warranted if in fact Mr Velmurugu was killed by the LTTE. A backlash did take place in the form of business establishments of Muslims being burnt down at Kalmunai. There were also allegations of abductions of Muslims and abductions of Tamils in reprisal. Mr S. Nadarajah TULF stalwart and former Chairman D.D.C. Jaffna was shot and killed allegedly by the LTTE. Mr Nadarajah had been invited by the IPKF for an Indian Republic Day tamasha. Mr Nadarajah delivered a speech on the occasion and that sealed his fate it is stated.

Grenade Attacks in Batticaloa

On 22.03.88 a grenade was lobbed at a passing IPKF vehicle adjacent to the Bishops House at Batticaloa. R.C. Bishop Kingsley Swampillai and about 25 priests and lay workers stood out while the IPKF searched the premises. Three lay workers were arrested. On 23.03.88 a grenade was thrown into the Batticaloa Police Station premises. The Police and IPKF started firing back into passers-by. The firing went on for nearly 3 hours and 25 persons including school children were injured.

CITIZEN'S COMMITTEE

Trincomalee

Date: 20th March, 1988

Time: 11.00 a.m.

Incident: Shooting Incident at passing vehicle - Private Van plying from hire-from the neighbouring jungle area on the approach from Pankulam, nearing VELVERIKULAM on the Trincomalee-Anuradhapura Road, killing one passenger at the spot and causing injuries to four other passengers, one of whom succumbed later at the Trincomalee Base Hospital on 22.3.1988.

Victims:

- (a) Mas. Ponnurasa Jayarajah - 18 years. Student St. Joseph's College, Trincomalee. Shot through the head damaging the brain.
Instantaneous death. Fell on the lap of his mother seated by the side in the vehicle.
- (b) Mrs. Manonmany Ponnurasa: 45 years. Mother of 1st victim. Wounded. Gunshot injury on Right Forearm.
- (c) Mr. Servas John: 67 years. Wounded. Gun-shot injuries in the abdomen. Two days later succumbed at the Base Hospital, Trincomalee. Cause of Death: C.R. Failure - Laceration of Intestine.
- (d) Mr. Bhaskaran: Severely wounded. Transferred to Colombo General Hospital for further treatment.
- (e) Another resident of Anbuvalipuram - Details not available.
(Mr. M. Ramachandran, TOT, Anbuvalipuram - Hand amputated).

Description of Incident according to Eye-witness:

The Eye-witness whom the writer met is the elder sister of the 1st victim, viz: Mrs. Poongothai Malar Karunakaran of Pankulam. According to her, the private van plying for hire left Pankulam at about 9.30 a.m. There were 18 passengers in all at that time. They passed the Security Check Point of both Sri Lankan and IPKF on the route. Immediately after the last check at the Sri Lankan Security Post at 10th m.p. at Kithuloothu, the engine of the vehicle developed trouble with diesel-block which necessitated the vehicle to be parked on a side. This occurred at a place just outside this check point. There was a delay of about an hour for the vehicle to resume on its journey after repairs. When the journey was resumed and barely within about 10 minutes of the journey and after passing Muthaliyakulam and approaching Velverikulam, the passengers in the van suddenly heard noises like gunshots. At the same time, one of the side glass of the van got splintered which they thought was the result of stones being thrown at the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle who was unhurt swerved the vehicle and proceeded at a faster rate. But at the next moment, they realised that it was the result of gun-shots when they found the boys (Mas. P. Jeyarajah - 1st victim) groaning with the words 'AMMA' and falling on the lap of his mother who herself was injured in her right upper arm. There were splattering of blood stains of the other three wounded persons.

This eye-witness (sister of the 1st victim) who accompanied her brother and her mother on the same journey and who escaped unhurt stated that she clearly saw about 4 to 5 person in uniform running away with arms from the jungle area. The mother (Mrs. P. Manonmany) also confirmed this. They strongly suspect that this atrocious crime was committed by the Sri Lankan Forces of the nearby Checking Point (i.e. the 10th m.p.). The reason for their thinking so seems to be induced by their feeling that the inordinate delay caused during the repairs to the vehicle, at a spot closer to the Sri Lankan check-post, provided the opportunity and time for them to plan out and commit this crime within about 1 1/2 miles distance from the same check-point. They seemed to have been cross-examined by the Police while recording their statement as to whether the 'persons in Uniform' whom they sighted at the scene of the incident could even be IPKF personnel or even Terrorists in Uniform. They seem to believe that nobody else other than Sri Lankan Forces (some of whom they met only just an hour ago at the check point) would have done this. These are matters left to criminal investigators and the arms of the law to trace the culprits.



THE IPKF AND ARBITRARY/ILLEGAL DETENTIONS

The IPKF is known to have a detention camp at Kankasanturai and another at Palaly near the airport. According to a Colombo newspaper, there are 390 detenus, including 6 females at the former camp (the position as was known at the beginning of March). An unspecified but larger number is reliably reported to be held at the Palaly camp. Smaller numbers of detenus are also held in make-shift cubicles or enclosures adjoining many house buildings, popularly called mini-camps, where following the Indian 'saturation strategy' the IPKF has billeted some of their men.

Several parents, spouses and close relatives of arrested or missing persons have visited the IPKF Jaffna Town Commandant's office and the many IPKF camps in search of their near and dear ones. Some have made numerous trips to these camps and yet received no information about the whereabouts of the arrested persons. Others have been promised that their arrested relatives would be released early but the releases have not materialised in most cases though the period of detention has exceeded three months.

People interested in the issue of basic human rights are wondering whether the detenus are being held by the IPKF under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and whether the Sri Lanka government has delegated powers to the IPKF under the PTA and regulations framed under it or, whether the IPKF is acting under Indian Laws and Regulations. One of the parents has reported that he had been asked to wait till procedures were completed and papers received back from Rao. (not Mr. Rao but very probably RAW, the Indian Intelligence Service).

1

Tamil militants have forced the closure of the only Tamil newspaper published from Sri Lanka's Northern Jaffna town by blowing-up the printing machinery and partially damaging the office building, official sources said.

Three militants armed with a pistol and 50 kg of explosives walked into the offices of *Eelanadu* yesterday afternoon and blew up the printing machinery and part of the building after ordering 45 employees out.

The sources said one IPKF jawan and a member of the LTTE were killed and another jawan wounded in an exchange of fire between the two sides at Tunukkai in Vavuniya district on Monday. The IPKF apprehended 19 LTTE men during a search operation in the Vadamarachchi area and two of them, Ravindran Ammachari Jegan and Sinnathambi Igniswaran, had been identified as hardcore members.

2

Protest against killing: Shops were closed and private buses went off the road in north-western Mannar town in protest against the killing of two Muslim youths including the area leader of a Muslim fundamentalist group, allegedly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam yesterday, reports said.

According to reports, "Al Jihad" leader, Mr. Abdul Kadir Ramzeen and a companion, Mr. Sellathurai Ameen, were riding a motorcycle when they were shot dead at the 89th km post on the Talaimannar-Mannar road.

The LTTE militants shot dead a leader of the rival People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), Mr. Chandrasekaram at Pettalai in Batticaloa district on Monday and two other PLOT members, Mr. Pakiyarajah and Mr. Mahendran at the same place yesterday, security sources said.

3

COLOMBO, March 3. (PTI & UNI) — At least 21 persons were killed — 15 of them massacred by militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam — since Wednesday in Sri Lanka's disturbed eastern districts, official reports said here today.

The 15 civilians, belonging to five families, were gunned down by LTTE militants wearing army uniforms, in a raid on a hamlet under Morawewa police station, 50 km southwest of Trincomalee town on Wednesday night.

Most of the dead are believed to have been Sinhalese.

Three persons with gunshot wounds were airlifted to Trincomalee hospital. One of them was a Tamil and two were Sinhalese.

Twenty-six persons fled the village following the massacre and took shelter in a nearby Sri Lankan air force camp.

The national news agency Lankapuvath, quoting official sources, said the Indian Peace-Keeping Force killed two militants in a raid on a well-fortified LTTE base in Mailambaveli (Batticaloa).

3 IPKF men were killed in a landmine attack of LTTE in Kathiraveli Batticaloa Dt.

4

COLOMBO, March 4.

Twelve people, including seven Tamil militants were killed, about 50 apprehended and six Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) jawans wounded in separate incidents in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces during the last 24 hours, Indian and Sri Lankan sources said.

Acting on a tip-off, the IPKF raided a hideout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at Urumpirai north, near the northern Jaffna town, and shot dead two militants who lobbed hand grenades at them.

The IPKF also shot dead a third militant while he tried to escape and wounded a fourth, who committed suicide by swallowing a cyanide capsule. Both were armed, sources said. The IPKF recovered four pistols and a large quantity of ammunition from the hideout.

3 TELO men killed: In another incident three members of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) were shot dead by the Sri Lankan police at Malwatte junction in the Vavuniya area. The militants blew up a three tonne IPKF truck carrying provisions at Vakkarai in Trincomalee district with an improvised explosive device, injuring six IPKF jawans.

In the neighbouring Trincomalee district, the manager of a hotel in Trincomalee town was shot dead by unidentified men, sources said.

During cordon and search operations yesterday, the IPKF apprehended 20 suspected militants in Jaffna, 15 in Vavuniya and 12 in Batticaloa.

The body of a former LTTE "helper", Shekar was found at Mallakam, sources said.

The national news agency Lankapuvath reported that two out of three women abducted by the LTTE at Sampathu in Trincomalee district were done to death today while the third escaped.

5

COLOMBO, March 5.

At least 19 civilians were killed and 23 wounded, 15 critically, when a landmine laid by LTTE militants blew up a truck today in Sri Lanka's Eastern Trincomalee district, official reports received here said.

The national news agency Lankapuvath said all the victims were Sinhalese. They included six women and two children.

The vehicle, returning from a market at Trincomalee to Kanthalai, was ripped apart in the explosion, which occurred at Sitharu on the Ella-Kanthalai road.

Associated Press quoting Sri Lankan military officials and doctors, said 26 were killed in the incident. Col. S. Liyanage who visited the scene told AP that as many as 19 people died on the spot and seven in hospital.



Two Tamils killed: Sri Lankan Air Force personnel allegedly killed two Tamils after rounding up 40 of them following the Thursday "massacre" at Morawewa village.

According to reports, the Sri Lankan Air Force men went to the nearby villages, populated mostly by Tamils, and apprehended 40 of them. They were taken to the nearby Air Force station, where two were killed.

Mudalikulam, Trincomalee dt. IPKF attacked innocent Tamil civilians, one person was killed.

6

COLOMBO, March 6.

Two Indian soldiers were killed, one was injured and another captured, when LTTE militants ambushed an IPKF truck near the second mile post on the Vavuniya-Mannar Road in the northern Vavuniya district today, according to authoritative reports reaching Colombo.

A resident from Vavuniya told PTI over telephone that the four soldiers went to the spot around 10-45 a.m. to dispose of a carcass, when the militants, laying in wait, ambushed the vehicle, killed two soldiers on the spot, and injured another.

The bodies of the dead, it was learnt, were put into the truck, which was set on fire and blasted by the militants.

One more soldier was taken prisoner by the militants, the resident said. This was later corroborated by the authoritative sources.

According to reports from Vavuniya, the IPKF cordoned and searched the area after the ambush. Helicopters were also stated to be used in the operation. Details were not available.

Blast toll rises: With seven wounded persons dying in hospitals, the death toll in Saturday's landmine blast in Sri Lanka's eastern Trincomalee district rose to 26, security sources here said.

While 19 persons died on the spot, two succumbed to their injuries at Kantale hospital and five at Anuradhapura hospital. The condition of three of the 17 others admitted was critical, they added.

The victims of the landmine blast, set off by the LTTE were all Sinhalese, returning by a truck to their settlement at Serunuwara after purchasing goods from Kantale market.

20 LTTE men held: The IPKF, meanwhile, apprehended 20 suspected LTTE militants including some hardcore members in the North and East during the past 24 hours.

They said nine LTTE men, including a hardcore member Bhaskaran, were apprehended at Kopaivettikulam in Batticaloa district on Saturday while another militant, armed with a grenade, was taken into custody from the Central College Students Hostel in Batticaloa town.

A hardcore LTTE member, Sivapadam alias Kattan, was arrested in the Northern Jaffna town, while nine others, including three with a large quantity of money on their persons, were apprehended in Vavuniya, they said.

Five TELO men surrender: The sources said five members of the TELO group led by Rajan surrendered before the IPKF with three G-3 and one AK-47 rifle in Vavuniya.

A Muslim youth, Abu Backer, working as an attendant at the Magistrate's Court in Trincomalee, was shot dead at Muttur by two cycle-borne militants on Saturday.—PTI, UNI

Seven civilians were shot dead by IPKF at Aviaodai, Trincomalee, dt.

In an attack at Nelukulam of Vavuniya, dt. LTTE killed two IPKF personnel and arrested one soldier.

At Manky Bridge in Trincomalee, in landmine attack by LTTE on Sri Lankan army 3 soldiers were killed.

9

COLOMBO, March 9.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force has 'killed' 23 Tamil militants during the past 24 hours ending Tuesday noon in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces, the State-owned *Daily News* said today.

However, Indian High Commission sources here could not confirm it immediately, but said 'by and large' the report of the LTTE casualties might be true as there were numerous encounters in the past 48 hours.

In a front page story, the newspaper said the highest number of casualties suffered by the LTTE was at Iranamadu in Northern Killinochi district where 17 militants were killed in an encounter with IPKF.

It said the LTTE opened fire at an IPKF camp there with mortars and rockets. The Indian soldiers, fanning out of their camp, 'mowed down 17 of the attackers'. The Commander of the LTTE, known as 'Waster' was injured and carried by his men to safety in the 'Viswamadu jungle' in the Killinochi-Mullaitivu area, the daily said quoting reports.

The other LTTE men were killed by the Indian foot patrols, which came under attack at Kalmunai, Samanthurai and Batticaloa (Eastern province) and Jaffna, the paper said quoting officials.

Colombo, March 9 (UNI):

Twenty three Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam guerillas were killed and more than 60 apprehended in direct 'fire-fights' and cordon-and-search operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka's North and East during the past 48 hours.

The government controlled *Daily News* reported that the IPKF, under orders to 'shoot to kill' following a radio intercept of a conversation between LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran and an area leader, directing the latter to engage in 'suicidal combat', had been attacked by LTTE at a number of places.

The newspaper said LTTE suffered the highest number of casualties in an attack they made on the IPKF camp at Iranamadu, near Killinochchi on Monday night. It said LTTE opened fire on the camp with mortars and rockets and the IPKF, fanning out of the camp, killed 17 of the attackers.

It said the commander of LTTE's raiding group, identified as 'Waseer' was wounded in the attack.

Mothers Front in custody

The entire leadership of the Batticaloa Mothers Front is under 'protective custody' of the IPKF and held in the Batticaloa Town Jail, renamed Rehabilitation Centre. The Mothers Front organisers were arrested after the death fast by Mrs. Annammah David was forcibly ended by the Indian authorities last week.

ANOTHER MOTHER RESUMES FASTING

Following the forcible removal of Mother Annammah David by the IPKF from her venue of fasting, another mother has started a Fast-to-Death demanding that Indian Government should see reason and resume negotiations to ameliorate the hardships of the Tamils of Eelam.

Paddy fields in Kilinochchi devastated by the IPKF

The use of napalm by the IPKF in Kilinochchi has resulted in many paddy fields in that area being completely burnt down and devastated. It is reported that this act of utter vandalism and mischief has been embarked upon by the Indian soldiers consequent to a disgraceful defeat they had had earlier on that date at the hands of the Tigers at a village called Kallikkaadu in the Kilinochchi district.

IF LTTE LEADER IS KILLED!

Aaladi Aruna of Tamil Nadu has declared in the Indian Parliament that India will be committing a Himalayan blunder if it, by design or accident, caused the death of Mr. Prabakaran, the LTTE leader. He has warned the Rajiv Government that the majority he wields in Parliament should not blind him to the fact that there are fifty million Tamils in Tamil Nadu watching every step of Raj Gandhi. He has told Parliament that LTTE is a power to be reckoned with and there is no other course open to his Government except to resolve the India-Tamil imbroglio through dialogue.

Indian sources said the *Daily News* report was 'by and large' correct.

The sources said the IPKF had apprehended 31 suspected militants in Batticaloa, 26 in Trincomalee and five in Jaffna. Fifteen of those arrested in Batticaloa had been confirmed as LTTE militants.

Sri Lankan security sources said an LTTE member, Suppiah Kalidasan, was shot dead by the rival People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam at Sammanthurai.

LTTE claimed responsibility for the killing of S. Vijayandran, Secretary of the Communist Party unit of Jaffna district and a politburo member, in Jaffna. In a note found tied to the body, LTTE has said he was killed for his political and other relations with the IPKF.

10

COLOMBO, March 10.—Two LTTE militants swallowed cyanide capsules and one of them died after being caught for throwing hand-grenades at the IPKF at Kokkuvil in Jaffna peninsula during a cordon and search operations yesterday, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said here today, reports PTI.

The other militant was taken to hospital in a critical condition.

One more LTTE member was killed in an encounter with the IPKF in northern Kilinochchi district yesterday.

Reports from Pankulam in northern Mullaitivu district said that the LTTE militants killed one "Amaldasan", a 16-year-old Tamil, for being a "traitor". His body was found with gun shot injuries, tied to a tree, the spokesman said.

The national news agency, Lankapuvath, said that Amaldasan had earlier been taken for questioning by the IPKF and later released.

In Jaffna, an LTTE political wing leader named "Shri" was apprehended yesterday, while 45 other suspects were detained in Trincomalee district for interrogation by the IPKF.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force also recovered a large cache of arms and ammunition, including three rounds of ammunition of various kinds, bombs and mortars during a cordon and search operation in Batticaloa yesterday.

11

COLOMBO, March 11

Eighteen civilians, including women and children, were killed and 15 injured today when

gunmen ambushed a bus at Rotawewa in north central Sri Lanka official sources said. The sources, however, were unable to identify the attackers.

Other sources said the gunmen could either be members of the country's majority Sinhala or the minority Tamil community.

The gunmen hurled bombs and fired on the passengers before setting fire to the bus. The passengers were mostly Tamils and a few Muslims and Sinhalese. Police and troops who reached the spot found 12 charred bodies. Six of the 2 injured died in hospital.

The bus, which came from the town of Horowupotana in north central Sri Lanka, was ambushed 50 km before reaching Morawewa in the Eastern Province.

The ambush took place in the same area where Tamil rebels massacred 15 Sinhala villagers a week ago. Last Saturday 26 persons, mostly Sinhala civilians, were killed in a landmine attack in the area by LTTE rebels.

Independent sources believe that the Sinhala attackers could have carried out the ambush in retaliation for the slayings. But official sources declined to comment on this.

Three IPKF men shot dead and 3 injured at Muthaikattu of Mullaitheevu dt, in an encounter between LTTE and IPKF.

The IPKF rounded up Muthaikattu, burnt 15 houses and slaughtered 4 civilians.

12

COLOMBO, March 12.

Two Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed and two others and several men of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wounded in an exchange of fire between the two sides in Sri Lanka's North and East during the last 24 hours.

According to Indian sources here, one jawan was killed and two were wounded in a confrontation with the LTTE at Karanpurikulam in the northern Vavuniya district yesterday. Eight LTTE men were reportedly wounded in the encounter and their arms recovered by the IPKF.

Five other LTTE men were apprehended, sources said. Another IPKF jawan was killed in a shootout with the LTTE at Sampur in Trincomalee district. Nine LTTE members were apprehended in Batticaloa and four in Jaffna, where one member of the group surrendered.

Armed LTTE men dragged out Mr. Abdul Hakim from his shop at Kalmunaikodi in eastern Ampara district and shot him dead yesterday, reports said.

13

COLOMBO, March 13.

Tamil militants shot dead two Sri Lankan Army officers in the north-west of the country, a newspaper reported today.

The two Lieutenants died when their jeep was ambushed yesterday near an Army camp in Mannar district, the Government-run *Sunday Observer* said.

The attackers were believed to be LTTE members, the report said.

Soldiers who heard the gunfire rushed to the area to find the bodies of the two officers beside their burning vehicle, it added.

LTTE man killed: An LTTE member was killed

led yesterday in Eastern Batticaloa town, when he, along with two others, chased by the IPKF, tried to escape in a boat across the lagoon. Another LTTE militant was wounded in IPKF firing while the third managed to get away. They were chased after the IPKF found them putting up anti-IPKF posters in the town.

The IPKF apprehended 23 suspected LTTE men in Jaffna, 16 in Vavunia and two in Batticaloa yesterday.

Two Indian Army men were killed in an encounter between LTTE and IPKF at Kallikadu of Mullaitheevu dt. Then the IAF planes raided the area with Napalm bombs. The villagers escaped but the paddy fields caught fire and burnt completely.

14

COLOMBO, March 14. (PTI & AFP) — At least five women cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were among the 14 left dead during the past 24 hours in Sri Lanka's disturbed north, east and southern provinces in encounters with the IPKF and the police. About 16 LTTE militants were also wounded.

The dead also included three hard core subversives, allegedly belonging to the outlawed JVP, who were killed in a confrontation with the public in the early hours of today at Hakmana in southern Matara district, known to be heart-land of the JVP extremists.

A spokesman of the Indian High Commission said the five women cadres of the LTTE were among the 10 LTTE militants killed in a number of encounters with the IPKF in the northern Mullaitivu-Vavuniya sector yesterday, as the Indian army made concerted raids on several hideouts of the rebels.

COLOMBO, March 14.

In a major offensive during the past 72 hours, the Indian Peace Keeping Force smashed the operational command headquarters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the jungles of the Northern Province, in the Oddusuddan area, and put Mr. V. Prabhakaran and other party leaders on the run. Some 12 bodyguards covering the retreat of the LTTE leader were killed in the process.

Apart from the 12 bodyguards who were killed, 19 LTTE activists were killed and 15 were apprehended. A large quantity of AK-47 rifles and other arms, ammunition, explosives and also a rocket launcher, were seized.

At Kandy Road - 4th milestone LTTE attacked Sri Lankan Navy force with R.P.G., killed an army officer on the spot and smashed the lorry in which the army personnel travelled.

15

Colombo, March 15 (UNI & AFP): Ten people — seven Sinhalese and three Tamils — were killed in continuing reprisal

attacks by extremists of the two communities in Sri Lanka's multi-ethnic Trincomalee district on Tuesday. Sri Lankan security sources and independent reports said

3 IPKF men killed: Three Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed in a series of skirmishes and encounters in Sri Lanka's north and east on Monday, Indian sources said on Tuesday.

They said three IPKF jawans were killed in an encounter in Vavuniya district in which one LTTE member was killed, another captured and a third wounded but escaped.

The IPKF killed two LTTE men and captured two others, while a fifth was wounded but escaped in a separate encounter in the district, they said. The IPKF also destroyed three huts used by the militants and apprehended nine suspected militants in another incident.

REPORT CORRECTED: Thirteen Tamils were attacked, not killed in eastern Sri Lanka today, the Indian High Commission here said, correcting an earlier statement.

A High Commission spokeswoman told reporters that the commission was "correcting itself" following an earlier statement that armed men had dragged 13 Tamils off a bus in Trincomalee district and shot them dead.

A LTTE fighter Vadhavuran was wounded in an encounter with the IPKF. On his way to the hospital, the IPKF tried to capture him alive, but he consumed cyanide. The above attack was at Vavuniya. In another attack at Kandi Road - Trincomalee, a Sri Lankan army officer was killed by LTTE.

16

COLOMBO, March 16. (PTI & UNI) — At least 29 people, including 24 Tamil militants and two Indian soldiers, were killed in the continued violence in Sri Lanka's north and eastern provinces during the past 24 hours, official sources said.

The two Indian army jawans were killed and five others injured in a landmine explosion at Kumburupiddy in the disturbed eastern Trincomalee this morning, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said.

The national news agency Lankapuvath, quoting official sources, said 11 LTTE men were killed and four injured when the Indian Peace-Keeping Force repulsed a attack at Akkarayankula in the northern Vavuniya district yesterday.

It said the Sri Lanka security forces ambushed a gang of LTTE men at



TORTURE AND INHUMAN TREATMENT

The IPKF is holding detenus in crowded, ill-ventilated conditions. In one instance an underground air raid shelter serves as a place of confinement. A number of persons arrested by the IPKF are stated to have subsequently died in custody. In a case reported from Chavakachcheri, a youth was arrested by the IPKF on 22.12.87. This youth was beaten right through the night of 22.12.87 in full view of other arrested persons. By morning the skin in some parts of the body of this youth had peeled off. A week or so later, he died in IPKF custody. The IPKF is also merciful in that, before they disposed of the body, they called the father and allowed him to see only the face of his dead son. The father was also told that his son died by his own hand taking cyanide.

RANDOM SHOOTING AFTER GRENADE EXPLOSION

At least 25 persons were injured, nine of them seriously, when policemen and IPKF personnel fired indiscriminately after an unidentified person lobbed a hand grenade at the Batticaloa police quarters on 23 March. As tension mounted following civilian casualties, an indefinite curfew was imposed which has since been lifted.

According to Batticaloa Hospital sources, at least three school children were among the nine who were seriously injured.

All activities in the town came to a standstill with government offices, schools and business establishments putting up shutters immediately after the incident. Quite a number of buildings were also damaged due to the indiscriminate firing.

Kurankulam in Trincomalee district today, killing eight of them after the villagers alerted the security forces of an impending attack. One Sri Lankan soldier was also killed in the shoot-out between the two sides, the agency said.

In continuing operations to disarm the LTTE, an IPKF patrol yesterday returned fire on being fired upon from a thatched hut at Pudukudiyiruppu on the Trincomalee-Mullaitivu districts border. Later bodies of three militants were found in the hut.

The IPKF immediately launched a search operation, assisted by helicopter gunships, and two fleeing LTTE men were killed, the sources said.

Some arms and a truck belonging to the militants were recovered from the area.

The sources said the IPKF captured an LTTE hardcore member, identified as "Kandipan" at Mallavi. It also captured two other militants, Parameswaran and Selvarajah, who were said to be brothers of a leading LTTE member of the area, "moorthy."

The IPKF destroyed a deserted mine factory of the militants, the sources said.

While engaging in a cordon and search operation near the bushes at Kumpirupitti of Trincomalee dt, IPKF men ran into the Landmines set by LTTE and 9 of them died.

In Mannar - Vellakulam area, in an encounter with IPKF, 5 soldiers were killed.

Subsequently LTTE attacked with claymore mines. IPKF casualties not known, but two LTTE men Tamaran and Murali have lost their lives.

In an attack on Sri Lankan forces at Triyai LTTE killed one Lankan soldier and wounded 4 personnel.

Two innocent civilians were shot dead and 4 wounded in the IPKF round-up. All the video equipments in a mini theatre were looted by IPKF men.

17

Hideouts smashed: The encounters invariably followed sniper attacks by the LTTE on IPKF search parties. A number of LTTE hideouts in the sector were smashed during the operation and the group was virtually on the run everywhere.

The sources said reports in a section of the press that Mr. Prabakaran barely managed to escape when the IPKF smashed his operational headquarters at Oddusuddan in Vavuniya district were "by and large correct." About 12 of his bodyguards covering his retreat were killed by the IPKF. The encounters with the LTTE were mainly around hamlets hugging the thick jungles.

15 LTTE men held: The Indian High Commission sources said the IPKF apprehended 15 LTTE militants each in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Jaffna sectors yesterday. It also took into custody two Sinhalese with powerful automatic weapons in Batticaloa. The two were being questioned. With one IPKF jawan dying of injur-

ies in hospital today, the death toll in yesterday's landmine blast at Kumburupiddy in Trincomalee district rose to two, the sources said.

The LTTE's Camp at Triyai was attacked by IPKF but repelled.

18

COLOMBO, March 18.

In an attack last night on two Sinhala settlement colonies in Digavapia village in Sri Lanka's hill Ampara district alleged LTTE militants hacked to death at least 14 civilians and seriously wounded over 15, according to authoritative reports received here today.

The dead, it was learnt, included six men, three women, four girls and a boy. The injured, most of whom sustained deep wounds or had their limbs chopped off were initially taken to Ampara hospital. Three of the serious cases were taken to Candy hospital in the hill district this morning.

Digavapia is a holy Buddhist village having a historical cave.

The national news agency, Lankapuvath, put the number of attacking Tamil militants around 20.

With this about 100 civilians have been killed in the past fortnight in the disturbed eastern province at places in Trincomalee district and adjoining areas of Ampara in renewed violence.

Most of the victims were Sinhalese but there were Tamil civilians also among the victims killed by Sinhala chauvinists.

Sri Lankan army kills militants: Sri Lanka's Army killed 10 people in its first gunbattle with Tamil militants since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, military officials said today in Trincomalee.

Colonel Lakshman Wijeratne, acting security coordinating officer of this eastern district, told reporters that 10 soldiers fought 20 militants on Wednesday in the militants' hideout at Kilankulam after hunting them for a day.

Eight members of the LTTE and two of four young women cooking for them were killed, he said. He said the militants belonged to a group who shot, hacked and burned alive 15 villagers from the Sinhalese majority on Tuesday.

The battle was fought without consultation with the IPKF. — PTI, UNI, Reuter

Two IPKF men were shot dead and one wounded by LTTE attack on IPKF's camp in Thunkayil at Mullaitheevu.

The IPKF rounded up Kumpurupiddi Village at Trincomalee dt. and arrested 5 innocent civilians.

21

COLOMBO, March 21.

A 20-hour curfew was clamped on Kalmunai today after the president of the Kalmunai Citizens Committee in Amparai district in the Eastern Province, Mr. Kandaiah Velmurugu, was shot dead last night allegedly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, official reports reaching here said today.

The IPKF patrol headed towards Kudumimalai area in Batticaloa was under attack by LTTE near Taravai. The casual ties of the soldiers in 3 trucks and a jeep were not known.

The IPKF patrol, heading towards Palampasi from Nedunkeni army camp, was ambushed by LTTE - Guerrillas, with two casualties, they soon took their heels to oddisudan army camp and fired mortars at civilian lines. A whole family of 7 members fell victims to the shell including a 6 months old child. 3 others were wounded along with a child.

22

Madurai, March 22: Tamil Nadu Congress leader P. Nedumaran claimed on Tuesday that LTTE leader "Jhonny" was actually shot dead by the Indian Peace Keeping Force as he had refused to take them to Prabhakaran's hideout.

(According to Government of India, "Jhonny", who had been escorting "Raheem" to Prabhakaran's hideout, was caught in a crossfire between LTTE and IPKF).

Nedumaran, known to be close to the LTTE, claimed according to information available with him that while the IPKF had first asked "Jhonny" to only escort "Raheem" who was carrying a message for Prabhakaran, one or two army men had trailed the duo despite protestations from "Jhonny". At one point "Jhonny" had firmly told the IPKF men shadowing him to turn back if they wanted the mission to be completed. Enraged at this, the IPKF men had shot "Jhonny" dead, Mr. Nedumaran alleged.

COLOMBO, March 22.

At least 15 persons, including women and children, were killed in yet another massacre allegedly by armed Tamil militants in the early hours today in two villages, mainly inhabited by Sinhalese in Sri Lanka's northern Vavuniya district, reports received here said. Official sources, however, put the figure of those dead at 13 and the injured at four.

In an encounter with IPKF at Udayarkaddu, Durga, a girl from LTTE guerrilla unit fought bravely and died.

23

Colombo, March 23 (DPA): The Sri Lankan Government on Wednesday clamped a curfew on the eastern district of Batticaloa after clashes between Indian Peace-Keeping Force and Tamil militants left six civilians dead and at least 20 others wounded.

Informed sources in Batticaloa said the fighting erupted in the town centre at about noon when guerrillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lobbed hand grenades into a group of Indian soldiers on patrol.

The rebels also attacked a Bat-

ticaloa police sentry, the sources said.

Police officials confirmed that fighting continued for well over three hours, and Batticaloa residents said the militants used civilian buildings and shops for cover in the attack.

Police also reported the foiling by IPKF troops of an alleged plan by Tamil militants to assault the Sinhalese refugee camp at Managalagam, near Batticaloa.

The situation in the eastern Sri Lankan town on Wednesday evening was described as tense, with Indian forces patrolling the streets.

At Kiran, farther to the east, two Indian soliders were killed and five injured on Wednesday when a landmine exploded.

LTTE guerrillas launched an attack on Batticaloa police station. In retaliation the IPKF along with Sri Lankan STF fired indiscriminately in the streets. 8 civilians were seriously wounded. An indefinite curfew clamped on.

24

COLOMBO, March 24.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force continued intensive search operations in Sri Lanka's Eastern Batticaloa town, which remained under an indefinite curfew for the second day today, while normal life was affected in the northern Vavuniya town due to a strike call by two militant groups.

Residents of Batticaloa said the IPKF had fanned out in various sectors of the town in search of the militants responsible for two grenade attacks during the past two days.

In all, nine people, including a school girl, had been injured in an exchange of fire between the IPKF and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam following a grenade attack on the town police station yesterday. Three IPKF men and a woman had been injured in a grenade attack on an IPKF patrol outside the Bishop's house on Tuesday.

25

An IPKF soldier was killed in an encounter with LTTE at Oluvil of Amparai Dt. Two soldiers were wounded.

26

Colombo, March 26 (PTI): Bodies of six Muslim fishermen believed to have been killed by Tamil militants, were washed ashore on Saturday, and a Muslim youth was reportedly murdered on Friday, in eastern Trincomalee, the national news agency Lankapuvath said.

Fresh trouble feared: Meanwhile, seven Tamil civilians including women, were killed in



'WARNING' BY LTTE

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have issued a 'warning' to the public in the northern Jaffna peninsula against having any unwarranted relations with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

Headlined 'WARNING', the leaflet which has been widely distributed in Jaffna states:

'The Indian Army, trying to blind the Tamil public from seeing the Army's despicable acts of rape, torture and so on is also indulging in humbugs, such as Indian Soldiers managing Tamil women.'

In this state of affairs, some traitors of our race among us, urged by motives of personal profit, are not only betraying the Tamil race, but are also operating as the paid agents of the Indian Forces of Conquest.

'We would like to have it known, that prompt action ending in death sentence will be taken against those among us engaging especially in the following activities, namely:

a) Persons furnishing information to, acting as paid agents of, or having needless relations or connections with the Indian Army of Conquest.

b) Persons needlessly establishing family-relationships or any other relationships with the Indian Army of Conquest or members of the families of such persons.

c) Persons, who making themselves out as leaders of the people, collaborate with the Indian Army of Conquest.

crossfire when the IPKF repulsed an attack on an Indian army patrol at Nedunkerni, four km off northern Vavuniya on the Vavuniya-Mullaitivu road on Wednesday, delayed reports received here said.

In Vanni area, the LTTE cadres Gracy, Victor and, Anil were killed by unidentified gunmen.

27

In between Iranamadu junction and Telecommunication Centre, LTTE attacked with landmines on IPKF and killed 2 of them and wounded 3. In consequence to the above attack, the IPKF fired indiscriminately on civilians.

Three IPKF personnel were killed and three injured by the LTTE attack in Kutchaveli, Trincomallee.

28

COLOMBO, March 28. (UNI & DPA) — Five people including two Indian soldiers have been killed in fresh violence in Sri Lanka's north and east, officials here said today.

The Indian High Commission here said a soldier died and two others wounded when the LTTE ambushed an Indian convoy in Kilinochchi District yesterday.

A Sri Lankan military spokesman here said a civilian was killed when a landmine planted by the LTTE exploded prematurely between two Indian jeeps passing through Kilinochchi yesterday.

A High Commission spokeswoman said they had no details of the second blast but 20 suspected LTTE militants, including a woman, were captured in Kilinochchi after the first attack.

In Jaffna peninsula, Indian troops detained 17 LTTE suspects, but one of them named Dharmendran, took cyanide and died at Murasunkodal village, the spokeswoman said.

30

COLOMBO, March, 30.

Eleven Tamil militants were killed in an overnight gun battle with members of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in northern Sri Lanka, a military spokesman said here today.

Indian soldiers backed by helicopter gunships smashed a jungle hideout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the dominant militant group, in Vavuniya district during a cordon-and-search operation, the spokesman said.

The Indian High Commission here had no details of the operation, but said six LTTE men were arrested during an overnight house-to-house search in northern Jaffna peninsula.

31

COLOMBO, March 31.

Tamil militants raided two villages in eastern Sri Lanka today, storming a mosque, looting homes and killing at least 40 people, police and residents said.

A police official at Kalmunai town, 40 km south of Batticaloa, said the militants burned at least 100 houses in the two-hour attack, one of the worst single incidents in the island's five-year-long Tamil separatist revolt.

Residents said at least 40 people, all Muslims, were killed in Mallaiyakadu and Sainamaruthu villages where 15,000 Muslims live. It was the second raid in a week on the area.

Last Saturday, police said suspected Tamil militants set fire to 25 Muslim-owned shops in Kalmunai which has a mixed Tamil and Muslim population. Kalmunai is five km north of the two villages.

The residents said the militants stormed into a mosque and shot dead a number of worshippers.

Thousands of residents fled in panic as the gunmen rampaged through the villages.

"Over 5,000 people have sought refuge in schools and mosques.

Kidnapped by 'Three-Stars'

The Three-Stars group has kidnapped six Muslim business men in Ninthavoor for allegedly supplying information to the LTTE, police said.

(The Sunday Times of Sri Lanka - 20.3.88)

EPRLF DOES IT AGAIN

According to confirmed news reaching our news desk, a van belonging to a Muslim of Mannar, Alla Pichchai Abbas by name, has been taken away by the EPRLF. It is said that the culprits who went to his house with criminal intention had gagged him and removed all the valuables from his house before scooting away with the van.



Vanguard with AK-47s: the people's warriors

The Guardian

வீர வீணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

கடல்கிளர் தன்ன கட்டுர் நாப்பண்,
வெந்துவாய் மடித்து, வேல்தலைப் பெயரித்,
தோடுகைத்து எழுதருஉத் துரந்துஎறி ஞாட்பின்,
வருபடை போழ்ந்து வாய்ப்பட விலங்கி,
இடைப்படை அழுவத்துச் சிதைந்து வேருகிய,
சிறப்புடை யாளன் மாண்புகண் டருளி,
வாடுமுலை ஊறிச் சுரந்தன
ஓடாப் பூக்கை விடலை தாய்க்கே.
ஒளவையார்

Ravi	7.3.88
Lt. Arasan	25.3.88
Suki	13.3.88
Kulam	14.3.88



Dorin 13.3.88



Lt. Durga 22.3.88

Rizwan	17.3.88
Deepan	27.3.88
Kaspirin	16.3.88
Sivapathi	1.3.88
Devanandam	1.3.88
Lt. Col. Imran	1.3.88
Lt.Col.Johnny	1.3.88
Lt. Suryakumar	1.3.88
Lt. Ramani	1.3.88
Lt. Ravi	1.3.88
Lt. Yogesh	1.3.88
Lt. Anal	1.3.88
Lt. Gunaseelam	1.3.88
Rosman	13.3.88
Podiyappu	13.3.88
Lt. Imelda	13.3.88
Rosali	13.3.88

Pratheep	13.3.88
Torin	13.3.88
Thusi	13.3.88
Helen	13.3.88
Murali	15.3.88
Thamaran	15.3.88
Murthy	17.3.88
Nidhi	17.3.88
Ramanan	17.3.88
Ramani	17.3.88
13.3.88 to 22.3.88	
Kandeepan	
Navam	
Vincent	
Capt. Vathavooran	
Durga	22.3.88
22.3.88 to 31.3.88	
Sukkan	
Nandan	
Mariadas	



Ravi 7.3.88



Navam 16.3.88




Ramanan



Ramani



Lt. Arasan 25.3.88



Lt. Col Johnny

claims	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
	IPKF	LTTE	S.L. ARMY	OTHER MILITANTS	CIVILIANS							
	1	1	1	19								
IPKF												
LTTE			10									
MEDIA												

2												

3												

4												

5												

6												

7												



10												

11												

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22												

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31												

TOTAL	13	19	113	43	2	6	5	155	99			
	29	17	32	24	6	4		21	12			
		1						37	45			
									74			

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12

CHAPTER 10

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

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29	30	31	

April



REPORT

APR. 3-9, 1988

The IPKF manhunt

Prabhakaran's death may have fallout in TN

THE denial by the ministry of external affairs notwithstanding, the IPKF seems to have launched an all-out effort to capture LTTE leader Prabhakaran, who is seen by both superpowers as a malevolent presence bent upon subverting their scheme of things in the Indian Ocean.

A division-strong troops assisted by helicopter gunships are engaged in the search for Prabhakaran who, according to the intelligence reaching the IPKF, is hiding in the northeastern Mullaitivu. His deputy Ajit Mahatiya is said to have sought shelter in northern Vavuniya. But combing the vast forest area between the Devil's Point, in Mullaitivu, and Kuchchaveli is by no means proving an easy task. Said a defence ministry official: "We know Prabhakaran is on the run. But the forest tract in which he is supposed to be hiding is an ideal terrain for guerrilla operations. How long is he able to evade capture depends on his luck." He noted, however, that guerrilla leaders in some parts of the world have survived for as long as 20 years, primarily because of local support.

But the IPKF operations have, in a way, paid off. On February 28, LTTE said it was prepared for unconditional talks—with the IPKF stopping military operations for 48 hours—accepting the appeal of the Mothers Front in toto.

While LTTE claimed that it had done so to persuade the two women—Annamma David and Nesamma Vadivelu—in the eastern Batticaloa district to give up their fast unto death, the Indian policy-makers could scarcely ignore the fact that the Tigers had withdrawn the precondition they had insisted upon: that before any negotiations, the IPKF must go back to the position it had occupied before October 10 last year.

Lt-General Depinder Singh, the overall IPKF commander who has now retired, had time and again pointed out

that military might could not be relied upon to wipe out an insurgency (for this political initiative was required) but the use of armed forces was meant to send out a message to the insurgent leaders that it was not worth putting up an armed resistance, especially if a way could be found out through negotiations.

There is no doubt that the IPKF has played a considerable role in softening up LTTE. Even if it has not been able to accomplish an outright kill, it has taken the Tigers on its own game to wage a war of attrition. "No doubt some of our soldiers are being killed. But every day we account for an increasing number of LTTE cadre, who are either caught or eliminated. That is bound to tell on their morale," said a senior army officer.

Prabhakaran and Mahatiya have been able to evade the IPKF but the soldiers have struck perilously close to their target. On March 14, the IPKF announced that the operational command headquarters of LTTE, in a jungle near Oddusuddan, had been smashed, even as Prabhakaran fled from the scene. As many as 12 bodyguards covering the retreat of the LTTE supremo died in the fighting.

Left behind in the well-fortified concrete bunkers of LTTE were a large number of AK-47 rifles, explosives and other arms. "Because the bunkers were so well built and outfitted, we had reached the conclusion that they were meant for the LTTE high command. Whether Prabhakaran was really there before the IPKF struck is mere speculation," said a defence ministry official.

The opulence of the bunkers in the jungle surprised Indian army officers. There were plush sofas, TV sets and a large quantity of foodstuff in the bunkers. The LTTE cadres were said to be regularly watching TV programmes of Doordarshan. It must be mentioned here that, according to Indian intelligence assessments, the LTTE leadership is basically an urban-oriented elite force, apparently unsuited to waging a rural insurgency. This is an assessment that has proved wrong.

The spokesman for the external affairs ministry who denied on March 21 that the IPKF was searching for Prabhakaran made it amply clear that, militarily, LTTE was no match to the IPKF in jungle warfare. Troops trained in counterinsurgency operations in India's northeast had been inducted into Sri Lanka.

That the elimination of Prabhakaran could have a dangerous fallout in Tamil Nadu was clear from the statements of

AIADMK leader Jayalalitha, who has asked the Indian government to halt its military operations against LTTE and open a dialogue with Prabhakaran.

This is not the first time Prabhakaran has been cornered. In October last year, when the IPKF took over the Navat-kulli armed base of LTTE in a surprise attack, the Tigers had feared that his capture was imminent. It was from LTTE communication, intercepted by the IPKF, that the latter reached the conclusion that Prabhakaran had been injured.

Later, on March 1, Prabhakaran's 30-month-old daughter, who died of diarrhoea, was cremated at Vaddakachchy, near Kilinochi. His wife attended the funeral but he stayed away because of security reasons. Among the 3,000 persons who attended was Ajit Mahatiya. It was only later that the IPKF came to know about Mahatiya's presence at the funeral.

The Tigers have termed the death of 'Lt-Col' Johnny—who had met Prabhakaran in his jungle hideout and was bringing back his message to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi—in crossfire as a breach of faith. He had been flown, along with Balasubramaniam Kanagarathnam alias Raheem, in a helicopter from Madras to Vavuniya on March 5, in response to the LTTE proposal for unconditional talks and a ceasefire by the IPKF.

Apart from the problem Prabhakaran presents—the LTTE chief himself carries a cyanide capsule—the IPKF has a difficult task ahead in Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Before the Sri Lankan security forces were sent to the barracks, under the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, the Special Task Force (STF) and air force had wrought havoc in Tamil-dominated areas. When the IPKF moved into action the Tigers struck back with a vengeance on the Sinhalese in Trincomalee. "At present we have nearly 40,000 refugees to look after in Trincomalee," said a defence ministry official. On March 23, top military and civil officials of both the countries met in Trincomalee and decided to carry out rehabilitation in two stages. For the rehabilitation of refugees, IPKF has agreed to make the security arrangements.

Meanwhile Batticaloa, the other trouble-spot, has been placed under a curfew. LTTE has been striking against the IPKF in the east and, in a repeat of its operation in Jaffna city, LTTE has been using houses and shops as cover. It is clear that the war will go on.

—G.K. SINGH

RECOGNISE LTTE

Bolton Tamil Association's plea to UNO

The continuing tragic conditions in Sri Lanka are a matter of concern to us. It is disappointing to note that most facets of the peace accord, on whose basis the Indian Army entered Sri Lanka, continue to remain unimplemented.

Of prime importance is the physical safety of the Tamils in the North and East, who till now were afforded some protection by their own military force — the Liberation Tigers. The Indian Army has been on the rampage killing civilians and destroying their protector, the LTTE. We, therefore, appeal to you to use your good offices towards a negotiated settlement between the Indian Government and the LTTE. As you are aware, the LTTE has for the past several months been seeking such negotiations.

One of the centrepieces of the peace accord which has still not been implemented is the formation of an interim administration in the

North and the East. As an organisation with overwhelming support among the Tamils, the LTTE was to have majority representation in this interim administration (seven out of a total of twelve members). This interim administration was to have been set up in Mid-1987 but so far this has not taken place. We, therefore, request you to intervene and have such administration set up allocating as was originally envisaged to the LTTE the majority of the seats.

Indeed in the last few months the Tamils of Sri Lanka are in far worse shape than were ever before. They have no hospitals, schools, courts of law or any proper civil administration; death is present everywhere and peace is nothing but a mirage. The Peace Accord in the formulation of which the Tamils had no part has brought them anything but peace. The so-called Indian Peace Keeping Force instead of keeping peace is waging war in the Tamil areas

against the LTTE.

Even the Indian Commanders on the field have admitted that they have not been able to vanquish the LTTE due to the massive support it commands among the Tamil people.

We suggest, therefore, that in as much as the P.L.O. is now largely recognised as the sole voice of the Palestinian people, the LTTE be recognised by the United Nations as the sole voice of the Tamil people. Further, in as much as you have dynamically endeavoured to negotiate a settlement between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, we urge you to try and negotiate an amicable settlement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, that provides as well for a peaceful Indian withdrawal.

Finally, may we appeal to you for your positive involvement in this matter and the courtesy of a reply at your convenience.

LETTER

LIES, BLATANT LIES.

N.Murugesu

... The tigers are fighting for their land but we are fighting for our wages'. — Indian Army Officer.

'To tell the truth, the Indian state radio and television stations should be smashed. We cannot tolerate the lies that are spread daily through these propaganda outlets. This should be stopped at once. Then only the situation will improve.' a member of the Jaffna Citizens Committee told angrily the Indian pressmen in the presence of Indian state and army officers recently. Whether officials in Delhi have heard this member's remarks or not, he has at least shaken the conscience of the Indian pressmen visiting Jaffna. These days, even the Sri Lankan press who followed the same path of deception on the question of Tamils prior to the arrival of the IPKF, exposes the Indian state media by giving prominence to official lies.

The dynamiting of two Tamil daily press offices in Jaffna and the capture of Liberation Tigers' radio and television equipment in Jaffna have had a disastrous effect on Tamils.


But, as expected by the Indians, the people of Tamil Eelam did not automatically tune to or were captivated by the Indian press and radio. In contrast they rightly discarded the twisted stories of Indian media as deceitful. The ordinary man or woman of the north and east is aware of the truth which would unconsciously have clouded their minds. Apart from Indian state radio and television, the lady spokeswoman at the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka and the Chief of the Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka are equally shining examples in this game of dis-information.

At a meeting of his fellow officers held in Bangalore, the chief of the armed forces has vehemently denied using helicopter gun-ships in their attacks in Jaffna. But this officer was caught with his pants down when an Indian reporter from India Today magazine subsequently revealed the truth with photographs.

The Eelam Tamils still have faith in the principles of Mahatma Gandhi who stood for truth. 'Truth is God' he said, on several occasions. But the India where Gandhi was born is now filled with lies, corruption and totalitarianism. The remarks of a high ranking Indian army officer in Jaffna, who is well-known among the Liberation Tigers as an eminent public relations officer, made to the Indian pressmen in a private talk recently are very appropriate. He said, 'I could have easily got round the Liberation Tigers and peacefully settled this problem avoiding bloodshed; but my uniform has prevented me in doing so. We are like slaves in the hands of politicians, carrying out their orders. The Tigers are fighting for their land but we are fighting to earn our wages'.

The truth has survived, however much masked by military uniform, though it took its time.

LETTER





RAPED

16.4.88

Kilinochchi

6 women

Painter Navjot recreates the anguish of a rape victim.

COMMENT

Indo-Sri Lankan Accord **AN AUTOPSY**

The situation across the Palk Straits grows more labyrinthine with each passing day.

One hundred thousand Indian soldiers are already fighting a battle there that is not even their own. Despite their superior military strength, the Indian army has not been able to curb the LTTE's intransigence.

Both the Sri Lankan and Indian governments have been unable to find a political solution either.

In this two part analysis, exclusive to the Weekly, Justice V R Krishna Iyer (retired) conducts a post-mortem on the Jayewardene-Gandhi accord, its consequences and implications.

History, says Engels, is about the most cruel of all goddesses. It has shown itself to be that, visibly, in the fate of the Tamils and invisibly in that of the Sinhalese in the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka. Great opportunities beckon to these 15 million people geo-politically bound to a common destiny of harmony and peaceful progress, if only tragic passions fuelling divisive forces do not overpower the culture of compassionate accommodation which is the hardware of ethnic pluralism and socialistic egalitarianism. But politicians—not statesmen—are myopic and act in haste, unaided by the dialectic of social forces at play. So they fail to feel the pulse of rival popular forces and the groundswell of their elemental rage.

An objective audit of the India-Sri Lanka accord alone will unfold whether the processes of national reconciliation, through social justice and ethnic amity, are making headway steadily backwards. The Tamils, our constant friends, broadly welcomed the good offices of India, but the harrowing happenings at the hands, unexpectedly, of the visiting troops, coupled with a deep disenchantment on the front of constitutional reform and administrative restructuring, has reversed their smiling faith into a sombre mood.

Indian statesmanship issuing from distant Delhi has rarely been sufficiently sensitive to the slowly but steadily escalating communal estrangement in the island which surely would, at white heat, affect the stability of the region. Equally short-sighted Sri Lankan power-mongers did not see the sinister seeds of communal hatred sown since 1948 and fertilised by electoral appetites, and woke up too late to control its growth.

Over the past few years, terrible things have taken place. Today, Lanka is all thorns and thistles and jungles, and the poverty of imagination and courage in its statesmen avenges itself.

The Jayewardene-Rajiv Gandhi 'summit meets', resulting in an agreement and assurances, are part of a healing process that Lanka needs. Navigational wisdom is vital if Destination 'Paradise Isle' is the goal of the operation. But the people (of Sri Lanka primarily and of India too) must be involved in the political locomotion; two top men cannot personalise the history of two countries. Nor can bleeding lead to healing. But yet, the pity of it is that killing is on the increase in the name of 'keeping peace'. Nor is there any serious sign of that

constitutional reconciliation without which the pathological roots of the dreadful disease will never die.

Certain categorical imperatives must be unreservedly accepted if a durable political solution is to emerge. The first such basic factor is that Sri Lanka has an ethnic pluralism, and elimination of this composition can never happen.

Second, the unity, integrity, sovereignty and democracy of Sri Lanka are non-negotiable and the Tamils must accept this. Secession is therefore out of the question.

Third, the Sinhalese must digest the historic heritage of Sri Lanka, wherein the Tamils must be given equal freedom in the island's political process, and unhindered autonomy reasonably necessary for their self-government within the parameters of the democratic sovereignty of the island. Again, the geographic-demographic integration of the Tamils of the north and the east is an inalienable aspiration of the ethnic minority, and so the island's 'unitary' structure must be flexible enough to accommodate this deep-rooted cultural hunger.

Finally, Sri Lanka and India must mutually accept the implications of their proximity in terms of common security, non-aligned foreign policy and the establishment of a *modus vivendi* which will eliminate irritants, frictions and foreign presences, without India playing any hegemonic role of interfering in the internal affairs of the island republic. This peremptory *panchashheel* must be heeded by the minds that seek to make history.

My thesis is that principled pragmatism geared to human justice for the minorities, and recognition of the demographic reality of the Sinhala majority, is the pharmacopoeia for island peace. The twin goals of the Tamils which started and sustained their struggle must not be lost sight of while negotiating for a truce. They ask for a home, fusing the north and the east, so that they may matter as a democratic factor in the island's power process, as the first postulate.

The substantial devolution of

provincial authority, within the inviolable parameters of Sri Lanka's sovereignty, unity and integrity, is the second constitutional fundamental. Integral to this political transformation is the *indivisible guarantee of human rights to Sinhalese and Tamils alike, a process which repels* hyper-concentration of power in a fragile political structure and futile chauvinist culture such as is suspected by many humanist sceptics to prevail in a land like Sri Lanka. A land which has suffered an emergency for a long spell, with breaks of 18 years, state terrorism through anti-terrorist laws which make a joke of the Human Rights Charter, a judiciary which is powerless against executive supremacy as a former chief justice in his retirement speech revealed, and a parliament which says 'aye' or 'nay' at the ukase of a supremo.

In Sri Lanka, general elections have been put to sleep since 1977 and parliamentary longevity is on borrowed time. The principles of a free Constitution are irrevocably lost, says Edward Gibbon, when the legislative power is nominated (or dominated?) by the executive. The phenomenon of novel constitutional incarnations and presidential elections in 1982, after safely disenfranchising the leaders of the rival party, is a bizarre democratic mutation; Tamil presence, including that of the meek TULF, has been almost eliminated from the parliamentary process by the sixth constitutional amendment. In short, a demonetised democracy and the Ku Klux Klan-like Sinhalese groups make for a murky political order. Violence breeds violence and the writ of law runs rarely where disorder is writ large. Tamil retaliation and Sinhalese aggravation feed the politics of hatred, and a return to the halcyon days is an impossibility with sordid alien opportunists gaining a dangerous foothold.

Those who understand the dialectics of historical materialism must post themselves soberly with the post-independence developments in Sri Lanka before they jump with joy at some 'accord' which soon proves an irrelevance or illusion as it blinks at the hard realities behind the upheaval, the eclipse of human rights, the en-

gineered violence, the gross discrimination by the State imperilling the ethnic survival of the largest minority which has deep roots and has invested developmental sweat and toil in the 'Paradise Isle'. Of course, the backward Sinhalese and the exploited Indian Tamils also have old grievances. But the ethnic injustice and the majoritarian menace plus the denial of rights to all the island people are the political essence of the current convulsion.

The upheavals in the island are not a mere matter of law and order but the volcanic eruption of great social forces as a result of the suppression of ethnic minorities and the arrogant assertion by a brute majority, intoxicated by fundamentalist ideology and abetted by the presidency. Within the Tamil fold, the north and the east, not highly homogenous, have a common linguistic-ethnic base and a cultural bond. Beyond these factors are the deep fears generated by successive governments which have operated against a minority that is irrepressible, though unequal. In such a scenario of historic revolution, any solution must be mechanical, not dynamic, not paper-perfect but convincingly guaranteed. India has been trying to deal with Sri Lanka without much success over the decades.

The Tamil millions, and more particularly the militant groups knew, to their cost, how unreliable was the Jayewardene regime. Their hopes had often been belied and unless India was willing to underwrite a degree of autonomy, life would become insufferable, and secession, in order to build a new sovereign State, the only creed.

India is solidly and rightly opposed to the dismemberment of Sri Lanka. Secession is a dangerous slogan and is often the work of imperialist sophisters, calculators and tricksters, and the bulk of the Tamils in Lanka and in India are opposed to this extremism. Today, even the LTTE, save the hard core, virtually abandons the division of the island except when bitten by betrayal.

The seventies and eighties witnessed escalating violence by the Lankan forces directed against

Tamil civilians, total breakdown of law and order in the land and a witch-hunt against Tamils wherever they could be located; State terrorism in the north, attacks on Tamils, regardless of age or sex, and on their property in Colombo, ethnic violence in Trincomalee, brutality by the police and the army even in prisons and detention camps, torture and inhuman treatment of Tamil suspects and witnesses.

These and other mounting betrayals of governmental obligations had dashed the faith of the minority of obtaining justice from the majority. Presidential pronouncements of better deals punctuated those dark days. But expectation darkened into anxiety, anxiety into dread, and dread into despair. Amnesty International, Law Asia, the International Commission of Jurists, independent media and other well-known human rights organisations and champions all over the world expressed shock at the macabre state-engineered happenings. Progressive forces inside Sri Lanka, including some leftist elements and the church, protested in vain. Indian Tamils were convulsed with anger.

Admissions to universities were manipulated against Tamils and educational opportunities eclipsed. Likewise, State-operated discrimination in employment and elimination of Tamils from the police and the armed forces went on apace.

This backdrop gives an insight into the birth and growth of Tamil violence and the boat trek to Rameswaram and other parts of the world. Promises made by the President in the national state assembly were unmade as often as convenience suggested. Round table conferences, all-party meets, diplomatic confabulations and other such exercises hardly advanced the cause of peace or justice; instead, they bred mistrust. Pledges made to G Parthasarathy, the seasoned Indian diplomat, understandings reached with P Chidambaram, an able and concerned go-getter and with other special envoys of the prime minister (he amateurishly changed horses mid-stream) on occasion after occasion and pleasing assurances given to our optimistic prime minister him-

self often floundered and even floundered.

President Jayewardene 'openly declared war on Jaffna, besieged and starved the civilians, bombed even hospitals and violated rules of humanity, inalienable in a civilised polity. Human rights agencies, outstanding personalities and non-aligned churchmen found the administration grossly guilty. Indeed, the heartless approach to Jaffna Tamils reached the boiling point of betrayal when the Indian prime minister rightly felt so enraged that he took upon himself the responsibility of unusual measures of humanitarian intervention without the assent of the island government.

A clearer example of the past projecting into the present and a broader grasp of the dilatory developments *vis-a-vis* the island's ethnic conflict may be appropriate. Essentially, the escalating ethnic antagonism was due to a scramble for economic opportunities among competing ethnic communities. The Sinhalese constituted 74 per cent of the population. The Tamils, including the more exploited Tamils of Indian origin were of the order of around 20 per cent and Muslims seven per cent. The Muslims also speak Tamil. The indigenous Jaffna Tamils had better education and job opportunities under the British and provided the manpower for the colonial administration. After independence, the vastly numerically superior but competitively inferior Sinhalese made Sinhala the official language, Buddhism a preferred religion, and augmentation of educational and economic opportunities for the Sinhalese a national policy.

The Tamils were also victims of ethnically motivated riots since 1958. But, since 1983, discrimination had escalated into suppression and tolerance of Tamils had deteriorated into chauvinist hostility. From the womb of this socio-economic complex of injustices was born the liberation movement of which the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was the spearhead. It was moderate in its methods, but militancy took over

when repression was intensified. Pirabhakaran's Tigers claimed *eelam* (homeland) of the Tamil-dominated provinces and took over the offensive of mass killing of Sinhalese. The situation worsened with the intrusion of Sinhalese through State-sponsored colonisation schemes calculated to reduce the Tamils to a minority in some regions where they were in a majority.

The aggravation of communal tension continued despite Indira Gandhi's efforts to produce a just solution through G Parthasarthy. President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met under the pressure of a deepening crisis, hoping to give a creative turn to the solution of the vexed problem. The cease-fire of June 1985 was a good omen. Further rounds of talks in July and August were marred by further killings. The second cease-fire of October 10, 1985 did not stop the killings of Tamils.

Although Rajiv Gandhi described the problem as a purely Sri Lankan one, he rightly expressed concern over the mass influx of refugees and the violation of human rights. However, abandoning a political solution to a political problem, Jayewardene sought a military methodology and roped in Pakistan, Britain and Israel in the shape of experts from these countries to wage a mini-war against militant Tamils.

Next came the conference of June 1986 with proposals for provincial councils and other institutions involving devolution of powers. The quantum of devolution was poor and the merger of the north and the east was rejected by the President. So the Tamils fed militarist militancy into their operational pattern.

And then in December 1986 came the new proposals with ministers Natwar Singh and P Chidambaram catalysing the process. The LTTE, dissatisfied with the proposals, persisted in their gory guerrilla tactics, but Jayewardene countered this move by full-scale blockading of Jaffna and starving the people, stopping communications and medical supplies, even bombing them. The world was horrified and India, in a sudden outburst of activity, initiated talks leading to the accord.

June-July, '87 saw a frenetic spell in Colombo-Delhi relations, after a fruitless zig-zag of futile palavers and deepening distrust. The Gandhi government, in a hubristic mood of sudden humanitarianism, and acting almost unilaterally, despatched in June to the starving Tamils of blockaded Jaffna, badly-needed food and medicine. They were peremptorily sent back by the puny Sri Lankan navy. Hurt by this humiliating rebuff, South Block hit back, ignoring international regulations about trespassing on the air space of sovereign states and air-dropping food and medical supplies over the besieged north. Though Colombo protested, its anger was happily obliterated by the welcome announcement of an agreement between the artful Lankan President and the artless Indian prime minister.

July 29, 1987 surprisingly witnessed a unique ceremony—two statesmen signed a vague accord of sorts in Colombo. A Jaffna cease-fire, a lovely serendipity indeed, was announced. The bilateral agreement was instantly blessed by President Reagan and praised by various other foreign leaders. So far so good.

The gestation and the midwifery of this agreement are a riddle wrapped in a mystery; the cumulative meaning of the ambivalent clauses of this hasty document is an arcane enigma; whom it benefits in the short and the long run is, as yet, difficult to decode. The India-Lanka accord must be tested by measuring its clauses, their viability and credibility, against the triple imperatives of Tamil justice and the restoration of people's political processes for Sinhalese and Moors, Burghers and other living in the 'democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka'.

There is a sombre realism in the growing feeling that peace is still a pipe-dream and the promised breakthrough is dwindling into a breakdown. Here is a typical sober response to the developments which spell death for Tamil optimism about fulfilment of the agreement. In an interview in *The Hindu*, Padmanabhan, the secretary

general of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, which obeyed the accord and disarmed itself said: 'We are greatly concerned with the problem arising out of armed hostilities between the peace keeping force and the LTTE.'

'It is imperative the Indian government take all steps to ensure that the civilian casualties and the extreme economic and psychological deprivation of our people is kept to an absolute minimum or avoided altogether.'

Does this acid comment implicate the Indian forces in the consciousness of the Tamil people as guilty of military excesses in fighting the LTTE? Armies away from home are not always examples of Newman's definition of a gentleman. Padmanabhan further mourns: 'Although five months have elapsed since the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, the people's expectation that it would pave the way for peace, democracy and devolution of power to the Tamils remains a distant dream.'

'In fact, the present reality that faces our people is one of despair, deprivation and death. The EPRLF, which extended its support to the accord, is now finding it difficult to demonstrate to our people, in concrete and tangible terms, the gains of the accord. What our people see is the process through which only those conditions favourable to the Sri Lanka Government are being satisfied.'

All the fanfare and fancy dress about the historic event of July 29, 1987 now boomerangs on India because our prime minister failed to discern the fine distinction between haste and speed. And who pays the penalty? *Mainstream* wrote on November 14:

'It is good that the prime minister paid tribute to the sacrifices of our jawans and officers who had fallen in the Sri Lanka operations, and their number is not inconsiderable. At the same time, it would be pertinent to ask what was the cause for which our soldiers have given their lives. Obviously this was not for the defence of the motherland. Nor have we decided to build an empire beyond our borders for which our troops have had to shed

their blood. Nor are we fighting to save the world from the evils of communism as the American GIs were told in Vietnam, nor for the defence of the socialist fatherland as the Soviet soldiers might have been motivated in Afghanistan. What is it for which our jawans are fighting? Is it to keep up the tottering Jayewardene regime? What needs to be questioned is not the role of the Indian armed forces, but the irresponsibility of those at the political level who have ordered our forces to Sri Lanka.'

The corpse of the amnesty clause lies in Sri Lanka, with India looking on, deaf-mute, but continuing its tiger hunt. It looks as if Rajiv Gandhi's only clause in the accord is surrender of arms. Lankan perfidy is beyond his ken or courage. Nor is the liquidation of the blackguardly, blockheaded LTTE the end of the story. The Tigers—or a section of them—may be a malignant manifestation but the *militant fight of the last Tamils will persist until basic justice greets them.*

There is no Left or Right where people are face to face with liberty or death. Every liberation struggle in the world proves this. While Indian official propaganda yells against the savage deeds of the Tamil Tigers and praises the triumph of the Indian troops against half-baked desperadoes—many trained and equipped in the past in Tamil Nadu—as a victory in the 'great' battle for Jaffna, Jayewardene chuckles, pays tongue-in-cheek compliments, and Sinhalese soldiers sigh with relief that their lives are safe and their weapons unstained with their own countrymen's blood.

Should dialectical activists omit to criticise Indian impotence in events that occurred after signing the agreement? Events such as (a) preventing student Thileepan's fast-unto-death for human rights in prison and eventual death (b) the cyanide suicide of 13 Tigers caught and transferred to Colombo to be tortured contrary to the proclaimed amnesty (c) the indifference of the Jayewardene government to the fate of thousands of detainees, in-

nocent Tamil and progressive Sinhalese (d) the blatant violation by the JRJ regime through the twin legislative pretences which stultify the agreement in its very essence, and (e) the murky absurdity of Colombo's claim to be in control of the IPKF which is a slur on our national self-respect and frustrates our country's humane purpose in sacrificing the lives of its jawans. The folly of South Block shall not sink our national resources in quicksand and kill our soldiers in Tiger-infested quagmire.

Rajiv Gandhi brooks no democratic dissent and changes his mind and mood because he has a majority in Parliament and impregnable authority in his party. Inner party or intra-cabinet democracy is a casualty in such a milieu; and the civil services, party echelons and the vast Congress or allied populace enjoy, in Mark Twain's language, 'three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them'. Lacking that intense empathy with Tamil ethnicity and vaccinated against criticism, the shining profile of our prime minister loses its convincing persuasiveness, despite his bona fides. The Tamils perhaps feel that to pin their faith in the JRJ-Rajiv accord as their sole savior is giving the wildest hostage to fortune. They have good grounds to be sceptical.

There were high hopes from the accord, even critics of the Left discovering some good in it. Let us dissect the diplomatic agreement with rationalist reverence.

The very process which produced the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement has genetic defects. When political polemics, emerging from ethnic conflicts and resulting in bitter, bleeding operations dividing the republic are to be resolved through peaceful negotiations and constitutional formulations, natural justice and democratic basics require the active involvement of, or, at least, extensive consultations with, real combatant groups. Therefore, the Tamil political leaders and militant organisations ought to have been vital participants in the very process of discussing the terms. *Ex parte* decisions don't bind.

The militants were fragmented and fighting. The TULF was largely ineffective in a violent climate, though it was a material factor with representative electoral credentials and intellectuals. But the pact was made *de facto* behind the back of the Tamil surrogates. Whatever Delhi may assert, no militant leader, nor the moderate TULF, had an effective voice. The agreement about the future of the Tamils was thus reached by Delhi and Colombo, the parties actually affected being merely informed of the *fait accompli* and directed to say 'amen'.

The process was unjust because Rajiv Gandhi, in his arrogation of paramountcy over the Tamils, whom he helped with arms and training to hit back against Sinhalese violence, acted as the principal and unaccountable plenipotentiary. The TULF's top cadre was formally informed and, though they had reservations, they muted their dissent. The militants were nowhere in the picture. Pirabhakaran, the head of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an intelligent intransigent with a fascist following, was confronted with an accord which he was given no option to amend. He seemed to assent under coercion, as he explained in Jaffna soon after.

The Sinhalese also had no opportunity. President Jayewardene too behaved smartly by not consulting anyone. In fact, even his ministers, his party, the progressive elements and other parties learnt of the accord rather than shaped it. The twilight of democracy produces the cult of personality. But the products, like the instant accords, meet with rough weather when they set sail.

These fatal procedural drawbacks notwithstanding, the accord is now a reality. It has to be analysed, amended or undone in the light of developments which furnish the best commentary on the covenant and its potential for good or evil. Now to the agreement.

The Preamble part of the India-Sri Lanka accord signed by the tallest executives of the two governments runs on realistic and sublime lines, attaching great importance to strengthening the traditional friendship between the two

countries and accepting the urgency and imperative necessity of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka. There is a frank statement that the violence is *consequent on the ethnic hostility* and that the developmental destiny of all the Lankan communities depends on the resolution of the ethnic hostility. If only this realisation were more than skin deep, if only the political forces grant this goal as the foundation of Indo-Lankan relations, if only an all-out effort by Sri Lanka, ably aided by India, were made on a national scale, it would fulfil the twin aspirations of the Tamils, of the fusion of the northern and eastern provinces and self-government for the minority, of course, within the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island republic.

There is a further refreshingly frank admission that the Tamil community has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which needs to be carefully nurtured. This is followed by a critical confession (if one may be pardoned for saying so) that the northern and the eastern provinces have been the *historic* home of the Tamil-speaking peoples who have, throughout in the past, lived *together* in this territory, with other ethnic groups. Not stopping with these important truisms, the agreement conscientises the nationalist forces into a mood of strengthening the island's unity through its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious pluralist polity, with every group having the right to live in *equality, safety and harmony* so that they may prosper and fulfil their *aspirations*.

Such is the cornerstone of the compact which may be regarded as historic if only the values so enshrined were taken seriously and implemented in the spirit of equal communal justice and minority aspirations on a democratic basis.

One spinal flaw in the crystallisation of the pact is the omission to involve actively the Tamil political militants and senior statesmen through a trilateral discussion. Whatever the Indian prime minister or his official ventriloquists may assert, the Lankan Tamil participation in the processing of the

proposals was next to nothing. Rajiv Gandhi took them for granted, assuming that their struggle would start or stop at India's command, and without arms and training from India, Tamil resistance would wither away. What a moronic misjudgement of a heroic movement! They are not party *bhaktas* but 'do or die' combatants, with burning self-respect and a vial of killer cyanide as the final sacrifice. The faculty to penetrate the soul of a people in revolt against being crushed out of ethnic existence belongs to statesmen with a vision of the future, not those intoxicated with self-importance.

Be that as it may, let us see if something good can be salvaged out of the accord. A few fundamental gains deserve to be highlighted as the spin-off benefits from the accord. First, linguistic justice is done to the Tamil and English official languages of Sri Lanka. Second, in a land of perpetual emergency and where both Tamil and Sinhalese languish in detention the Sri Lankan President, runs the accord, will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws. The amnesty also extends to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate the militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will cooperate in the process.

Sweet words but brazen baloney, because no one has bothered about those prisoners still behind bars. Even so, as an undertaking, such generosity towards human rights deserves hearty approbation, if it is honestly implemented.

Third, there is a clear understanding that 'residual' issues of importance, not finalised in the earlier negotiations, *shall be resolved* between India and Sri Lanka *within a period of six weeks* of signing the agreement. There is a sly rider here which says that these proposals are also conditional to the Government of India cooperating directly with the Government

of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

While India agrees to prevent militant troops operating in Sri Lanka from using Indian territory as their base, the Lankan government also agrees that nothing prejudicial to India will take place by Sri Lanka being used by foreign interests to the prejudice of Indian security.

There is a promise of polls in three months, in any event, *before* December 31, 1987, with Indian observers to watch over the elections to the provincial councils of the north and east. Likewise, there is a provision for a common administrative unit for the northern and eastern provinces with a tricky condition that while the two provinces join together with one administrative unit, one elected provincial council, one government, one chief minister and one board of ministers, *there will be a referendum on or before December 31, 1988, to enable the people of the eastern province to decide whether they would like to be governed together or remain separated* as distinct provinces. The President is given, at his discretion, the power to postpone a referendum in this behalf.

Finally, there is an obscure conditionality fraught with interpretive riddles written into the accord. Clause 2.15 runs:

'These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4-5-1986 to 19-12-1986. *Residual matters* not finalised during the above negotiations *shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement.* These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.'

By way of a democratic reinforcement of the accord, there is a clause which assures the people that Sri Lanka will ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the northern and eastern provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this agreement. The Government of India will extend full cooperation to the Sri Lanka government in this

regard.

With the tragic exit of Tamil Nadu chief minister M G Ramachandran and the mounting deaths of Sri Lankan civilians and Indian jawans, infantile calculations may be problematic. After all, people are unpredictable and react with more uncanny political sanity than the *pro tem* tenants of Janadhipathi Mandiraya or Race Course Road, wish.

All right-thinking persons in our two countries will want that justice be done to the Tamils, that we on both sides of the Palk Strait live in happy amity and peace, that the accord be made an instrument to advance this consummation. But will it work? A closer look at the documents of July 29, will do good.

There are five fundamentals in the accord: The formation of a single administrative unit telescoping the north and the east and setting up of the apparatus of a ministry in that behalf during the 'interim period' between 'the elections to the provincial council' and the referendum for determination of the will of the people of the eastern province to separate or live united with the north (Clause (1) (2)—*not implemented*). The election to the provincial council is agreed to be held within the *next three months* (ie before the end of October) and *in any event before December 31 1987 (not implemented)*.

No free and fair election can be held if the Emergency is not lifted, and so there is a condition *to lift the Emergency* in the eastern and northern provinces by August 15, 1987 (*not implemented*). A prelude to peace is the cessation of hostilities and that condition is to come into effect all over the island *within 48 hours of signing the agreement*. The surrender of arms and the confinement of the Sri Lankan security personnel also have a time-bound provision: *the process is to be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities*, coming into effect. All but the LTTE have surrendered and now repent the step as Pathmanabhan of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) has stated.

It is too obvious to need argu-

ment that unless there is a general amnesty the hostiles cannot come into the open nor can normalcy be restored. Rightly, therefore, clause 10 of the agreement provides that 'the President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws, and to combatants as well as those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. (*Not implemented*, except as a first instalment gimmick.) Many Sinhalese progressives who support the accord languish in jail still. Many LTTE extremists rot in prison or carry huge sums on their heads.

These clauses form a package and stand or fall together. You cannot ask for surrender of arms, inflicting lethal disablement on the resistance movement which has gathered momentum, but do nothing to enforce the imperative undertakings of Sri Lanka's President. The Indian prime minister, obsessed with his (illusory) authority over the Tamil militants, talks all the time of surrender of arms as the essence of the accord. The soul of the agreement is to hold elections, to lift the Emergency, to grant amnesty and to begin the formation of a joint province. A priority item is the quantum and quality of devolution of powers, so that the reality of autonomy may be brought home constitutionally to the minority consciousness.

There is a pledge in Clause 14 that these matters will be resolved between India and Sri Lanka *within a period of six weeks of signing the agreement*, that is, *before the middle of September*. This has certainly not been carried out. Clearly, there is an implication that all these matters of legislation and constitutional amendment bearing on political normalisation, provincial election and power devolution *will be discussed with India* and also with the concerned parties, that is, the political organisations, militant or other, in the island. This has not been done.

A monitoring body to review the progress of the implementation is provided for, so that failures on both sides may be exposed and complaints in that behalf heard. No

such functional watchdog has yet been created.

There is a provision in the new treaty for repatriation of Indian citizens from Sri Lanka, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu (Article 2-16 (d)). Here again there is victimisation of these unfortunates lingering in Sri Lanka in large numbers. There is no realism in the exchange of populations:

While it is difficult to quantify the cost of the military operations in Sri Lanka, the finance ministry, it is said, estimates it to be around Rs 300 crores and over Rs 5 crores a day. Other estimates place the amount much higher, which means that the Indian taxpayer is being burdened beyond his ability. Besides, our soldiers are being killed or injured in foreign fields.

In contrast, the Sri Lankan economy now looks relaxed and its budget for 1988 shows a great reduction in defence expenditure, of course, at India's expense. This is made further clear by the Sri Lankan President's disclosure that because of the accord Sri Lanka has saved much of its war expenditure and raised the salaries of its employees with such savings. PTI reports (December 12, 1987) Jayewardene as saying: 'If not for the IPKF we would have to fight this war. We have to spend more than what we are spending for the salary increase.'

Our cost is not merely in war expenditure but in war casualties. The Sri Lankan President claimed that while Sri Lankan soldiers died in large numbers before the IPKF took over, after the latter's arrival not a single Sri Lankan soldier had died. Our men died instead.

Both the Sri Lankan President and his Parliament must give to India this authority, agreeing that *pro tanto* Sri Lanka would have parted with sovereignty or final control *vis-a-vis* the Indian forces and their operations. A very clear statement on this point is needed now, if the Tamil people are to feel assured that the Indian army will not desert them, but will stand by them until north and east come under one administrative umbrella, and devolution of powers on a

par with that enjoyed by an Indian State becomes an accomplished fact. Of course, IPKF excesses, if continued, may make them a hated horde and their withdrawal may well be the demand, first simmering, then boiling and finally bursting. Today Tamil blood tells a gory story. This is a serious caveat.

Limitation on sovereignty for specific purposes and under covenants is nothing new in this integrated world of ours. The European community, with the European Court, European economic policies etc may be construed as an infringement of the sovereignty of Britain or other member nations. All international covenants involve erosion of some part of sovereignty. In the present case, our men have laid down their lives, our scarce resources have been showered for the benefit of Sri Lanka's citizens and the two republics have taken various measures on the faith of each other's representations. In this view the Indian forces, it must be made unmistakably clear, are there in Sri Lanka in an independent capacity and conditioned by the fulfilment of a task. If this is not acceptable, we should withdraw the army, leaving the Sri Lankans to themselves.

The military misfortune of the 30,000 Indian troops rushed to Jaffna but unprepared for the novel urban guerilla operations, and without sufficient military intelligence about the adversary, was the result of a prime minister's hubris—not a crime but a bad blunder. He has let down the army and, unwittingly, lowered its international reputation. The insensitivity to escalating criticism, of this adolescent delinquency, can lead to more deafness and egregiousness. But more casualties, more cries from Jaffna and Batticaloa,

may trigger a pathological process of hostility at home. And the reckless LTTE, like a bear at bay, may seek and secure military hardware from unscrupulous agents keen to embarrass India such as Pakistan and Israel and the satanic CIA.

The question then is, are we the friends of the beleaguered Tamils or the rescue auxiliaries of a reeling President guilty of near-

genocide? Let the Sri Lankans share the casualties. We, Indians, as our sons die in vain in Sri Lanka, are actually the victims of JRJ's newsspeak with which the July agreement abounds. Either we command the militants into a cease-fire and *pari passu* pressure Janadhipathi Mandiraya into the fusion-devolution pledge or leave both parties to shape their own destinies. Why play the macabre military *mukhtiar* of Sinhalese Jayewardene and yet boast that the accord, as a whole, would be executed?

Two make-believe bills were introduced and passed in Parliament with a small amendment caused by the Supreme Court decision requiring a referendum. Without going into the details of the legislative exercise at this stage, one may confidently assert that they fall far short of the aspirations of the Tamils. Indeed, there is no legislative sanction yet for bringing the north and the east under one umbrella. This is relegated to a later presidential direction. It is all a game of hide-and-seek. Why is it that a straightforward legislation by constitutional provision is avoided in bunching together the two provinces making up the homeland of the Tamils? Premadasa, the prime minister, clearly stated that he was against it. The President is too. Do we not have sufficient omens to suggest that the legislative process in Sri Lanka will defeat this foremost objective of the Sri Lankan Tamils?

The second imperative is about the devolution of powers. What is given is a husk, not the kernel. No effective powers regarding land and other important items covered by the State List in India is distributed under the Sri Lankan bill. More fraudulent is the dubious negation of autonomy. Powers are given to the governor to be exercised at his discretion and the hand which pulls the strings is that of the President.

Thus, instead of State autonomy, what is granted is an illusory triarchy. More than all this, the President and Parliament retain their plenary powers which can effectively nullify State legislation and action. A close scrutiny of the

devolution scheme brings out the ugly fact that what is created is a talking shop with formal authority precariously dependent on the governor, the President and Parliament. Hanging over it is the Damocles sword of the Emergency which can extinguish even what little autonomy there is. Can one find fault with the militants for refusing to be cheated? In fact, the TULF leaders had informed Rajiv Gandhi that the two bills were unacceptable and it was impossible for them to sell the scheme to the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The referendum, what with Sinhalese colonisation subtly engineered by Colombo, the terror the brutal LTTE has generated and the alienation of the Muslims fomented by the politics of reli-

The Tamil militants are not party bhaktas but 'do or die' combatants, with burning self-respect and a vial of killer cyanide as the final sacrifice.

gious 'minorityism', may well be a clever ploy to dismantle the united province. The myth is that the militants alone resist the agreement; the truth is that Sri Lanka's President and Parliament have already mutilated its anatomy.

The Indian prime minister, with no answer for these accusations, now uses a 'cover-up' of 'firm assurances' by the President to reconsider the bills after they are passed. It needs credulity beyond breaking point to believe a President who bypassed India before the bills were formulated, asserted before the Sri Lankan Parliament through his prime minister that the common province would never come, and diluted constitutional autonomy to a shadow.

And the major Opposition—the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 34 other political organisations, the Buddhist clergy and that murderously extremist Sinhalese group the Janata Vimukti Peramu-

na are opposed to the Tamil minimum. Only the left, a sensible but negligible political factor, supports effective decentralisation of power and minority authority for Tamil-dominant Jaffna and the eastern sector. Even they do not expose the spinal weaknesses of the accord.

Another pathetic feature about Jayewardene, the United National Party and their tardy and ambivalent manoeuvres about the accord is the anxiety to preserve the Sinhalese status quo because Parliament's term expires in 1989 and the President's in 1988 itself. The strategy is, to drag on till then without radical Tamil justice and use the Indian army to kill the truculent LTTE, boasting that not a single Sinhalese soldier has been killed!

Against this background, the Indian establishment's obsessive military dream of killing of the LTTE desperadoes as the only issue is cowardly folly. When more and more Indians die in Sri Lanka—and no defence of the motherland is involved—more and more Indians will demand why? How far will this go? What will be the gains, what the cost and how will it be justified? The ink of history is a string of interrogatories. Our prime minister's attitude vis-a-vis the Tamils of Sri Lanka, is a blend of oversized ego, underestimation of others' intelligence plus a wish to achieve instantly high objectives without hard thinking or ideological moorings.

My purpose is to promote a stable solution to the vexed problem of ethnic justice in Sri Lanka and friendly relations between India and Sri Lanka. Whatever the shortcomings in the processes and performance, I must appreciate the creative foreign policy factor implicit in the consummation of an accord between our two countries.

We must adopt dynamic thought to salvage the purposes of the accord and seek methods by which we may strengthen Indo-Sri Lankan friendship and Tamil-Sinhalese relations.

Once we accept the imperative of democracy, that authority cannot be divorced from accountability, our prime minister

must answer for the full-scale military operations, including naval and aerial patrols, the diminishing chances of peace and the escalating involvement in war, which has resulted in increasing Indian casualties and the fratricidal Tamil death roll.

The unkindest cut of all is the Sri Lankan ministers virtually dismantling the accord and demanding Pakistani military presence and elections in the current hysterical atmosphere, thereby dealing a death blow to the pact and laying a death trap for our jawans. If by some freak of friction Pakistani forces enter the south and the Indian forces control the north, a conflict between the two may not be a recondate possibility.

The war continues; peace eludes us. The kismet of the accord becomes curiousest and curiousest. Its eventual Indian impact is sure to be a time bomb.

I plead with the prime minister to review the deteriorating situation and boldly speak to his counterparts in power in Sri Lanka to innovate a creative formula which will work without violence and will involve the militants, Tamil and Sinhalese, in the process.

A new confidence has to be created which can never happen so long as the Indian guns use their fire power and continue curfew indefinitely as they do now. Nor is it the business of the Indian forces to make house-to-house searches, shoot anyone with a weapon, and, incidentally, commit those delinquencies which are associated with occupation armies. To keep the peace is a more innocuous operation than engaging on a man-hunt for the Tigers. A great effort must be made to win over the Tigers and the JVP into the mainstream of democracy on an ideological basis and to assure that the rights of every Sri Lankan citizen will be guaranteed.

If the India-Sri Lanka agreement is alive, a functional audit is badly needed so that changes may be wrought to make it fulfil its preamble. If the accord is all but dead, an autopsy must be done to understand why it never took off, except for massacres on both sides.

3.4.88. ■

COMMENT

TIME
TO
LEAVE

AKBAR KRISHNA



Why are we in Sri Lanka? To hear it from the glib *avatars* of realpolitik on the cocktail circuit of New Delhi, we are pursuing our strategic interests there. India had to decisively end the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka; otherwise Colombo would have been, indeed was, tempted to invite others in to help them do it. We would have had Pakistanis training the Sri Lankan army, American companies exploring for oil off the Lankan coast, and Trincomalee reduced to a western base. 'Indian interests' would have suffered.

So instead we are busy annihilating the Tamil force we had helped create, arm and train, in order to force them by war to make peace with someone else. And in the process of frying this particular omelette we are breaking a number of eggs: reducing much of northern and eastern Sri Lanka to rubble, taking the lives of people our soldiers had gone there to protect, losing the hold we have always had on their hearts and minds. As our own country reels in the grip of one of the worst droughts of the century, our national exchequer rains five crores of rupees a day into the effort to establish a *Pax Indica* on the teardrop island off our shores.

What for? The explanations of the government's critics have ranged from the naive to the cynical. I do not believe our prime minister suffers from a chronic addiction to unworkable accords, as some suggest. Nor am I convinced he was grasping at a foreign straw to pull him out of the domestic quicksand into which he seemed to be sinking. No, I think that New Delhi decided, no doubt reluctantly, to follow Kautilya rather than Rama: our incursion into Lankan affairs reflects South Block's view of the imperatives of statecraft rather than Racecourse Road's of the exigencies of politics.

But for all the cold logic of our position, there is no doubting that, to an increasing minority of thinking Indians, our intervention in pursuit of that position is indefensible. It was arguably time for us to wash our hands off the short-sighted intransigents of the LTTE and to wish Colombo luck and diplomatic support in its attempts to reassert Sri Lankan national unity—but not for Indian jawans to shed their blood to attain this end.

In the pages of the *Weekly*, that fine and insightful observer of our times, O V Vijayan, suggested the Lankan venture was the last thrust of the Aryan incursion into the Dravidian South. But there was nothing Dravidian about the retired general I met in Delhi who bitterly described the IPKF as the Innocent People Killing Force: about the father who spoke to me of the anguish of his son, an army captain, at seeing his comrades hunting down people they had themselves trained; of the retired ambassador who told me he would have been ashamed to be defending this policy in an international forum today. These were all North Indians.

scions of Aryavrata, and they were saddened and disillusioned by our hollow victories over Pirabhakaran's *rakshasas*.

Make no mistake: these words are not intended to cast any aspersions on the courage and valour of the Indian soldiers who are so bravely fighting today in Sri Lanka. But they are meant to question the judgement and morality of the policy-makers who sent them there. There was a time, not so long ago, when India's foreign policy spokesmen boasted that our international role emerged from our national values and cultural traditions: that India's foreign policy was a legacy of the Hindu precepts and Buddhist ethics which had given us the *ahimsa* and *satyagraha* of our freedom struggle. Nehru even attributed non-alignment to atavism: 'there was no cold war,' he explained, 'in Asoka's heart'.

Of course, all this probably had as much to do with the rhetorical flourishes of new orators of the world stage as with any real policy assumptions. But the assertion of an ethical international position did at least accord with the national self-image of Indians: it gave to the country's often ineffective external policies a moral legitimacy that guaranteed their acceptance. Foreign policy in India was elevated to an historically-sanctified expression of the country's innate genius, and it rapidly acquired an impressive political consensus.

The primary duty of an Indian government is to meet the needs of the Indian people. Instead, our military expenditure on Sri Lanka is soaring at a time when Colombo has cheerfully slashed (for the first time in ten years) its spending on the army by 37 per cent and its overall defence allocations by 13.5 per cent. While anti-Indian vitriol corrodes both Sinhalese and Tamil opinion, President Jayewardene proudly tells his compatriots that Indian soldiers are now dying instead of Sri Lankans.

No Indian government can indefinitely divert resources from development to war unless the broad mass of the people are convinced that the war is vital to their own survival. And this they will not be, because as the death-toll mounts and domestic inflation rises and the government seems to have less and less money and time to devote to the needs of the people, they will begin to question the war. And no amount of slick talk about strategic goals, or about Pakistanis and Americans, will convince them, that India should be expending precious resources, lives and fraternal goodwill by intruding into somebody else's quarrel.

In Bangladesh we at least had the moral argument: we were intervening on behalf of the oppressed, the victims of exploitation and attempted intellectual genocide. In Sri Lanka we have placed expediency above ethics, and defined our national interest without reference to the interests of our nationals.

In the end, such a policy can never succeed. Let us pull out in honour before we are forced to do so in disgrace.

3.4.88

EDITORIAL

4.4.88

Sri Lankan quagmire

LAST WEEK'S BUTCHERY at Kalmunai, south of Batticaloa, is a grim reminder of the explosive situation that prevails in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province. Close on the heels of the clashes involving Tamil and Muslim groups, the Indian troops announced the capture of several top leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the region. Although first accounts suggested that the vicious attack on the Muslim community was launched by "suspected LTTE men," later reports indicated that it was the work of the so-called "Three Star" group. Whoever the perpetrators of the crime, the fact that nine months after the induction of Indian troops a massacre of this magnitude could take place in an area with a mixed population is a sad commentary on the peace-keeping arrangements under the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. In the last several months the Indian army's operations have been directed almost entirely towards elimination of the LTTE cadres. The claims of success emanating from New Delhi in this regard have served to create a false sense of satisfaction over the current Indian role. No less a person than the GOC-in-C of the Indian peace keeping force (IPKF) in Jaffna has acknowledged in a press interview (which has attracted a partial and qualified denial from New Delhi) that 90 per cent of the population in the predominantly Tamil peninsula is pro-LTTE and that there is no sign of the LTTE running out of weapons. It is doubtful if the leadership in New Delhi which has committed the army to hunt for and neutralise the LTTE has taken into account the dangers inherent in the creation of a political vacuum through its misconceived strategy.

The essential justification for the deployment of Indian troops was the need to prevent elements inimical to our national interests from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka. Yet prolonged Indian military presence in the island can prove counterproductive as such elements will then feel tempted to sponsor and assist local groups with a view to dragging the IPKF deeper and deeper into the quagmire. The report that Pakistan has trained and equipped the Muslim Al Jihad group assumes significance in this context.

The political settlement envisaged under the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is nowhere near realisation. President J.R. Jayewardene's administration says it is determined to hold elections to all but two provincial councils in the next four or five weeks. Even if it succeeds in the effort, there remains the problem of holding elections in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which can only be done with the co-operation of the LTTE. A new complication is developing with Mr. Jayewardene's cronies plotting to get him a third term as President, which is forbidden under the island's Constitution. If the Government of India does not look ahead and disengage itself in good time it runs the risk of willy-nilly becoming an accessory to the establishment of a banana republic with a self-perpetuating President and a self-perpetuating Parliament.

CIVILIANS KILLED



K. Jayabala 5.4.88



Pararajasingam 24.4.88



P. Vijayabaskaran 6.5.88



Sinnarasa 6.4.88



M. Jayakumar 27.4.88



Mrs. Lakshmi 7.5.88



K. Kamalawaran 8.4.88



I. Ganapathipillai 28.4.88



S. Sivaraman 8.5.88



S. Raasunyar 11.4.88



V. Udayakumaran 28.4.88



Rasvarajeeva 10.5.88



M. Tharmalingam 14.4.88




U. Vadhyalingam 28.4.88



R. Udayabalan 12.5.88



Sellaya 21.4.88



Joseph 29.4.88



Gnanasekaran 13.5.88

LTTE denies Prabakaran accepted accord in return for money

Ravi Shankar, Sunday 24.4.88



LTTE STATEMENT

MADRAS, April 6.

The LTTE today denied the suggestion that its leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, "accepted the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in return for payment of funds to his organisation."

In a statement, the LTTE, however, said that it was "offered five million rupees monthly" by the Government of India until the formation of an interim administration as "compensation" following discussions on withdrawing "the taxation system which provided the main source of income to our organisation." The Government of India made one payment of five million rupees and "thereafter withdrew its commitments" following the collapse of the proposed interim administration, it said.

The following is the text of the LTTE's statement:

"The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam wishes to issue the following statement, clarifying confusing reports emanating from the Indian High Commission sources in Colombo about funds offered to the LTTE by the Government of India:

"First of all, we wish to deny categorically reports suggesting that the LTTE leader accepted the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in return for payment of funds to his organisation. This is a malicious distortion of truth, deliberately fabricated to discredit the image of our movement.

"During his talks in Delhi, our leader, Mr. Prabakaran, refused to accept the Accord expressing serious reservations on various issues, particularly on the Provincial Council proposals which fall short of Tamil aspirations. Mr. Prabakaran is firmly convinced that the proposals envisaged in the Accord would not pave the way for permanent settlement of the Tamil question.

"During his discussions with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Mr. Prabakaran pledged to surrender the arms in stages following certain clarifications and assurances given by the Indian leader. Mr. Prabakaran also promised to cooperate with the implementation of the Accord if it promoted the interests of his people and protected their lives.

"During these talks, the Indian Prime Minister pledged to set up an interim Government with the LTTE playing a dominant role and offered funds for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tamil refugees. The LTTE was also offered five million rupees monthly until the formation of an interim Government as compensation following our discussion to withdraw the taxation system, which provided the main source of income to our organisation.

"We wish to confirm that the Government of India made a payment of Rs. five millions and thereafter withdrew its commitments following the collapse of the proposed interim Government. Therefore, the funds offered by the Government of India has nothing to do with the Accord but it is related to the formation of an interim Government and the rehabilitation of our people and maintenance of our cadres. We also wish to point out that the interim Government was also not an item envisaged in the Accord. — Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam."

REPORT

MONEY FOR TIGERS: A RAW DEAL

Leak meant to distract attention from Bofors?

APR. 17-23, 1988

"ONE cannot get anything without paying the price. Sometimes one has to make the supreme sacrifice." That was the comment of Speaker Balram Jakhar when payment of a substantial amount of money to Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE supremo, was raised in the Lok Sabha on April 5.

That the payment had been made was divulged by J.N. Dixit, Indian High Commissioner in Colombo. Why India had to make such a payment is one question. But more important in the political context is the motive behind divulging the secret. It was obviously a deliberate leak. A veteran diplomat like Dixit would never shoot his mouth off.

The payment as such was not surprising. India had been helping LTTE, particularly during Indira Gandhi's regime. It was because of the inexperience of Rajiv Gandhi and the personal prejudices of former foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari that India's attitude towards the Tamils changed soon after Rajiv became Prime Minister.

For two days the ministry of external affairs would not comment on Dixit's statement. Then the confirmation came in the form of a statement in the Lok Sabha by Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh. His was a rather poor performance.

Said Natwar Singh: "One of the main problems mentioned by Prabhakaran concerned the fact that LTTE had been collecting funds through 'taxes' levied on the people of Jaffna and some other areas of the northern and eastern provinces. According to Prabhakaran, these collections were being used by them to provide allowances for the upkeep of their cadres. It was made clear to Prabhakaran that once the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement came into effect, such forced collections from the population must cease

"Prabhakaran requested, therefore,

that till the interim administration comes into being, and till his cadres are employed, he should be given the financial means to support his cadres as otherwise it would become exceedingly difficult for him to retain their loyalty.

"The Indo-Sri Lankan agreement provides that the government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate the militant youth with a view to

reports about certain payments made to LTTE in connection with Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. Hon'ble members have also raised this issue in the house. I rise to clarify the position." They wanted to know how the statement could be suo moto when the minister admitted that the issue was raised by the members in the house. Natwar Singh, a bit shaken, preferred to keep quiet.

There was no doubt that India had agreed to pay a sizeable amount to LTTE till its cadres were rehabilitated. The matter was raised by Prabhakaran when he met Rajiv Gandhi a day before the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was signed. He wanted financial assistance to maintain the cadres and Rajiv Gandhi agreed. The first instalment of Lankan Rs 50 lakh (about Indian Rs 25 lakh) was paid through RAW channels. All formalities required for such a pay-

Ravi Shankar, Indian Express 7.4.88



bringing them back to the mainstream of national life. India is expected to cooperate in this process."

"In order to help LTTE make the difficult transition from militancy to peaceful democratic politics, it was agreed to extend some interim financial relief. It would only cover the period till the rehabilitation of its cadres."

Members in the Lok Sabha wanted more details. But Natwar Singh did not feel obliged to give details in a suo moto statement. Members of the opposition drew his attention to the first paragraph of his statement which said: "The government has seen newspaper

ment were completed. When LTTE leadership refused to obey Indian orders, the payment was stopped.

In fact an indirect reference to such a payment was made in the Indo-Sri Lankan accord itself. Soon after Rajiv agreed to the payment a message was sent to add a line to clause 2.11 of the agreement—"The government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life; India will cooperate in the process."

So far so good. But why did a seasoned diplomat like Dixit choose to leak

the secret agreement? Indications on such a clause were given earlier by Dixit himself and later by Major-General Harkirat Singh and political adviser to LTTE, Dilip Yogi.

Dixit had given the indications while denying reports that LTTE was not consulted on the terms of the accord. Dixit had said: "On July 28, the PM himself received Prabhakaran and, in his presence, Prabhakaran said 'I accept the agreement, I shall cooperate in implementing it; myself and my cadres will join the mainstream of politics.' And the PM said: 'With your background of having advocated the Tamil cause, you have a place in the Sri Lankan politics. And its time you gave up the gun and came back to the demo-

language understood by diplomatic circles.

Yet, the credibility of the government being low, there were few takers to this theory. Many felt that the Government of India was engaged in an exercise to tarnish the image of Prabhakaran, having failed to win over the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. Tamils, who even now look up to LTTE for leadership and guidance, do not feel secure under the protection of Indian peace-keeping forces. The only way now to win them over is by discrediting Prabhakaran.

A few days ago there were reports in Indian papers about some jeans-clad women in the military entourage of Prabhakaran. The Indian media are

closure part of a counter-move? Is there any link between the disclosures in Colombo and the disclosures to come from Stockholm 48 hours later? It may indeed look far-fetched. But credibility not being the strong point of the present government, any wild theory would be lapped up.

A deliberate leak or not, the news was not received well. None talked about the avarice of Prabhakaran or condemned the government for paying money to LTTE. The immediate suspicion was on the politics of the accord. Speculation was rife on the secret deals of Punjab, Assam and Mizoram accords. Were the signatories of these accords won over by such payments? Though in international accords such payments may be a usual feature, would it not have disastrous results if such payments are introduced in accords within the country? Is it not a new version of horse-trading? If payments were made in domestic accords, from which account were they made? Such questions are now heard in the corridors of power in New Delhi.

Another aspect was the propriety of the leakage; even if such payments are usual in international agreements, is it advisable to disclose them? Would any country hereafter trust India to keep secrets? Would not any country shy away from such agreements fearing that at some stage Indian officials might embarrass them?

The news about the secret payments came as another setback to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. The fact that it came from a seasoned diplomat of India made LTTE and Tamils look at Indian intentions with suspicion. LTTE, obviously, feels that the disclosure was deliberate and intended to tarnish its leaders. Such feelings can only weaken whatever is left of the accord.

On the other hand, when the IPKF is expecting to complete its operations, the Government of India should have made a last-minute attempt to win over the LTTE leaders. Having been cornered from all sides it is quite likely that at least a section of LTTE would have cooperated with India. Instead, the disclosure indirectly paved the way for LTTE to stand united in its fight. Indian interests demand that the remaining Tamil leadership survives. Total suppression of LTTE or any other Tamil group is not in India's interest.

K. GOPALAKRISHNAN



Shrewd move. Dixit

The disclosure by Dixit came 48 hours before the Swedish prime minister was to appear before the parliamentary committee of his country. Was the disclosure part of a counter-move?

cratic process." For this he was given a number of incentives the details of which I do not wish to give. He took these incentives. That is my answer to this theory that all of them were consulted."

Later in an interview to Reuters on August 9, 1987, Major-General Harkirat Singh referred to "financial aid to LTTE" and on August 10, LTTE leader Dilip Yogi too referred to India's responsibility to provide financial aid to LTTE. On August 11, *Veerakesari*, a Sri Lankan newspaper, also indirectly referred to the assistance as rehabilitation funds jointly given by Sri Lanka and India. Besides, the Sri Lankan authorities were told about the cash assistance to LTTE cadres.

So the theory is that what Dixit disclosed was not anything new but what had been told repeatedly in a guarded

quite familiar with such "news tips" during briefings on political as well as terrorist forces within India.

Another theory is that the leak was to inform or misinform the Tamils in India on the real character of Prabhakaran. With DMK chief Karunanidhi periodically expressing concern over the fate of Prabhakaran, some adverse information on the Tiger chief's character and lifestyle might benefit some rival political party.

A third theory is purely on the timing of the disclosure. Remember, the Indian Air Force airdropped essential commodities over Jaffna the day on which the Swedish audit bureau report on the Bofors deal was released. The disclosure by Dixit came 48 hours before the Swedish prime minister was to appear before the parliamentary committee of his country. Was the dis-

D.B.S. Jayaraj

● **Amnesty** COMMENT

'If these Sinhalese, Tamils, or Muslims, wherever they may be and whoever they are, give up violence, surrender arms and accept the agreement, I shall grant them an amnesty and remove the proscriptions that prevent them from participating in democratic elections. I invite them to join the other parties in this non-violent and humane democratic process.'

The words referred to above, excerpted from President Jayewardene's address to Parliament last month has given hope to many a political offender behind and outside bars. The Indo-Lanka Accord in terms of Clause 2:11 stipulates 'General amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the P.T.A. and other emergency laws and to combatants as well as to those persons accused, charged and or convicted under these laws...'. Several clauses of the hastily drafted Indo-Lanka Accord have been disputed in its implementary stages. One such clause is the one that relates to an amnesty.

New Delhi feels that the amnesty covers all types of offences in all parts of Sri Lanka prior to the accord being signed on July 29th. Colombo's contention however is that the amnesty extends to only offences committed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The political rationale behind Colombo's view is that (1) it would be politically tenuous to grant amnesty to offenders who have harmed civilians in the seven provinces outside the North and East, (2) it would be politically embarrassing to release Tamils committing offences in the south when Sinhala extremists are under detention for alleged offences in the south.

The end result of all this was that in the aftermath of the accord certain categories of alleged offenders were not being released. The growing disenchantment peaked when 17 Tigers including the Trincomalee Tiger leader, Pulendran alias Amman were arrested in October '87 off Point Pedro. Pulendran was suspected of being the perpetrator of the Habarana massacre where 147 persons were killed. The crime was committed outside the North and East. So there was mounting pressure on bringing the Tigers to Colombo.

It is in that context that President Jayewardene's reiteration of the amnesty offer has to be viewed. Already it has fuelled hopes to the extent of hundreds of detainees writing letters to President Jayewardene. Their basic position is that they eschew violence and that the question of laying down arms does not arise because they

are already incarcerated. It is learnt that these detainees are now required to file affidavits to the above effect. The moving force behind this manoeuvre is Mr. Kumar Ponnambalam of the Tamil Congress.

The interpretation of the Amnesty clause by Colombo was particularly harsh on the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS).

The flashpoint of tension for the EROS arose when Niranjan alias Haran along with three others were arrested by the STF at Batticaloa. Haran had earlier been detained by the IPKF on suspicion for nearly two months. The four EROS men were brought to Colombo. The others except Haran were released following intervention of the Indian envoy Mr. J.N. Dixit. The rationale for Haran's continuous detention was the same as that of Pulendran. Haran was suspected of being the man behind the EROS bombing of Oberoi Hotel in 1984. Jyotindra Nath Dixit strained every diplomatic sinew and got Haran released from Sri Lankan custody. He was taken to Palaly and is being kept in IKPF custody. Since Colombo still feels that the amnesty does not apply to Haran, he is being detained to be available for interrogation.

But Haran does not seem to be the kind which is content to be in a state of 'benevolent incarceration'. In a letter dated March 17 he has written to Mr. Dixit for the third time. Stating that keeping him under Indian custody on the orders of the Sri Lankan Government was ridiculous Haran urges his immediate release. He also says that he would commence a fast unto death campaign. He would await Mr. Dixit's reply until March 26 before initiating the campaign.

The views expressed by Sri Lanka at the recent UN Human Rights Commission sessions in Geneva seems to suggest that Colombo still interpret the amnesty as being applicable to the North and East only. Mr. Dixit has already expressed concern over these views to the Sri Lankan Government.

The contradictory interpretations of the amnesty is another indicator of the hasty manner in which the accord was signed. A clear definition of the amnesty would have averted many a tragedy and controversy.

The post-Indo-Lanka Agreement scenario has seen many fast unto death campaigns aimed at focussing attention on crucial issues and winning demands. If and when Haran fasts the issue would be the amnesty. Haran's case is now a test case. His release or continued detention would determine whether the amnesty applies to the

entire country or the North and East alone.

● **Murders in the East**

'Who killed Cock Robin?'

The immediate question in the Amparai district, 'who killed Vel Murugu of Pandiruppu? The previous question in the Batticaloa district, 'who killed Ahmed Lebbe of Kattankudi?' The earlier question of the Trincomalee district, 'who killed Abdul Majeed of Kinniya?'

Given the complex nature and peculiar nuances of Eastern Province actualities one would ponder a great deal before venturing out with an answer.

There is a difference in the case of mass killings. The past weeks have seen a series of massacres. The majority of those killed have been from the Sinhalese community interspersed with incidents where the minorities, mainly Tamils have been victims. Yet in the brutal carnage one could detect a method in the madness, motive in the mayhem. Hypersensitivity bordering on xenophobia towards the issue of demographical changes in the province along with the Mosaic tradition of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth has led to genocidal frenzy.

The deaths of ex-Senator Nadarajah, Mannar GA Makbool, Communist Party leader Vijayanandan, Mutur and Sammanturai AGA's and a host of lesser-known personalities it was not difficult to ascertain who the killers were. In some cases the Tigers claimed credit.

One cannot however rush into conclusions about the deaths of former Deputy Minister and ex-MP for Mutur Mr. Abdul Majeed; former DDC member and Citizens' Committee Chairman Mr. Vel Murugu; former T.C. Chairman and Citizens' Committee Chairman Mr. Ahmed Lebbe. Some have openly pointed the accusing finger at the LTTE. The LTTE certainly has to bear its share of the guilt but the objective seeker of truth must be on guard against the common tendency to make a scapegoat of a Tiger. Two of those killed were called off their homes. Abdul Majeed was shot dead in his compound while Vel Murugu was abducted and killed. Ahmed Lebbe was shot while on the pillion of a motorcycle.

There is a common factor among the three. All of them were persons who worked hard in thought, word and deed for Tamil-Muslim unity. Mr. Abdul Majeed was a tower of strength to the TULF during the 1981 DDC elections where despite the Tamils being only a third of the district Trincomalee was won by that party. In recent times he

rendered yeoman service in reducing tensions between the Muslims and the Tamils, the Muslims and the IPKF. After his death a leading Muslim politician remarked publicly that Homeguards were responsible for the killing. A newspaper reported it and was never openly contradicted.

In the case of Mr. Ahmed Lebbe it cannot be forgotten that he helped the LTTE open a branch in Kattankudi at the residence of a close relative. He played a mediator role in the clash between the LTTE and the Jihad. More importantly he was elected Vice-President of a newly-formed Muslim organisation which openly supported the North-East merger. Shortly afterwards he resigned his post allegedly under pressure from a fundamentalist Islamic group. He was killed a few days later. In the ensuing panic eight Tamils were abducted by a Muslim group carrying sophisticated arms.

Contrary to the impression that Mr. Vel Murugu was against the fast knowledgeable circles assert that Mr. Vel Murugu was the motivating force behind the fasts. The fasts were in sympathy of the Mothers' Front fast. Mr. Vel Murugu who helped pour oil on troubled waters during Tamil-Muslim clashes in Kalmunai was instrumental in getting Muslim youths also to fast in support. The IPKF took great umbrage at this and forcibly broke up the fast threatening that 'Muslims should not fast'. They were supported by anti-LTTE groups. Mr. Vel Murugu had then coaxed the fasting persons to call off the fast to avoid violence. Also the car used by the killers was found in Karaitivu which could not be described as a Tiger stronghold.

The Eastern Province cocktail consists of various admixtures like the Police, the STF, the Homeguards, the IPKF, the LTTE, the non-LTTE Tamil groups and the Muslim armed groups. Speaking to a cross-section of sources emanating from Security, Police, Journalist, Citizen and religious circles a broad answer by no means conclusive emerges. All indicators are that:

The Killing of (a) Mutur's Abdul Majeed, (b) Kattankudi's Ahmed Lebbe, (c) Pandiruppu's Vel Murugu is presumed to be the work of (a) Homeguards, (b) Muslim armed group, (c) armed Tamil group other than the LTTE respectively.

● Chasing Prabakaran

'Curiouser and curiouser' the ungrammatical yet quaint phrase from 'Alice in Wonderland' appropriately describes the grand manhunt launched by the Indian Army in search of that elusive Tiger leader Velupillai Prabakaran.

In the good old days of Sri Lankan Army-LTTE clashes Sri Lankans were regaled with 'media-centred tales' of Prabakaran's movements. Seen here, there, everywhere; captured here, wounded there, 'killed' everywhere. Fortified with past experience Sri Lankans react with a casual response to Indian spokespersons, Indian-inspired leaks and Indian newspaper scoops about the adventures of the elusive Tiger.

Holed up in Kokuvil was the first, trapped in Kopay was next. Then he was injured in Chavakachcheri from where he hobbled on one foot to the base hospital in Manthikai, Puloly. He was sighted limping yet he was not captured or killed. A red herring then swam all the way across the Palk Straits. The search was on in Vedaranyam and Rameshwaram. The Tiger leader according to intelligence (Indian) reports found Jaffna made too hot for him and crossed over to India from where the Indian Army came.

The red herring swam back this time to the Islands off Jaffna. The next search was in Vadamaratchi.

The logic (Indian) was that the son of Vadamaratchi soil would prefer to die at the hands of the Indian Army on his native soil. Unfortunately VP did not want to die.

The scene then shifted to the East. Prabakaran could not cope with the superior Indian forces in the North, so he moves on to the East. The Tiger hunt is on, still Tiger No. one eludes his former friends and present foes.

In the meantime Prabakaran found time to send innumerable radio messages to his cadres in Madras, political leaders in India including Rajiv Gandhi. The IPKF was very skilful in 'intercepting' several messages between Prabakaran and his cadres here. Still no capture. While all this was going on Sri Lankans were told at different times that (1) Prabakaran was running from place to place followed closely by the Indian forces who were allowing him neither rest nor respite, (2) Prabakaran's hide-out, a luxurious bunker, has been discovered with couches to recline and television to watch (Rest and Recreation), (3) Prabakaran has surrounded himself with women and children. It was difficult to catch him because the Indian forces did not want to harm the civilians (nothing mentioned about civilian lives lost during Operation Pawan), (4) the Indian Army knows where Prabakaran is; it is only a matter of time before he is caught.

Adding to the confusion were the contradictory statements by Indian politicians, bureaucrats and reports in the Indian media. 'India wants him

dead; India does not want him dead; India wants to capture him alive; India does not want to capture him because he would commit suicide, etc. were the confounding themes.

The situation however is now serious. Whatever the Indian political establishment may feel the military has scented blood. Three houses in Shastri Koolankulam in Vavuniya were bombed by helicopter upon receipt of information that Prabakaran was there.

So now the spotlight is on the Wann. The natural habitat of the Tiger is the jungle. So the Wann jungles are the 'happy hunting grounds'. Indran the God of the Devas has the 'Vajrayudha' as his weapon. 'Operation Vajra' (Cutting Edge) has been launched in the Wann. Area of operations comprise the districts of Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Trincomalee, 7,000 troops are in the jungles.

Again comes the confusion caused this time by contending political forces. Karunanidhi of the DMK says Tamils all over the world including Tamil Nadu are shocked that Indian soldiers were making efforts to capture Prabakaran dead or alive. The hands of the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi will be stained forever with the blood of the Tamils by the efforts to liquidate the LTTE or Mr. Prabakaran who from the beginning had respect and confidence in India. Tamil Nadu Congress Committee President Karupiah Moopanar was quick to respond. 'It was not the intention of the Central Government to kill' the LTTE leader Mr. V. Prabakaran, he said.

In such a situation one would like to conclude with an excerpt from Sukumar Ray, the Indian version of a Lewis Carroll. Sukumar Ray whose centenary was last year is called the 'Nabab of Nonsense' and is well-known for his comic verse and fantasies. A passage from his fable 'HA-JA-BA-RA-LA' reads as follows.

'Who's cousin Treehopper?' I asked. 'Where does he live?'

'Up in the trees of course,' the cat replied.

'Where can I find him?' I asked again.


'Oh you can't do that,' he cried. 'Quite out of the question.'

'Why?' said I.

'It's like this you see,' said the cat.

Suppose you're looking for him at Vluberia: you'll hear he's in Motihari. So you go to Motihari only to find he's at Ramkrishnapur. Off you go again, but they tell you there he's left for Cossimbazzar. You just can't run him to earth.

Then how do you manage to meet him at all? I wondered.






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 மரணங்களின் செய்தி கூடக்
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 ஏக்கங்களையும் துக்கங்களையும்
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 கடலம்மா நீ மலடி
 ஏனத்தத் திவுகளை
 அனாதரவாய்த் தனியே விட்டாய்?





இளைய வயதில்
 உலகை வெறுத்தா
 நிறங்கள் உதிர்த்தன,
 வண்ணத்துப் பூச்சிகள்?
 புழுதி படைது
 பொன் இதழ் விரிந்த
 சூரிய காந்தியாய்,
 நீர் தொடர்
 சூரிய இதழ்கள் விரியும்
 தாமரைக் கதிராய்,
 நட்சத்திரங்களாய்,
 மறுபடி அவைகள் பிறக்கும்.



Peace in Jaffna 'a long way off' INTERVIEW

JAFFNA, April 1.

A top official of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force has indicated that peace and normality in Sri Lanka's war-torn Jaffna peninsula may still be a long way off because, though weakened, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is not "down and out yet."

"The peace which has descended on the peninsula is apparent, but we do not deceive ourselves into thinking that we have brought the situation under complete control," Maj. Gen. Sardesh Pande, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the IPKF in the Peninsula, told UNHCR in an interview at his Palaly headquarters, 20 km north of here, on Wednesday.

Hidden arms: There were no signs of the LTTE running out of weapons. "Either they have a large number of weapons hidden away or they are getting fresh supplies. So we have to continue to recover them," Gen. Pande, who took charge of the IPKF operations in the peninsula, the erstwhile bastion of the LTTE, in January said.

Gen. Pande dismissed the LTTE's overtures for a ceasefire as "unreasonable, clever and manipulated." "You stop firing and we will stop firing," he said and pointed out that the LTTE had, so far, not shown any inclination for a ceasefire.

The LTTE had, in fact, distanced itself from a ceasefire by continuing its attacks on the IPKF. "Everyday they are blowing up vehicles, throwing grenades and killing innocent people. What credibility do they have?"

The LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran was waging a "full-fledged war" against the IPKF which showed no sign of ending as far as the group was concerned. "The only thing the LTTE believes in is the gun and its power. So they simply can't afford to think of laying down the weapon. That will be their end."

Million dollar question: Though the IPKF had established military control over the peninsula, when normality would be restored was a "million dollar question," Gen. Pande said. Normalisa-

tion of the situation would depend on the people's willingness to assert themselves and convince the militants that "violence is no longer necessary."

Public opinion, which was now "prostrate on the ground" would have to stand up. "It will take some time for us to give it that confidence." With both the political and militant leadership having disappeared from the peninsula, the atmosphere was now characterised by "substantive fear" on the part of the civilian population. The fear was "total" some months ago.

Gen. Pande said the peninsula which was the stronghold of the LTTE would continue to be so because "90 per cent" of the population was "pro-LTTE."

'Social projection': "If the people were not pro-LTTE there would be something wrong with them" because the group was a "social projection" of the accumulated grievances of the island's minority Tamil community for the past 40 years. "The LTTE had fought for their honour and safety and it is part and parcel of society."

The response the civilians had given the IPKF was "tremendous" and the common man was genuinely interested in peace. The people now realised why the IPKF was here and had "seen us paying the price." Of late, they had positively started helping the IPKF, he added. "What they can't stomach is that we have suddenly entered into a conflict with the LTTE."

Asked why the IPKF went into conflict if it felt that the LTTE enjoyed popular support, Gen. Pande countered: "Why don't you ask this question to the political leaders and top military officials."

'Total distrust': Gen. Pande said the biggest impediment to peace in the peninsula was the "total distrust" the people showed towards everything. "The people have lost all faith in everybody. They feel that they are being taken for a ride. They think that we are playing the Sri Lankan game. They think that we are not clever enough to see it through."

One of the constant refrains was that the IPKF was here to protect its strategic interests and that it was keen to gain control of Trincomalee harbour. "We have better places in India from where we can protect our strategic interests," he said.

In this background, it would be very difficult to fix a time-frame to overcome the "deep-seated distrust" of the people to restore peace, he pointed out.

'Difficult proposition': Gen. Pande said the IPKF was in the peninsula only to control the situation and "that has been achieved." But militarily insurgency was a "difficult proposition" to solve as history had shown in several countries. "I am confident in my mind that at this rate, with the application of military and persuasive force, it will be possible to restore peace and normality in the peninsula."

Gen. Pande said the LTTE leadership had disappeared from the peninsula because, confident of the support of the people, they did not want to "waste their efforts here."

"We feel that they still retain their hold on Jaffna. Our aim is to loosen their grip."

Gen. Pande said that with the IPKF relaxing the movement of people in and out of the peninsula, some LTTE men had started coming back. The geography of the peninsula was such that it was impossible to stop the movement of the militants. "The lagoons are not even porous, they are like bottomless sieves. Anyone can wade across these lagoons or move in a fishing boat."

Asked about allegations by the LTTE that the IPKF was using members of the rival militant groups to spot their men, Gen. Pande said that anybody who helped the IPKF to fight the war would be given "a sympathetic hearing." Many had come to the IPKF because the LTTE had threatened them.


He said the hatred between the other groups and the LTTE had reached such levels that it was going to be their (LTTE's) weakest point in the days to come. — UNHCR

"90 percent of the population was pro-LTTE.

If the people were not pro-LTTE there would be something wrong with them"

— Maj. Gen. Sardesh Pande

Asked why the IPKF went into conflict if it felt that the LTTE enjoyed popular support Maj. Gen. Pande countered: "Why don't you ask this question to the political leaders and top military officials."



COMMENT

CLEANING UP THE MESS IN SRI LANKA

Accord with LTTE likely

NIKHIL CHAKRAVARTTY

THE inadvertent remarks by our High Commissioner in Colombo about payment of a huge sum of money to the LTTE leader have not only been a stunning revelation but are also turning out to have highly embarrassing repercussions for the Government.

High Commissioner J.N. Dixit is not only a senior member of our Foreign Service but is known for his maturity and competence. He has handled in the past such difficult assignments as Bangladesh immediately after liberation in 1972 when he was the Deputy High Commissioner in Dhaka, and Afghanistan in the early years of Soviet intervention, where his assessment of the difficult situation was always taken with seriousness.

In Sri Lanka too he was adroitly handling the crisis, with single-minded focus on the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. It was therefore surprising that Mr. Dixit should have made the faux pas of talking about the money being paid to Mr. Pirabhakaran in such a casual manner as to suggest that this was the price for the LTTE leader's consent to the agreement.

FANTASTIC

Although the Government statement in Parliament sought to clear up this point, the sensitive nature of the issue has touched off many speculations, some of them wide of the mark and bordering on the fantastic. For instance, a theory is being propounded that Mr. Dixit's leak of the big money

being paid to the LTTE leader was deliberate, so that there would be an outcry in Parliament demanding to know where such huge sums came from. At that stage, the Government, having been caught in the Bofors kickback controversy, would calmly try to explain away that the money from the Bofors deal had been secretly spent for winning over the LTTE militants. This sounds almost like a repeat of Washington's Iran-Contra deal. Perhaps the theory itself has been lifted wholesale from that scenario.

There is also another predicament facing the Rajiv Gandhi Government over the Sri Lanka crisis. In Tamil Nadu, the overwhelming body of opinion is now demanding a cease-fire by the Indian Army. This is not only the line of the critics of the Congress (I) like Mr. Karunanidhi's DMK, and the Janaki-Veerappan faction of the AIADMK, but even Ms. Jayalalitha and her group of AIADMK, supposed to be the only ally of the Congress (I), have raised the cease-fire demand. More aggressive critics of the Centre outright demand the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka.

TIED DOWN

The demand for a cease-fire in Sri Lanka has been snowballing in other parts of the country as well. For more than eight months now, the Indian troops have been tied down to one corner of the island, with little prospect of the present military operations bringing about a settlement. The mismanagement and disarray of the Sri Lankan Government has made the insistence of Indian demand for the acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord by the Tamil militants sound unrealistic, since President Jayewardene has hardly fulfilled his commitments under the accord.

In this context, the Prime Minister's insistence that the Indian Army's continued presence in Sri Lanka depends very much on President Jayewardene is rather confusing. New Delhi need not regard JRJ as is its best bet in Sri Lanka, an assessment which seems to be popular in the Rajiv Gandhi establishment. In his interview to Japanese newsmen on the eve of his Tokyo visit, the Prime Minister said that President Jayewardene wanted the Indian Army, that "we are helping him to implement" certain clauses of the agreement. It needs to be noted that JRJ has not implemented even those clauses which he could have done; and India has not brought home to him effectively his default. The general impression in the country is that Mr. Gandhi is largely

engaged in pulling Mr. Jayewardene's chestnuts out of the fire.

SECRET DEALS

From time to time there are also reports of secret negotiations going on between the Tamil militants, including the LTTE, and some of the high-ups of the Sri Lankan Government. Some time ago, two prominent Sri Lankan Ministers were mentioned as trying to strike a deal with LTTE, with the common objective of raising the demand for the exit of the Indian Army from Sri Lanka. Of the two Ministers involved in these secret parleys, one is Lalith Athulathmudali, known to be a severe critic of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, but the other, Gamini Dissanayake, has long been known as an ardent supporter. There is also the recent report that President Jayewardene himself has met a Tamil militant leader, though not belonging to LTTE.

Under the circumstances, New Delhi has realised the urgency of finding a way out of a jam. It is significant that Minister of State Natwar Singh, speaking to the press on April 11 during his Oman trip made the point that the Indian Government had never lost contact with the LTTE. This is the actual position today and it is good that the Minister has prepared the ground for some understanding with LTTE so that a cessation of hostilities could be achieved in the immediate future.

BADLY BRUISED

Although New Delhi is naturally tight-lipped and is keeping its fingers crossed until an understanding is actually struck with LTTE, one may safely presume that the cessation of hostilities is not far off. For one thing, the LTTE is badly bruised and in a corner. Besides, the Indian side is also beset with problems and accusations, albeit largely unfair, apart from having to incur an expense of reportedly Rs. 1 crore a day for the Indian Army operations in Sri Lanka.

Mr. Gandhi's aides are well aware of the danger of large-scale demonstrations demanding a cease-fire in Sri Lanka facing him in Tamil Nadu when he goes there for the AICC(I) meeting scheduled in the last week of this month. It would therefore be an intelligent guess that a move for cessation of hostilities based on an understanding with the LTTE might mature before that. An announcement of peace for Tamils in Sri Lanka would have a dramatic impact on Tamil Nadu politics, and that is precisely what the Prime Minister would like to achieve in the first shot in the election game in that State due to go to polls in June.

18.4.88



REPORT

India has alienated Sri Lankan Tamils

S. MURARI

SIX months have passed since the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka got entangled in a bloody war to disarm the LTTE. And now comes the candid assessment from the Jaffna commander of the IPKF that 90 per cent of the population in the peninsula are still with the Tigers.

Obviously in trying to isolate the Tigers politically and militarily, India has alienated an entire population. The euphoria over the accord has long since evaporated. If the Sinhalese have been hostile from the beginning to the presence of Indian troops which are after all fighting their dirty war, the Tamils have become equally unfriendly. The troop strength has swollen from the initial 6,000 to over 70,000, and more are on the way.

The time-table for the implementation of even non-controversial agreement provisions like lifting of emergency, scrapping of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and resettlement of refugees has long since been upset. The Provincial Council Bill does not satisfy even the moderate TULF. And the LTTE is far from subdued, though considerably weakened.

In short India has landed in a mess of its own making and is vigorously pursuing the military option while keeping the door open for talks. There is no way out unless India understands the psyche of the Tamil people.

Militarily, the Indian army has achieved in six months what the Sri Lankan army could not achieve in six years or more. It has ejected the Tigers from Jaffna, the seat of their power and dealt a mortal blow to the ego of LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran. It has broken their back and shattered their command structure. So much so, the boys are moving about in small groups and are operating on their own, their links with the leadership cut off. In Batticaloa, another stronghold of the LTTE, almost all top leaders barring commander Karuna are in the IPKF net. With the naval cordon tight and effective, supplies to the rebels have dwindled over the months. So much so, they are now conserving their ammunition and are increasingly using knives and swords to kill Sinhalese civilians and landmines to blast IPKF convoys. In the last few months, there have been very few direct confrontations with the IPKF.

And yet, Pirabhakaran is proving to be as elusive as ever. There is much truth in the IPKF claim that the LTTE is divided on the continuation of the struggle, but it is yet to be reflected in its political approach. All that the LTTE has done is to come down from its original position that the IPKF should pull back to the position it held before it launched the operation disarmament on October 10 last. In the last couple of months, it has expressed its readiness for unconditional talks.

MISCALCULATION

India has used every method, fair and foul, to contain the Tigers and failed. If the guerillas are able to hold out still it is because they continue to enjoy people's support. It was here that India made a grave miscalculation. It got carried away by the initial euphoria generated over the accord and convinced itself that any action against the Tigers would get the local people's support. When Indian soldiers arrived in Jaffna on July 30 last, they were given a hero's welcome much to the chagrin of the Tigers. Now the IPKF is looked upon as an army of occupation. Contrary to general belief, the Tamils' disillusionment with India started long before the war on Tigers began.

After consolidating peace in Tamil areas, India should have addressed itself to the task of resettling refugees, starting with about 40,000 Tamils uprooted from their homes in the East. The war-weary people were eager to get back to their villages. And yet, not a single refugee in the island itself dared go back, though Sri Lankan armed forces were then con-

fined to the barracks and Indian troops were present though not in required strength.

During this period, the Sri Lankan Government got busy with resettling the Sinhalese. Repeated pleas and relay fasts by Citizens' Committees of Mullaitivu and Trincomalee to draw India's attention to fresh colonisation under the garb of resettlement of the Sinhalese failed to evoke any response. The Sri Lankan Government went slow on release of political prisoners, lifting of emergency in Tamil areas and scrapping of the dreaded Prevention of Terrorism Act, preferring to wait until the Tigers turned in all their weapons. The Tigers held on to their arms, hoping to force the Sri Lankan Government to honour its commitments under the accord.

Instead of tackling these issues effectively, India directed all its efforts towards politically isolating the LTTE and militarily containing it by promoting other groups. One month after it claimed to have surrendered all its weapons, the LTTE was able to massacre nearly 100 rival militants right under the nose of the IPKF in Batticaloa. Operating in an alien territory with no clear-cut mission and subjected to contrary pulls and pressures from different agencies of the Government of India, the IPKF has not been able to check killing of Tamils by Tamils, Tamils by Sinhalese or Sinhalese by Tamils since that first massacre in Batticaloa.

Nor has India been able to meet the LTTE's challenge politically. It is easy to put all the blame on the LTTE and accuse it of having gone back on its word. But then, Pirabhakaran never agreed to support the accord. He only gave a public undertaking that he would not obstruct it so long as it safeguarded the interests of Tamils.

Instead of acting firmly at the first sign of trouble when Pirabhakaran went about killing rival groups in Batticaloa, India used that incident to mock at LTTE's sudden love for Gandhian ways when Thileepan undertook a fast unto death to focus attention on issues like colonisation and delay in the release of political prisoners which were agitating the public mind.

DISILLUSIONMENT

It was at this point of time that the Tamils' disillusionment with India started. Subsequent events like Thileepan's death, the collapse of the Interim Government Plan after the LTTE insisted on changing two of its nominees and the suicide by 18 LTTE men, including two commanders, in Sri Lankan army custody completed the process.

The bloody battle for Jaffna has left a deep scar in the hearts of the Tamil people, a scar that will take a long time to heal even if India tries to make amends by pumping in massive aid. During the initial stages of the operation, India maintained that it would not repeat the mistake the Sri Lankan forces made during the Vadammarachi offensive and that the IPKF was fighting with one hand tied behind its back. The report of the Jaffna General Hospital Superintendent, Dr. Nachinarkiniyar, makes nonsense of this. In this battle for the last position of the tigers, 76 patients were killed, says his report.

For the hapless Tamils, the accord has not brought the promised peace. There has been only a change of guards. With each passing day, more and more innocents are getting killed by an army that cannot make out an enemy from a friend in a guerilla war.

The continuing struggle has made the people hostile not towards the Tigers but towards India, according to even pro-Indian moderate as well as militant leaders.

However, having reached the end of their tether, the people are increasingly pressuring the Tigers to realise the futility of fighting a big power like India and to rely more on diplomacy than on the gun to achieve their political goal. The appeals for a ceasefire and resumption of talks issued by various Citizens' Committees and the fasts undertaken by the Mothers' Front of Batticaloa are positive signals of the changing mood of the people.

Even if India prefers to react cautiously to such signals, the least it can do is not to vitiate the atmosphere by allowing diplomats like Mr. Dixit to shoot off their mouths. Mr. Dixit has a tendency to view every agitation as an LTTE-inspired pressure tactic and counter it by stepping up his campaign. Thus, when Mrs. Annamma David's fast gains momentum, the talks about the LTTE's secret talks with the Sri Lankan Government. Her fast is forcibly ended and reports are floated that the LTTE tried to poison her. Now that her place has been taken by another woman, Mr. Dixit lets out the half-truth that the LTTE was paid some money on the eve of the accord. It is left to a minister to tell the whole truth. A sorry state of affairs indeed.

The sooner India ends the impasse, the better for all concerned. The only way out is not to insist on preconditions for talks like acceptance of the accord and surrender of arms. The LTTE has already said it will not oppose the accord. It is also ready for an initial token surrender. Now it is upto India.

12.4.88

What price the Lanka accord?

COMMENT

Seema Chowdry

IN Israel, the death of a soldier, whatever his rank, is treated as a national loss. A soldier killed in action gets an obituary notice in the newspapers with his photograph and a write-up extolling his virtues. Last November six Israeli soldiers were killed by a Palestinian commando who landed in an army camp with a hang-glider. The whole nation mourned their death by holding special condolence meetings. Prayers were held in synagogues, and schools and colleges held special functions to commemorate the 'martyrs'. TV and radio played soul stirring music. Rich tributes were paid by the Cabinet as well as the Knesset (Israeli parliament).

In India there appears to be no sign of mourning for our dead soldiers, in Sri Lanka or anywhere in the country. According to official figures, more than 370 officers and jawans have been killed and another 1,150 wounded in Sri Lanka. Parliament has not observed even two minutes' silence in memory of those who have laid down their lives in the true traditions of the Indian Army.

During the 1962 India-China conflict and the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan, the whole nation voiced its support for the brave soldiers. Unprecedented patriotism was re-kindled. There was national awareness due to the clarion calls given by the national media and various leaders, irrespective of their political affiliations, reminding one of the 'Quit-India movement'. Differences in faith and affiliations were bridged and the nation stood as one to meet the threat.

National indifference

In those emotional moments a number of welfare schemes for the soldiers were mooted. It is appalling to see that in the present fighting against the LTTE, people are apathetic and indifferent. The cause lies in the failure of the government to mobilise public opinion. It is almost a full scale war. Look at the number of casualties, look at the number of troops sent there. The national indifference has seriously eroded

the otherwise high morale of our armed forces.

I had occasion to talk to a large number of officers and jawans engaged in the fighting in Sri Lanka. It was surprising to discover that our soldiers feel that they are fighting a 'distant battle' for a cause they are not aware of. Some of them are critical of even the acronym IPKF, since it is not a peace keeping force; its task is to fight an insurgency in a foreign country.

It goes to the credit of Mr. Jayewardene that he has succeeded in his Machiavellian scheme by making the Indian troops fight the Tamil insurgents whom they had trained and armed to fight the Sri Lankan army. It is ironical that the Sri Lankan soldiers are living a comfortable life in their barracks and the Indian soldiers are fighting 'their' battle against their own erstwhile disciples whom they taught the art of guerilla warfare.

The soldiers though not vociferous in giving vent to their feelings, are well aware of the pitfalls of this adventure which might well portend India's 'Vietnam'. Many officers and soldiers I spoke to wondered whether the Sri Lankan adventure has been undertaken to divert the country's attention from the dire mess that the Rajiv government finds itself in.

In this undeclared war against the LTTE, there has been an acrimonious debate about the role of the IPKF, as had happened in USA about its involvement in Vietnam. There has been no homogeneity in our thinking or feeling because the government did not care to take the nation into confidence. Apparently the top brass of the army was not even consulted before signing the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.

The vast majority of the soldiers come from Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. Their thoughts, naturally, are back home; thanks to the unprecedented drought and famine-like conditions. Adequate relief and remedial measures have not been taken to alleviate the distress of their kith and kin. For instance, Haryana has been allotted a paltry Rs. 30 crore for

drought relief whereas Meghalaya was granted almost Rs. 300 crore for a non-existing drought during the elections. This has not escaped the attention of the troops. They are also wondering at the wisdom of the Government in spending enormous amounts of money, approximating Rs. three crore a day, in the operations in Sri Lanka, plus relief measures for the local population — whereas their own families are not getting even the bare necessities. An officer told me of a conversation he had overheard between two jawans who were unloading relief supplies for Tamilians in Jaffna. "I wish at least a portion of this could be given to my people in Rajasthan", one of them said. The other jawan quickly shot back, "Friend! Our government is meant to solve the problems of foreigners. Our families will be looked after by God"

Doordarshan blamed

The November '87 Palestinian commando raid on an Israeli military camp was given wide coverage on Indian TV. The very next day seven IPKF soldiers were killed in the fighting in Sri Lanka and this hardly got any coverage. The soldiers are very bitter that their acts of bravery are not being given exposure in the media, whereas irrelevant news of no consequence is given prominence. On the other hand, look at the coverage given by the state-controlled media, particularly by Doordarshan, to that unfortunate incident of an Indian soldier who ran amok and killed a few civilians in north Sri Lanka.

The army has had to suffer heavy casualties due to lack of forethought and sense of anticipation at government level. In 'Operation Bluestar' directions were given to the troops not to fire inside the Golden Temple to avoid damage to the shrine. This even as the terrorists themselves were unscrupulous enough to convert the 'Temple' into a 'fortress'. The army was launched with "prayers in their minds and compassion in their hearts", as one of the Generals commented later.

Again, just before the IPKF was hurriedly launched into Sri Lanka, strict instructions were given to avoid casualties among the civilians, in order not to alienate the Tamilians. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, the former GOC-in-

C Southern Command, said in an interview on TV that troops had to fight with one and a half of their hands tied behind their back. This prompted one officer to tell his colleagues sarcastically, "Boys, in 'Operation Bluestar' we fought with one hand tied behind our backs, while, in 'Operation Pawan' (name of the operation in Sri Lanka) we are fighting with one and a half hands tied behind our backs. Now be prepared to fight with both your hands tied behind your backs against GNLF"

The soldiers were given the impression that the role of the IPKF was to 'police' the surrender of arms by the Tamil insurgents. There was no indication of fighting a protracted insurgency. The force which was sent initially in a hurry was neither trained nor equipped to fight the insurgents. No war games were carried out for the impending task, nor were the commanders given any prior information. The IPKF was taken by surprise, resulting in a high rate of avoidable casualties.

Almost blind-folded

It was indeed lack of foresight, political wisdom and maturity. The army was not given any clear-cut aim, which is the first and foremost principle of war. The IPKF was inducted out of the blue and the Sri Lankan troops did not waste time in returning to their barracks without giving any intelligence support and administrative back-up which is vital for counter insurgency operations. The Indian soldiers had to fight almost blind-folded.

The Government's attitude seems to be that the casualties are natural in the performance of a soldier's duty, that he is being paid adequately and is doing nothing beyond the call of duty. There have been no monetary grants or rehabilitation schemes for the bereaved families. Contrast this with what is done for cricketers. One Test cricketer was given Rs. 20,000 by the Madhya Pradesh government for taking the maximum number of wickets against the West Indies! The families of policemen killed by terrorists are given monetary grants, whereas families of soldiers who have died fighting, have drawn a blank.

One senior Brigadier expressed concern at the disadvantage we are now facing vis-a-vis Pakistan due to our involvement in Sri Lanka. With the signing of the Mizoram accord, and major improvements in the situation in Nagaland and other North Eastern states, combined with the modernisation of the armed forces, India had acquired a distinct edge in its capabilities, and this was acting as a deterrent against any Pakistani mischief. By despatching two and half divisions to Sri Lanka and the move to send thousands of more troops to flush out the insurgents, India has lost this advantage. With the return of more than 30,000 Pakistani troops from Saudi Arabia and the impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, we are woefully short of the wherewithal in our strike capability vis-a-vis Pakistan.

There are approximately 100 battalions of para-military forces like the BSF and the CRPF committed in the maintenance of law and order in Punjab, Darjeeling and other trouble-prone areas. The para-military forces are the back-up force for the Army. At certain places on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, BSF personnel have been withdrawn for internal security duties in Punjab.

Pull-out vital

By making the Sri Lanka accord a prestige issue, the Rajiv Government has ignored strategic considerations of national defence. Pakistan and the Western powers would like to ensure that the Punjab problem is kept alive so that a major portion of our para-military forces are deployed there. It is still not too late to retrieve the situation. This calls for a political settlement of the Punjab and GNLF issues and a pull-out from Sri Lanka.

The army is the ultimate unifying force in the country. With fissiparous and regional tendencies threatening national unity, enlightened public opinion should make the government see the light and force it to take immediate steps to boost the sagging morale of our armed forces. We should not lose sight of the lessons of history: a nation which does not honour its soldiers cannot survive for long.

14.4.88

Cartoon by AJIT NINAN



EDITORIAL

24.4.88

OVERTURES TO EELAM

It is unlikely that Mr J. N. Dixit's denial of Press reports that India is making unilateral overtures to the LTTE leadership without any semblance of consultation with Colombo will remove the mistrust that is growing between the two signatories to the July 29 accord. The impression in Colombo that India is desperately seeking ways of pacifying the recalcitrant Tigers so as to improve the Congress (I)'s electoral prospects in Tamil Nadu does not in any way militate against the return of peace in Sri Lanka. But some members of President Jayewardene's Government might be justified in questioning the motives of a régime that wishes to do all the talking itself, keeping Colombo merely "informed". Certainly, the seemingly imperious manner in which the Indian High Commissioner objected to "any attempt to circumvent India" reinforced the conviction that New Delhi wants a settlement with the Tamil militants on its own terms without too much regard to Colombo's sensitivities. Even Mr Dixit's reported admission of a pay-off to Mr Pirabhakaran coincided with official revelations of disarray in the LTTE ranks in the Eastern Province, a situation which New Delhi is anxious to exploit to its own advantage. It would also seem that President Jayewardene's symbolic meeting with the PLOTE leader, Mr Uma Maheshwaran, was Colombo's feeble reply to Indian unilateralism.

While there can be no denying the fact that all avenues to restoring peace in

the island must be explored by Colombo as well as New Delhi, it is also apparent that there can be no settlement without the consent of both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. But the orchestrated campaign by a section of the exiled Tamil leadership in Madras suggesting that the July 29 accord was a non-starter because the devolution package was inadequate only suggests an attempt to blame the Jayewardene Government instead of the intransigence of the LTTE. This may be an expedient card to play for the sake of Tamil Nadu's domestic politics but it is also a gross distortion of what actually happened between July and October last year. A handful of Sinhalese bigots may have a lot to answer for, but New Delhi must make it absolutely clear that it cannot approve of the LTTE's preposterous demand for a one-party Eelam. Neither for that matter can it afford to repeat the virtual surrender of the Provincial Councils to the Tigers which followed the death of a second-ranking militant after a protracted fast. If the LTTE wishes to be rehabilitated in mainstream politics, it must not only agree to eschew secessionism and violence, but also accept the ground rules of competitive politics. It is Mr Pirabhakaran's failure on these counts rather than any imperfection in the devolution proposals that has contrived to Sri Lanka's second civil war. And to break out of this impasse requires the cooperation and agreement of all the concerned parties, not a back-door deal negotiated in a hurry.

people in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka into hell—all in the name of finding a solution to their problems. A report about a recent incident in Jaffna town involving the IPKF, that appeared in a Tamil weekly *Junior Vikadan* (February 24), is a case in point. When a lone LTTE gunman shot dead an Indian soldier at the Muttasi Kadai Theru junction of Jaffna town, the IPKF forced three thousand local residents—men, women and children irrespective of age—onto the nearby street and held them under the blazing sun, without water or food, for full nine hours. Also they raided the *Eelamadu* newspaper office located nearby and beat up its editor with belts and wires.

If the LTTE does not agree to India's condition that it should lay down arms before any negotiation begins, there are rather genuine reasons for it. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord does not offer the Sri Lankan Tamils even the extremely limited autonomy enjoyed by the states in the Indian union. After more than three decades of bitter struggle, this is not what the Tamils have bargained for. Moreover, the government of India has failed to prevail over the Sri Lankan government to execute certain limited benefits the accord has promised to the Tamils. In a recent letter to the Indian prime minister, the leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) has given specific instances of how state-sponsored Sinhala colonisation is going on in the eastern province and how the Sri Lankan armed forces are murdering the Tamil refugees returning to their homes. While the Tamil political prisoners continue to languish in the much dreaded Sri Lankan gaols, contrary to the promise, the notorious Sinhala homeguards are yet to be disbanded. Instead, there is redeployment of Sri Lankan armed forces in the eastern province. In these circumstances, laying down arms by the LTTE will mean mortgaging the future of the Sri Lankan Tamils to India, which is more bothered about its own geo-political gains rather than a solution to the Tamil question in the island nation.

The way out for India from the Sri Lankan quagmire is to redefine its stance as one of just assisting the Tamils in their effort to find a solution on their own, rather than to impose on them an unfair solution. With the passage of time, even those Sri Lankan Tamils, who earlier found the accord acceptable, are getting disillusioned. Note what V Balakumar, leader of Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) who still supports the IPKF, has to say recently: "We don't want to fight the IPKF. We don't want to treat them as our enemies, at least so far. But if the present situation is allowed to continue without relief for common man, we may be compelled to return to arms." Unless the government of India makes amends for its mistakes in Sri Lanka—that too rather soon—this country will find itself on the wrong side of history.

Economic and Political Weekly April 16

The Quagmire

M S S Pandian writes:

THE recent confession of Maj-Gen Sardesh Pande, GOC-in-C of the IPKF, that ninety per cent of the people in the Jaffna Peninsula support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) headed by Velupillai Prabhakaran, proves beyond doubt that no durable solution to the Sri Lankan Tamil question can be sought without the involvement of the LTTE. However, the government of India, drunk with military arrogance and for its own

geo-political gains, is pursuing a path which is just the opposite—of physically liquidating the LTTE by means of an expensive armed campaign. The Indian government has deployed one lakh armed soldiers to hunt down an estimated 2,000 LTTE militants.

Not only has the Indian government turned down the repeated offers by the LTTE for unconditional talk, it has also turned a deaf ear to the appeals by citizen groups and political parties, both in Sri Lanka and in India, to declare a cease-fire and open negotiations with the LTTE. On the contrary, the trigger-happy Indian soldiers are turning the life of common

EDITORIAL

26.4.88

The urgency of talks

THERE CAN no longer be any doubt that India's Sri Lanka policy, which has revolved around the plan to run the LTTE to the ground and force the surrender of its leader V. Prabhakaran, needs to be revised and revised urgently at that. There is mounting pressure both in Sri Lanka and closer home in Tamil Nadu too for India to pull its troops out of the island, and India can no longer ignore such pressures as if they were of no consequence.

Tamil Nadu is scheduled to go the polls shortly, and the three main groupings in the fray, viz the Janaki Ramachandran and the Jayalalitha factions of the AIADMK and sections of Congress (I) are certain to make the withdrawal of the IPKF an electoral issue. If peace does not descend in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka shortly, the fall out will be felt more in Tamil Nadu than in Sri Lanka. Ms Jayalalitha has threatened dire consequences if LTTE leader Prabhakaran is captured and killed. But even if this does not happen, given the fact that the liquidation of the LTTE militants is a highly emotive issue in Tamil Nadu currently, one should expect a measure of violence and needless blood shed there if the Sri Lanka issue is not resolved quickly. For the first time in months, it is as much in India's interests as it is in Sri Lanka's that a major effort is made to bring peace to Sri Lanka. If this requires rethinking of India's Lanka policy, then let us do so.

There is only one route to peace in Sri Lanka, and that involves talks leading to a negotiated settlement between the Sri Lanka Government, the LTTE and New Delhi. Ever since the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka, this fact has tended to be forgotten both by President Jayewardene and by New Delhi. But the consequences of such lapses of memory have been high. The IPKF has got bogged down in what is clearly an interminable war which is costing the Indian taxpayer an estimated Rs 7 crores every day apart from the heavy cost in lives lost on both sides.

Recognition is drawing slowly and belatedly that the LTTE cannot be eliminated through the use of brute force, however many Indian troops are put onto the operation - if 70,000 Indian troops can not crush a militant force of fewer than 3000 people; then the latter can not be crushed. This belated recognition has brought about some softening of India's stand in relation to the LTTE, with the Government now sending signals to the LTTE that it is willing to accept a token surrender of arms as a

precondition for calling off the IPKF offensive, and thereafter resuming talks. But because New Delhi has during these past few months severed most of its links with the LTTE leadership, it has no way of conveying its intentions to Mr. Prabhakaran and Co without being subject to suspicion. The hopelessly botched up exercise of sending three LTTE leaders to Sri Lanka, which ended in one of them being shot dead by the IPKF, has not helped matters at all. New Delhi is thus in a peculiar predicament of being unable to reach the LTTE top brass and thence begin the peace process. It has tended, as how now become habitual with it, to cover up this shortcoming with stepping up the tempo of the operation to capture Mr. Prabhakaran. The signals that are sent out in the process are mixed and the Indian Government can not expect either message to be taken seriously. The way out is to open unconditional talks with LTTE. These are the only terms on which the LTTE is likely to talk, and getting them to the negotiating table is a matter of urgency now.

LETTER

Americans in Vietnam, Chinese in Kampuchea, and Russians in Afghanistan have burnt their fingers. Indian political leadership is yet to realise this.

In Tamil Nadu, sentiments are hardening against the Centre. Tamils here cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that India is too eager to liquidate the Tigers. And as you rightly pointed out, Jayewardene would be the ultimate victor—when the Indian army returns from Sri Lanka, the Indian government would have antagonised Tamils in Tamil Nadu, Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese, too.

R. GURUMOORTHY,
MADRAS

● 'WHEN can the Indian forces come home?' (March 13-19) has exposed the lies mouthed by the ruling party at the Centre.

Why should our men lay down their lives in Sri Lanka? Certainly, this is not a case of 'loving thy neighbour'. Are our forces engaged in defending our frontier from an enemy attack? If the answer is no, then what is the compulsion?

This commitment is meaningless, bereft of sane thinking, this is going to be a war of attrition.

S. DAVID,
GUNTAKAL AP.



* Bhatlekhar, Weekly

COMMENT

“WAR IS CRUEL, BRUTAL AND TRAGIC”

*Syed Shahabuddin, M.P.,
speaking in the Lok Sabha
of the Indian Parliament*



Bhatlekar, Weekly

The purpose of the Oct 10 operation was to teach the LTTE a lesson. For what? For their intolerable and unpardonable impertinence, for their not responding, like Pavlovian subjects, to Rajiv Gandhi's whistle, for not serving his ego, for not co-operating in implementing his concept of regional co-operation, for flouting his dictates and orders, for questioning his right to decide what is good and what is not good for the Tamils.

Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, from the Operation Eagle of June 4 when we dropped relief supplies over Jaffna to the military operation of October 10 when we dropped paratroopers, we have indeed turned a full circle. The act of solidarity has been substituted by an act of hostility. In this House, we seem to be speaking with Orwellian logic and using the euphemism of a Peace Keeping Force. But this does not hide the fact that we have been involved, we are involved in a war, in a wrong war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place and against the wrong people. War is war, it is not peace, war is not negotiation, war is not diplomacy, war is not policing, war is not cricket. **War is cruel, brutal, tragic, a failure of diplomacy and a violation of pious intentions. This war is an absurd war, it is an ironical war, it is an unequal war, it is a bizarre war against a group, against the people whom we supported, we equipped, we nourished, and to whom we extended our moral support. It is against the people with**

whose aspirations we sympathised.

This accord, like all the other ill-fated accords is already dead as a dodo. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi may only keep a lonely wake over its lifeless body. He should be forced to recognise the reality and see the truth. Today even a blind man can see that euphoria has evaporated. There is a bad odour in the air, there is the grim outlook of a prolonged war in which we have been sucked in. The Long Night's journey into the day has begun, as Shri Ashok Mitra recently put it.

No provision of this agreement has been implemented in time according to the time schedule and no time schedule shall be kept for the rest of the provisions. Therefore, this accord to my mind was a child of immaturity, of impetuosity, of inexperience, of impatience, and of indecent haste. It was a child conceived hurriedly, nourished scantily and delivered prematurely. Why this haste, hurry and rush? **Why could we not have waited for a week or two and taken the LTTE along with us, whom we accepted as the most important militant group in Sri Lanka?** The heavens would not have fallen. This is the question; and to my mind the answer to this question is that there was a domestic compulsion behind this Agreement; that there was a storm, there was a hammering going on and the government wanted to stop that, through a vision of glory, by diverting the attention, by dazzling the mind of the people

Sir, there was a fatal flaw in this Accord. The fatal flaw was that the Tamil militants were not made a party to this Agreement. The Agreement, therefore, does not bind the LTTE. Therefore, by any juridical standards we cannot accuse the LTTE of violating an Agreement to which it is not a party. Of course, if we

acted on the assumption that the LTTE was our own creation, was our own child, that is a different matter. Are we prepared to own the parentage?

The Tamil agitation or insurgency was basically an internal problem of Sri Lanka. Of course, it has international repercussions. Why could not there be two agreements? **An Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on the substantive question, and an Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka on the possibility of political and military co-operation** as there ought to be between the two neighbouring and friendly countries. If that was done, you would not have fallen into this difficulty.

Sir, then, before the ink was dry, we introduced the armed forces. Sir, have a look at the Agreement. Agreement talks about Clause 2.16 parts (A) & (B), and then we come to part (C). I hope Mr. Natwar Singh will take a note of that. After that comes the Annexure and in the Annexure, after Clause 5 comes Clause 6. Now, before the ink is dry, the Government of Sri Lanka invokes Article 2.16 part (C) read with Clause 6 of the Annexure and the very next day we rush in our troops. Was there a prior Agreement? Was there an understanding that the steps envisaged in parts (A) and (B) were not to be contemplated? If the militants were not forthcoming, we had the option of part (A) and then the option of part (B). Neither of these was implemented. Neither of these was looked at and immediately we went to part (C) and crossed the rubicon. **Thus we allowed Mr.**

Jayewardene to lead us up the garden path, to trick us into a military intervention. Now, why did they do so? Why was there a rush?

Because they knew the time was not on their side? **There was no Tamil consent, and therefore, the army had to be there in order to coerce the Sri Lankan Tamils into acquiescence. They had to be browbeaten into surrender; they had to be silenced into line; that is why immediately after the Agreement was signed, this part was acted upon and the Indian forces were introduced in Sri Lanka.**

Sir, much has been said about the object of this war. I am talking of the present conflict that is going on. Is it to establish law and order in Sri Lanka? Is that our responsibility? Is it our responsibility to bring an end to civil war and peace to the stricken civilians in Sri Lanka? It may be our desire but it is not our responsibility. Is it to save Jayewardene's regime from collapse, from people's attack? Certainly not. Is it to destroy the Tamil militancy? Look at our own record of the last 3 or 4 years. Was it to liquidate the Tamil resistance to Sinhalese chauvinism? Certainly not. If at all intervention had a purpose, the purpose should have been to win the hearts of the Sri Lanka people, Tamils and Sinhalese. Are we by our present action going to win their hearts? The purpose could have been to defend India's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity. Does the LTTE pose a threat to our sovereignty or to our independence or to our territorial integrity? I must say great experts like Mr. Dinesh Singh and Mr. B.R. Bhagat have tried to give a security perspective, a broad security panorama so as to justify the intervention. I shall come to that a little later when I shall come to the role of the great powers. But, today every Sri Lankan Tamil - militant or civilian - who is falling to our bullets, unfortunately with the greatest possible care that we are having, I admit, whether he belongs to the LTTE or otherwise, **in the eyes of the Sri**

Lankan Tamils, is a martyr. I repeat that in the eyes of the Sri Lankan Tamils, he becomes a martyr. You can see it from the reports of our own papers. Because, according to them, it is ironical that the supporters have become executioners, defenders have become liquidators, saviours have become destroyers and friends today have turned into foes. Therefore, what we are reaping by this war, Mr. Deputy Speaker, is not gratitude, but anger, not love but hatred, not joy but bitterness; and in Sri Lanka today, we do not see hope, but we see disillusionment. We do not see trust, we see a sense of betrayal and we see a sense of shock. We have lost the faith and the confidence of the people whom we regard as our own kith and kin. What more could we have lost, tell me Mr. Deputy Speaker?

You have also created new fears and apprehensions in the minds of all our neighbours. Why this war? Prime Minister says, 'peace in Sri Lanka'. Mr. Bhagat says, 'security environment' and of course the 'protection' of the ethnic rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils! No. That was not the reason for this October 10 Operation. **The purpose of the October 10 Operation was to teach the LTTE a lesson. For what? For their intolerable and unpardonable impertinence, for their not responding, like Pavlovian subjects, to Rajiv Gandhi's whistle, for not serving his ego, for not cooperating in implementing his concept of regional co-operation, for flouting his dictates and orders, for questioning his right to decide what is good and what is not good for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, and for violating his commitment to President Jayewardene that LTTE shall surrender all the arms.** I read para

2.9 of the Agreement which says, "All arms presently held by the militant groups will be surrendered." Who authorised you to say that? Who authorised Rajiv Gandhi? Therefore, I would say that punishment was the purpose that it was a case of *lese majesty*.

What is the rationale that you are giving? You call it with characteristic immodesty as the biggest event of the century. That is what Prime Minister called this Accord. And in order to carry friends along, this diplomatic absurdity was being flourished around among our friends and sympathisers who say that unless we had stepped in, Sri Lanka would have invited the USA, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, all the devils in our pantheon.

Prof.N.G.Ranga: *He has invited them already.*

Shri Syed Shahabuddin: *Where have they disappeared. Sir? Have they disappeared into thin air? Have you sent them packing? Have the Government of Sri Lanka sent them packing? I have seen no such news report, so far.*

Then, this was readily gobbled by our leftist friends as a justification for the Accord and of course to our ultra-nationalists this was the great vision of Pax Indica. Sir, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, at best, play a marginal role. The USA has its hands full in the Gulf and could not possibly open another front and I have strong reasons to think, and there are friends in America who tell me, that USA was indeed asked by Sri Lanka and USA refused. JRJ was advised to look towards Rajiv Gandhi. So, JRJ turned his charms on, and Rajiv Gandhi was led up the garden path. And the hard-liner of all times, Jayewardene - every Sri Lankan Tamil tells me so - suddenly turned soft as pulp. He was even prepared to barter a part of his sovereignty. And Rajiv Gandhi fell: **Jayewardene took him for a ride. So, this is the rationale why this Agree-**

ment was signed. Now, 30,000 troops are there. Three crores of rupees are being spent per day and there is an indefinite commitment. I do not know what will happen. We shall be sucked into a quagmire. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Cyprus - all these memories come to us. But no two situations in history are absolutely alike. We do not know what it shall be. May be it turns into something, all such situations rolled into one.

Now, Mr.Deputy Speaker, Sir, the LTTE was kept out of the negotiations and their leaders were practically under house arrest. They had just a last minute meeting with the Prime Minister. **Mr.Prabaharan is on record as having told the Jaffna public meeting that the Indian leaders made it clear to us, 'take it or leave it, whether you support the Agreement or you don't support the Agreement, we are going ahead with it'.** This is what he said publicly. This has not been contradicted so far. Yes, when they found the situation impossible, our forces already in, they made a token surrender at Suthumalai.

After that, what happened in these two months? Sri Lanka continued with its policy of colonisation. It continued to delay disarming, disbanding and sending back to the barracks the Home Guards. It continued to introduce Sinhalese Police personnel in these two provinces. It deferred the return of many Tamil prisoners. It did not agree to the removal of military personnel stationed in such places as schools or homes. **The LTTE launched a Satyagraha. A man died. That did not move us. They committed suicide. That also did not move us. Now, LTTE want to retain their defensive capacity. I am not for them. But they know best what is good for them. But surely to a person or to a group in that situation you cannot insist**

that they must not maintain their defensive capacity against an enemy whom they know to be perfidious, that is to say the Government of Sri Lanka, the Government of Jayewardene.

Then came the beginning of the military operations. Do you recall that these operations began when J R J made a very hard-hitting statement? He said, *"If you are not disarming these militants, then out you go."* That meant, disarm or get out. Therefore, **this operation began when we received a threat from Jayewardene. We acted under threat. We did not act in freedom.** This is the point that you must keep in view. But the Government of Sri Lanka has been the biggest gainer of the situation. **What a laugh they must be having at our expense. No loss of life for them. No expenditure of money. We are doing their job for them.**

The Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (Shri K.Natar Singh): Fifty people died in a bomb blast, yesterday.

Shri Syed Shahabuddin: **That is still much less than what you have done. That is the JVP. The cost, financial, military and political, of pacifying the Northern Province has been very cleverly shifted on to our shoulders. And what has Mr.Jayewardene done as part of his bargain? Even the Prime Minister admitted yesterday that the devolution package as envisaged in these two Bills is inadequate. It is my case that the Government of Sri Lanka has gone behind the December 19, 1986, proposals. I shall not go into the details. But the recent judgement of the Supreme Court makes the passage of even these two Bills very uncertain. So, instead of these Bills envisaging a federal pattern with equal rights for Tamils and Sinhalese, they are talking about something else. We are again being forced into a situation where even if there is peace,**

surely the Tamil battle for autonomy will not cease; because, their political objectives have not been taken care of in these Bills.

Mr. Jayewardene today is finding his own throne collapsing. He is offering something which even the TULF - the most moderate of the Tamil groups - does not find it possible to accept. **He is offering a post-dated cheque of a bankrupt company on a failing bank. Why should LTTE accept it?** If Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is prepared to wage a war unto the end against the LTTE because they did not surrender their arms, or unless they surrender their arms, why does not the Government of India take Mr. J R J to task?

Take Mr. J R J to task for offering a moth-eaten Tamil province, for not creating an Interim Council, for not legislating according to schedule, for going behind the Dec. 19, 1986, proposals, and for not implementing paragraph 2.15 of the Agreement which says, **"Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka."** There is no public record, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that there was any consultation between the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka on these residual matters. Mr. J R J is working on those five counts. Why don't we take disciplinary action against him, if we are so keen to punish the LTTE for its supposed wrongs?

Therefore, what is the conclusion? We are in Sri Lanka so long as Mr. J R J finds it convenient for us to be there, till he says, "Get out." I am sure he will say that one day. This is an impossible position; we shall not get out because Government will lose face; and we have to get out when a foreign Government will say that. Never before have we forced our armed forces into such an impossible situation. I admire the heroism and the morale of our army; **but I dis-count and question the wisdom of**

the policy-makers.

Prof. Madhu Dandavate: Servants are good; masters are bad. That is what he is saying.

Shri Syed Shahabuddin: A sordid game is going on. There is a sordid drama in which **we have the Tamil militancy symbolised by the LTTE. It cannot be forced to surrender. It enjoys the support, even according to your intelligence, of a large cross-section of the people.** If young men and women are prepared to commit suicide or fast unto death, they have not been defeated. They enjoy every advantage of the terrain. They may choose to wage a long war of attrition.

And we have the other players, viz. the Sinhalese resistance, sometimes symbolised by a kindly face and sometimes by a macabre face. But it is as much there as the Tamil militancy. And then, there is our armed intervention. Their tragic inter-action may produce exactly the result that you and I, God forbid, do not want to happen! That is to say, **finally, a situation in which Sri Lanka is divided**, something that we would like to avoid, something which we would like to pay anything for avoiding.

But what are the options? I come to the end of my observations. In my view, there are three options: One is, of course, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, **carry on the war to the bitter end**, and hand over a pacified North and East to Mr. J R J on a plate. But under what time schedule, and at what cost? **The second option is total withdrawal**, and leaving Sri Lanka to its fate, to work out its own destiny. To me neither of these options is acceptable. **What I want is an immediate cease fire. This is the third option, to be followed by military disengagement and progressive withdrawal, but with a clear and unmistakable reaffirmation of our mediatory role for finding a solution other than partition, through bilateral, and if**

necessary trilateral, negotiations, but which must lead to a direct agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militants.

I would like to end by saying that if I know the Prime Minister's mind and if I know the way Government functions, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi will not heed this advice. He will carry on, because he has got the USA's pat on the back, he has got the endorsement of the Vancouver Summit, and he has been duly appointed perhaps as the gendarme of the region. The CIA has not been absolved of all charges of destabilisation. Who remembers the Congress (I) resolution of April 18? The World Bank is satisfied about our economic liberalisation. The conditionalities attached by the USA to the supply of a super-computer have been found acceptable. Collaboration is on the way in defence production and we are duly silent over what is happening in the Gulf or over the question of a Star War or over the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. **President Reagan's signed message of congratulation was handed over to the Prime Minister within three hours of the signing of the Agreement**, according to a report. When the Prime Minister talks about universal endorsement, I know what he is really talking about - a pat on the back that he received when he was in Washington.

We have come to a situation where, I am sorry to say and I am using a very strong phrase, we have become vulnerable to international blackmail and mere appeals to emotions of patriotism and sentiments of national glory will not help us. **We are generating hatred and ill-will amongst a people whom we regard as our kith and kin, and suspicion and distrust amongst all our neighbours.** This is Rajiv Gandhi's war; this is Jayewardene's war; this is not India's war; this is not what we voted you for; this is not what the Parliament voted funds for. This war must come to an end

Sri Lanka: the truth according to Jayawardene

COMMENT

THE ADDRESS TO THE SRI LANKAN Parliament by President Jayawardene, at the commencement of its new session on 25th February, 1988, has a few intriguing statements which throw new light on the circumstances in which the governments of India and Sri Lanka signed the Agreement in Colombo on 29th July, 1987, under which India agreed to send its troops to Sri Lanka to fight Jayawardene's war against the Tamils. Says Mr. Jayawardene:

"On the 29th July, 1987 the Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Gandhi and I signed in Colombo an Agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka..."

"On this day, the 29th July, in some parts of the Island, other than in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, rioting took place. Mobs converged on the city of Colombo from the direction of Kelaniya, Nugegoda and Panadura-Moratuwa. The security forces and the police were able to disperse them at Peliyagoda, Dehiwela Bridge, Kirillapone, Pamankade Bridge and Ayurvedic Hospital Junction, Borella. These mobs had committed a spate of violence in the outskirts of Colombo, before attempting to enter the city.

"Violence spread to other areas as well. The areas most affected were Matara, Galle, Hambantota, Kalutara, Mount Lavinia, Nugegoda, Kandy, Ratnapura and Polonnaruwa."

There are facts that were widely known at the time when these incidents occurred. However, Jayawardene then goes on to give statistics to explain the gravity of the situation that confronted him during this period. He says:

- "(a) Total number of incidents in the country between 28.07.1987 and 02.08.1987. — 2,527
- (b) Breakdown of incidents —
- Murders — 16
- Injured — 40
- Damage to Government/Corporation buildings — (42 Local Govt. and Asst. Government Agent's Offices, 47 Railway Stations/Tracks).
- Culverts damaged — 529
- Damage to Govt./Corporations/Private vehicles (including Ceylon Transport Board buses). — 1,005
- (Over 500 Ceylon Transport Board buses damaged)
- Damage to telegraph pylons and transformers. — 189
- Robberies — 561
- "The damage caused amounted to over Rs. 200 million."

According to Jayawardene:

"The JVP had clearly designed to unleash violence throughout the country, by exploiting a situation where large numbers from other political groups were to take to the streets, in order to stage demonstrations. They converted such crowds into violent mobs. In fact, the robbery of 311 shotguns by the JVP during this short

period, suggests that they had a larger and long-term objective in mind — the eventual capture of state power and destroying the democratic process."

To deal with this situation, Jayawardene says:

"The Government had to withdraw the security forces amounting to about 4500 from the North and East to meet this treat. Over 900 police personnel were also engaged on duty in Kandy on account the Esala Perahera."

And then he goes to make the most significant revelation:

"Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi came to my assistance by sending Indian Forces to the Jaffna Peninsula to relieve Sri Lanka Forces to come down to the South. As a result of this gesture I was able to bring to the troubled areas outside the North and the East sufficient security services to prevent further rioting and causing of damage to persons and property.

"I was advised to permanently strengthen the security services in the South and I did so. This necessitated that they be released from duties in the North and East. This has been done."

This revelation lifts the veil off whatever secrecy there may have been over the behind-the-scenes role played by the United States and Great Britain to rush India and Sri Lanka through the Agreement to deploy Indian troops to fight the Tamils, even as it explains the reasons for not associating the LTTE in the talks preceding the Agreement. India could not have possibly associated the LTTE with the signing of the Agreement and Jayawardene could not have taken Sri Lankan Opposition parties into confidence when both countries were playing the roles of puppets of the western powers.

Jayawardene's statement is also significant for what it seeks to conceal. Jayawardene states that there were 2,527 incidents in the country between July 28 and August 2, i.e. in four days to be precise. These were not ordinary incidents. There was sabotage on a massive scale, with 529 culverts damaged and 189 telegraph pylons and transformers damaged, killings which claimed 16 lives and injured 40, arson on an extensive scale which damaged 1005 buses across the country, and attacks on 42 government offices and buildings and 47 railway stations and railway tracks. It could not be that all this came as a surprise to the Jayawardene's government.

The Sri Lankan Government's Intelligence services as also the intelligence agencies of many friendly foreign powers operating in the island have been keeping track of the going in the JVP camp, and it is more than obvious that they would have known that the JVP was poised to strike in many parts of the country on July 29. In fact, Jayawardene almost lets the cat out of the bag when he says in his Address that "the JVP had clearly designed to unleash violence throughout the country." Given the size and weakness of its armed forces, Jayawardene's government decided, with the advice and consent of the United States and Great Britain and with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet Union that it should rush through with the Agreement with India whose Prime Minister had

already been convinced by the Western powers that he would be in line for the Nobel Peace Prize if he undertook the job of restoring peace in Sri Lanka, which shorn of its embellishments, meant killing that Tamils there. It is thus clear that it is the impending JVP action which made Jayawardene sign the Agreement with India.

So we now have confirmation from no less a person than the Sri Lankan President of what we have been saying from the day the Agreement was signed that the Indian Peace Keeping Force has gone to Sri Lanka to fight Jayawardene's war. But something more sinister is afoot in Sri Lanka. The massive build up of over 1,30,000 Indian troops in that country cannot possibly be to deal only with 2500 LTTE guerillas. The Americans and the British had evidently decided that Indian soldiers be used to fight not only the Tamils but also the Sinhala JVP, which Jayewardene's ragtag army would not have been able to tackle. And sooner than later, Indian soldiers will be called upon to deal with the JVP underground. India has indeed got into its Viet Nam, and will have to pay a heavy price both in terms of its men and money, what to speak of its long-term interests in South Asia, because of the follies and immaturity of R. Gandhi.

All this and more on our tragic involvement in Sri Lanka does not still evoke any response from our Opposition, never mind those occasional inane resolutions passed by a party or two and indignation-filled statements issued once in a while by some political leaders. When the government treats the entire Sri Lankan operation as a closely guarded secret and scrupulously avoids telling the truth on the casualties among Indian troops, the daily burgeoning costs of the expedition which the poor Indian tax-payers has to bear, on its implications to India's security and reactions with neighbours, the Opposition adopts the attitude of the three monkeys which heard no evil, saw no evil and spoke no evil. And that prime joker who is the Prime Minister had the temerity to tell the DMK member of Parliament, Murasoli Maran, that the Sri Lankan operation will go on till he has the head of the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran. Imbecility obviously breeds, among other things, on fantasy. Except that in the case of R. Gandhi he means what he says. Maran was shocked at the way the Prime Minister gesticulated and pointed to the floor at his feet where he wanted to see the severed head of Prabhakaran.

The communists and the BJP are generally in agreement with the government's, Sri Lanka adventure — though for different reasons. There is at least one person in the Janata Party who not only demanded Indian military action in Sri Lanka, but announced the formation of an army of mercenaries to fight in Sri Lanka. (The Americans must have agreed to meet the cost of such private armies.) The media has also, by and large, chosen to be a part of the conspiracy of silence over the Sri Lankan operation, and is diverting its crusading zeal in investigating Zail Singh, the godmen and other sundry scoundrels. The trade unions have either no clue about the implications of Sri Lanka or no inclination to do anything. The Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat had organised a demonstration in Bombay on January 21, demanding the withdrawal

And that prime joker who is the Prime Minister had the temerity to tell the DMK M.P. Murasoli Maran, that the Sri Lankan operation will go on till he has the head of the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran. Imbecility obviously breeds, among other things, on fantasy.

of the IPKF, but there are no reports from elsewhere in the country of any such demonstrations.

The DMK president, M. Karunanidhi, has announced his intention to convene a national conference to create public opinion to demand the withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka, but as of date, the idea does not seem to have travelled far, because the persons sought to be involved in the conference are all busy with their own little parties or their highly personalised politics. The youth and students have either turned wholly apolitical or are embroiled in petty squabbles on the campus or in the streets when not engaged in the search for jobs which are not there. It is now over eight months since Indian troops have been fighting in Sri Lanka, a war that has no meaning for India and a war that, as far as one can see, cannot be won. Young lives are being sacrificed in the swamps and jungles and towns of Sri Lanka to satiate the ambitions of R. Gandhi, ambitions rooted as they are in his idiocy and ignorance of the interplay of global political forces, that have to fail, though at a great cost in men and money to India.

The continuation of the IPKF in Sri Lanka is one more national calamity, of as great a magnitude as the Punjab tragedy created by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and continued by R. Gandhi. It will be foolish for the Opposition to wait till the Congress government is defeated in the next general elections to begin to apply their minds to this problem. The time to get our men back from Sri Lanka is now.

April 1988



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times

EDITORIAL

30.4.88

One step forward

THE COMPLETION OF council elections in four out of Sri Lanka's nine provinces, despite stray violence which claimed two lives on polling day, is the best piece of news to have come out of the troubled island in a long time. Originally seven provinces were due to go to the polls, but the Janata Vimukti Peramuna's violent campaign compelled the Jayewardene administration to delay the elections in three of them. The voter turnout of 50 per cent in the North-Western, North-Central, Sabaragamuwa and Uva provinces, where polling took place on Thursday, shows that the decision of the main opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, to boycott the elections did not dampen popular enthusiasm to the extent thought likely. If the elections thus became a credible exercise, the credit for it must go primarily to the leftist United Socialist Alliance (USA), which participated in them with full vigour, undeterred by the dastardly murder of its leader, Mr. Vijay Kumaranatunge, by JVP terrorists. The USA, now led by Mrs. Chandrika Kumaranatunge, daughter of Mrs. Bandaranaike, has emerged as a close second to President J. R. Jayewardene's United National Party, winning 64 out of the 155 seats in the four provincial councils, as against the UNP's 88. The newly formed Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, which put up candidates only in the Muslim belts in the North-Western province and Badulla district of Uva province, has taken the remaining three seats.

Hopefully, Thursday's success — the UNP gained control of all the four provincial councils — will give the Government the necessary courage to hold elections in the other Sinhala-majority provinces on June 2, as scheduled, despite the continuing JVP threat. The crucial test will come later when it has to hold elections in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The provincial council scheme was conceived in the first instance to give the Tamil majority in these provinces a measure of autonomy within Sri Lanka's unitary framework. While the Peace-Keeping Force, inducted into the island under the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement last year, has subdued the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, conditions in the two provinces are far from conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. Since any elections held while the Indian army is in virtual occupation will lack credibility in the eyes of the world, serious efforts for a rapprochement with the LTTE must now begin. While insisting on surrender of arms by the LTTE, the Government of India must not overlook its legitimate concerns about the safety of Tamils in general and of its cadres in particular. The widespread feeling about the inadequacy of the provincial council set-up, voiced even by the moderate Tamil groups, also needs to be taken note of. What this means is that the major task now before the Government of India lies in the area of diplomacy, not military action.

LETTER

JAFFNA: HOW NORMAL IS NORMAL?

S P Krishnan, Chavakachcheri

There is much talk, nowadays, about normalcy in the Northern Province. Newspapers and magazines, both foreign and local, try to show that the North is returning to normal. Journalists come to the north, take two or three photographs at the crowded bazaar or at the co-operative stores, interview people at the high levels of society and go back to tell the world that Jaffna is returning to normal. But **there is no normal life in the northern province. How is it possible? How can one say that there is normal life when the IPKF's operation is still on?** Can anyone say that fighting is going on somewhere though normalcy has returned elsewhere?

The government radio and other instruments of the mass media daily give news about incidents in North and East. The same sources announce that normalcy is returning to the North. **The way that the IPKF started on the 10th October last year is still on. They are occupying houses and government offices.**

Camps and sentries are found in every nook and corner of the North. Jeeps, trucks and other army vehicles speed along highways, and lanes. Searches, surprise checks and night patrols continue. Sudden curfews are clamped while the arrests of youths continue. **Houses are forced open. Inmates, men, women and children are terrified.** Fences are burnt. Barbed wire fences are cut. All this on the pretext of searching for terrorists.

Any outsider visiting Jaffna should travel along KKS Road, from Kokkuvil to Kankasanturai and Point Pedro and then to Chavakachcheri to

view the war-ravaged houses, buildings, temples and the poor man's huts. Houses damaged by shelling are a terrible sight. They are not repaired yet. They are not in repairable condition. Many of the damaged houses are used as sentry points by the IPKF. Bunkers are made of the concrete blocks from the damaged houses.

Hindu temples were shell-ed. Their *Koapurams* - beautiful art works - are now a pathetic sight. One wonders, are these army people actually from a land that is famous for ancient Hindu temples? How can there be normalcy, when even a place of worship is denied the common man? Tea boutiques, cycle repair shops and other small business centres of the poor man were burnt to ashes. No one has helped them to rebuild, so far. Some rehabilitation centres are functioning there. People are seen crowded at these places, holding affidavits in their hands, expecting some relief. But no one seems to have received any compensation so far.

What about the government's promises?

The former Finance Minister announced that many millions of dollars of foreign aid would be used to rehabilitate the North and East. This tune is still going on. More aid is com-

ing for this purpose, according to the mass media. But not a single project has been started in the North except for the filling of the holes in the main roads in the heart of Jaffna town. Damage to the Chavakachcheri Driberg College was repaired by the IPKF. But there are many other schools that lie unrepaired where classes are conducted under no roof.

Where is the normalcy?

Why don't they start work at least on essential services - hospitals, temples, market buildings and roads - if they have the foreign aid in hand?

We have a fine heritage of promises and cheatings; forty years of such experience. Everyone knows why the Tamil youths turned to violence. **Non-violent democratic methods adopted by Tamil politicians since 1947, to win our rights, were in vain.**

The IPKF is still fighting the terrorists in the North and East. So how can there be normal life in the midst of this war situation? **By hiding the facts no one can find peace!**

(Sunday Times, Colombo)



BAD SOLDIER SINGH

COMMENT

The West Indian Writer V.S. Naipaul - origin, Indian - has been panned by critics for depicting India as one vast backside defecating all over the place.

After what happened in Jaffna when the IPKF launched its operation against the Tigers on 10th October 1987, one wonders.

The Jawans took quite some time to gain control of the Kopay area, where the Tigers' Women's Brigade resisted fiercely.

Ultimately, the Jawans inched forward and gained control of Kopay. They occupied some house in Kopay.

When the owners moved back they found the contents of almirahs and cupboards strewn about and the raiders had defecated on sarees, even koorai sarees and, believe it or not, on paddy stacks stored in the houses.

Retaliation? Or uncontrollable purging?

The University of Jaffna has many wounds of war to show.

Among them, the staircase in the new Arts Block. Every step a toilet.

The District Minister of Jaffna U.B. Wijekoon, had a nice, expensive carpet laid out in his office. But that was before the IPKF moved into the Jaffna kachcheri. In what appears to have been a concerted team effort, the peace-keepers seem to have lined up and performed their ablutions on the carpet, rolling it before the next batch of peace-keepers lined up to defecate dutifully, and went on rolling the carpet till no further roll was possible.

Carpet-shitters?

Chickens and goats are having a hard time in Jaffna.

A house quite close to a prominent College in Jaffna Town had a poultry run. IPKF soldiers raided it every day and took away at least 50 birds. The raids stopped, of course, but only when the run ran out of birds.

The price of eggs, if available, has now shot up in Jaffna.

In several villages where the IPKF has established itself, owners of goats prefer to slaughter the animals and auction the flesh rather than have the IPKF take them away - free.

Fowls and goats are the biggest casualties, after civilians, in the Jaffna Peninsula.

'DISAPPEARANCES' AND MISSING PERSONS

Parents and spouses have reported the 'disappearances' of their children and married partners. In a specific case from Jaffna town, a man has not been able to trace so far his wife and three daughters taken away by the IPKF in full view of his neighbours on 12.11.87. Another case is that of Mr. Renganathan, a government school teacher. The IPKF took him away from his Kopay residence on 16.11.87 in spite of the pleas of his weeping wife and children. The wife and children together with relatives have paid innumerable visits to IPKF camps without any encouraging news. Seventeen

year old Yasotharan Thangarajah, a GCE Advanced Level student of Jaffna Central College and who excelled in his studies as evidenced by his GCE O/L results, was taken from his Jaffna residence by the IPKF on the morning of 17.12.87. His distraught mother, a widow, has yet to find him (as reported on March 1). A married woman with five small children from Vaddukoddai complained about the 'disappearance' of her husband who was arrested by the IPKF on 08.1.88. An IPKF officer gave evasive replies and tried to console her by sending her free rations.

INDIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES CALL FOR CEASEFIRE

Eleven opposition Members of Parliament said prolonging the Indian Peace-Keeping Force's offensive against Tamil rebels would not improve the situation in Sri Lanka and demanded an immediate ceasefire.

In a statement in Delhi, they said any future political settlement would be jeopardised if Sri Lankan forces were allowed into Tamil areas on any pretext.

They said the Indian Government should act immediately to prevent the Sri Lankan forces from entering the Tamil areas and resume negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to bring peace to Sri Lanka.


It was 'unfortunate that the Sri Lankan Government had sent its forces to the eastern province' while LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran had come forward with a proposal for unconditional

talks with the Indian Government, they said.

The statement said, 'under the pretext of the so-called guerilla war by the LTTE,' the Sri Lankan government was 'reluctant' to implement the main demands of the merger of the northern and eastern provinces as one unit and devolution of power to the provincial council before elections.

The signatories to the statement were M.S.Gurupadaswamy, Madhu Dandavate and Thampan Thomas of the Janata Party, P.Upendra of the Telugu Desam, Aladi Aruna and K.R.Natarajan of the Janaki faction of the AIADMK, V.Gopalasamy and N.V.N. Somu of the DMK, L.K.Advani of the BJP, V. Kishore Deo of the Congress-S and Lt.General (Retd) Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Akali Dal (L).

Opposition public meeting in Delhi



more about....

BAD SOLDIER SINGH

COMMENT

Reports allege sexual harassment - and rape - by the IPKF.

The 'Veerakesari' - the Indian-owned Tamil daily - reported some instances in Kokuvil which, it said, had led to the cashiering of IPKF personnel. But a contradiction was later issued - and carried.

But on a recently organised conducted tour of Jaffna, the IPKF big brass candidly admitted to journalists that four Indian soldiers had been court-martialed for rape. The Big Boss was, in effect, pleading for understanding, with the cry that his men "Were only human". The people of Jaffna have come to know another thing the hard way - that the Indians can only count up to four!

Unimpeachable witnesses testify that they have seen IPKF sentries put a lot of "Feeling" in frisking women, especially girls, at check-points.

On the look-out for bombs - or sex-bombs?

An Army is an Army. The khaki does make the man - and hang ethnicity. When the IPKF launched its Operation Disarm against the Tigers, old women, children and old men got the works.

At Kokuvil, a retired District Agricultural Extension Officer, Mr. Jayasselan, his wife (the sister of the present Chief Justice of Sri Lanka), their youngest son and two others were shot dead in their houses.

At Anaicottai, an elderly sister of the late senator Nadesan and a few others were pulled out of the bunker in which they had taken refuge, lined up and shot.

Of course the Indian media - by now, Lan-kapuwath and Rupavahini in reverse - blamed the Tigers for the Massacre.

A few days before the 'Eelamurasu' and 'Musasoli' offices were wrecked some IPKF personnel had visited both places on the pretext of finding out their advertisement rates. One of them had even gone to the toilet to ease himself.

A matter of acquainting themselves with the terrain?

IPKF personnel have reportedly told some press workers whom they arrested that they would never allow any newspaper in Jaffna to come out as all the papers there - in the IPKF perception - were anti-Indian and anti-IPKF.

● Northern citizen committees accuse Alleged rape of six women by Indians

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Six Tamil women were raped by the Indian soldiers at Iranamadu and Visvamadu in the Killinochchi district, last week, citizens committee officials in the northern districts allege. The raped women included a mother of two they say.


A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission in Colombo said they had made inquiries from the Indian military stationed in the Killinochchi district and were awaiting a report. According to the Indian sources they will look into the allegations with an "open mind."

The raped women, according to the source, who declined to be identified had been treated at the Jaffna hospital and discharged. The rapes have also been reported to the Killinochchi police by the relatives of the victims. Sources said that the people of the area showed their anger by staying indoors and closing business establishments on April 10 and 11.

However "The Island" was unable to contact the Killinochchi police as the telephones there were out of order, yesterday. A senior police officer in Colombo said that "Tamil women normally do not lodge complaints with police regarding such incidents for fear of social stigma."

Earlier four Indian soldiers (ranks were not divulged) were court-martialled and sentenced to one year, imprisonment for rape in the Jaffna peninsula during the 'Operation Pawan.' The IPKF commander in the peninsula Brigadier R.I.S. Kahlon revealed the convictions in mid January.

16.4.88



Painting : Bikash Bhattacharjee

LETTER

SITUATION REPORT:
JAFFNA DIOCESE IN SRI LANKA*Rev.Fr.M.E.Pius, Director, Jaffna Diocesan Human Development Centre*

Normal life has still not returned to the Jaffna Peninsula since the 10th of October 1987, when the IPKF started its role of disarming the LTTE. Little bit of everything is working in the Jaffna town - the hospital, banks, shops, transport, etc. The supply of electricity within the Jaffna Municipal limits has been restored since the 14th December though with limitations like low voltage and unannounced power cuts at times. The 'dailies' and 'weeklies' stopped in October 1987 have not commenced publishing. Post Office has not resumed its full functions.

Reaching the surrounding villages from the Jaffna town is a Herculean task. The presence of the IPKF at the check points almost at every 100 yards and the forced diversions of vehicles at various points call for great ingenuity to reach the intended destinations. Even now many villages cannot be reached because of the sporadic fighting and firings. Hundreds of houses have been demolished or badly damaged and it is estimated that about 40,000 Indian soldiers are in occupation of private properties in the Jaffna Peninsula. The indiscriminate shellings by the IPKF has uprooted thousands of families from many villages. Some villages have to be considered as refugee camps since vehicles, medicines, food and other essential items are beyond their reach still.

The problems of drinking water (pipe-borne water), fuel, transport, food, clothing and medicine have not been solved. A vacuum exists in the administration. Unruly elements unleashed in a few villages have a field day - thefts and robberies are rampant due to lack of law-enforcement officers.

IPKF moves into houses and institutions at any time under the pretext of search for the LTTE. Many people have been beaten beyond recognition after tip-offs due to past rivalry, enmity or jealousy between individuals, families or movements. Many parents spend sleepless nights to prevent the raping of their children - a fear not without firm foundation. Due to the war situation, more than 90% of the people in the Jaffna Peninsula are without any source of income - masons, carpenters, daily wage earners, taxi owners, farmers, fishermen, small industries, the self-employed, etc. The normal ration (food stamps) that is given free to the low income group of people in the South of Sri Lanka does not reach the people in the North (Jaffna) of Sri Lanka.

About 37,500 families are in need of urgent relief measures to tide over their difficulties. Provisions bought in Kilinochchi (35 miles from Jaffna), Vavuniya (90 miles) and Colombo (250 miles) are transported amidst untold hardships and risks to Jaffna by lorries and distributed by us to the accessible 46 villages and towns. It takes two days to travel from Jaffna to Colombo; delays are caused by 43 check-points, curfew and movements of troops.

Malaria, dysentery, and scabies are now very common in our districts. Due to the want of medical facilities we have opened a few medical centres along with the medical mobile unit at our service.

The badly wounded who request assistance are helped with an initial donation of Rs.250 for their medical facilities. Though we estimate more than 25,000 to fall within this category, our local agents experience great difficulties in collecting the necessary data due to the communication gap. Many widows, orphans and the maimed will need further assistance and help for their maintenance. Distribution Centres in villages have asked for assistance by way of clothing.

We fear that our relief programme will have to continue for another three months (minimum) till the people are able to begin their routine of income-generating activities. **There is no apparent end in sight to the confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE. Problems will have to be solved not by bullets but by dialogue.** Hope and pray that both sides accept this fact.

CIVILIANS KILLED

Seven Tamil civilians, including women and children, were killed when IPKF personnel fired back in response to an attack on one of their patrol party at Nedunkerny, 27 miles off Vavuniya, on 23 March.

According to the Vavuniya District Citizens Committee sources, the seven victims included four members from one family. The mother of this family who could not endure the tragedy committed suicide by taking poison.

According to the Citizens Committee, this was not the first time that civilians have fallen victims of indiscriminate fire by the IPKF.

AFFIDAVIT

ARUDSELVAN PARAMESWARY (22) C/O S. Kamalanathan,
Navagiri, Puthur.

The deceased Vadivel Arudselvan, aged 22 years was my husband.
He was a Vegetable Vendor.

On 3.4.88 at about 5.00 a.m. my husband left home as usual to
Chavakachcheri market where he used to sell his vegetables.

At about 2.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband's lifeless body lying
at Chavakachcheri.

I came to know that he was shot and killed by the army.

His body was brought home on the same day and cremated at Atchuvay
Thoppu cemetery on 4.4.88.

I am five months pregnant.

After my husband's death whom I married two years ago I do not have
any income or support and undergoing untold hardships.

SH. HSBLO BQA

MANICKAN YOGAMMAH (28) WIDOWED WIFE OF NAGAN
MANICKAM, Myliddy North, Soodukadduvan, Vasavilan,
Presently displaced at Suthanthirapuram, Vasavilan.

The deceased, Nagan Manickam, aged 31, is my husband. He was the
sole bread-winner of my family. He was a daily wage Labourer.

On 5th. of April 1988 at about 10.00 a.m. the IPKF suddenly came in large
number to Suthanthirapuram. During this time my late husband, four
children and I were in our huts. As soon as the IPKF arrived the
neighbours ran out of their house with fear. We also fled our residence
through fear and we were running towards Nilavarai side to seek
shelter.

While we were running, simultaneously, a unit of army personnel were
coming in the opposite direction from Nilavarai side. The army
personnel started firing. Through fear my late husband ran towards a
bush to hide himself.

At that time a bullet struck on to his chest. Profusely bleeding from the
chest he fell down and died at the spot.

At that time I was hiding behind another bush. One hour later when the
Army personnel moved away from that place I removed the dead
body of my husband with the help of my relatives.

That cremation of the body took place at Kudidiapulai Hindu Cemetery
on the same evening at 5.00 p.m..

That the untimely death of my husband has caused unbearable loss to me
and my family. He has left me and four children without any source
of income.

LOT. B. W. S. L. O. L. 17

SEBASTIAMPILLAI SEBAMALAR (45) Mareesankoodal, Illavalai.

The deceased Sebastiampillai Thevanayagi aged 19 years was my
daughter.

She was a self employed Seamstress.

On 8.4.88 at about 7.30 a.m. my daughter and her cousin left home for
the nearby Kaithar church to attend the service.

After they departed we heard sounds of gunfire and became highly
worried.

We went outside and found the lifeless bodies of my daughter and her
cousin lying in the lane in a pool of blood.

My daughter's body bore multiple gunshot injuries.

C R P

April, 15th - Jaffna - 8 militants arrested.

April, 15th - Odduchuddan - 3 militants killed & 3 arrested.

April, 15th - Batticaloa - 8 militants arrested.

April, 16th - Vavuniya - 30 PLOTE members arrested.

April, 16th - Kilinochchi - 6 women raped allegedly by IPKF. Protest by Citizens
Committee.

April 14 - 16 - South East of Elephant Pass - 30 LTTE members killed.

April 14 - 16 - Batticaloa - 30 militants killed; 9 arrested.

April 14 - 16 - Valaichenai - 6 LTTE cadres arrested.

April 14 - 16 - Vavuniya - 1 militant killed.

April 14 - 16 - Mutur - 6 of LTTE arrested.

April 17th - Mankulam to Puliyankulam - 15 Tamil passengers ordered to quit
bus and ride 17 miles on hood endangering their lives. Their places
inside the bus were taken by IPKF personnel. An Accountant who
rode on hood complained to the Indian envoy in Colombo.

April 20th - Mullaitivu - 8 militants killed.

April 21st - Kilinochchi - IPKF Lt. Col Killed & Capt. injured in encounter with
LTTE.

April 27th - Karaveddy - Militant youth taking IPKF soldier on motor cycle shot
at; both killed.

27.04.88 - Kilinochchi - Four IPKF soldiers kidnapped. IPKF conduct thorough
search of all vehicles plying through Kilinochchi.

30.04.88 - Arantalawa near Vavuniya - Government bus ambushed. Of the 9
killed six are Lankan soldiers. Six including one Lankan soldier
seriously injured.

IPKF OPERATION IN VADAMARADCHI EAST:

The IPKF imposed a curfew in Vadamaradchi East comprising, Nagarkovil,
Thaalaiyadi, Vettillakerni and Alliyawallai, on the night of
30.04.88. The curfew was continuous until lifted on 13.05.88.
During the first few days, the IPKF discovered a cache of arms and
a petrol bowser full with petrol buried underground. This led to
IPKF men assaulting residents and torturing youth for information
about militants. Shops and 20 schools in the area remained closed.
The residents were on the point of starvation. People of
neighbouring Valvettiturai township outraged by the ill -
treatment of people in Vadamaradchi East took out a procession
demonstrating against IPKF harassment in Vadamaradchi East.
The curfew was finally lifted to enable students to sit the Year - 6
scholarship examination to be held on 14.05.88. Only a few students
presented themselves for the examination. Whereas the people of
Vadamaradchi suffered untold miseries at the hands of the Lanka
Army during 'Operation Liberation' in May 1987, this year in May
the IPKF has taken over the function of tormenting the people of
Vadamaradchi.

Sittaru in Trincomalee District - On 01.05.88 a Government bus carrying
passengers was blasted by a landmine. Twentysix civilians mostly
Sinhalese were killed.

TELO called for hartal to be observed on 06.05.88 to commemorate killing of its
leader and other members in 1987 by LTTE. TELO members went
about Jaffna Town trying to enforce closure of shops. Six of them

I learned that she and her cousin died after being caught in a crossfire between the militants and the army.

My daughters body was buried at the Karthar church burial grounds on 9.4.88.

I have three daughters and a son

My husband is a Casual labourer and it was my late daughter who supplemented the meagre income with her income which she derives from sewing.

செ. சரோஜினி



SAROJINIDEVI SANTHIRASEKERAM (47) 15/3, Potpallai Road, Kokuvil.

The deceased Santhirasekeram Kuhaparan (17) is my 5th child.

My husband is a sickly person. He was a farmer engaged in paddy cultivation, cultivation of other crop at Ponnaveili.

Due to the illness of my husband my son S. Thayaparan was engaged in paddy cultivation. He died in 1982 due to insecticide poisoning after spraying the paddy field.

As there was no one else to look after the paddy field my son Kuhaparan undertook to look after the paddy field.

On 11.4.88 S. Kuhaparan who was engaged in threshing the paddy had left for Palavi to collect gunnybags and was shot dead by the IPKF during search operations.

I have two more sons aged 13 and 9 years and 3 daughters aged 21, 15 and 12 years.

As my husband is ill we looked forward to S. Kuhaparan to look after our cultivation which was our only source of income.

S. Sarojinidevi



ELAYATHAMBY RAJU, (53) years Mulli Road, Ariyalai.

The deceased person Raju Alex Vijayanathan aged 20 years was my son. He was a fisherman.

My son left for Batticaloa on 14.4.88 to see my youngest son, Raju Dias.

On 15.5.88 I was informed that my youngest son Raju Dias was shot and killed by the army.

I went to Batticaloa on hearing the news.

While I was staying at my relations house in Karuvepankerni, my eldest son left the place at about 11.00 a.m. on 5.6.88 saying that he is going to visit some of his relatives.

At about 12 noon I was informed that my eldest son was shot and killed by the army at School-road.

I rushed to the scene of incident where I found his body.

His body was buried at the Kalliankadu cemetery on 6.6.88.

I am suffering from Rheumatism and my late eldest son was our sole breadwinner.

After his death we are undergoing untold hardships.

Elayathambay Raju

THAVAMANY NAESARAJAH (45) Widowed wife of Nagamany Naesarajah, Tholakaddy, Vasavilan.

The deceased, Nagamany Naesarajah, aged 51, is my husband. He was the sole breadwinner of the family. He was running a Bicycle Repairing shop at Tholakaddy, Vasavilan.

On 15th. day of April 1988 at about 8.00 a.m. my late husband left out of my house in order to go to Atchuvely to purchase bicycle spares for the above workshop.

After ten minutes I heard the sound of continuous gun firing from the Oddakapulam side. The neighbours revealed me that the army personnel were rounding Oddakapulam and Atchuvely areas.

When the situation returned to normal some of the reliable informants came and informed that my husband above named was gunned down by the army personnel somewhere near the Oddakapulam Church side.

On receiving this information I rushed to the scene and I found the dead body of my husband lying on the ground in a pool of blood with gun shot injuries on his chest.

The prevailed tension did not permit us in proceeding for a sudden death inquest, as such no inquest was held in this connection.

The dead body of my husband was buried at Oddakapulam Roman Catholic Cemetery on the same evening at 5.00 p.m.

The untimely death of my husband has caused unbearable loss to my family. He has left me and four children without no source of income.

உரு. தவ. மனசாமி



SIVANANDA IYER, SELVAMANI (21) years., Selvasannathy, Thondamanaru.

Sivanada Iyer Selvarasa (23 years) is my eldest brother.

On 20.4.88 while my above mentioned brother was returning home on bicycle he was shot to death by the army near Pillaiyar Koviladi, Thondamanaru.

We have no mother and our father after our mother's death - remarried and deserted us.

I have an unmarried elder sister of age 25 years for me to support,

S. Selvamany



RATNAVELU INDRANY (44) years; wife of late Mr. Appasamy Ratnavelu, Pilavodai Lane, Puloly East, Point Pedro, in the A.G.A's Division of Vadamardchy North & East of Jaffna District.

My beloved Husband Mr. A. Ratnavelu, aged about fiftythree (53) years, was killed by gun shots fired by the IPKF Personnel, on Thursday, 21st. April, 1988 in our house, when my husband, a nephew of ours and I were in a room of the front portion of the house.

On the said date, at about six o' clock in the evening, my late husband was chatting to a nephew of ours, near our main gate.

At that time, I heard gun-shots from the direction of Point Pedro Bazaar area.

Within another ten minutes or so, a vehicle came rushing down our lane, firing indiscriminately.

I saw my late husband and my nephew running into the house.

I too from the well site rushed into the house.

I saw IPKF Personnel came running into our compound and fired into our house through a window in the front side of our house.

At the time of the incident, we three: my late husband, my nephew and I were in the front room of our house.

In this incident a bullet struck my beloved husband, in the abdominal region of his body, and he collapsed instantaneously.

My husband was killed by the IPKF Personnel, for reasons unknown to me.

My late husband was about fiftythree years of age at the time of his untimely death under tragic circumstances; and am fully & honestly aware, that my husband has never got involved in any form or type of Anti-Governmental, Anti-Social and Un-lawful activities.



EHAMPARAM SOMASUNDARAM (65) Kapputhu, Karaveddy.

The deceased Kandavanam Thavakumar (25) is my nephew (my own sister Thangammah's son).

K. Thavakumar was a bachelor.

The parents of my nephew Thavakumar are both old and feeble. They are confined to their homes.

On the 27th of April 1988, Kandavanam Thavakumar was shot dead by the IPKF during search operations. He was in his farm at the time of the incident and must have been mistaken for a militant.

The parents of Thavakumar and his sister Thavamalar (18) were entirely dependant on the earning of Thavakumar who was the sole bread winner of the family.

ச. கந்தசுந்தரம்



PONNIAN KATHIRGAMANATHAN (56) Karaveddy West, Karaveddy.

On 27.4.88 my late son Ragavan left home at about 9.00 a.m. to the village of Kappathu for the purchase of dry chillies.

On the day, the IPKF was cordoning off the area. On seeing the servicemen my son ran through fear when he was fired at by the Forces. He fell dead on the spot having received severe chest injuries.

On receipt of information regarding the demise of my son at about 2.00 p.m. I went to the scene and brought home his body.

The funeral took place on 28.4.88 and his body was cremated in the Sonappu Hindu Crematorium at about 12.30 p.m.

My late son was a trader who earned an average monthly income of Rs 1,000/-

I and my family was maintained and looked after by my late son.

I have a son and daughter who are school going.

K. Kathirgamanathan



ARICHANDRAN FONROSE (45) Pathaimeni, Atchuvally

The deceased person Appuge Arichandran aged 43 years was my husband.

He was employed as a Lorry driver.

On 29.4.88 at about 4.30 a.m. my husband left for work.

At about 8.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed after being unfortunately caught in a cross fire between the army and the militants at Pathaimeni.

His body was brought home and buried at the Vallai Catholic burial grounds on 30.4.88.

I have three children.

A. Arichandran

C R P

were shot and killed while on this mission. Several others were wounded and hospitalised. IPKF gave protection to hospitalised TELO cadres.

Damages caused to Jaffna University buildings and equipment during IPKF offensive in October/November 1987 is estimated at Rs. 52 million.

Kalmunai Disturbances :

The media interest in the East turned towards Kalmunai during the last fortnight. House and shop buildings were destroyed and nearly 26 died both Muslims and Tamils. Muslim leaders blamed the "Three Star" group for the death and destruction. The Indian High Commissioner also blamed the "Three Star" group and went on to say that the "Three Star" group was backed by a Lankan Minister. At the instance of Muslim M.P.'s the government has appointed a Select Committee of Parliament to inquire into the recent disturbances at Kalmunai. The IPKF has now pitched a camp at Islamabad a village in Kalmunai.

Cordon and Search Operations in Jaffna Peninsula;

Military Operations South of Elephant Pass by IPKF :

Not a day passes without some part of the Jaffna Peninsula being subject to cordon and search operations. Jaffna Town, Eriallai, Urumpirai, Vadamarachchi, Atchuvally, Neervely, Kopay, Chavakachcheri, Chulipuram and Pandateruppu areas were searched during the last fortnight. During the search, all young males have to assemble at a Central spot while soldiers go searching the houses. Searches in the above areas and military operations south of Elephant Pass resulted in the death of 24 LTTE suspects and injuries to 26. A further 400 were arrested with no loss to the IPKF. Nearly a 1000 Tamil detenus are held by the IPKF with nearly 400 among them held for as long as 5 months. Villagers who feared a cordon and search operation, induced a young men of their village to voluntarily surrender to the IPKF as he had earlier been arrested and released by the Lankan Security Forces. In fact the IPKF had made announcements promising no harm to those who voluntarily surrendered. A young man 'X' surrendered accordingly on 29.12.87 to the IPKF. On 16.01.88 the IPKF handed over the dead body to the mother, saying he had died a natural death. The family made the following observations on examining the body :

- The left shoulder joint was swollen.
- The left arm was dislocated at the shoulder.
- There were blackened strips marks the whole length of both arms (people who saw this said these were effects of electric burns).
- On both legs there were lacerated wounds.
- On the back also there were lacerated wounds.

Fast by Tamil Detenus :

From 26.02.88 a fasting campaign was organised by Tamil detenus at the New Magazine Prison, Colombo to back their demand to release all detenus and prisoners under the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The fast was continued by batches of ten detenus in relay. From 17.03.88 five of the detenus went on a fast unto death. Within one week two were hospitalized. On 27.03.88 on the intervention of Mr Kumar Ponnampalam, Tamil Congress Leader the fast was suspended. Mr Ponnampalam was relying on a promise the Secretary to the Minister of Defence Mr Sepala Attygalle made on behalf of the Government. Now Mr Ponnampalam states that he has been let down by the Government.

CONFRONTATION

1

NEW DELHI, April 1.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka has had some major and significant gains in the past 24 hours. In the first instance in an early morning swoop the IPKF apprehended the Commander of the LTTE group in Batticaloa, Dileep, in the Sunawaledi area. Along with him other top leaders caught were Ramesh, Deputy Commander, and Yogen, political commissar. Another significant catch has been Gurukulasingham alias Vardan, communications chief who was apprehended outside Batticaloa with an AK-47 rifle and 45 rounds of ammunition. According to PTI, Victor, finance secretary, was also arrested.

The Dileep group is the most important of the three LTTE groups operating in the area, the other two are led by Karuna and Newton. Dileep is reported to have told the IPKF that the lower-level cadres of the LTTE were now weary of the conflict and their morale was at the rock-bottom.

Informed sources in New Delhi said that in the Kalmunai incident seven Hindu Tamils had been killed along with 10 Muslims. They stressed that the information was made available only after the massacre had taken place and within 15 minutes of the report of the incident, three platoons from the Rajput regiment and the Guards regiment located nearby arrived at the scene.

2

Three IPKF commandos were killed and many wounded in a landmine attack by LTTE in Kanniya, Trincomalee dt.

3

COLOMBO, April 3.

Twelve Tamil militants surrendered to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) with their arms in the Eastern Batticaloa district yesterday and 12 other 'hard-core' militants were apprehended, according to official reports.

The surrender of the 12 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) came close on the heels of the capture of five top leaders of the group on Thursday last by the IPKF in Batticaloa town.

ENDLF men killed in LTTE attack: Some 30 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighters attacked an Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) camp at Kilinochchi on Saturday, killing two ENDLF men and wounding a third seriously, security sources said here on Sunday.

The raiders, who used hand grenades and opened fire with AK-47 rifles, managed to escape, despite the proximity of a Sri Lankan as well as an Indian Army base, the sources said.

An office of another rival group, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), also near the ENDLF camp, was spared by the LTTE, they said.

4

Colombo, April 4 (PTI): Seven Indian soldiers were wounded, when an improvised explosive device (IED) reportedly laid by the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) went off at Chavakacheti in Jaffna peninsula on Sunday an Indian High Commission spokesman said here on Monday.

Bodies of five Tamil militants, belonging to the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) were found at Periatthampalai in northern Vavuniya district, on Sunday reports reaching here said.

The five were abducted on Friday allegedly by the rival People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).

Names of three of the militants were given by the EPRLF in a press release here as 'Sarangan', 'Ravi' and 'Thanges'.

In another press release, the EPRLF, which is now a recognised political party in Sri Lanka, condemned the recent violence in the two eastern fishing villages of Kalmunai in Amparai district.

The incidents at Sainamarathu and Maliakathu in which innocent Muslims and Tamils were killed, were part of a cynical design to prevent the merger of the northern and eastern provinces to jeopardise the implementation of the (Indo-Sri Lankan accord), the release said.

During a raid on Colombo's commercial pettah area on Saturday, police discovered the body of a 35 year old man suspected to be a 'hard-core LTTE' element. They also found two parcels of heroin and two high-powered walkie-talkie sets near the body.

Thirty young Tamil suspects, residing in the area were taken into custody and five of them served with detention orders under the country's emergency regulations. The others were being interrogated.

5

Tamil militants on Tuesday ambushed and killed five Sri Lankan soldiers bringing breakfast for their comrades, officials said here.

The PLOT which had accepted an Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, killed eight rival militants on Sunday last, also in Vavuniya, the spokesman said.

Also on Sunday, seven IPKF soldiers were wounded when their vehicle ran over a landmine planted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

TAMILS DIE OF STARVATION

According to reports reaching us from Batticaloa, a number of innocent Tamils have died in the jungles of Pulipaanchakal. The jungle was surrounded by the IPKF and many of the victims could not come out due to the fear that they would be killed. It is reported that those who got trapped in the jungle could not find any food and have died of starvation. Indian media reported this incident with enthusiasm by referring that all those who died were LTTE members.

HALF A MILLION REFUGEES IN JAFFNA

The Ministry of Rehabilitation and Information revealed that at least one out of three persons in the Jaffna peninsula is a refugee, with a majority of them being displaced after the arrival of the IPKF. The number of refugees receiving state assistance in Jaffna is put at 500,000 or 120,000 families reported the Ministry. In addition to the refugees in Jaffna, there were 33,815 refugees in Vavuniya, 41,162 in Mullaitivu, and 16,000 in Kilinochchi.

IPKF OFFICIAL KILLED

Lt.Col.A.S.Sekhon, a senior IPKF official, was killed in action while leading his troops in a raid on an LTTE camp near Paranthan on 21st April, 1988. Another officer, an IPKF captain, was injured. Lt.Col.Sekhon is perhaps the most senior IPKF officer to die since the October operations in Jaffna.

7 Sri Lankan Army men were killed and two escaped with wounds, in an attack by LTTE near Sri Lankan Army Camp in Kondachi Farm, Mannar Dt.

7

COLOMBO, April 7. (PTI) — One LTTE militant was killed while seven other rebels were apprehended from different areas in Eastern Batticaloa yesterday, as the IPKF continued its concerted search and cordon operation, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said here today.

The Indian troops also recovered 300 rounds of different kinds of ammunition, 16 hand grenades, one AK 47 and two G3 the spokesman added.

The IPKF rounded up Valvettiturai, Polikandy, Udupiddy at midnight and arrested thousands of men and took them to the Udupiddy army camp. In the guise of identifying Tiger sympathisers, IPKF, along with three star mercenaries, beat up and ill-treated them throughout the night.

8

COLOMBO, April 8. (PTI) — Eight members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed — four of them after taking cyanide — in Sri Lanka since yesterday as the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) closed in on the Tamil rebels.

Six militants also surrendered to the IPKF today.

A junior commissioned officer of the IPKF was injured yesterday at Dharampura in Jaffna peninsula.

A spokesman of the Indian High Commission here said the officer was wounded in an encounter with the LTTE.

SUICIDE: Authoritative sources said three of the four militants who committed suicide were from Batticaloa district.

Another militant killed himself in north Vavuniya district. Yet another "Tiger" was prevented from swallowing a poisonous pill by the IPKF.

IPKF men killed two militants in Batticaloa and the other two in northern Jaffna and Vavuniya.

Six LTTE militants were apprehended from different areas in Jaffna, and Eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts, the spokesman added.

Two LTTE cadres Kamal and Ilayaraja and some villagers were at work in the fields at Mullaitivu. A mini van arrived and within moments three star boys identified the Tigers and the IPKF shot at them. Kamal died on the spot. On fleeing from the scene with wounds Ilayaraja consumed cyanide. A civilian also felt victim.

9

COLOMBO, April 9.

Fourteen Sinhalese villagers, including two women, were gunned down by suspected Tamil militants near Anuradhapura yesterday evening, in one of the most serious attacks to occur in the Sinhala-majority north central province in recent times.

According to a Sri Lankan military spokesman, a group of people were travelling along a road near Meegaswewa village close to Anuradhapura when they were ambushed by armed men. Two of the villagers escaped and informed the security forces. A lorry and a tractor, in which the victims were travelling, was burnt.

The spokesman said there was no definite indication which group was responsible.

In another development, the IPKF arrested over 50 suspected Tamil militants over the last 24 hours in the north as part of its continuing search operations.

The Indian High Commission today also denied reports appearing in the local media that the chief of the LTTE's political wing in Batticaloa and 13 other LTTE cadres had been released from custody by the IPKF.

Express News Service

Madras, April 9: In continuing combing operations in Sri Lanka, the IPKF arrested 33 "hardcore" LTTE guerillas and 154 suspected militants on Saturday, besides seizing ration stocks, printing machinery and explosive devices including grenades.

A defence spokesman said here that the LTTE had begun to avoid direct contact with the IPKF, and "there was a noticeable drop in their activity during the past 48 hours".

Nine hideouts of the group were raided in Vavuniya sector, unearthing two document caches. A local leader Kumaraswami, besides 16 hardcore guerillas and 122 suspects were arrested.

A large quantity of grenades, explosive devices and a tractor were also seized.

In Mullaitivu, radio equipments besides rations and documents were seized from a house. Seventeen militants were surrounded by the IPKF at Urumpirai and Karavaddi.

In Trincomalee sector, four militants were apprehended in Muthur area. In Batticaloa, 32 militants were arrested, in areas west of Kalmunai, leading to seizure of grenades and ammunition.

In a round-up by IPKF at Kinnady, the LTTE cadres Johnson and Lt. Sudarsan consumed cyanide sensing the no-escape situation.

10

PTI, UNI report from Colombo:

At least four LTTE militants were left dead in a massive cordon-and-search operation by the IPKF in the northern district of Vavuniya yesterday, an Indian High Commission spokesman said today.

MULLAITIVU IS REINFORCED

Realising that all is not well with Mullaitivu, which the Indian forces once claimed has been rid of the Tigers, the IPKF has started to build up its military strength in Mullaitivu. According to reports, Indian helicopters continue to hover over the Mannar-Mullaitivu area transporting soldiers and ammunitions.

HOMEGUARDS COULD NOT GUARD THEMSELVES

Unconfirmed sources report that a pack of homeguards living in the Sinhalese Colonisation Scheme at Kokkuthoduva in the district of Trincomalee, who had gone on a robbery spree into a Tamil village at Munthirikai Kulam, were shot at by the Tamil residents of the village. Though none of the homeguards was killed, two were injured while three managed to run away. The injured two who were in possession of hunting guns were arrested and handed over to the Tamil Tigers.

HOSPITAL STAFF ATTACKED

Dr. Mohanathan, a Dental Surgeon, attached to the base hospital in Kalmunai was seriously hurt and four others were also injured in an incident involving Indian army personnel on March 4th.

According to Kalmunai sources, soldiers from the IPKF camp at the Kalmunai rest house had gone to the residential quarters of the Kalmunai medical staff, at about 7-30 p.m. on Friday. The Indian soldiers were looking for another doctor S. Sasendran of the same hospital for questioning regarding a charge that he had been giving treatment to LTTE men. Dr. Sasendran was not in the medical quarters at that time.

Thereafter the Indian soldiers had assaulted Dr. Mohanathan and three others who were playing bridge with him. A fourth was also injured. The others were Messrs. Selvanayagam, Kailasapathy, Mahendran and Nadanalingam.



INNOCENT TAMILS MASSACRED IN HORAWUPOTANA

According to a BBC news report, masked gunmen in Sri Lanka have attacked a bus and killed at least 16 passengers all of them Tamils. Military officials in Colombo have confirmed that the attackers threw bombs and shot the passengers before setting the bus on fire. It is reported that the bus was travelling on the main road in Horawupotana in Anuradhapura district.

An IPKF jawan was also injured. Reports from sources close to the Vavuniya Citizens' Committee said that there were heavy LTTE casualties in the IPKF operation at a place called Panikkaneeravu, five km from Omanthai in Northern Vavuniya district.

A LTTE camp at Tambalakammam, Trincomalee was under attack by Sri Lankan Forces and in the battle LTTE cadres Archuna, Malanan, Jani and Rajkumar were killed. 8 cadres wounded.

11

COLOMBO, April 11.

Fifteen persons described as "hardcore LTTE" cadres were detained, an LTTE camp was destroyed and 250 rounds of ammunition were recovered by the IPKF during its operations in the Northern Province during the past 24 hours. At least 250 persons have been detained and interrogated.

An Indian High Commission spokeswoman said that Selva Chandran, Dharam and Yogendren were among the senior cadres taken into custody.

An officer and six jawans were injured when an IPKF patrol was fired upon, and at least two militants were killed in the return of fire, the spokeswoman said. The IPKF believes that three more militants may have been killed while they fled. In another incident, an IPKF jawan was injured while trying to defuse a booby trap.

Search operations continued in the Eastern Province, and six persons were detained and a fibreglass boat seized at Muraiguntivu. A cache of small arms were recovered at Karankudy, the spokeswoman added—Our Special Correspondent

COLOMBO, April 11. (PTI) — At least ten suspected militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed and several others injured, when the Sri Lankan Army launched a big operation inside jungle hide outs of the rebels at a place, 15 kms East of Meegawewa in North Central Anuradhapura District on the border of Trincomalee on Sunday, reports reaching here today said.

Meegawewa was the place where alleged LTTE guerillas were reported to have killed 14 Sinhalese people on Friday last.

According to Joint Operation Command (JOC) sources of the Sri Lankan Army in Colombo, eight bodies of the LTTE elements were found after the operation.

Some of the identity cards of the Sinhalese civilians killed on Friday, were also recovered from the area, they said.

A LTTE Camp at Mulunkavil, Mannar came under IPKF attack and in the ensuing battle a LTTE cadre, Ravi, died.

14

NEW DELHI, April 14.

A total of 27 LTTE militants were killed and 36 injured in the continuing "clearing operations" by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the jungles south of the Elephant Pass in Sri Lanka during the last 24 hours.

Official sources here said this evening that in the operations, code named "Virat" and "Trishul", IPKF destroyed 34 camps and hideouts of the LTTE and captured 112 hardcore LTTE members. — UNI

Two LTTE supporters Eswaran and Sri were arrested at Thalankuda, Batticaloa. The IPKF and three stars tortured and killed them at the camp.

15

Colombo, April 15 (AFP): Fifteen people, including 10 tamil rebels, were killed in violence in Sri Lanka, official said here on Friday.

Indian troops shot dead seven guerillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northern district of Vavuniya on Thursday, the Indian High Commission said.

Three other LTTE rebels were killed by Indian soldiers in north-eastern Mullaitivu district a spokeswoman said.

Twentyone Tamil militants were wounded and three captured during operations in the island's north, she said, adding that three rebel hideouts were destroyed.

In neighbouring Trincomalee district, two Muslims and two Tamils including a woman, were killed in ethnic clashes on Thursday, a Sri Lankan military official said.

In Batticaloa, with the help of the IPKF, the Three Star — mercenaries abducted three LTTE sympathisers, Mohan (Chettipalayam), Amirthalingam (Mangadu) and Kunam (Kathavalai) and tortured them to death.

16

MADRAS, April 16.

The IPKF continued with its operations codenamed 'Virat' and 'Trishul' for the ninth consecutive day today in the northern Vavuniya sector.

While searching a huge area systematically, it destroyed four LTTE camps, liquidating three militants and injuring another two. While six militants were apprehended in the search operations, 32 suspects were nabbed at check points and are being screened by Intelligence personnel.

At Uyilankulam, Mannar in an encounter with the IPKF, the LTTE guerrillas Lt. Murali (Uyilankulam) and Lt. Tanbarin (Kranji) were dead. A LTTE sentry between Pudukudiyiruppu and Viswamadu was attacked by the IPKF. Two cadres died in the ensuing combat.

17

The IPKF rounded up Poonakari Vilalge. LTTE cadres captain Nixon (Vankali), 2nd Lt. Sankar (Poonakari) were encircled. They sensed defeat and preferring death to surrender they shot themselves.

18

The IPKF shot dead two LTTE supporters at Palayadivat-tai, Batticaloa. One more was victimised at Porativu.

19

At Chettipalayam LTTE cadres Kutti and Kala of Batticaloa Dt. were brutally tortured to death by three stars with the help of the IPKF.

20

COLOMBO, April 20.

Four middle level militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam surrendered in Batticaloa and six others were apprehended in Trincomalee yesterday, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force continued to maintain its pressure on the LTTE which has now almost collapsed militarily.

Those who surrendered yesterday were Sinnah Thamby Kumar, Sanmuganatham, Selvarajah and Thyagarajah, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said.

There has been a lot of surrender by the LTTE militants in the North and the East following capture of several top leaders of the LTTE in the Eastern province by the IPKF.

According to Sri Lankan military sources, a militant suspect named Kandiah Mohandas was shot and killed by the IPKF sentries when he attempted to escape at Kalviyankadu in Batticaloa district yesterday. — PTI

21

COLOMBO, April 21.

Thirtyseven militants were killed in clashes between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces in the 48 hours ending yesterday, the Government-controlled *Daily News* reported today.

Without mentioning the source, the daily said that LTTE gunmen on Wednesday raided the house of Mr. Rajaratnam at Pugudutivu in the northern Jaffna Peninsula where EROS had its political office and killed eight men.

The LTTE also attacked the house of Balakumar, leader of EROS Tineveli unit in the Peninsula and murdered his father and brother-in-law. The report said that Balakumar was not the chief of the EROS group who also bears the same name.

The newspaper said that EROS retaliated with the massacre of 20 LTTE members at Muttur junction, in Eastern Trincomalee district. It also abducted two LTTE men at Killinochchi. The report did not give any reason for the clashes.

Sources in Batticaloa said that EROS has called for a hartal tomorrow in protest against talks by LTTE.

IPKF raid confirmed: Meanwhile, an Indian High Commission spokesperson confirmed that the Indian Peace Keeping Force raided a big LTTE camp, north of Vavuniya town yesterday but he said there was no information about the deaths of 27 militants or the capture of 18 as reported.

22

COLOMBO, April 22.

Lt. Col. A. S. Sekhon, a senior IPKF official, was killed in action while leading his troops in a raid on an LTTE camp near Paranthan in the Northern Province, yesterday.

According to a spokeswoman of the Indian High Commission, three LTTE men were also killed in the exchange. Another officer, an IPKF captain, was injured.

COLOMBO, April 22.

An area leader of the LTTE and a soldier were among nine people killed in violence involving Tamil and Sinhalese militants in Sri Lanka, officials said on Saturday.

Military officials said the IPKF shot dead the LTTE leader, who was identified by his codename "Inban", and three other militants during a clash at Chullipuram on the northern Jaffna peninsula.

Also on the peninsula, suspected LTTE activists shot dead a police sergeant at Point Pedro as he was returning home from a police station.

In other developments, Sinhalese militants from the Janata Vimukti Peramuna dragged a soldier from his house in the suburban Maharagama area and beheaded him.

JVP activists also shot dead an official of a State-owned farm at Hinguragoda in the eastern Polonnaruwa district.

A LTTE Cadre at a sentry post in Pudukudiviruppu of Mullaithivu forest area, fell victim to the IPKF sniping.

24

Colombo, April 24 (AFP): Indian peace-keeping troops have ended two military operations in eastern Sri Lanka, killing about 50 Tamil militants, informed sources said here on Sunday.

The IPKF operations also led to the arrest of more than 100 men of the LTTE in Batticaloa district, the sources said, adding that more than 100 LTTE men had fled the coastal area and were believed to be in neighbouring Trincomalee.

They included the LTTE's Batticaloa leader, known as Karuna.

Several hundred Indian soldiers were involved in operations "Tulip Bloom" and "Sword Edge" which began about two months ago to neutralise the LTTE in Batticaloa, the sources said.

The IPKF assaulted a LTTE camp at Kommathurai, Batticaloa, LTTE lost one fighter, Sari.



DIALOGUE IN THE OFFING?

(From our Geneva Correspondent)

The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Mr. V. Prabaharan has sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross a notice of the LTTE's accession to the Geneva Conventions I-IV of 1949 and the Protocols Additional I & II to the Geneva Conventions. Copies of this notice have been sent to UN Secretary General and the Director for Human Rights. It is learnt that certain Non-governmental organisations are endeavouring to bring about a dialogue in Geneva between the delegates of government of India and the LTTE. The LTTE has renewed its appeal for a cease-fire and has pledged to the government of India that they would co-operate with it for the satisfactory implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord to protect the honour, interests and safety of Tamil people if a political solution could be found which will fulfil the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people. The leader has sought the assistance of the delegates to assist them and the government of India in their mutual quest for peace.

GMOA CONFIRMS HOSPITAL MASSACRES

The IPKF has killed three doctors and 65 other health workers attached to the Jaffna Hospital according to a report released by the GMOA. A Dental Surgeon employed at the Kalmunai Hospital has fractured his hand as a result of an assault by the IPKF.

PLOT, EPRLF OFFICES SEALED

The IPKF sealed the offices of PLOT and EPRLF in Vavuniya on 18th April. 14 PLOT and 8 EPRLF men were arrested. The EPRLF members were released subsequently. 8 EPRLF members were killed by PLOT.

DISAPPEARANCES CONTINUE IN THE NORTH AND EAST

Disappearances were a common feature in the North and East during the time the Sri Lankan forces were fighting the Tamil freedom fighters. However, disappearances are still continuing under the IPKF. When relatives make inquiries about arrested people the replies given are, "escaped from custody" and "released", etc.

PROTEST AT IPKF ARRESTS

About 500 civilians lodged a protest with the Government Agent, Vavuniya, Mr.K.P.Logeswaran, over the alleged arrest of 25 innocent civilians at Sastri Koolankulam, Vavuniya, by the IPKF.

25

LTTE denial: The LTTE leadership, in Madras dismissed reports that the Tigers were involved in a bloody clash with the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation, for long an ally of the group, adds Express News Service from Madras.

In a statement on Monday, the political committee of the LTTE here blamed the Sri Lankan army for the murder of EROS' Muthur activist Jagan, and for the reports of bloody clashes between the two groups in which many were allegedly killed.

26

The IPKF rounded up an LTTE camp at Tambalakamma, Trincomalee. No damage incurred.

27

In the LTTE Camp at Pankulam, Trincomalee an attack was carried out by IPKF. 3 LTTE cadres missing.

An IPKF soldier was shot dead by LTTE in Vadamarachi, Nelliyadi. In this attack a three star mercenary man was also killed along with the IPKF soldier.

28

COLOMBO, April 28.

One non-commissioned officer of the Indian Army and at least three LTTE men were killed in an encounter at Neliady in Northern Jaffna Peninsula yesterday, as the IPKF recovered huge cache of arms and apprehended some militants, according to sources.

Among the three LTTE men killed was "Mohan Das", known to be the area leader Sri Lankan official sources said.

A spokesperson of the Indian High Commission here said the IPKF recovered large amount of arms and ammunition, including detonators and cartridges, from LTTE hide-outs during combing and search operations in northern Killinochi district yesterday.

The spokesperson said seven LTTE militants, including four in Batticaloa, and three in Trincomalee were captured yesterday. Two militants of the PLOT group were apprehended from their camp in northern Vavuniya sector, where the IPKF had two armed encounters with the LTTE elements. There was, however, no report of casualty in these encounters, the spokesperson added. — PTI

Two civilians were killed at Pudukudiyiruppu, while they were passing in a jungle way. In another incident the father of LTTE cadre gracy was killed by the IPKF along with two civilians.

29

In an encounter with Sri Lankan Army at First Unit, Vavuniya LTTE killed 5 armymen and wounded 7.

30

COLOMBO, April 30.

Six Sri Lankan soldiers and five civilians were killed when suspected Tamil militants ambushed a bus near Awarantalawa, Vavuniya, today. The soldiers were aboard the bus to provide protection to the villagers. Nine persons died on the spot, and two others died on the way to hospital. The bus was on its way from Anuradhapura to Vavuniya.

In another incident, PLOT sources said, eight of their members were killed in an encounter with the IPKF at Chettikulam in Vavuniya, where the organisation has a camp. The Indian High Commission here could not confirm the incident, but according to PLOT, Kulendran, alias Gaddafi and Kirubakaran alias Jagan were among those killed. The sources said a large number of their cadres had been rounded up by the IPKF yesterday.

At Trincomalee in Kokuvilanthan area, IPKF men were caught in the landmines set by LTTE and one of them killed on the spot.

In a roundup at LTTE Camp, Pankulam by the IPKF, two LTTE cadres Nathan and Mohan have lost their lives.

C R P

EPRLF - PLOTE Clashes :

On 01.04.88 each of the groups reportedly kidnapped 5 members of the other group. Kidnapped members of the EPRLF were said to be killed later on. The area of such activities centered around Vavuniya. Consequent on the clashes between two groups, the IPKF arrested some EPRLF cadres in Vavuniya and Mannar and released them after 24 hours. The IPKF also raided the PLOTE camp and took into custody some PLOTE members and 17 civilians found in the PLOTE camp. The PLOTE cadres and civilians continue to be detained by the IPKF.

Lankan Security Forces in North & East

The Government announced that it was strengthening its security forces in the North and East in order to pave the way for the phased withdrawal of the IPKF. Lankan Security Forces have to be confined to camps in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord. However, exceptions are being sought now on the ground that Lankan Security Forces were required to protect Sinhala villages in the East. ON 05.04.88 four Lankan soldiers riding in a jeep at Kondachi in the Mannar District in the North were shot and killed by militants. Following the Lankan Rapid Development Force was deployed in Kondachi about 25km South of Mannar the next day.

வீர வீணக்கம்

LITE MARTYRS

Kala 19.4.88
Sun 24.4.88
Lt. Kutti 8.4.88
Capt. David 17.4.88
Capt. Rahim 20.4.88
Patchan 27.4.88
Charles 30.4.88
2nd Lt Anbu 9.4.88
Kamal 7.4.88
Radha 14.4.88
Joseph 8.4.88
Kuruvi 17.4.88
Thaya 10.4.88
Kasan 7.4.88
2nd Lt Raghavan 10.4.88
Lucas 19.4.88
Nalin 24.4.88
Lt. Sudarsan 9.4.88
Johnson 9.4.88
Sinnaravi 10.4.88
Arjuna 10.4.88
Johnny 10.4.88
Manalan 10.4.88
Rajkumar 10.4.88
Ravi 11.4.88
Bastian 14.4.88
Sree 14.4.88
Tanbirin 16.4.88
Lt. Murali 16.4.88
Capt. Nixon 17.4.88
Lt. Shankar 17.4.88
2nd. Lt. Arasan 19.4.88
Capt. Thambukili 21.4.88
Naren 28.4.88
Jeevan 29.4.88
Capt. Nathan 30.4.88
Mohan 30.4.88

காலனும் காலம் பார்க்கும்; பாராது
வேல்சுண்டு தானே விழுமியோர் தொலைய,
வேண்டிடத்து அரீஉம் வெல்போர் வேந்தே!
திசைஇரு நான்கும் உற்கம் உற்கவும்,
பெருமரத்து, இலையில் நெடுங்கோடு வற்றல்
பற்றவும்,

வெங்கதிர்க் கனலி துற்றவும், பிறவும்,
அஞ்சுவரத் தகுந புள்ளுக்குரல் இயம்பவும்,
எயிறுநிலத்து வீழவும், எண்ணெய் ஆடவும்,
கன்றுமேல் கொள்ளவும், காழகம் நீப்பவும்,
வெள்ளி நோன்படை கட்டிலொடு கவிழவும்,
கனவின் அரியன காணு, நனவின்
செருச்செய் முன்பு! நின் வருதிறன் நோக்கி,
மையல் கொண்ட ஏமத்தில் இருக்கையர்,
புதல்வர் பூங்கண் முத்தி, மனையோட்கு
எவ்வம் கரக்கும் பைதல் மாக்களொடு
பெருங்கலக் குற்றன்றால் தானே, காற்றோடு
எரிநிகழ்ந் தன்ன செலவின்
செருமிகு வளவ! நிற் சினைஇயோர் நாடே.
கோலூர் கிழார்.



Lt. Manalan 10.4.88



Mohan 12.4.88




Kala 19.4.88



Arasan 19.4.88



Suri 24.4.88



Maj. Naren 29.4.88

claims	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
	IPKF	LTTE	S.L. ARMY	OTHER MILITANTS	CIVILIANS					
IPKF			5 ^C		17					
LTTE										
MEDIA				5 ^{EP}	17 ^C					

11	6	14				14
		1				

22	1	4	1			

12						

23						

13						

24						

14		27	148			
		2				
		30				

15		10	24		5 [*]	
		4	19 ^C			

16		3	40 ^C			
		2				
		30	21 ^C		30 ^P	

17						
		2				

18						

19						
		1				

20		1 [*]	10 ^C			
		8				

21		20 [*]		17 [*]		
		1				
	1	1				

27						
	1		3 ^C		1	
	1	4 ^C	1			

28	1	3	7 ^C		2 ^C	
		1			5	

29						
		1	5	7		

30			6			5
	1	2				
			6	1	8 ^P	6

31						
			11			

9	14	96	24 ^C	12	24	2 ^C	55	13 ^C
5	3	20	8 ^C	12	9	1		6
2	1 ^C	73	40 ^C	21	1	13	30 ^C	16 ^C
	4							17

TOTAL



1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12

CHAPTER 11

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	

Operation checkmate,
major IPKF offensive
on LTTE launched.

May



PSYCHOLOGY OF STATE TERRORISM

M. Sreetharan, PhD

COMMENT

During the pre-accord period, driven by the historical emotional attachment to India, an overwhelming majority of Tamils wished and demanded India to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka. **Contrary to our expectations, we have witnessed, as distant observers and with many of us burdened with personal tragedies, the untold suffering and destruction unleashed on the Tamil community and their property by the Indian invasion forces.** It is worthwhile examining some fundamental principles that govern the behaviour of nations in marching forward with their geopolitical agenda. Some material in the following sections has been drawn from the writings of Noam Chomsky

Three different mechanisms can be identified that serve as potential sources of state terrorism (political ideology plays no part in the psychology behind terror, but methods to achieve the ambitions may be different):

- 1) Superpowers finding ingenious ways to exacerbate local hostilities and inhibit peaceful resolution of local conflicts. e.g., Contras (US) Afghan Govt. (USSR).
- 2) Regional powers or powerful neighbours attempting to control states that threaten their geopolitical designs for the region. e.g. Indian involvement in Sri Lanka.
- 3) Nations within a single state with either a 'democratically' elected majority conducting with complete freedom state-sponsored terrorism to subjugate a politically weak minority or an authoritarian regime terrorising its own population. e.g. Majority Sinhalese Government-sponsored pogroms, massacres and planned land settlement policies to make Tamils nonentities in Sri Lankan socio-economic spectrum.

The philosophy and the moral content behind these actions by organised 'legitimate' institutions, short-sighted and corrupted by the power derived from

their relative military strength, is common; subjugation by terror motivated by self interest with rudimentary respect for international law. The only difference is in the size of the geographic area the aggressor wishes to have under its influence.

THE FIFTH FREEDOM

Franklin Roosevelt announced that US and its allies must uphold in the conflict with fascism the following four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. The central conclusion that emerges from the historical record of all nations that have engaged in state terrorism is the concept of preservation of the fifth freedom, understood crudely but with fair degree of accuracy as: **"The freedom to rob, to exploit and to dominate, to undertake any course of action to ensure that existing privilege is protected and advanced"** thereby having the freedom to breach the most fundamental tenet in the state system, the sovereign equality. The IPKF's behaviour in the Tamil heartland can be explained in the above context; they were only exercising their fifth freedom. Indiscriminate killing of thousands of civilians (including the old, children, doctors and patients in Jaffna hospital, the documented evidences are embarrassing to the extent that the UN indicted India at the sessions of the human rights commission) and looting of the savings of the Tamils are all valid courses of action under the rules governing the 'fifth freedom'.

MEDIA AND ORWELLISMS

Liberal democratic theorists have long noted that in a society where the voice of the people is heard elite groups must insure that the voice says the right things. In Sri Lanka, the media is controlled by the state; what people think does not matter too much. (The 'peace keeping' Indian commandos further helped the Sri Lankan regime by blasting the press/buildings of all three Tamil newspapers). In India bulk of the

media is state-controlled with a few notable exceptions. The propagandist flirtations of such media even hailed the Sri Lankan involvement as a foreign policy success for India. As vehemently criticised by the former Foreign Secretary Venkateswaran, India does not have a coherent foreign policy; rather they are made at the whims of the politically naive but aristocratically arrogant Prime Minister of India. But the state-controlled media dutifully labours to maintain a positive image of their chief executive. **The constrained dissent exhibited in Tamil Nadu for the Indian atrocities in Jaffna reflects the efficiency of the propaganda machinery of the state.** In contrast, United States is unusual if not unique in the lack of restraints on freedom of expression. Here, the technique is 'manufacturing consent' as is immediately evident to any foreigner; the thinking of the indigenous population except the intellectually bright are already controlled by the media.

In the Indian invasion of Jaffna the Peace-Accord became the focal word. By the history of this accord it is already a form of 'Newspeak' where the term, Peace-Accord, has a technical sense divorced from its ordinary meaning. In its technical sense it refers to the proposals advanced by the Indian government and the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE, the other main party in the conflict, was never a party to the accord. The impact of a headline saying "LTTE breaks the Peace-Accord" is obvious, but as we have seen although this is false, it is true in the world constructed by the media.

The state-controlled media will play down the role of overt state violence, regardless of its indiscriminateness or its intent to hit 'non-combatant targets'. These forms of state-sponsorship are generally treated as falling within the morally neutral and emotionally positive category of 'uses of force' or 'military action' or 'hit guerilla targets'. Manipulation of political language certainly acts as a powerful weapon in perpetuating this fraud.

DAMAGE CONTROL

Once the aggressor nation fails to achieve the objectives as swiftly as originally planned, a project of damage control becomes the next logical step. The state will be forced to deal with the following issues:

- a) to conceal the systematic nature of the criminality now being partially exposed;
- b) to question the failure of their military machinery against a weak enemy as judged by their intelligence agencies;
- c) to reassess the options and continue the offensive or find a way out, without losing face.

Indian involvement in Sri Lanka presents a case-study of underestimating the strength of a 'weak' minority. India currently is in the damage control phase. Simplified explanatory models are being used in paranoid style to establish some kind of justification for their actions. (IPKF is publishing their own newspaper in Jaffna to replace the local papers they demolished). Recently, however, common sense appears to have given way to their hitherto intransigence of not negotiating with the LTTE, the only credible representatives of the Eelam Tamils, hopefully to pave the way for a justified solution in the Tamils point of view.

SUMMARY

The recent period in the history of Sri Lankan Tamils is unique in the story of humanity; a powerless, but morally strong minority undergoing immense sufferings under the hands of undisciplined military of two terrorist regimes in succession, behind the veil of democracy and peace while the world simply observed in silence. What has also been tragic is the fact that 'democracy' in the land that is the proud mother of Mohanadas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru has not been strong enough to play a principled role in the conflict. As a global community, we are still short of a fair international mechanism that safeguards the fundamental rights of minority groups struggling all over the world.

GREETINGS FROM PRABAHARAN

To the International Tamil Conference

I am very delighted to know that the World Federation of Tamils has organised an International Conference in London to focus on the Tamil national liberation struggle and on the implications of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Such a convention, participated in by the Tamil patriots all over the world, is most timely and urgent in view of the critical and dangerous situation that has developed in Tamil Eelam since the signing of the Accord.

You are aware that within a short span of time after the so-called Peace Accord was signed, the Indian troops, which landed on our soil with a peace mission to protect our people, embarked on a ruthless war against our liberation movement, the consequences of which are catastrophic in terms of civil deaths and destruction of property. This war, which was started on the 10th of October last year is continuing, unabated, with ever growing fury, bleeding the Tamil nation profusely. The continuation of this war with its violence and bloodshed clearly demonstrates that the Accord has miserably failed in its acclaimed objectives of bringing peace and harmony to our people. **It is no more a peace agreement. It can only be characterised as a war accord, as an accord of military alliance between India and Sri Lanka, the strategic aim of which is to destroy the Tamil freedom movement and its armed vanguard.**

For the last seven months, we have been fighting to defend ourselves against a formidable military apparatus whose sophistication in war technology and in manpower is far superior to ours. **It is sheer will power, courage and our fierce determination not to surrender in humiliation, and above all, the morale and, the moral support provided by our people, that have contributed to our survival as a fighting force against the military might of a super power. Our capacity to resist in this prolonged war should be a bitter lesson to India that the will of a nation cannot be suppressed by military means, however formidable it may be.**

It is with profound sorrow and pain we took to arms to resist, since India offered to us no alternative other than to defend ourselves or perish. We consider India as our friend and ally and therefore we despise this war. I have made several appeals to the Indian Prime Minister for

peace, for negotiations and reconciliation. But to our deep dismay India has turned down our genuine plea for peace. **There seems to be a callous and calculated determination on the part of India to wipe out the Tiger movement and thereafter to induct an electoral process in Tamil Eelam at the point of a gun, to impose upon the Tamil people a deficient political framework.** She has thus chosen to betray the interests of the Eelam Tamils in order to strengthen and consolidate her relationship with Sri Lanka and to secure their geo-political objectives.

As a consequence of India's direct and violent intervention in the Tamil National problem through the medium of this Accord, the future of our people and their socio-political existence have suddenly been thrown into the darkness of uncertainty, confusion and gloom. Our political struggle for self-determination which is a product of a lengthy evolutionary history extending over forty years, a product of national campaigns, of mass agitations, and of revolutionary armed resistance, is faced with the danger of being stamped out. **The ultimate consequence of the Indian intervention is the grave danger of the complete subjugation of our people to the dictatorial dominance of the Sinhala ruling class and the perpetuation of oppression, state terror and genocide.**

In view of this grim situation facing the people of Tamil Eelam, it is the national duty and solemn responsibility of all the Tamil patriots living abroad to organise and mobilise themselves into a powerful international voice of reason to fight for the redemption of their motherland caught in a monumental historical tragedy. **The patriotic Tamil intelligentsia living abroad should lead an effective global campaign to stir the conscience of the civilised world about this tragic human condition of betrayal and oppression. We fervently hope that the international Tamil community will understand and support wholeheartedly, the determined struggle of our liberation movement to fight for the cause of justice for our oppressed people.**

My congratulations and good wishes for the success of the International Tamil Conference.

TAMIL CONFERENCE

An 'International Tamil Conference' was held in London on April 30 and May 1 to discuss the 'Tamil National Struggle and Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord'. The Conference was organised by the 'World Federation of Tamils' and sponsored by the Tamil Voice International which came into circulation recently.

It is understood that the conference was attended by over 200 individuals and delegates from organisations specially invited for the occasion.

Public notifications regarding the conference indicated that several guest speakers addressed the conference. They included V.Gopalasamy, MP belonging to the DMK, Aladi Aruna, MP belonging to the AIADMK, Retired Supreme Court Judge Krishna Iyer, Former Foreign Secretary A.P.Venkateswaran, P.Nedumaran (all from India), Ms. Karen Parker, a human rights lawyer from USA and Prof.A.J.Wilson.

Mr.N.Seevaratnam, the Chairman of the conference Committee, and N.Satyendra, a leading lawyer from Sri Lanka and presently living in the UK and who participated in the Thimpu Negotiations in 1985 as spokesman for the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), played a prominent role in the conference and its organisation.

The three resolutions adopted at the Conference by acclamation, in brief, (1) called upon the member states of United Nations, including the government of Sri Lanka 'to support the struggle of the Tamils of Ceylon for their basic and fundamental rights, including the right to self determination' and the international community to 'assist in securing a just political settlement of the conflict in Sri Lanka on the basis of an open recognition of the political reality that there exists in Sri Lanka today two nations — the Tamil Nation and the Sinhala Nation'; (2) recognised that V.Prabakaran and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have emerged as the true leaders of the Tamil National Struggle and called upon all member states of the UN to recognise them as such, and also called upon all Tamils to strengthen the LTTE to further the Tamil national struggle; and (3) called for an immediate ceasefire, and to commence negotiations to reach a political settlement within the framework of the four demands made by the Tamil delegations at the Thimpu Negotiations.

Tamil Times

EDITORIAL

UNITY AND UNANIMITY

The International Tamil Conference convened and concluded successfully in London to address the central issues of the Tamil national struggle in the context of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, and the developments since, is historic in many respects. This Conference is the first of this nature held and attended by a large number of delegates of Tamil associations and organisations from the five continents of the world. In that respect the message of this Conference was not only a representative voice of the Tamils of the world but also an authentic one too.

Having discussed at length the political issues involved, the representative delegates to the Conference took a joint view in acknowledging that the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people in Ceylon, on the basis of the four cardinal principles declared jointly in Thimpu, have not been met by the Accord. The delegates to the Conference further reaffirmed their commitment to those principles which express the joint and unanimous will of the Tamil people.


The Conference took a united stand in its historic resolution affirming the leadership of Mr Velupillai Prabhakaran and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and appealed to the world to recognise this, and urged the Governments of India and Sri Lanka to effect an immediate ceasefire and commence serious negotiations with the LTTE to seek a political resolution to the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Whilst expressing the solidarity of the International Tamil community with their brothers and sisters in Ceylon at this time of trial and tribulation the Conference called on the Tamils of the World to unite in this hour of need, around the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. All Tamil Associations and Organisations and Tamil activists the world over were called to help implement a five-point programme which was endorsed by the delegates.

Apart from the clear stand it took and the various resolutions that were passed the Conference was even more significant to the Tamils of Ceylon, both at home and abroad, in the sense that it brought out the united expression of the will of a people who are denied all avenues of democratic expression in their own homelands in Ceylon, with the presence of well over 100,000 Indian troops in their midst, and without any political representation or say in their governance.

Above all, the Conference recognised that there can be no peace without justice, and that justice cannot be met without securing the rights of Tamils in Ceylon including their inalienable right to self determination as a people, from which flows all other basic and fundamental rights, and it declared that the political reality is that there are two nations in Sri Lanka - The Tamil Nation and the Sinhala Nation - and that two nations may agree to live together by force of reason but cannot be compelled to live together by force of arms.

All Tamils must rally round this call for unity and duty at this hour. It is now or never.



O.V. Vijayan, The Statesman

EDITORIAL

FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE

IRONY of all ironies! Hardly any Sinhalese prelate or politician asked for devolution or provincial councils. If at all, there was tremendous opposition to any such proposal. However, already elections have been held for four Provincial Councils and by June 9 elections would have been concluded for a further three. By then the island's seven provinces in which the Sinhalese people predominantly live would be enjoying substantial devolution of legislative and executive powers with their own Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

It was the Tamil people predominantly living in the northern and eastern provinces who demanded, campaigned, struggled and fought for autonomy which is yet to be achieved. For all the tensions and hostilities engendered during recent years between the two communities resulting from the Tamil demand for autonomy, the first beneficiaries are the Sinhalese people, and they ought at least to thank the Tamil people for this unsolicited gift of extended devolved democracy.

How come that the Sinhalese people who never asked for devolution or provincial councils got them? The answer is not far to seek. The Tamil demand for autonomy could no longer be resisted. It was being urged as a basis for solving the ethnic conflict by India and the rest of the world too which have witnessed the fall-out of the conflict being deeply felt in their own countries. Failing in its repeated military endeavours, urged by India, reluctantly and step by step, the government of Sri Lanka came round to the idea of some form of autonomy to the Tamils. But it did not have the courage or the political honesty to tell the Sinhalese people that the resolution of the conflict demanded the grant of autonomy to the Tamils. Thus we have a situation in which the constitutional and institutional guarantees that the Tamil people required to protect their rights and identity as a people being granted to the Sinhalese too whose rights and identity were never under threat and in fact by the sheer strength of their permanently entrenched numerical majority, they required no such special guarantees. In any civilised society, it is the numerical minority, particularly, when its aspirations are linked to the preservation of its physical and cultural identities, that requires special protection.

The Tamil militant groups and the TULF are still of the view that the arrangements made through the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Council do not provide the safeguards they were expecting. In fact, at the time the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed, the Agreement itself provided for

'residual matters', that is, those matters over which the Tamil representatives had expressed reservations, and those matters about which no provision has been made at all, be further discussed. These discussions never took place and they have not taken place yet.

It may be that the breakdown of the time-frame provided for the surrender of arms and the establishment of the interim administration for the north and east, the resurgence of armed violence in these provinces and the eventual outbreak of fighting between the India Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE produced a climate in which the contemplated negotiations on the 'residual matters' could not take place. It may also be that, in view of the tensions that were building up in the south following the signing of the Agreement, the government felt prudent to enact the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Council in the way it did without giving a chance for the opposition to mobilise against such measures.

It is high time that the 'residual matters' be taken up for discussion without any further delay. The dominant Tamil militant group, the LTTE, which accepted the Accord with reservations, has indicated in several letters to the Indian Prime Minister that it is pledged to cooperate with the implementation of the Accord provided it is given the opportunity to negotiate about certain matters in respect which it has expressed concern. The other Tamil Militant groups and the TULF are also not satisfied with the present arrangements that some Sri Lankan Ministers had discussions with some representatives of the LTTE. It is also reported that Indian government officials have been negotiating with the LTTE stalwarts in Tamil Nadu. One leader of a militant group has in fact met and discussed with the President. Under the amnesty provisions of the Accord, some political prisoners are also being released.

In this context, the climate seems to be particularly suitable now for a resumption of negotiations on the 'residual matters' and the issues of concern for the Tamil people with the governments of India and Sri Lanka. And a prerequisite for such negotiations to take place in an amicable atmosphere is a cease-fire between the IPKF and the LTTE for a stated period during which the negotiations should be concluded. The Sri Lanka government, the IPKF and the Tamil Militant groups are said to be 'fighting' for peace and justice. What is required is an end to the fighting and resumption of 'talking' for peace and justice.

Sri Lanka : New Trends

SUMIT CHAKRAVARTTY

THE first phase of the elections to the provincial councils in Sri Lanka, that took place on April 28, has recorded certain striking features that need to be dispassionately analysed by all those who are interested in the return of peace in that strife-torn island republic.

The first and most significant of these is the fairly large turn-out of voters—1.78 million constituting 61.49 per cent of the total electorate—that in the prevailing circumstances, marked by widespread violence and terrorist acts engineered by the outlawed and extremist Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), has come as a pleasant surprise (even if this is of a modest scale in a country where every election in the

past has been witness to heavy polling ranging between 70 to 80 per cent). The fact that the electorate exercised its franchise by and large rejecting the call for poll boycott given by both the JVP and the largest opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLEP), is a highly noteworthy and welcome development.

Secondly, the two organisations which have fared exceedingly well in these elections—the ruling United National Party (UNP) and the United Socialist Alliance (USA) of four Left-wing parties (that is, the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party headed till the other day by Vijaya Kumaranatunga, the charismatic popular leader and cine-star slain three months ago by the

JVP; the Communist Party of Sri Lanka; the Lanka Sama Samaj Party; and the Nava Sama Samaj Party) —are both staunch supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord that has come under heavy fire from the side of Sinhala chauvinists.

Thirdly, the USA did unexpectedly well in these elections and ran a close second to the UNP. This is evident from the following figures: in the Puttalam district of North-Western province the USA polled 70,270 votes and won six seats as against 89,810 votes secured by the UNP which captured eight seats; in the Kurunegala district of North-Western province the USA polled 160,704 votes and won 13 seats as against 257,168 votes secured by the UNP which captured 21 seats; in the Anuradhapura district of North-Central province the USA polled 85,324 votes and won nine seats as against 112,760 votes secured by the UNP which captured 12 seats; in the Polonnaruwa district of North-Central province the USA polled 14,652 votes and won three seats as against 30,081 votes secured by the UNP which won seven seats; in the Badulla district of Uva province the USA polled 78,240 votes and won seven seats as against 118,289 votes secured by the UNP which captured 11 seats; in the Monaragala district of Uva province the USA polled 27,082 votes and won six seats as against 35,463 votes secured by the UNP which captured seven seats; in the Kegalle district of Sabaragamuwa province the USA polled 109,277 votes and won nine seats as against 127,338 votes secured by the UNP which captured 10 seats. Overall, the USA secured 669,975 votes as against 918,211 polled by the UNP. It is all the more revealing that the USA fared remarkably well in the JVP stronghold of Sabaragamuwa province.

The results have been expectedly hailed by the Government of India as reflective of the Sinhala people's general support to the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. While none can take exception to such an interpretation of the poll outcome by New Delhi it would be more correct to underscore that the democratic political culture of the Sri Lankan people (Sri Lanka was the first British colony to be granted universal suffrage way back in 1931) has superseded every other consideration. It has also brought out the validity of the democratic forces' demand for setting in motion the electoral process as a means to isolate the JVP from the masses — a demand which was powerfully aired by Ronnie de Mel, the erstwhile Minister for Finance, who resigned from the Sri Lankan Government on this very issue.

These elections have underlined the Sri Lankan people's desire for peace as manifest in the negative response to the JVP call for boycott and attempts to disrupt the poll. The rejection of the SLFP's contention that the provincial councils would be vested with too much power is also of no mean significance. The SLFP adopted this course as it was opposed to the Tamil areas of the North and East enjoying more powers than they ever had in the past.

At the same time, the USA's amazing success — mostly the result of mass sympathy generated by Vijaya Kumaranatunga's martyrdom but also attributable to the fact that sections of disgruntled followers of both the UNP and the SLFP voted for it — is a signal that the people of Sri Lanka desire a

democratic change. This is likely to get more pronounced in the coming days especially when the remaining three Sinhala dominated provinces (that is, Central; Western including Colombo; and Southern provinces) go to the polls for the provincial council elections next month. The USA is known to be relatively more strong in these areas than in other parts of the country.

The mood of the Sri Lankan people is clear from these elections: they want the electoral process to work. Under no condition should J.R. Jayawardene deprive the Sri Lankan citizens of their right to participate in the parliamentary elections (last held eleven years ago, in July 1977, and due in mid-1989) as well as the presidential elections (last held less than six years ago, in October 1982, and due by this year end). The Government of India has the moral responsibility to impress upon JRJ not to put off these elections under one flimsy pretext or the other because the consequences of such a step would be suicidal for the Sri Lankan President.

The outcome of these elections in the four Sri Lankan provinces highlight the necessity for New Delhi to redouble its efforts and ensure the success of political negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since that alone would pave the way for the holding of provincial council elections in the North and the East.

Two more positive developments need to be noted in the Sri Lankan scenario. First, the JVP is faced with quite serious inner-party differences with its key organiser Gamanayaka expressing opposition to JVP supremo Vijayavira's call to liquidate all supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, including those of the Left. Gamanayaka is understood to have been against the slaying of Vijaya Kumaranatunga. Sharpening of these differences in the near future can have far-reaching implications for the Sri Lankan polity.

Secondly, quite a few of the democratic elements among the Sinhala people who had supported the accord and yet were languishing in JRJ's prison-house having been denied amnesty have lately been released. They include Pulsara Liyanage, the 28-year old lecturer at Keleniya University (who had been jailed since November 1, 1986 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act) and 12 others of the *Vikalpa Kanduyama* group. They were all charged with sedition, although their actual crime was to join hands with a section of the Tamil militants and fight the anti-democratic policies of the JRJ regime. The charges against the 23 accused in this case have yet to be withdrawn, however.

In the light of these positive developments it is necessary for the democratic forces of India and Sri Lanka to act in concert to bring to an early end the ethnic conflict in the island-state. More pressure must be exerted on the respective Governments to hasten this process and thereby strengthen the edifice of peace in the region. In this context the political negotiations between the Government of India and the LTTE with the ultimate objective of ensuring ceasefire and withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka acquire added importance. □ (May 4)

SRI LANKA - IN A CIVIL WAR SITUATION

COMMENT

Ms Karen Parker, Human Rights Attorney in USA

I would like to begin by discussing why it is that Tamil people have a struggle. I am not a Tamil. I have taken on issues relating to Tamils in the United Nations, before my Government, and before the Government of India. What is it in International Law that underpins this initiative? Quite frankly, it's not because Tamils are Tamil. Tamils are no different from any other group when it comes to International Law. Under International Law principles, all people are equal. Tamils are considered naturally no more peaceful, no more intelligent, no more warm and loving than any other people in the world. Though I must say, given the last six months in the field, **certain members of the Tamil community have shown themselves to be rather unusually courageous, rather unusually brilliant military commanders and, in the face of what appears to be overwhelming odds, dedicated and determined. This is difficult to find in 1988 among any peoples of the world.**

But the struggle in Tamil Eelam is not adopted by the International Community because Tamils are Tamils. **The struggle is discussed in the International Community because Tamils as Tamils have been persecuted and denied their basic rights as people.** And that persecution has led to a series of events, that has led to an armed conflict, that has achieved diplomatic status, that has given a legal right for Tamils to be engaged in the activities they are now engaged in both internationally and in Sri Lanka.

RECOURSE TO REBELLION

The third preambular paragraph to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: "Whereas it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." **What occurred in Sri Lanka is that the rule of law for Tamil people ceased to exist. What happened in Sri Lanka is that the government became a**

racist government, not a national government and the oppressed people of that racist government began to see themselves more as oppressed people rather than citizens of Sri Lanka who happen to be Tamil rather than Sinhalese or anything else. The Tamil cause did not generate in my view because Tamils consider themselves different or better than anyone else but because the government in Sri Lanka was saying that Tamils were less than someone else, especially the ruling party in Sri Lanka.

Now the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is rarely discussed in terms of its establishment of a legal basis for rebellion. But I defy anyone to find another juridical meaning to the words "whereas it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression." I defy any jurist to find in those words a prohibition to rebellion against tyranny. The only way it can be construed is an acceptance that mankind, a people, will indeed, as their natural right, exercise the right to rebellion against tyranny.

For the most part, the right to engage in armed conflict is usually discussed in terms of the right to self defence. In other words, country A may not invade country B but country B can fight back if invaded and country B has the legal right to use force against oppression. Country A would be considered the aggressor country. When it comes to a people it is normally discussed in terms of a right to self defence. So that a government in an internal setting must appear to be against part of the population in order for that population to say I am exercising my right to self defence. There is also in International Law, an acceptance of the fact that inside countries and purely in a civil war setting there are power struggles and there is no international prohibition to the concept of a power struggle even if the power struggle takes on the force of arms. The International Law regime recognises civil wars, and

civil wars may be fought not only from the perspective of an oppressed people against a domineering government but can be a mere power struggle as occurred in my country's civil war and has occurred in other countries' civil wars.

Civil wars can be revolutionary, as is the case right now in El Salvador where the opposition forces want to take over the National Government. Civil wars may be secessionist such as occurred in Pakistan creating Bangladesh or the attempt to create the State of Biafra in Nigeria. And civil wars may be, in the case of Sri Lanka, a war in which one segment of the population wants a homeland with some degree of autonomy if not total self sufficiency but something short of total sovereignty or separatism.

A civil war is found, and this is the International Law rule, when there is an armed conflict in the territory of a state between Government armed forces and dissident armed forces or other groups who under responsible command exercise sufficient control over territory so as to be able to engage in military operations and implement humanitarian law.

The International Community recognise that that state existed in Sri Lanka when in 1987, after three years of struggle in the United Nations, **we achieved the adoption of a resolution in which the situation of Sri Lanka was discussed in terms of humanitarian law.** Those are two sacred words to anyone involved in armed struggle. This is not the law of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but the law of the Geneva Conventions, the protocol's addition to the Geneva Convention and what we call **the Laws of Armed Conflict.** They are of course related.

I argued since 1983 that there was by law an armed conflict governed by these rules because in my view at least **the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam had met that test.** Throughout the years constantly looking to see which other of the mili-

tant groups might have met the test, I never found any of the others independently meeting that test; and only in the limited periods when there appeared to be some intrinsic unity between the groups would any of the others groups ever be protected by humanitarian law. But throughout the last several years at least, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have met that test, they are protected as well as obliged by the Geneva Conventions, and the International Community adopted that concept in the Resolution of the Human Rights Commission 1987.

A VERY GRAVE VIOLATION

That instantly changed by law the status of LTTE from any implication that they might be terrorists. I had to contend with everything possible to prevent the use of the words 'humanitarian law' in the United Nations. Every time I would make a speech going through this test and showing why the LTTE made it or arguing about where are the POW's in this war to point out violations or would expose attacks on a civilian population as violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Government of Sri Lanka would come back and argue, 'there are no POW's in Sri Lanka', pretending that the Geneva Conventions did not apply. **Of course, what they were really doing was admitting a very grave violation of humanitarian law.** But they were constantly trying to defend and the biggest struggle of human rights organisations dealing with the issue year after year was to get recognition that humanitarian law applied.

Then on October 10th, the universe changed. Until that time there had been and was an armed conflict in Sri Lanka between Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka and that both sides were protected by and obliged by the International Humanitarian Law rules. **What happens when another country comes into a civil war? And then who's who?**

What obligations? There are two ways of looking at it. One is, you have

an Internationalised civil war or you have a civil war and an international war going on at the same time. I prefer the second characterisation but in a way it does not make any difference, because **whereas the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka in their armed conflict with each other were obliged by the civil war rules of humanitarian law, the Government of India is obliged by the International rules of humanitarian law meaning the entire Geneva Conventions, not just Article 3 which governs civil wars.** So now we have to look at the situation. We have combatants of the LTTE and combatants of the Government of India. Let's look at what we see in a war. It's different to what we look at when there is not a war if we are going to find culpability for human rights or humanitarian law violations.

What we looked at was the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Emergency Regulations and all those other Acts of the Sinhalese Government directed at the Tamil population and talked about it in terms of human rights. We talked about torture. We talked about disappearances. We talked about summary and arbitrary execution. We talked about the situation in the Boosa camp. We talked about their sweeps into neighbourhoods and the abductions and the arrests of, in particular and almost exclusively, the Tamil youth.

WHAT HAPPENS IN A WAR?

Now that we have a war, what have we talked about. Well when we talk about what's going on, it starts making more sense because what happens in a war? **Bullets fly and people die.** It's not an issue of a little torture here and there, it's an issue of the regrettable and devastating effect of bodies piling up and I am sorry to be graphic that is what happens in war. And we talked about the protection of the civilian population from military operations, not the police coming in, not interrupting a riot with a slightly hefty billiard club. You talk about

someone coming into your home and shooting up your relatives, wearing uniforms. Civilians are protected from the dangers of war, hospitals are protected from military attack. I have prepared an outline, it has not been distributed, for those who are interested I am sure we can get a copy, The Basic Rules of Military Operations. In other words, what can an armed force do that's legal and what can an armed force not do. When we are talking about human rights in Sri Lanka it's not a human rights violation unless it breaks one of these rules.

International Humanitarian Law says you may not attack hospitals even if the other side says 'Yea but there were soldiers in there'. Doesn't matter if there are soldiers in there. A hospital is off limit. You also must take Prisoners of War. That means that you cannot treat the captured enemy as if the war is still going on and you can shoot them. You hold them as a prisoner of war. I notice that in the course of the Indian - LTTE armed conflict, **the LTTE turned over to India some of the captured combatants. I am not yet aware that the Government of India has turned over any captured combatants.** In fact, the International community is rather disturbed that captured combatants may not be alive. Every captured combatant who is dead represents a war crime on the hands of the Indian Government and that leads into another point.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

What happens when you violate human rights? You are a human rights violator. What happens when you violate the rules of war? You are a war criminal. The existence of humanitarian law changes not only the quality but also the culpability of violations and subjects perpetrators to perhaps universal jurisdiction for the rest of their life for the acts carried out. And it is my view that **a number of the Indian Peace Keeping Force have the rest of their lives to wonder if someone isn't going to find them because their relative will identify that that's**

the one that came into my house and killed my mother or my father or my sister or my brother as a war crime and I have just as much right to seek them out the rest of their life as people have been seeking out the Nazis 40 years later. That is the gravity of that kind of violations in International Law. Why is there International Action? Why does Karen Parker get involved in Sri Lanka? Why has the United Nations got involved in Sri Lanka? Is it not intervening in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka?

First of all we don't presume to speak for Tamil, for Sinhalese, or for anyone else but to the degree we are discussing the basic rules of human rights, a humanitarian law, we are not intervening in any country. These areas of law have been internationalised. They are no longer in the internal jurisdiction of countries. South Africa can't say 'Apartheid is internal law therefore Ms Parker when you come over here and talk to us about apartheid you're intervening', it is not intervening when one involves oneself in violations of human rights or armed conflict law. We call it the Internationalisation of Rights and there is another reason why the International Community gets involved and that is because situations such as are occurring in Sri Lanka, create refugees. So that the problem inevitably, even if we have hard hearts in Washington or Ottawa who actually don't care that Tamils die in Sri Lanka, must deal with Tamils in the United States or in Canada or elsewhere who have fled and have a legitimate right to flee not simply because of violations of human rights leading to persecution which gives people a right to seek asylum from persecution but because people also have a right to flee flying bullets and they may not be sent to any country where there is an ongoing war or violations of the Geneva Conventions. So the issue in Sri Lanka becomes a key issue in the United Kingdom as to whether or not a Tamil who arrives here is entitled to asylum, or whether or not a Tamil who arrives here may be

sent back to Sri Lanka by the British Government without the British Government committing a violation of human rights or armed conflict law.

GRAVE BREACH OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

Armed conflict law prohibits forcible repatriation of persons who have fled armed conflict and, in particular, repatriation to a country where the Geneva Conventions are not being complied with. **A forcible deportation under those circumstances is considered by Article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention signed and ratified by the Government of**



United Kingdom a grave breach of humanitarian law. A grave breach is another word for war crime. And so it is not just combatants who may commit war crimes in International Law. Governments sending refugees from armed conflict back to armed conflict situations also commit war crimes. That is one of the other reasons why the International Community deals with even internal situations.

What has the International Community done on Sri Lanka? The human rights organisations and groups, myself included, have pushed for a number of years in the United Nations forums for there to be recognition of the serious and grave problems in Sri Lanka and for there to be recognition of the state of war and the classification of the combatants.

INDIA HAS NO DEFENCE

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights did agree with our characterisation of conflict as I said in the Commission on Human Rights Resolution of 1987. Before that there had been a resolution passed in the sub-commission and another in the commission on human rights which were somewhat weaker but still indicated a concern with the problem. We also make sure that the United Nations special rapporteur for torture received all information and allegations of torture in Sri Lanka. That the special rapporteur for sum-



mary and arbitrary execution received information about people whose deaths were not a result of a legitimately carried death sentence. Now I certainly hope that members of this community who have known of deaths occurring at the hands of the Indian Peace Keeping Force or the Sri Lankan Army in the last year have submitted details of those deaths to the special rapporteur for summary and arbitrary execution. It would be rather dreadful if the next year's session of human rights reports not one death in Sri Lanka when hundreds of deaths of the civilian population have taken place since October 10th. **Every single one of those cannot be justified by military necessity. India has no defence. Every one of those is a summary and arbitrary execution and should be reported.**

Geopolitical consideration
We sometimes forget that no inter-

national or frequently relatively few internal affairs ever occur without manipulation from inside and out. We are probably in an era in which no international event occurs without some finger in the pot from one or the other or more of the super powers. It is impossible to understand accurately the events in Sri Lanka without looking a little farther than the relationship of Tamils and Sinhalese, without looking a little farther than the relationship of India and Sri Lanka, or the relationship past, present and future between India and say the LTTE. My Government has had a very interesting and interested involvement in the events in Sri Lanka, particularly since the current administration came to power in 1981, and I am quite convinced that some of the events that have occurred in the last six months at least if not more in Sri Lanka have been in part staged at the behest of that govern-

ment, and certainly the continuation of Mr Jayewardene has to be looked at broader than just his supposed iron fisthold over Sri Lanka.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What comes out of this conference is extremely important. If this conference falls short of endorsing or supporting the idea of cease-fire and negotiation, or if it falls short of achieving some reasonable unity of the Tamil Community, then it may be an exercise in just vetting of motions but not towards a political solution and I say that because when we sit in the United Nations taking up these cases, if we don't have the sense that we have the people on whose behalf we are speaking behind us, we tend to back off. None of us is arrogant enough to take on anyone else's cause. When we are concerned we raise it. If the affected parties aren't there around putting in their state-

ments, making their presentations and appearances, it starts looking funny. And you can be sure that if the Tamil Community is not visibly out there the Government of India, and the Government of Sri Lanka are going to say 'See the Tamils are all happy, there are not here are they, they are not present are they'.

So I hope what can come out of this meeting is an even stronger sense of the urgency and the need for unity and understanding and that you begin defending your rights under human rights and humanitarian law and recognising that the combatants fighting in your cause do indeed have legal combatant status and deserve all the support for their rights under humanitarian law that we can possibly give them.

Secret talks show LTTE's leverage

MERVYN DE SILVA

ADAPTABILITY

With remarkable resilience, the LTTE has adapted itself quickly to the mounting Indian military and diplomatic pressure. Both the Tiger ambush and the land-mine blast were on lonely, largely unpatrolled jungle roads outside the Jaffna peninsula, once the impregnable Tiger bastion in the Tamil separatist heartland. The LTTE is now compelled to operate outside Jaffna's urban centres and small towns on a terrain unfamiliar to Mr. Pirabhakaran, and in conditions to which his 400 to 500 hardcore guerillas are quite unaccustomed. This is scrubland and thick jungle.

The incidents of the recent past conform to a pattern. Most take place in what may be called "border areas" — where the Northern Province merges into the predominantly Sinhalese North-Central Province or where it merges into the Eastern Province, with Trincomalee, the ethnically mixed (Tamil, Sinhalese, Muslim) port city, standing right where the two provinces meet. The most crucial provision in the India-Sri Lanka peace accord is the merger of the North and

the East for a trial period of one year at the end of which the Easterners will decide at a referendum whether the arrangement should continue.

From the Tamil point of view, it is certainly the most important concession by the Jayewardene Government since it acknowledges, however inadequately, the fundamental Tamil concept of a "traditional homeland."

Since no Sri Lankan regime has been suicidal enough to yield on this point, it is also Mr. Gandhi's vital diplomatic victory, and therefore his strongest case for Tamil Nadu's appreciation and support. In the domestic Sinhalese debate, the "merger" is the most abrasive issue. Sinhalese ideologues and the Buddhist clergy regard the conceptual concession as a tacit acquiescence in the sinister notion of a separate Tamil "kingdom."

Dislodged from the north, militarily bruised, arms supplies severely restricted, his command-and-communication structures disrupted, Mr. Pirabhakaran has intuitively grasped the fact that he must now accentuate the "political" in this politico-military conflict.

The political situation in both India

and Sri Lanka is ideally suited to the LTTE's new tactic. While Mr. Gandhi is keeping a watchful and perhaps anxious eye on developments in Tamil Nadu, under President's rule, and the balance of forces is still unsettled, President Jayewardene faces provincial council polls, and more importantly presidential and parliamentary elections. For Mr. Jayewardene, the question of power at the centre, the survival of his own regime, will be decided by year's end.

In such complex, potentially explosive conditions, a halt by the LTTE to its current operations, no military challenge to the IPKF but highly damaging to the Jayewardene regime and to the peace accord, is a top priority concern. A negotiated settlement with the LTTE is here vitally important. Hence the Sri Lanka Government (or key Ministers in it) have made secret contacts with the Tigers. The political-diplomatic initiative enhances the leverage of a militarily much weakened LTTE. Mr. Pirabhakaran appears to have understood the relative importance of his agreement in the new equation.

6.5.88

RECENT OMINOUS DEVELOPMENTS

PEASANTS TURNED INTO RELUCTANT INVADERS

Derek Brown in Trincomalee

REPORT

This battered but still lovely place has known many invaders from the sea: Tamils, Portuguese, Dutch and British. Now it is being invaded from the land, by the Government of Sri Lanka itself. **The new invaders are Sinhalese peasants. They are being pushed forward, unarmed, into the front line of savage ethnic conflict. The aim is to thwart the main point of last year's Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which was to create a secure homeland for the Tamil minority by merging the Northern and Eastern provinces and giving them a measure of self-government.** Whichever community controls Trincomalee district controls the geographical hinge between north and east and it is clear that Colombo is determined that the Sinhalese should dominate in this strategic place.

The result might ultimately be that Sinhalese votes in provincial elections and in the referendum that is supposed to follow could swing the Eastern Province against joining the north or at least provide a pretext for keeping Trincomalee itself out of the new Tamil zone, thus splitting it in two. Whatever happens, people on the ground, as many of them as possible, are a basis for political influence and argument.

The biggest thrust is along the main road from Colombo, beyond the town of Habarana. There, the road enters a no-man's land where Tamil terrorists have for five years fought the Sinhalese without mercy. The road, pockmarked by landmine craters, crudely repaired, winds through thick forest. On either side are the new settlers, encamped in primitive wattle-and-daub huts, some with a vegetable patch scratched from the jungle, a few with access to a water hand-pump and virtually none with electricity. There are thousands of them. They are densely packed near Habarana, and thin out, like a lance, as the road crosses the border of Trin-

comalee district, in Eastern Province. **As more and more invaders are lured into service by offers of land and money, their colonies stretch towards the ultimate prize: Trincomalee town.**

Last October, Tamil militants fell upon the unarmed Sinhalese minority in the town. They were driven from their homes, which were then looted and burnt. Now there are dismal acres of charred stumps, which once were Sinhalese shops and houses. It takes an expert local guide to distinguish them from the rubble of Tamil property, destroyed in earlier excesses.

Trincomalee has reverted to being an overwhelmingly Tamil town, with a small minority of Muslims and others. So long as it has a Tamil majority, it sustains the dream of separation - either the Eelam nation sought by extremists, or the modest measure of self-government which remains the key provision of the accord. The first is anathema to the Colombo Government; the second only marginally less repugnant.

The Government says it will hold elections for a new joint provincial council, as soon as the troops of the Indian Peace Keeping Force eliminate Tamil Tiger terrorism. The same Government is doing its best to sabotage that prospect of peace, by organising and encouraging a new wave of Sinhalese colonists. There are hundreds of new camps within Trincomalee district. They are heavily guarded by Sri Lankan troops and Home Guards - unsmiling young men armed with shot-guns and Lee Enfield rifles. Sinhalese settlements are also springing up in an arc around Trincomalee town. Some are being put up to rehouse genuine refugees.

But most Tamils are convinced that the Sinhalese influx consists largely of

new colonists; desperately poor peasants from the south and centre of the island who can be tempted by a few thousand rupees (the going rate is equivalent to £135) and a patch of land into risking their lives. The risk is horribly real. The Tamil Tigers, smashed as a military force by the Indians, have been driven deep into the jungles of the north and east. Their softest available targets now are the Sinhalese colonists. Last year, on Good Friday, more than 100 Sinhalese bus passengers were killed on the main Colombo-Trincomalee road, near Habarana. Since then, hundreds more, women and children included, have died in 'landmine blasts, ambushes and village raids.

The civil power has virtually evaporated here. There have been improvements in recent weeks, with restored bus services, more food supplies getting through, and petrol becoming available. The little fleet of venerable Morris Minor taxis is once more earning a precarious living. All of this is due, not to the Sri Lankan Government, but to the Indian Peace Keeping Force. **The Indian soldiers have, on occasion, killed innocent civilians themselves, after their own men had died in landmine blasts and the like.** But they are generally disciplined and they have encouraged the local population of 26,000 to engage in a semblance of economic activity.

The farmers are simply too scared to work in the fields where once the human Tigers roamed. So now there are real wild boar, regiments of black-faced languor monkeys and even occasional destructive forays by wild elephants from the reserves far inland. The farmers are not allowed to own guns, so they cannot scare off the beasts. The land is shaggy with weeds and scrub and the people are hungry for peace.

- *The Guardian* -
12 May, 1988)

Time for a settlement with Tamil militants

Nikhil Chakravathy

REPORT

The media in our country has not been following carefully the significant developments that have been taking place of late in Sri Lanka. Over-preoccupation in the last nine months has been concentrated largely on the LTTE. But the happenings in the rest of the island-republic have a bearing on the Tamil problem as well. One cannot look at the Tamil area nor solve its problems in isolation from the developments in the rest of Sri Lanka.

One of the myths with which President Jayewardene has assiduously fed the decision-makers in New Delhi has been that he could not speed up the constitutional reforms nor could he institutionalise the devolution of powers to the provinces to the extent envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement because of the strong opposition to the accord

itself, that he has been fighting a lonesome battle in the interest of Indo-Sri Lanka goodwill. That has been the crux of his explanation why the constitutional reforms enacted so far could not come up to the expectations of the Tamil moderates represented by Amritalingam's TULF, not to speak of meeting the demands of the militants as represented by Prabhakaran and his LTTE. In Rajiv Gandhi's circle, Jayewardene is painted almost as a rider on the white horse, staking his political fortunes to retain India's goodwill.

Recent events in Sri Lanka have punctured this myth. The first phase of the elections to the provincial councils in Sri Lanka took place on April 28. In the elections to the provincial councils in four provinces considered peaceful, the results reveal a significant trend. The largest Opposition party, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's SLFP, boycotted the poll and the outlawed militant JVP threatened to wreck it. Even then, defying the boycott call and the physical threat, as many as 61.49 per cent of the electorate turned up to cast their votes. This is an indicator of the mood of the public in the island today: it would like to have a peaceful and stable situation, anxious to go for orderly political functioning, making full use of whatever devolution of power has come. In other words, the public temper in Sri Lanka today is for peaceful political approach to problems and disfavouring any attempt at military solution.

More importantly, the analysis of the poll results shows



that out of a total of 17.8 lakh votes cast, as many as 15.8 lakh came to two leading parties that have strongly committed themselves to the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. Of the two parties, the largest number of seats was bagged by Jayewardene's UNP, with a total vote score of 918,211. Next to it is the United Socialist Alliance composed of four parties of the Left—Sri Lanka Mahajana Party, recently formed by the noted film star, Vijaya Kumaratunga who was killed three months ago by JVP terrorists, also the CP of Sri Lanka, the Lanka Sama Samaj Party and the NVA Sama Samaj Party. This United Socialist Alliance has been openly campaigning for the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. What is further significant is that this United Socialist Alliance polled heavily in some of the known strongholds of the JVP.

While it would certainly be a mistake to under-estimate the danger to constitutional process posed by the JVP, it would be correct to take as a major positive development the emergence of the United Socialist Alliance. Along with the ruling UNP, this alliance stands for bettering relations with India. In this context, it was rather strange that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi should send a message of congratulation only to President Jayewardene on the victory of his party in the poll. What could and should be legitimately highlighted by the government of India is that the supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, irrespective of their party affiliations, have



together received a resounding mandate from the electorate. It is necessary for New Delhi to remind itself that India's friends and well-wishers in Sri Lanka are far wider in number than President Jayewardene's following in the island, that the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement is not a private contract between the ruling parties in India and Sri Lanka.

The lesson to draw from the results of the April 28 poll is that the environment is congenial in Sri Lanka for renewed political initiative—instead of resorting to arms—to settle the ethnic question. It is therefore the opportune moment to bring about an understanding with Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE. To create the condition for such a settlement, there has to be a bold initiative on the part of the government of India. The immediate ordering of a ceasefire by the Indian armed forces in the northern and eastern provinces would have an electrifying effect in the Tamil areas as well as in Tamil Nadu. In the favourable condition that will thus be generated, the LTTE leadership itself would have to come forward and abandon its armed operations. This way the road will be cleared for them to join the political process which ultimately will lead to the holding of elections in the combined northern and eastern provinces. To say that the LTTE first has to lay down its arms and swear by the Indo-Sri Lanka accord before a ceasefire could be ordered, would be counter productive at this stage, as it will lead the Indian authorities nowhere since no political group agrees to surrender when put against the wall. It is for the party with the superior forces to bend backwards to win over the other side. After all, the broad objective of India in Sri Lanka is to pave the way for a settlement of the ethnic problem, and not the physical extermination of any group, however obnoxious it may appear to be.

What is needed today in Sri Lanka therefore is not the settling of scores, nor teaching of lessons in the Chinese style towards the Vietnamese, but calling up the courage and conviction for statesmanship. This has to be the agenda of the day for New Delhi

8.5.88

CIVILIANS KILLED



Mrs. Rajeswari 13.5.88



Mrs. Selvarani 20.5.88



Nadaraja 1.6.88



V. Jayachandran 16.5.88



Sridharan 20.5.88



Jothinathan 2.6.88



S. Ravindran 17.5.88



Naguleswaran 24.5.88



Selvi Jayavani 4.6.88



V. Sivakumar 18.5.88



Subban 25.5.88



Maria Doris 6.6.88



Shanmugarathinani 19.5.88



Selvi Yasodha 25.5.88



Gunabalasingam 7.6.88



Satyamoorthy 20.5.88



Poonudurai 26.5.88



Rathinasingham 7.6.88

REPORT

INDIA-LTTE CONTACTS

Prospects bright for Lanka truce

From S. MURARI

JAFFNA, May 10. — Prospects for a cease-fire to facilitate resumption of talks between the LTTE and the Government of India have brightened in the last few days following nearly three months of hectic consultations at various levels in Madras, New Delhi and Jaffna. But neither side is showing undue optimism since there has been many a slip between the cup and the lip in the past.

The LTTE, which refused to respond when India unilaterally ordered a 48-hour cease-fire last February following an appeal by former Jaffna Municipal Commissioner C.V.K. Sivagnanam, is understood to have indicated since then that arms surrender is negotiable and it is ready to discuss it along with other issues if India offers an unconditional truce.

The talks, held in Madras and New Delhi by the Indian intelligence agencies — the RAW and IB — and LTTE's former Jaffna commander Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu and its representative at the Thimpu talks Anton, during the last 10 weeks, have helped identify areas of agreement and disagreement between the two sides.

The talks have also led to an avoidable delay in ending this conflict since Kittu has found it difficult to keep in constant touch with LTTE leader V. Pirabhakaran and the top echelons as they are believed to be hiding in the Vanni area comprising the jungle track along Vavuniya - Killinochi - Mullaitivu - Mannar stretch and are always on the move. The issue has been further complicated by the difference positions taken by the RAW and IB on sensitive issues like arms surrender.

IPKF ROLE: Now, for the first time, the Defence Ministry has come

into the picture in a big way through the IPKF. In the last few days, top IPKF officers like Lt. Gen. Kalkat, IPKF commander Maj. Gen. Shardashpande and Jaffna town commandant, Brig. R.I.S. Kahlon, have had several rounds of talks with Mr. Sivagnanam who has been authorised by the LTTE to negotiate on its behalf. The IPKF officers have also had discussions with EROS leader V. Balakumar and leading citizens of Jaffna to assess the mood of the people.

The IPKF has forwarded to New Delhi a message from Mr. Pirabhakaran conveyed through Mr. Sivagnanam. New Delhi has asked the LTTE to itemise basic issues. Mr. Sivagnanam is expecting to get from the LTTE a letter in the next few days, spelling out its latest position.

Both sides are hastening slowly since basic differences still persist on how to break the deadlock. India continues to insist, at least as a bargaining ploy, that the LTTE should first declare its unequivocal support for the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement and express its readiness to surrender arms. The LTTE is sticking to its position that the talks should be unconditional and should be preceded by an indefinite cease-fire.

Despite this, there is cautious optimism in LTTE circles about a breakthrough since they feel that the IPKF, which has spread out far and wide and whose activities touch every facet of life, will surely have a better perspective of the Tamil's problem than the intelligence agencies.

COMMUNICATION GAP: The softening of the LTTE's attitude towards the IPKF is attributable to the failure of the RAW-inspired peace mission a month or so ago. At that time, LTTE leaders Rahim and Johnny were taken from Madras to Vavuniya in an IAF plane. While Johnny was proceeding to contact Mr.

Pirabhakaran, he was intercepted by an IPKF patrol and shot dead. This incident has brought to the fore the communication gap between the RAW and the IPKF at the ground level.

With the talks continuing in Madras despite this incident and its own position militarily weakened, the LTTE has avoided a head-on confrontation with the IPKF. The IPKF, which has surrounded Vanni area where the LTTE leadership is believed to be holed in, is no longer talking tough about going after Mr. Pirabhakaran lest it should upset negotiations at this delicate stage.

However, neither side is willing to hazard a guess as to whether the current moves will lead to breakthrough. Mr. Sivagnanam, whose call for a 48-hour cease-fire on February 16 was either misunderstood or distorted to mean that the LTTE wanted time to turn in its weapons, has this time made the LTTE position clear at the very outset. He has conveyed the LTTE view that there should be an indefinite cease-fire and immediate resumption of talks on all issues, including arms surrender.

This has been the LTTE's position since the outbreak of hostilities last October. Time and again, LTTE leaders Pirabhakaran and Ajit Mathia have said that the LTTE is not opposed in toto to the agreement or averse to laying down arms. The LTTE has said that it will accept the accord so long as it safeguards Tamil interests. It would lay down arms once conditions of security both for its cadres and the people are guaranteed.

By this, it means the formation of an interim Government and raising of a Tamil police force.

Talks between the RAW and Kittu in Madras have also covered the quantum of arms to be laid down. According to media reports here, Indian authorities have told the LTTE that it should, as proof of its bonafides, surrender at least 1,500 weapons out of the 2,750 it is supposed to have. The LTTE continues to deny that it has so many arms. More-over, it is not possible to make such a huge token surrender since the arms are cached in places widely spread out and the cadres are scattered. It has, however, offered to turn in 500 arms to begin with.

ARMS SURRENDER: Mr. Sivagnanam, who reflects the LTTE's latest thinking on this issue, told me the other day that the talks would be a non-starter if arms surrender was made an issue like this. But the LTTE can be expected to keep its word this time since it is as much subject to the pressure of public opinion as the Government of India is.

The IPKF, which put pressure on Mrs. Annamma David of Batticaloa Mothers' Front to end her fast on the 19th day, has not resorted to any such strong-arm tactics this time in the case of Mrs. Susheela Ganesan of Trincomalee. The Trincomalee Mothers' Front has already written to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that more mothers would join the fast if he did not favourably respond to their request for a cease-fire.

Unlike last time, the LTTE is understood to be demanding compensation for the arms to be turned in. It is also concerned about the Rehabilitation of its cadres for which India once paid Rs. 50 lakh. rehabilitation of all militant groups which support the accord is one of the commitments made by both the Governments under the accord. But this has not been given effect to because of the stalemate over arms surrender. India is understood to have assured the LTTE that it will be pumping in Rs. 156 crore for a massive reconstruction programme in Tamil areas and that rehabilitation of militants would form a part of this.

A more ticklish point is the revival of the interim Government plan which was dropped after the collapse of talks between the LTTE and the Government of India last September. In the aborted interim administrative council, the LTTE was given seven of the 12 seats and the TULF two. The remaining three seats were set apart for representatives of the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil Muslims. The plan was dropped after the LTTE insisted that Mr. Sivagnanam should be replaced by Mr. Padmanathan as council chief and Mr. Kasi Anandan should be included in the place of another member in order to give representation to its cadres in the east.

LIKELY PROBLEMS: India might still agree to giving the LTTE a majority of seats in the council. But problems are bound to crop up if the LTTE insists on the retention of its revised list of nominees because Mr. Padmanathan, an emergency detenu, is not acceptable to Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene while Mr. Kasi Anandan is considered anti-Indian.

Even if the LTTE relents on this issue, it is dead set against the inclusion of any member from groups like PLOT, EPRLF, TELO and ENDLF. It was the promotion of these groups by RAW and the patronage given to them by the IPKF which fuelled the LTTE's worst fears and led to the present imbroglio.

The LTTE wants further discussions on the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Council Bills with a view to improving the devolution package. With elections already held in four

southern provinces on the basis of this package and due in one more province in June, India will find it difficult to convince President Jayewardene that the proposed North-Eastern Province should be placed on a different footing though the Tamils have a strong case for greater devolution of powers.

Land colonisation is a very sore point for the Tamils and it has been highlighted not only by the hawkish LTTE but even by the moderate TULF. After the accord, the Sri Lankan Government has given a push to the Veli-Oya scheme involving settlement of Sinhalese along Trincomalee - Vavuniya - Mullaitivu belt to further divide the Tamil province with the long-term objective of defeating the merger of the north and the east when it comes up for review through a referendum in the east to be held a year after the Provincial Council poll. The powers conferred on the Provincial Council regarding land alienation have been held to be far from adequate even by the TULF.

REFUGEES' RETURN: Though 10 months have passed since the signing of the accord, the return of 1.25 lakh refugees from Tamil Nadu and another 40,000 who have been uprooted from the east, has been impeded by the present conflict. India has taken the position that the return and resettlement of refugees can be tackled by the interim Government if and when it comes into being. The massive aid package that India has offered will take care of this problem also.

Considering the complexity and magnitude of the problem, India and the LTTE will have to cover a lot of ground to reach an overall settlement. But unlike in October last when the conflict started, each side seems to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of the other. Though nine months have passed, the IPKF has not been able to completely disarm the LTTE or win over the Tamil people. On the other hand, it has broken the back of LTTE's resistance, scattered its cadres and forced it to go underground and revert to guerilla warfare. Continuation of the present state of unrest will only make matters worse for both. Mr. Sivagnanam touched the crux of the problem when he told me that to a big nation like India, the Tamils might look small but they were a proud people. He has impressed upon Indian authorities that the Tigers cannot be coerced but they can certainly be won over.

With elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly due in a month or so, this realisation appears to have dawned on India also.

REPORT

Anti-Indian feeling stays in Jaffna

From S. MURARI

JAFFNA, May 15. — Jaffna is like a phoenix: It rises from its ashes. A town which was witness to two brutal military onslaughts within a space of six months and lost a few thousand of its citizens, it has recovered its poise in just under a year, because of the massive reconstruction programme undertaken by the IPKF and the never-say-die spirit of the people.

There are outward signs of normality with banks, schools, colleges and business functioning as usual, shops and hotels doing brisk business and the streets filled with packed mini-buses, quaint old Morris Minor taxis and Indian Army jeeps and trucks. At dusk, the town goes to sleep with night curfew in force for the last 10 months. Even during day, life is on a low key. Beneath the surface calm, there is resentment against an army that is supposedly killing the people it has come to protect, whatever be the circumstances leading to the present situation. All the sins, all the follies of the "tigers" are forgotten. Engraved in memory is the October operation which has benumbed even a people who are used to war.

The anti-Indian feeling is but natural, given the ferocity of the two-week battle between the IPKF and the LTTE. The feeling is not so much because the IPKF is fighting the boys and who had been protecting the people for years. Nor is it entirely because of high civilian casualties caused by the heaviest ever shelling that the people have seen. They do not complain over much about the agony that thousands upon thousands underwent in temples, churches, schools and colleges that served as make-shift refugee camps, for three weeks, without food, water, electricity and basic sanitation. They still recall how parents looked on helplessly as children died of starvation, and could not even be given a decent burial.

All this the people are ready to treat

as part of the game in a war, but what they cannot forget is the attack on the Jaffna General Hospital last October 21 that left 29 hospital staff, 70 patients and visitors and about 30 passersby dead, according to doctors and other leading citizens. The hospital attack is to the Jaffna man what Operation Bluestar was to the Sikhs.

They saw it coming when AIR started reporting at the height of the war that the LTTE was using the hospital as a forward position. With the hospital within shelling range from Jaffna fort, its Director Machinarkiniyar and other leading citizens sought permission from Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit to close it down temporarily. It was refused.

The IPKF maintains that the LTTE fought from the hospital for days to bottle up the Jaffna Fort garrison and to gain time to remove its wounded. A senior officer of the IPKF admits that there were civilian casualties when the Army stormed the hospital. "It was nearly dusk and all that the soldiers could see were panicky movements in dim light, but it is a damn lie to say that here were wanton killings."

Dr. Nachinarkiniyar admits that the "Tigers" also had underwent treatment there along with hundreds of other wounded civilians, but asserts that they were removed well before the army's assault. He also claims that never before in the hospital's history had anyone entered it with arms. Even if the indiscriminate killing of doctors, nurses and patients can be dismissed as at worst an excess, what answer have you for the shooting down of Dr. Sivabalanandaram, head of the paediatrics department, the next morning when he came to the hospital in his uniform and walked in shouting his identity all the way, ask the doctors.

ORDER RESTORED: It is true that the IPKF got the hospital going with Indian staff immediately after the operation "until Dr. Nachinarkiniyar surfaced" a few days later. The IPKF also restored water supply and electricity in the town in a record time. What is more, it extended electricity supply to several islands off the peninsula which had been without power since 1983. It is a fact that civil administration was revived as quickly as possible.

The IPKF attempts to win over the people are nullified by isolated incidents of rape, especially in the countryside. Though the IPKF welcomes complaints, naturally few cases are reported and fewer still proved, but the punishment in such cases is severe.

On the other hand, there have also been one or two love marriages. One romance was nipped in the bud: The

girl was found shot, apparently by the Tigers. In another incident, a 30-year-old woman was brought to Jaffna hospital with gun shot wounds.

The next day a Tiger walked into the ward and put a bullet into her head after talking to her for 15 minutes. "And not a single person came forward to give information", an angry officer said. She was killed for her alleged liaison with the IPKF.

The IPKF admits that the Tigers have started recruiting schoolboys, but asserts that it is not on as alarming a scale as the local people make out. Residents, however, say the boys are handpicked from wrecked homes.

The other day, TELO called a hartal to commemorate the second death anniversary of its leader Sabaratnam. He was slain along with 100 other TELO boys in May 1986 by the LTTE. The hartal call was an open challenge to the LTTE.

Residents say at least 15 TELO boys were found shot dead on the day of the hartal. The assailants in quite a few cases were schoolboys in the 10-14 age-group, according to eyewitnesses. Two of the TELO boys died in Jaffna General Hospital. Another three, who were undergoing treatment there, were removed within a day to the military hospital by the IPKF. At least eight bodies were found near Wellington in the heart of the town and in Tirunelveli where the LTTE once had its headquarters.

The killings reveal that the Tigers are still present in the town and are very much a force to reckon with. This is despite periodic cordon and search operations by the IPKF. This operation takes the form of collective punishment whenever an incident occurs in an area. At Nelliadi on the Point Pedro Road, an Indian soldier going with an EPRLF boy was shot. There have been also a few incidents of rape, locals allege.

With the local shielding the Tigers, the IPKF is no longer apologetic about using rival militant groups to identify them.

Even during routine cordon and search, residents are dragged out of their houses and made to wait in the hot sun for hours for identification parade.

SECURITY CHECKS: Security checks are felt keenly during long-distance travel. The journey from Colombo to Jaffna, a distance of 250 miles, takes 17 hours. With night curfew on in most Tamil areas, buses take off from Colombo in the night so as to reach these areas during the closing hours of the curfew. Our bus, which reached Madavachi near Vavuniya at 3 a.m., halted there until dawn

along with 70 other vehicles to allow curfew hours to pass.

From Vavuniya, the checkings are numerous. At each checkpoint, the passengers are made to get down and walk at least a furlong while the bus is subjected to check. Even my innocent-looking typewriter was forced open and turned upside down at one point.

Surprisingly, people do not fear the Indian Army. This is a plus point for the IPKF. With police force non-existent and judiciary yet to function in most Tamil areas, the people increasingly turn to the IPKF to settle even family disputes, showing that the wounds of war are slowly healing.

The people's conflicting mood is no surprise to the IPKF. As one officer put it, the Jaffna man will keep his feelings to himself and exploit any situation to his advantage. Traders still pay taxes to the LTTE, but pass them off as thefts. The other day two car passes were found forged.

The people are exposed more than ever before to Indian culture. Indian T.V. programmes beamed to the soldiers are popular. Milk, Coffee and Chappathi are slowly coming into vogue in Jaffna restaurants. Indian newspapers and magazines are available in the Jaffna market the same day and are preferred to Colombo papers.

STAYS: Despite all this, the bitterness remains. Any alien force which invades people's privacy and restricts their freedom of movement will naturally be resented, says one Army officer. But, it is something more than that. What people find hard to digest is the fact that India, which they had considered for long as their home away from home, has done this to them. The officer regrets that all the good that is done is taken for granted and the ill-effects of an alien presence are blown out of all proportions. Naturally, says a local businessman, a black dot in a white screen will hit the eye.

The LTTE has succeeded in convincing the people that the IPKF has come more to safeguard India's geopolitical interests than to protect the Tamils. Still, the people do not want the IPKF to go, for they know only too well that it will create a big vacuum and lead to a terrible blood-bath. The consensus among the Tamils is that the IPKF should stay and protect them during the transition period and at the same time the LTTE should be given its due role.

Sri Lanka-India Relations

LETTER

IN recent years relations between India and Sri Lanka have become more close and to a certain extent even more strained. The presence of about 1,00,000 Indian soldiers and other officials is causing much concern among Sri Lankans of all communities.

The recent decades have seen the unfortunate worsening of the relations among the ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. Due to our failure to resolve these problems amicably and in time, the ethnic conflict became intense after July 1983. About 1,25,000 Sri Lankan Tamils went as refugees to Tamil Nadu, and India has looked after them. We admit that we have to blame ourselves for our shortcomings in this matter. Sri Lankans, specially those leading political and military groups, are primarily responsible for our present troubles. It is the responsibility of Sri Lankans to remedy this sad situation.

We cannot, however, fail to see that India too has contributed towards the aggravation of the conflict here. Though the Indian government denied it, it is now common knowledge that India gave refuge to the Tamil militant groups, enabled them to have their military camps there and operate from Indian shores. They had communication facilities for their conflict. It is also generally believed that Indian personnel too had a hand in training and arming them. It is known that the central government and the government of Tamil Nadu gave considerable financial aid to the militant groups. Would our ethnic conflict have got so aggravated and prolonged without such Indian support? India also contributed to the creation of world public opinion in a manner that was unfavourable to Sri Lanka.

Many here fear that India helped to create a situation in Sri Lanka which would legitimise Indian armed intervention. Their interests in this were not merely an understandable concern for the rights of the Tamils, or the preservation of the unity, integrity and independence of Sri Lanka. They were apparently concerned about Indian security, given Sri Lanka's recent foreign policy and alliances. The Indian government exerted military and diplomatic pressure to make the government of Sri Lanka accept an unequal treaty specially in the letters exchanged bet-

ween prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and president Jayewardene.

Today many in Sri Lanka are speculating as to why the Indian Army is unable to complete its responsibility of disarming all the Tamil militant groups. Worse still there are open accusations of the IPKF being partial to some of these groups, and of using them against the LTTE. On the other hand, the IPKF is said to be rather inactive when Sinhala and Muslim civilians are killed by some of the armed groups. There are allegations of misbehaviour by the Indian forces, such as killing of civilians, ill-treatment of persons, taking away people's property, etc. When the IPKF deals thus with Sri Lankans, Indian sources that were quite vociferous against abuses by the Sri Lankan security forces, now seem rather silent. The Sri Lankan Tamils are the worst affected by this.

Many in Sri Lanka are wary of the Indian intentions. Are they incapable of handling a guerilla situation which they themselves helped build up? Or are they unwilling to deal with it; or worse still are they making use of it to prolong their stay and achieve their own military or political objectives? There is a deep-seated fear of Indian hegemony and Indian expansionism. The movement of persons and of goods between India and the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka is presently without any significant checks—not even customs, passports and visas.

The statements of Indian leaders concerning their good intentions are taken with a pinch of salt—given past denials of militant bases, and the actions of the Indian and Tamil Nadu governments since 1983. Can we exclude less altruistic motives at certain levels of the Indian political, diplomatic, intelligence or military hierarchies? The situation is further complicated by the Sri Lankan issue being made a matter of political campaigning and bargaining in Tamil Nadu and even at Indian central government level.

We believe most Indians want Indo-Sri Lanka relations to be one of peace and good neighbourliness. We are in favour of the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord for the settlement of the relationship among the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka. But we think that Sri Lanka should not be subordinate to

India. We would welcome reciprocal relationships as between two independent neighbouring countries.

We desire in a special manner that the IPKF too be subject to an impartial monitoring authority. This could be an Indo-Sri Lankan body or an international one like the International Committee of the Red Cross. The fact of the IPKF being not accountable to any such impartial agency is not good for Indo-Sri Lanka relations and even for the fair name of India.

The government of India should hasten the implementation of its responsibility under the Accord. This would enable the IPKF to leave Sri Lanka in a situation in which Sri Lankans could resolve their issues justly and democratically. The longer the IPKF remains here, and that in a somewhat partisan manner, the greater are the risks of India assuming a dominating and even imperialistic role—which we trust would be repugnant to most Indians.

FR TISSA BALASURIYA
BERNADEEN SILVA

Centre for Society and Religion,
Colombo.

இந்திய தொலைக்காட்சி யில் காண முடியாத, வானொலி யில் கேட்க முடியாத, ஈழத்திலும் கூட உள்ளூர் பத்திரிகைகளால் வெளியிட முடியாத 'வாய்க்கட்டு' போடப்பட்டுள்ள 'அமைதிப்பணி கள்' ஏராளம்.

'அமைதிப்பணி' எப்படி நடக்கிறது என்பதற்கு ஒரு எடுத்துக் காட்டாக வல்வெட்டித்துறையில் வசிக்கும் ஒரு தமிழ்ச்சகோதரி வெளிநாட்டில் வசிக்கும் தோழிக்கு எழுதிய பின்வரும் கடிதத்தைப் படியுங்கள்:

சிவமயம்

வல்வெட்டித்துறை
25-2-89.

அன்பின் மோகனாக்கா மற் றும் யாபேருக்கும் அன்புடன் எழுதுவது.

நாங்கள் நலம். அதுபோல் நீங் களும் நலமே இருக்க ஆண்டவனை வேண்டுகிறோம்.

மேலும் உங்கள் 23/1 கடிதம் 23/2 கிடைத்தது. இன்று சரோ அக்காவுக்குக் கடிதம் எழுதுகிறேன். நீங்கள் அங்கேயே இன்னும் சில காலம் இருப்பது தான் நல்லது. இங்கு இப்போதைக்கு வர நினைக்காதீர்கள். சிலோன் ஆமியை விட இப்போ இங்கு இருக்கும் எங்களை ஆன்பவர்

களும், அமைதியை காக்க வந்தவர்களுக்கும் சேர்ந்து மிகவும் சித்ரவதை செய்கிறார்கள்.

22-ம் திகதி கண்ணிவெடியில் சிலர் இறந்ததற்காக பொலிகண்டியில் இருந்து ஆலடி வரையில் உள்ள ஆண், பெண், சிறுவர், வயோதிகர் எல்லோருக்கும் மிருகத்துக்கு அடிப்பது போல் அடித்தார்கள். இதில் 900 பேர் அளவில் அடி வாங்கினார்கள். உலக்கை, கம்பு, சைக்கிள் செயின் என்பவற்றால் அடித்தார்கள். அன்று ஆஸ்பத்திரியே நிரம்பி வழிந்தது.

அன்று நாங்கள் வீட்டில் தான் இருந்தோம். நாங்கள் சாமி அறையில் பூடிக்கொண்டு இருந்து விட்டோம். மற்ற சதவு எல்லாவற்றையும் அடித்து துறந்து விட்டார்கள். ஏதோ எங்கள் நல்ல காலம் எங்களை அவர்கள் காணவில்லை.

இது வரையில் ஒரு நாளும் அனுபவிக்காத அவலக் குரலைக் கேட்டோம். வயது வந்தவர்களும் கதறினார்கள். பாடசாலைச் சிறுவர்களும் கதறி அழுதார்கள். இவற்றை எல்லாம் கண்ணால் பார்த்த நாங்கள் அழத் தான் முடிந்தது. வேறு ஏதும் செய்ய முடியவில்லை.

ஊரிலிருந்து யாழ்ப்பாணம் போவதற்கு இடையில் 4 காம்பு இருக்கிறது. வி.வி.டி. அடையாள அட்டை என்றால் (இளைஞர்கள்) அவர்களை இறக்கி ஆடு மாட்டை அடிப்பது போல் அடித்து அனுப்புகிறார்கள்.

5-ம் திகதி (5-2) ஒரு வானுக்கு சுட்டு அதில் 5 பேர் இறந்து விட்டார்கள். அதில் நெடியகாட்டைச் சேர்ந்த ஒரு குடும்பம் பயணம் செய்தார்கள். தாயும், மகனும் இறந்து விட்டார்கள். தகப்பனும் 2 பெண்பிள்ளைகளும் துட்டுக் காயத்துடன் யாழ் ஆஸ்பத்திரியில் இருக்கிறார்கள். தாய்க்கு கழுத்திலிருந்து இடுப்பு வரையும் துடு (26 குண்டு இருந்தது). இன்னும் ஒருவர் நெடியகாட்டைச் சேர்ந்தவர். அவர் திருமணமாகி ஒரு சில வருடம்தான். ஒரு பெண் குழந்தையின் தந்தை.

முந்தானை பொலிகண்டியில் இருந்து பருத்தித்துறை வரை ஊரடங்கு சட்டம். முதல் நாள் மீன் பிடிக்கச் சென்றவர்களுக்கு தெரியாது. அவர்கள் மீன் பிடித்துக் கொண்டு வரும்போது வள்ளத்துக்கு சுட்டு விட்டார்கள். இதில் திருவிலைச் சேர்ந்த ஒரு இளைஞர் இறந்து விட்டார். இப்படியே நித்தமும் பயந்து பயந்தே வாழ வேண்டி இருக்கிறது.

நாங்கள் வீட்டில்தான் இருக்கிறோம். சிலோன் ஆயிக்கு உள்ளுக்கு போய் இருக்கலாம். ஆனால் இவர்களோ எந்த இடமும் மிச்சம் இல்லாமல் வந்து போவார்கள். அதனால் வீட்டிலேயே இருக்கிறோம்.

இப்போ நடக்கும் பிரச்சனை எழுதிக் கொண்டு போனால் இடம் பந்தாது. இத்துடன் முடிக்கிறேன். உங்கள் கடிதம் கண்டு மறு கடிதம் எழுதுகிறேன்.

இப்படிக்கு,
அன்பு மறவாத,

தேவ்

AT THE HANDS OF THE IPKF

ANOTHER INSTANCE OF BRUTALITY

Sivasambo Murugesu, a Sri Lankan Tamil presently living in Ontario in Canada, in a letter addressed to Rajiv Gandhi the Indian Prime Minister, has described the manner in which IPKF personnel murdered members of his family and also called for a team of international jurists to be allowed to investigate into the crimes committed by the IPKF.

Pointing out that the Indian Prime Minister's mother too was brutally murdered, Mr. Murugesu's letter states

"In a similar manner your bandit soldiers entered my house, where my widowed junior sister, my senior sister, her husband and their six children, my children and my sister's grand son were staying; and opened fire at them without any provocation. They killed my sister (46 years), her son-inlaw (26 years), my brother-inlaw (58 years) and two other relatives over 50 years old. Many children were badly injured including a 3 years old infant. My brother-inlaw died on the third day due to bleeding and sister's son-inlaw died after six hours of bleeding. All the injured children and my senior sister who were badly injured were taken to

the hospital on the third day. Your soldiers wanted them to die out of bleeding whereas your mother was given treatment immediately. Is your mother's life different from the others, because she was a Prime minister? On the judgement day they will be treated as equal before god. It is a privilege and not a right to be a Prime Minister.

"After all these cruelty the dead bodies were put together in front of the entrance to our Hindu Temple and partially burnt there by your soldiers. They have insulted our place of worship and a Holy shrine.

"After this carnage they ordered injured ones to move out of the house and the soldiers (about 25 of them) looted the house. They took more than 600 grams of golden jewellery belonging to four families and other valuable electrical items. They didn't even leave old pots and pans. They made a clean sweep of the house.

"I am sure that you can't see the events that are happening in Jaffna. If you are really honest in bringing these culprits to justice you should allow a team of international jurists to investigate into these crimes. I am prepared to give evidence in front of such a team."

The IPKF and the 'Three Star' Menace

Is organised Robbery, Extortion, Ransom kidnapping and Murder part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force exercise? This question has to be asked and it is time someone on behalf of the Indian Government gives an answer.

Since December 1987, thousands of bus travellers between Jaffna and Colombo have seen for themselves IPKF men almost all along the Jaffna-Vavuniya trunk road. Yet, lorries have been relieved of their entire goods on sections of this road under the control of the IPKF. Vehicles are stopped, passengers are relieved of cash and jewellery, businessmen are kidnapped and youths believed or suspected to be sympathisers of the LTTE are forced out of buses and summarily executed. Passengers speak of a kind of Mafia gang actively operating on this section of the road, right under the eyes of the IPKF, and apparently with their blessings, protection and support. This gang of ruffians continue to be a law unto themselves and they have been enjoying this 'freedom' for over five months now; and they are known as 'Three Stars' — drop-outs from some militant movements.


Sometime in January an elderly lady from the West, a representative of the

Red Cross was trying to travel by car from Trincomalee to Jaffna, and had to turn back to Anuradhapura and onwards to Colombo because the driver of the car, harassed by the 'Three Star' men refused to go further. When the car stopped at a petrol bunk in Vavuniya, a few of these ruffians walked up and the first words they addressed to the driver were: 'Why have you brought this old hag here; you could have brought a young woman.' Fortunately the lady did not understand the language and the driver and a local who was in the car avoided translating what the men had said.

In the third week of March, a businessman from Vavuniya complained that he was almost relieved of a large sum of money he had just then withdrawn from the bank. Having failed in the first attempt, the group tried to summon the businessman to the group's camp. Having failed in that also, the group made arrangements to close the businessman's establishment. All these happened under the very nose of the IPKF. The businessman has sent written complaints to the Indian and Sri Lankan authorities.

Vavuniya
Sri Lanka

S.S. Maniam



PAAPED

25.5.88 Pavalkulam
5 girls

30.5.88 Muthaiyankattu
Idathukarai
4 women

LETTER

to Rajiv Gandhi

Don't seek the
mirage of a
cheap Victory.

'We are Tamils from Sri Lanka who have sought refuge in North America, from the injustices heaped upon us by successive government in the land of our birth.

'Some of us left that country as early as 1956, when the "Sinhala Only" legislation was passed, making Sinhala the sole Official Language. We realized then, that no self-respecting member of any minority community had a future there, except as a second class citizen, and that too, on the sufferance of the majority.

'The others are refugees from the five pogroms visited upon Tamils — Tamils only — beginning in 1958, and many other harassments in between, of which you must be aware. It was clear to us, as it is now clear to anyone who is willing to see, that we could have remained there only as hewers of wood and drawers of water, and not as equals in rights or dignity with the majority.

'Some of us left behind parents or other members of our immediate families; others did not; but we never ceased to look upon the North and East of the Island as our patrimony — the land of our fathers and their fathers. That land will always inspire us as Tamils, and nothing, not even time, will make us surrender it.

'We want to let you know, Mr. Prime Minister, that your policies and your recent action have left us deeply disillusioned. We are disillusioned, not only because you have chosen a course of destroying our hopes of regaining our dignity as a people; but more because we have always associated India with a much greater sense of justice than your recent action can be credited with. You are asking the Tamils to pay an intolerable price — to surrender their dignity, their honour and even their basic rights, to your expediency.

'We are certain, Mr. Prime Minister, that we speak for every generation of Tamils alive today. The values which we have always lived by, and intend to live by, are those we inherited from our forefathers. Our thinking is rooted in the great Indian epics — the Mahabharatha and the Ramayana — and the limitless wealth of religious and literary tradition which can be described only as Indian; Indian, not in any specific religious or linguistic sense, but in the much larger sense of a common cultural and spiritual

heritage.

'It is by these standards alone that we measure your actions, and it grieves us deeply that you have failed us as Tamils, you have failed India and all that stood for in the eyes of the world.

'You, Mr. Prime Minister, took upon yourself the role of intermediary between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamils of Sri Lanka; intermediary between a people struggling for their basic right and the government which has consistently denied them even their identity. We cannot help seeing a close parallel in the Mahabharatha: Sri Krishna who went to mediate between the Pandavas and the Gauravas.

'Sri Krishna did not make a deal with the Gauravas and bludgeon the Pandavas into accepting a dishonourable peace. That is the path you have chosen, and no amount of sophistry can wash this simple truth away.

'You have sealed off the North and East of Sri Lanka from the inquiring eye of world media. But there is hardly a family among us here which has not received the horrifying details of the ruthless, indiscriminate — and, yes, blood-thirsty — actions of your own armed force, against innocent civilians: our fathers, our mothers, our sisters and brothers. Our villages and our towns are now India's killing fields.

'You cannot re-write history, Mr. Prime Minister. You cannot impose peace on a people who wanted nothing but peace over half a century, much like the Pandavas, and who chose a separate destiny, only when every avenue of peaceful accommodation was denied them. Two "accords" which were negotiated in good faith by the Tamils were unceremoniously torn up by the Sinhala leaders of the two political parties that have ruled that country since independence. Tamils were burnt alive, and their homes looted and burnt, for the crime of wanting to be equal — nothing more.

'We are also puzzled about your reasons — to be more precise, your motives — for embarking on such an unjust and 'un-Indian' course. We want to be candid, and we cannot help feeling that you have become, wittingly or unwittingly, nothing more than a mercenary commander, serving the designs of a crafty, unscrupulous and morally bankrupt leader of the majority community. Your armed forces are doing what he attempted to do when you protested in the name of justice for Tamils.

'How have things changed? Is it wrong only when the government of country, whose "integrity" you have now sworn to protect, kills the hapless Tamils, and right when you, as "peace-keeper", kill them?

'Our expectations of India as the source of our values and beliefs, and of

you as heir to Nehru's sense of justice and the Mahatma's commitment to truth, may sound like sloppy sentimentality to your advisers who may quote Chanakya as well as Machiavelli to you. They may have convinced you that there are no permanent friendships, no permanent enmities, only permanent interests. But history has not worked that way, Mr. Prime Minister.

'What happened to Churchill's vision of Britain's permanent interests in India? Or to Napoleon's dreams of France's interests, or Adolph Hitler's version of Germany's destiny? We are quite capable of understanding permanent interests, but we cannot understand how permanent interests can be served by monstrous expediency which is contrary to India's own history, and her destiny. India, we would suggest in our naivette, cannot have permanent interests in hostility to the Tamils, or at their expense.

'There is one more side to this madness, Mr. Prime Minister — madness is what it is, to force a people driven by historical experience to chose a future apart from their tormentors, to embrace the very same people who do not want them except as aliens in their own land. What other conclusion is left to anyone who can see things as they are, from the violent protests by the Sinhalese, against your "Peace Accords"? The Tamils were not a party to this accord; the Sinhalese do not want it; whose peace, then, are you keeping?


'The Tamils are not a violent people, Mr. Prime Minister. We do not condone violence against innocents anywhere. But we have chosen to be free, and you cannot smother that will even if you brought all your armed might to the task; even if you wipe out a whole generation of our youth. Too much water has flowed under the bridge, too many lives sacrificed, too much blood shed in a just cause.

'India has a historic mission. Mr. Prime Minister. History will judge you by your success or failure in carrying that mission forward during your life-time. We want you to succeed. But you cannot succeed if you choose the path of short term expediency, and set out to build India's future on the graves of her real friends, on the ruins of their hopes and their expectation of justice. We can only hope that you will have the courage to understand the resolve of the Tamils to be free and the wisdom to choose India's eternal interests, over the mirage of a cheap victory against a people who trusted you.

Respectfully yours,

N. Vijayanatham

On behalf of The North American
Tamil Forum, 50 Whiteleaf Crescent,
Scarborough, Ontario
CANADA M1V 3C2






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 நித்தம் நித்தம்
 முள்முடி குட்டியும் ஆணிகள் அடித்தும்
 சிலுவையில் அறைகிறாய்.....?

.....
 ஆணிகள் அடித்த சிலுவைதன்னிலும்
 கவிழ்ந்து போகுமோ
 என்சிரம் என்றும்

என்முகம் சிதைத்து
 என்சுலம் அழிக்க
 எரியும் நெருப்பாய் சூழும் போதெலாம்
 புத்தொளி கொண்டு
 பீனிக்ஸ் பறவையாய்
 மீண்டும் மீண்டும் வானில் பறப்பேன்.







.....
 சிலுவையின் கீழ் அவன்
 சந்திய குந்தித் துளிகள்
 என்றுமே காய்ந்திலது
 இதோ
 இன்னும் பச்சையாக
 இன்றைக்கும் சந்தியமாய்

.....
 அவர்களின் கொடுமையில்
 சிலுவை தாங்குவோர்
 சந்தும் குந்தித் துளிகள்
 இன்னும் இந்தப்
 பூமியை நனைக்கிறது.
 ஒடுக்கு முறைக்குள்ளானோரின்
 ஒவ்வொரு கல்லறையிலும்
 அவர்கள் நினைப்பது போல்
 உதிரும் உறைந்து விடுவதில்லை.
 உட்கணன்று கொதிக்கும் அது
 புதிய உருவெடுக்கும்.



LTTE-MUSLIM ACCORD

A significant development took place in Madras in the third week of April which passed off without much fanfare or publicity, but which could well prove to be a historic turning point in the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka. Understanding was reached between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the visiting Muslim delegation on a wide spectrum of issues concerning the two people. The Muslim delegation of the recently formed Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF) was headed by former SLFP Minister Dr. Al Haj Baddudin Mahmud and included the Secretary General of the Front Mr. M.I.M. Mohideen and former M.P. for Kalmunai Mr. M.C. Ahmed.

A joint statement of both parties, signed on behalf of the LTTE by the Madras-based former Jaffna Commander Mr. Krishnakumar (Kittu) and by Mr. Mohideen of the MULF has far-reaching implications, apart from opening the way for a close identity in Tamil-Muslim relation in the Eastern Province. The meetings were spread over three days — the 15th, 16th and 19th April.



LTTE's 'Kittu' & Dr Baddudin Mahmud

The high degree of boldness evidenced by both sides and the spirit of give-and-take that was displayed stand out, in the terms of the joint statement. Following are some of the highlights:

- It is understood that although the Muslim people living in Sri Lanka speak the Tamil language, they are a distinct ethnic group falling within the totality of Tamil nationality.

- The Muslim people recognise that the area composed of the northern and eastern Provinces are as much their traditional homeland as it is of the rest of Tamil-speaking people.

- The Muslim people believe that their interests could be safeguarded only in their homeland, and this could be achieved only through a greater unity between all Tamil-speaking people.

- Since the Muslim people constitute a minority in their homeland, and hence it is important that they should be assured of a life free from fear and insecurity, the LTTE will take all steps to ensure this and extend all co-operation in the future to have the security of the Muslim people guaranteed by law.

- Whatever steps taken to safeguard the interests of the Muslim people and the arriving at a reasonable power-sharing agreement will be done in such a way as not to undermine the territorial integrity of the Tamil homeland.

- While the Muslim people form 33% of the population in the Eastern Province and will comprise 18% in the combined Northern and Eastern Provinces, it is agreed that in order to ensure maximum safeguard for them and enable them to enjoy an equitable power-sharing, they will be entitled to not less than 30% of the representation in the Provincial Council and the Cabinet.

- It is agreed that in all future land distribution, the Muslim people will be entitled to not less than 35% in the Eastern Province, not less than 30% in the Mannar district and not less than 5% in other areas.

- Unless otherwise a Muslim has been appointed Chief Minister of the Northern-Eastern Provincial Council, legal provision should be made to ensure that a Muslim is appointed as the Deputy Chief Minister of said Council.

- A de-colonization policy should be evolved in order to redress the adverse effect caused by planned Government colonization.

- The forthcoming election for the Provincial Council of the Tamil-speaking Province should be based on a voters' list compiled in a manner that is fair and justifiable

- It was agreed that in order to alleviate the sufferings of the vast mass of innocent civilians who are the ones who are truly affected by the military actions, and to enable them to return to normal, peaceful life, there should be an immediate ceasefire.

- Once hostilities cease, it is imperative that there should be an interim administration until such time as people return to normal life and Provincial Council elections are held. The composition of the interim administration should be in accordance with the earlier decision arrived at in this connection.

Some of the major implications that follow from this agreement are: The Muslims in the Eastern and Northern Provinces have decided that their future well-being lies in identifying themselves with the other Tamil-speaking people in these two provinces, and not

look for succour outside; that they are no longer prepared to be led by Muslim leaders in the south-west; that they recognise in the LTTE its Tamil representative character; above all, they have decided to support the concept of the Tamil traditional homeland.

On their return to Colombo, the M.U.L.F. has appealed to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to announce a ceasefire, and urged President Jayewardene to issue a proclamation merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

While the M.U.L.F. delegation visit to Madras was by all accounts a big success and its dialogue with the LTTE cordial and fruitful, there were a couple of unpleasant incidents prior to their departure, according to informed sources. They arose out of statements made by the visiting Muslim leaders to Indian journalists that the LTTE had no hand in the recent killings of some Muslims in Kalmunai and that another militant group was the one responsible. This apparently irked some members of two other militant groups in Madras, who on pretext of seeking an interview with the Muslim leaders at the hotel President where they, staying tried to browbeat them. 'The LTTE was responsible for the killing of 17 Muslims in Kalmunai. How can you cover it up?', asked one of them heatedly. 'You came to Madras to speak only to the LTTE? You think that only the LTTE has weapons? We too have arms, you know', said another, adopting an offensive tone.

According to a report in the Tamil weekly, the JUNIOR VIKATAN, the Muslim leaders while being polite, dealt with the discourteous youths very firmly. 'Look here "Thambimare"— we do not issue statements about happenings in the Eastern Provinces while seated in Madras. We are all people who came from there. We have evidence to prove that it was your organisation that was responsible for the killings of Muslims in Kalmunai. If you so desire, we are ready to produce the evidence in public'. The second man who spoke about arms was told: 'Please don't run away with the idea that we are afraid of weapons. We came to talk to the LTTE not because they have arms, but because we consider them the legitimate representatives of the Tamils. If you try to threaten us with arms, we can assure you that we Muslims can get any amount of arms from abroad; and we are not going to take shelter behind third parties and display our might. . . ' (in an obvious reference to the group's consorting with the IPKF in the East). The interview ended on that note, with the youths walking out in that same threatening mood!

REPORT

Coming to a Head

The accord gets a boost but the pressure is now on India



THE sudden flurry of developments in Sri Lanka last fortnight is of major significance as far as the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is concerned. More than nine months after it was signed in Colombo, the much-maligned accord looks like it may finally work out after all.

The credit for the new impetus must go to the master strategist, Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. First came the holding of a round of provincial council (PC) elections in the Sinhala areas that signified a slap in the face of the anti-accord forces. Then came what looked like an agreement between his government and the proscribed ultra-left Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (jvp) that had become a major terrorist threat in the southern part of the island.

The Sri Lankan Government said it would remove proscription and release all jvp detenus. Colombo claimed that the jvp had agreed to surrender arms, cease violence and enter the political mainstream.

But the elation was cut short when jvp chief Rohana Wijeweera denied that any

an agreement with the jvp cannot be ruled out. The results of last fortnight's PC elections were a major blow to their movement. The jvp had issued death threats to all contestants and voters. Though they did murder nine candidates, the surprisingly large turnout (62 per cent of the 2.89 million electorate) came as a rude slap in

Jayewardene campaigning for PC poll



Courtesy ANOC

By successfully stage-managing last fortnight's Provincial Council elections, Jayewardene has pulled off a major political coup and given new impetus to the accord.

such deal had been struck, causing considerable confusion in Colombo. The Sri Lankan Government had obviously jumped the gun in making the announcement—but not without some reason. The covert negotiations by National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali were obviously with the second rung of the jvp leadership which seems inclined to abandon the extremist path.

Despite Wijeweera's denial—and Colombo's embarrassment—the prospects of

the jvp's face.

Credit for that must go to Jayewardene who lived up to his reputation as "the old fox". Jayewardene, with a superb sense of timing, announced the PC elections when public antipathy to the jvp was at its peak. The nation was still mourning the death of the charismatic actor-turned-politician, Vijaya Kumaranatunge, at the hands of the jvp.

The results of the elections have come as a rude jolt to the jvp rank and file which is now increasingly aware that public opinion in Sri Lanka is rapidly turning against the movement. More important, the presence of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in the southern and eastern province has meant that the Sri Lankan security forces are now all concentrated in the south, the jvp's traditional stronghold.

The success of the IPKF in neutralising

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has also caused a negative psychological reaction against the jvp in the public mind—as long as it shared the headlines with the LTTE for acts of violence, public reaction was not so strong.

All this suggests that the jvp rank and file and many of its leaders may be prepared to lay down arms and make their peace with the Sri Lankan Government. Just how much of a hold Wijeweera exerts on the movement is difficult to assess but it is certainly nowhere near the respect that LTTE leader Pirabhakaran commands.

In any event, the chances of an agreement between Colombo and the jvp can no longer be eliminated from New Delhi's calculations. If, in the next few weeks,

there is some kind of a lasting and credible agreement between Colombo and the jvp, the pressure on New Delhi to follow suit with the LTTE and begin a phased withdrawal of the IPKF will be much greater. Indian High Commission officials till recently had maintained that "Jayewardene cannot ask for early withdrawal of the IPKF because he needs his redeployed forces from the north and east to handle the jvp problem in the south." If the jvp does come around, India can no longer be complacent about Jayewardene's inability to insist on a firm time schedule for early withdrawal of the IPKF.


But even without such an agreement, the pressure on India to reach an understanding with the LTTE has dramatically increased in the wake of the PC elections. Perhaps realising this, there has been a sudden flurry of parleys with the LTTE in Delhi and Madras for a cease-fire. Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit flew to New

Delhi on May 6 to hasten the momentum from the Indian end.

That is now a crucial necessity. Today, Jayewardene is in an unassailable position both in regard to the accord and in terms of domestic politics. With the PC elections in four Sinhala provinces on April 28, the accord passed its first test. The crux of the accord, which is the devolution of power, blossomed from paper to reality.

As Jayewardene said: "The first political task has been accomplished." Dr Nissanka Wijeratne, minister of justice, added: "In Sri Lankan politics, 1988 marks a watershed. Forty years ago, power was transferred from one colour to another. Now it has been transferred from the Centre to the grassroots."

SHYAM TEKWANI



The elections—a part of the accord's provisions—were a make-or-break issue as far as the accord was concerned. The main opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), however, boycotted it.

Jayewardene, the wily strategist, decided on a staggered poll. Only four of the nine provinces—traditional strongholds of the ruling United National Party (UNP)—went to the polls in the first round held on April 28. In the four provinces that saw elections—North-central, North-western, Uva, and Sabara-Gamuva—94 per cent of the electorate are rural Sinhalese. The result—in favour of the UNP—and the high voter turn-out, has established that the accord was not an issue with them.

Only two pro-accord groups were in the fray: the UNP and the six-week-old leftist United Socialist Alliance with the incongruous acronym USA, comprising four leftist parties—the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (Kumaranatunge's), the Lanka

Sama Samaja Party, the Nava Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party.

The UNP won in all the four provinces. "It's better than we expected," admitted Athulathmudali. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, awaiting the outcome of the elections, interpreted it as "proof that the people of Sri Lanka supported the accord". But the ruling party, which had viewed the polls as a one-horse-race, was jolted out of its complacency when the USA won 64 seats against the UNP's 88.

Nevertheless, the elections have strengthened Jayewardene's position vis-a-vis the accord. They proved that:

► he could hold elections despite the

Athulathmudali: jumping the gun?

boycott and death threats.

► his party may win two of the remaining three Sinhala provinces.

► he now has greater leverage with India: he has more than fulfilled his part of the bargain while India is yet to fully disarm the LTTE.

► he has been able to call the Opposition's bluff that PCs would mean the country's fragmentation. With the swearing-in of governors and chief ministers, the public can see the mendacity of opposition fears.

As yet, however, the ground reality in the north and east does not suggest that the time is right yet for the holding of elections. Said Minister of Mobilisation, Ranil Wickremasinghe: "There is a marked reduction in violence but it has not ended. In the north, normalcy to enable civilian activity has been established. In the east, the IPKF does not claim even that."


The success of the IPKF hitherto has been its ability to reverse LTTE's position from defending its strongholds, to guerrilla warfare to one of individual elimination. Said Athulathmudali: "There is a military factor in tackling guerrilla warfare. But there is no military solution. The only final solution is to get the LTTE to join the political mainstream." Both India and LTTE are fully aware of this, and both are playing their cards accordingly.

Even as military operations to disarm the LTTE continue, India opened up political avenues with it by initiating "informal talks" as early as February 4. The LTTE is now in a conciliatory mood. Said a senior LTTE source: "We have reached a stage where we have two options—continue to fight India as an enemy or see it as a friendly force. We've opted for the latter." The LTTE has now agreed in principle to four hitherto intractable issues—lay down arms, support the accord, prepare for talks and join the political process.

The first goal of the current talks hinges on a convincing surrender of arms. Said an LTTE source: "Policy-wise, we have taken a decision to hand over weapons. It's just a question of numbers." While the LTTE dismisses the importance of numbers, it is believed to have 3,000 pieces of weaponry, including rifles, artillery and rocket launchers. India insists on the surrender of 1,500 rifles. The LTTE claims it has only 500. "The gap is being bridged," said the source.

Athulathmudali reflects popular Sinhala opinion when he says that Colombo has fulfilled its obligations under the accord. It is now up to New Delhi to follow suit.

Asked whether the new conciliatory mood stemmed from a position of weakness in that they are clearly on the run, with a large number of their bases smashed, cadres killed, arrested or surrendered, and ammunition and funds running low, the source replied: "It's true we've lost men and material but that is part of a guerrilla struggle. We derive satisfaction from the fact that we have demonstrated to the world that we are capable of resisting a superpower. Our



conciliatory attitude is not from weakness. We have proved our point that we can't be fooled around with. Now we'd like to give peace a chance."

INDIA TODAY learns that the LTTE has conveyed to India two conditions for it to join the political process and contest the PC elections—setting up of an interim administrative council for six months while refugees and other Tamil political groups return to the north and east. The Tigers also want controlling interest as was offered to them soon after the accord.

AUDACIOUS as this may seem, they still have some bargaining clout. First, they still have mass support. Second, unlike in the southern province, there is absolutely no political activity in Tamil areas and without LTTE cooperation, it is virtually impossible to make a start in this direction. Despite IPKF saturation in Jaffna, the Tigers have assassinated 40 informers in the peninsula in the last six months. Third, the Tigers are beaten but not crippled. They remain a guerrilla force with 3,000 members and 1,000 fighters and can tie down the IPKF in Sri Lanka for a prolonged time, even if ammunition is low and supplies remain cut off. The Tigers are primarily 'explosives artistes'. Said an LTTE source: "While we are prepared for peace, we are simultaneously preparing also for a Vietnam-type situation as a back-up measure if we fail to come to an agreement with India."

In the wake of the new developments, New Delhi is running out of time. The IPKF has to put enough pressure on the LTTE to force them into a ceasefire.

But an agreement on an interim council is ruled out. It is learnt that both Jayewardene and Rajiv, at the Delhi meeting in January, came out strongly against the proposal because of their personal resentment of the LTTE. The militants' second demand—that powers devolved to the PCs be renegotiated—has provoked India to say that it should be renegotiated by the Tamils after they win the PC elections.

Both Rajiv and Jayewardene would ideally like elections in the north and east by July. By next week, Jayewardene would have started the procedural formalities that would have his country ready for the parliamentary elections in July. And Jayewardene cannot face the Sinhala electorate unless the IPKF begins at least a token withdrawal—which can happen only after the PCs are set up.

India has to come to an agreement with the Tigers, not out of favour or recognition but out of sheer expediency: their exclusion from the political process would make it a meaningless exercise.

IPKF soldiers on patrol in Jaffna district

Smarter by experience, the IPKF is launching another major round of military operations in the north and east to reduce LTTE's bargaining clout and to make one last attempt to marginalise the militants.

It is also understood that the IPKF is making an all-out effort to dredge out LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran—alive if possible, dead if inevitable. They are convinced that no other leader among the Tigers can command the fierce loyalty of the cadres. In his absence, the force would flounder, which would solve all of India's problems at this juncture. Significantly, when asked whether the IPKF was instructed not to shoot Pirabhakaran if sighted, General Officer Commanding Lt-General A.S. Kalkat remarked: "No instructions have been issued either way."

The fact remains that the primary intent of IPKF's Operations Viraat and Trishul in the northern province was to get Pirabhakaran. So far, the LTTE chief has been able to elude the IPKF because he has been moving constantly in a variety of disguises. Now, with the Sri Lankan Government's successful staging of the PC elections, India has no choice but to put enough military pressure on the LTTE to accept a cease-fire and negotiate a political agreement before the unofficial July deadline for elections in the north and east.

—ANITA PRATAP in Colombo

• MAY 31, 1988

REPORT

India dragged by the Tigers' tail

IT is both tragic and ironic that two armies are engaged in fighting extremist groups in Sri Lanka nearly a year after the signing of the so-called peace accord.

Colombo was burning and Jaffna was jubilant when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J. R. Jayewardene signed the agreement in July last year. Both the towns are now in ferment with the Janata Vimukti Peramuna and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fighting the accord and the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments nowhere near bringing either of them to the path of peace. The blame for the discord the accord has created should be equally shared by the octogenarian President and the young but inexperienced Prime Minister. Both ignored the lesson of Sri Lankan history that no accord that is not born out of a Sinhala consensus will work. In this case, there was not even a Tamil consensus.

Smarting under the blow of an imposed accord, President Jayewardene cleverly manoeuvred to bring about a confrontation between the LTTE and the Government of India so as to tell the Sinhalese, angry over Indian "armed intervention," that the IPKF has come to fight their battle. He is now reaping the bitter harvest. The strength of the IPKF has swollen to 70,000 and the Tigers are far from disarmed, though subdued, after seven months of conflict. Naturally the JVP, which is violently opposed to the accord, is back in action in a big way to disrupt the provincial councils system flowing from the accord. Criticism of the Jayewardene regime comes not only from Sinhala hardliners but even moderates who have come to regard the President as weak and wavering.

In a desperate move to stem the tide, Mr. Jayewardene hastily lifted the proscription on the JVP early this month through an agreement brought about by self-styled JVP negotiator S. C. Senanayake. The pact, a brainchild of National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, turned out to be stillborn with the JVP promptly dis-

owning it. As Land Development Minister Gamini Dissanayake, who is Mr. Athulathmudali's rival for presidency, gleefully put it, "There is no agreement, no marriage." Mr. Dissanayake is, however, with Mr. Athulathmudali on the need to placate the JVP to meet the challenge from the Opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). That was why he was keen that Indian Defence Minister K. C. Pant should immediately visit Sri Lanka to finalise dates for elections in the Tamil-dominated provinces and draw up plans for an IPKF pull-out.

Mr. Pant, however, is in no hurry to rush to Colombo's rescue since India is having its own problems in bringing the LTTE round. As a result, the JVP is continuing with the violence. In the last one month, the JVP has killed 18 candidates belonging to the United National Party (UNP) and the United Socialist Alliance (USA) who were in the fray for elections in the Southern, Western and Central provinces due next month. The Sri Lankan Government, which managed to hold elections to four provinces in the south last month in the face of mounting violence by the JVP, is going ahead with the polls in the remaining three provinces, leaving only the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces which are to later merge, according to the terms of the accord.

With Colombo falling within the Western province which is going to the polls, the JVP has signalled its determination to carry the campaign of terror to the capital by killing UNP General Secretary Mandalan Fernando in the heart of the city in broad daylight.

Notwithstanding widespread support for the JVP because of mass discontent, there is growing disenchantment with the cult of violence. To that extent, the Government has taken a step in the right direction by lifting the ban on the JVP to give it a chance to come overground.

Apart from the JVP menace, the Government has to contend with opposition to the accord from the SLFP. While boycotting the provincial council poll, the SLFP is planning to contest the forthcoming by-elections

to the Parliament in four constituencies to feel the pulse of the people. In the main, it is keeping its powder dry for the presidential elections due in December. Moves are already underway between the SLFP and the USA for an electoral understanding. Mrs. Bandaranaike, who fell out with her daughter Mrs. Chandrika after her marriage to film star-politician Vijaya Kumaranatunge, is reportedly coming closer to her after her husband's death at the hands of the JVP.

The only way the President can contain the JVP threat and meet the combined Opposition challenge is by making the agreement work to the advantage of the Sinhalese majority and coaxing India into signing a friendship treaty to make provisions impinging on Sri Lanka's foreign policy look less obnoxious. With this end in view, he has set his face against a permanent merger of the mixed population in the east with the Tamil majority of the north.

With a view to defeating the merger in the referendum to be held in the east one year after elections, the Sri Lankan Government is reported to have settled 4,000 new Sinhala families along the Trincomalee-Vavuniya-Mullaitivu stretch under the controversial Veli-Oya scheme. Not only has the Government pushed through the Provincial Council Bill without discussing with India residual matters as required under the agreement, it has also gone ahead with elections in Sinhalese areas. While the agreement stipulates that English and Tamil should also be made official languages along with Sinhalese, the Government has quietly made English the link language, as a sop to the Sinhalese.

The only remaining irritant from the Sinhalese point of view is the continuing presence of the IPKF necessitated by the Tigers' refusal to lay down arms. Here again, the Sri Lankan Government is not prepared to wait any longer and is keen on holding elections to the Tamil province by July-August regardless of whether the LTTE wants to participate or not. It is felt that once a popular Government is installed, the IPKF will no longer have any excuse to stay.

But India, which underestimated the Tigers' capacity for resistance, is not prepared to risk holding elections without the LTTE's participation.

This is hardly surprising since the LTTE's writ still runs in the north and the east though it has considerably weakened militarily. Its call for civil disobedience is heeded not only in Jaffna but also in Batticaloa and Trincomalee. Crude attempts to break

up fasts for a ceasefire by mothers' fronts in Batticaloa and Trincomalee have only further distanced the IPKF from the people. Efforts to promote rival groups to counter-balance the LTTE have also not borne fruit. PLOT is under fire from the IPKF for talking directly to President Jayewardene and TELO has not been able to even gain a foothold in Jaffna. When TELO organised a hartal with IPKF permission to commemorate the second death anniversary of its leader Srisarathnam, at least 15 of its boys were shot dead in Jaffna.

The talks between the LTTE and the Government of India, going on at various levels since last March, have not made much progress. This is because the LTTE has not budged an inch on basic issues. It has demanded an indefinite ceasefire followed by unconditional talks. It has offered to lay down arms once the security of the Tamil people is guaranteed by India. It has opposed holding of elections in Tamil areas "under the umbrella of Indian military occupation and domination" and said an interim Government should be established to facilitate the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tamil refugees. The LTTE also wants the Government of India to renegotiate with the Sri Lankan Government, with the active participation of Tamil representatives, the framework of devolution of power. It has reiterated that there can be no permanent solution to the problem unless the Tamils are recognised as a distinct nationality with a homeland comprising the north and east and with the right to self-determination, which includes the right to secede.

The accord rejects the homeland concept and seeks a solution within the unitary structure of Sri Lanka. Even if other Tamil groups do not go as far as the LTTE by demanding the reopening of the agreement, they too are uneasy about provisions in the Provincial Council Bill which gives the President the power to dismiss a popular Government on the perceived threat of war or armed rebellion and vests with the Centre, powers over land alienation.

But neither Government is in a mood to oblige. The Sri Lankan Government has already made it clear that the devolution package cannot be improved any further since it was cleared by the Supreme Court by a narrow five-four majority.

Under the circumstances, an early breakthrough is difficult whatever be the compulsions of the LTTE as well as the two Governments.

— S. Murari after a visit to Sri Lanka

FAST UNTO DEATH BY MOTHER SUSEELA GANESHAN

Mrs. Suseela Ganeshan of the Trincomalee Mothers' Front commenced a fast unto death on 10 April at Sivan Kovil premises in Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka demanding that (a) India should declare an unconditional ceasefire, (b) The LTTE should lay down their arms, and (c) India and LTTE should negotiate with a view to arriving at the just solution.

A statement issued by the fasting Suseela Ganeshan said:

'The Annaiar Munnani (Mothers' Front) commenced 24 hours relay fast on March 9th. Up to now, two hundred mothers as well as young boys, young girls and children of both sexes have participated. But the Government of India has remained silent. Under the circumstances, we have no alternative but to start a fast unto death. I, a founder member and a member of the Central Committee of the Annaiar Munnani participated in the Tokan Fast conducted by Trincomalee mothers on 29th Feb. at Pattirakali Ampal Temple in Trincomalee in support of the demands put forward by Batticaloa Annaiar Munnani. On that day I came forward voluntarily and gave my name to serve as a member of the Central Committee that was formed amongst the mothers who participated in that fast. I also informed the Secretary of the Annaiar Munnani that I was prepared to commence a fast unto death in this struggle. Now I thank the Annaiar Munnani for having given me an opportunity to fulfil my desire. I have decided to sacrifice my life on my own willingness for the emancipation of the Tamil speaking people. I publicly announce that no one has the right to prevent or stop my fast or to make me to change my decision. But, only in the event of the Government of India agreeing to the demands of the Annaiar Munnani, I will give up my fast with the consent of the Central Committee of the Annaiar Munnani. I wish that the sacrifice of mine for the Tamil speaking people should be felt not only by the Tamil speaking people living in the Northern and Eastern provinces but also all Tamil people living in every nook and corner of the world. Ceasefire by the Government of India and negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are essential for elimination of sufferings of the Tamil speaking people.

'In order to pursue this, the mothers should come forward to continue the fast unto death in all places wherever the Tamil speaking people live. Particularly, the mothers who were displaced from this country and living in India, especially in Tamil Nadu as refugees should also continue this struggle.

'My last desire is that THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITHOUT WORSENING THE TAMIL PROBLEM, SHOULD DECLARE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATE WITH THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM AND MAKE THE FUTURE OF THE TAMIL SPEAKING PEOPLE PROSPEROUS TOO'.

DEATH FAST MOTHER DIES

Forty-eight year old Mrs. Poopathya Kanapathippillai who had undertaken a fast unto death organised by the Batticaloa Mothers' Front died on 19 April after 31 days from the day she commenced her fast at the Mamangewarar Hindu Temple.

Mrs. Kanapathippillai had undertaken the fast in support of the two demands put forward by the Mothers' Front, namely that there should be an immediate cease-fire between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE and the Indian government should resume negotiations with the LTTE.

Mrs. Kanapathippillai commenced her fast on 19 March following the abrupt end to the fast by Mrs. Annamamah David. She continued her fast in defiance of the frequent calls to give it up by the IPKF commanders.

Mrs. Kanapathippillai is the mother of five children. One son was killed in operations by the Sri Lanka security forces. Two of her sons and a grandson are presently in detention at the Boosa detention centre. Her husband is a retired railway officer.

Several hundred of Batticaloa residents paid homage to her at the office of the Mothers' Front where her body was kept. Mrs. Kanapathippillai was laid to rest on 21 April with thousands of mourners participating in the funeral procession.

The Mothers' Front announced that, despite Mrs. Kanapathippillai's death, the fasting unto death campaign would continue until the Front's demands are met with favour.

The Trincomalee Mothers' Front, in a letter to Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, has threatened to commence fasts on the streets of Trincomalee if no solution is found to the ethnic conflict.

THE RIGHT OF THE TAMIL NATION TO SELF-DETERMINATION

By Justice Satchi Ponnambalam

A summary of a paper prepared for the International Tamil Conference to be held in London on 30th April and 1st May 1988

"In so far as we can give to each nation the power to express itself as a state..... we liberate a spiritual energy, which beyond discussion, adds to the happiness of mankind..... For one nation to refuse this power of expression to another is to impoverish the spiritual well-being of the world." - Harold Laski in "Nationalism and the future of civilisation (1939)

National self-determination as a political principle has evolved over the last 150 years as a by-product of the doctrine of nationalism. The term "peoples", in the UN Charter and Covenants is used as being coincident with "nation." What is a nation?

At the time of World War I, on the basis of Krehbiel's formulation, it was said that **"a nation exists when its component parts believe it to be a nation."** This repeats the much earlier idea of the great French scholar Ernest Renan when he simply referred to the nation as a "corporate soul." While this attempt at defining emphasises the subjective factor, yet it is inadequate in offering no means of distinguishing a nation from a community or tribe. **An indispensable characteristic is the possession of a specified territory by the nation.**

Taking into account the many views expressed, we find the following as indispensable characteristics of a nation:

- (1) **possession of a specified territory;**
- (2) **a consciousness among the people as a nation; and**
- (3) **cultural integration which binds the people by ties of cultural oneness.**

Applying these criteria, the Tamils of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis the Sinhalese are indisputably a nation. However much Jayewardene brothers and their recently recruited pseudo-intellectual cohorts, in their myopia may want it otherwise to carry on their mad programme of Tamil genocide, **the Tamils are a nation, living in a specified territory, possessed of consciousness as a nation and manifesting socio-cultural integration and coherence as one people.**

It is essential to correctly designate the political conflict in Sri Lanka as one between the oppressor Sinhalese government subjugating the Tamil nation in the name of the interests of the Sinhalese nation on the one hand, and the oppressed Tamil nation fighting for freedom, on the other. It is a national question sui generis. That the Tamils of Sri Lanka are an oppressed nation, now subjected to genocidal repression by the very Government which must protect their lives, is put beyond any doubt by what Jayewardene, as President of the country told Ian Ward, a British journalist in July 1983. He said: "I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people...Now we can't think of them. Not about their lives or of their opinion about us." (*Daily Telegraph, London. 11.7.83*)

This Daily Telegraph interview was re-published in the Sunday Observer (Colombo) and all the Sinhala newspapers. The TULF President and M.P. for Nallur referred to the above statement in the 'Sunday Observer', in parliament and said: "I only hope that what was published would be contradicted by the President.... I

hope to God that the article which was an interview was wrong as it was stated there that the President did not care for the lives of the people of Jaffna." No contradiction was ever made and the President stood by the correctness of that news report.

A multi-nation State can continue to exist only if the cultural diversity of the separate nations is recognised as the bedrock and the equality of the constituent nations is accepted as axiomatic. The legislature in such a State must devise the structure to prevent the domination of one nation by the other. If domination be pursued, the State will fall apart and destroy itself. In Sri Lanka, domination and subjugation of the Tamils was what the blinkered Sinhalese chauvinist politicians wanted and achieved. Hence, the nation-breaking that is taking place.

The Tamil people have been subjected to and are fighting against the internal colonialism of the Sinhalese. The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (G.A. Resolution 1514 of 1960) states: "... the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and all people have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty."

Professor Virginia Leary, in her "Ethnic Conflict and Violence" in Sri Lanka (I.C.J. 1983, p.69), states: **"The Tamils could be considered to be a 'people'. They have a distinct language, culture, a separate religious identity from the majority population, and to an extent, a defined territory.** Claims to self-determination under international

law, however, must also be balanced against the international law principle of the territorial integrity of states." True and a correctly stated international law principle indeed. But territorial integrity of states is not an end in itself. It is only of instrumental value in furthering the interests of all its citizens and to provide for the peoples comprised in the territory of the State their legitimate right to exercise power for their well-being. In international law, a nation of peoples have rights, viz, right to freedom from oppression, from racial discrimination, human rights, fundamental freedoms, etc.

The UN Declaration on the Principles of Equal Rights (GA Resolution 2625 of 1970) gives the right of self-determination to peoples within existing independent states when governments fail to "conduct themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights" and when the States do not "represent the whole of the people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." The Article reads as follows:-

"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial principle of equal rights and self-determination as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour."

The Sri Lanka Government which does not hide its naked genocidal massacre of the innocent Tamils in their homelands cannot be regarded as conducting itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights. **Nor can that government be regarded as representing the Tamil people when Jayewardene himself has said that he was not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people and not about their lives.** What is self-determination in international law? The UN Declaration on

the International Status of "Peoples" and their Right of Self-determination (GA Resolution 2625 of 1970) states:-

"The establishment of a sovereign independent state, the free association or integration with an independent state or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people."

The Sri Lankan Government has not simply been against but oppressive of the Tamil people, as a nation and its political, economic, social and ethno-cultural interests. **Tamils in Sri Lanka have no state and are seeking to create their own sovereign state of Eelam based on their right of self-determination.** They are a stateless nation oppressed by alien Sinhalese colonialism and domination.

The Tamil freedom fighters today assert and bear arms in exercise of their right to self-determination. In practical terms, what is now necessary is a constitutional formula for secession. In this, the Tamil people need the help of the international community, as the oppressor does not want to recognise its own international obligations. Otherwise, the state of international relations would be seen to be one of paralysis and

bankruptcy, the inaction dictated by out-dated clichés of "internal affairs", "territorial integrity", "national unity", etc. To avoid further unnecessary violence, turmoil and loss of innocent lives, on both sides, it is the right and duty of the UN and concerned Member States, to intervene in recognition of the right of the Tamil people to self-determination. The particular justifiable circumstance of the Tamil people's desire for self-determination by secession is that it developed out of the dynamic of national oppression and has generated its own momentum. It is a national liberation struggle sui generis and in the words of David Selbourne of Oxford University "a true national question, if ever there was one."

There is need for enlightened and progressive realisation that self-determination necessarily involves attack on existing union, territorial unity and state sovereignty. But that is for the higher cause of human liberation, human rights and human dignity. **The existing state cannot be regarded or defended as permanent and unalterable in the face of internal colonialism, genocidal repression, organised pogroms and mass massacre of a nation of people.**

'Subject IPKF to monitoring body'

The Centre for Society and Religion has suggested that the Indian peace keeping forces in Sri Lanka be subject to an impartial monitoring authority, and that the government of India hasten the discharge of its responsibility under the Indo Lanka accord.

In an 'open letter to human rights groups and people's movement in India', the centre suggests that this monitoring authority could be an Indo Sri Lankan body or an international one like the International Committee of the Red Cross.

"The fact of the IPKF being not accountable to any such impartial agency is not good for Indo-Sri Lanka accord. But we think that Sri Lanka should not be subordinate to India. We would welcome reciprocal relationships as between two independent neighbouring countries".

It warns that "the longer the IPKF remains here, and that in a somewhat partisan manner, the greater are the risks of India assuming a dominating and even imperialistic role — which we trust would be repugnant to most Indians".

The letter is signed by Fr. Tissa Balasuriya, Director, and Bernadeen Silva, Asst. Director/secretary.



Why did the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) refuse to accept the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord unconditionally? What are the basic defects and limitations of the Accord? Does the Accord offer a permanent solution to the Tamil national question? Does it fulfill the political aspirations and national interests of our people? Will it create an appropriate political climate so that our people can live in peace, in freedom, with honour, dignity and security?

This paper attempts to answer these crucial questions and clarifies LTTE's position on the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

The euphoria and high hopes that were displayed when the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in July last year have almost disappeared. What prevails now is gloom and hopelessness since the Accord has brought war, violence and misery, instead of the promised peace, harmony and happiness. Yet the Government of India continues to praise the Accord as a remarkable historical triumph, as a magnificent diplomatic achievement on the part of Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardane. What amuses the people of Tamil Eelam is the continuous assertion by India that the Accord was signed to promote the interests of the Tamils and to find a permanent solution to the Tamil question. In India's opinion, the Accord provides for all the political demands of the Tamils except the demand for an independent Tamil state. We wish to argue that this interpretation advanced by India is deliberately misleading and far from truth.

It is our considered opinion that the Accord fails to fulfill the political and national aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. It fails to grasp the complex dimensions of the Tamil national question. It fails to offer an adequate framework for the resolution of the problem. This failure can only be attributed to the superficial approach to a complex historical problem, an

approach based on entirely false premises, on false perceptions. Let us discuss the issue in more detail.

A NATIONAL QUESTION

The problem of the Eelam Tamils is a national question. It is a problem concerned with the fundamental political rights of a nation of people. It is a problem of the right to national self-determination of a people. The political struggle of the Eelam Tamils is based on this very question of national self-determination.

Our people have all the attributes that constitute them into a unique nationality. We have a homeland, a historical habitation with well defined territory, a unique culture and tradition, a rich language, a distinct history that extends to pre-historic times.

As a nation of people, we have the right to determine our own political destiny. This right to self-determination of people is recognised by international law and by U.N. Charter. This right bestows upon us the freedom to form an independent state of our own.

Our struggle for self-determination arose as a consequence of state repression, terror and genocide, as a consequence of the rejection by the chauvinistic Sinhala regimes of our civilized demand for Federal autonomy, as a consequence of ever growing conflict between Tamil and Sinhala nations which made co-existence under a unitary state intolerable and impossible.

The forms and methods of our struggle for political independence changed on account of the concrete conditions of State oppression. The peaceful, non-violent agitations adopted by our people were ruthlessly crushed by the repressive arms of the racist State. Armed struggle as a mode of political agitation arose when our people were presented with no alternative other than to resort to armed resistance to defend themselves against a savage form of State terrorism.

As the liberation movement of our people, we have been fighting an armed struggle for the last twelve years to gain our right to self-determination. In this long and arduous struggle we fought with dedication and commitment and made supreme sacrifices. Over a thousand of our cadres have laid down their lives for this noble cause. Our people too, have faced immense suffering, the vicissitudes of which cannot be described by words. Over twenty thousands Tamils have lost their lives for the emancipation of their homeland.

Ours is a national liberation struggle, a struggle for freedom to shape our political destiny, a struggle waged with courage, heroism and sacrifice, a struggle soaked in blood and tears, a struggle built on the ashes of several thousands of martyrs.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord fails to identify the essence and mode of our struggle as a liberation struggle, as a struggle for self-determination. Instead, the Accord places our national struggle entirely on a fallacious premise reducing it to a simple problem of a **discriminated minority group in a pluralistic social formation**. The accord acknowledges that "Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, and a multi-lingual society" and that Tamils are one of the ethnic groups. Such characterisation conveniently buries the truth that there are two major linguistically oriented national formations, the Sinhalese speaking and Tamil speaking people and that the conflictual relations between the two generated by the chauvinism of the big nation, is the cardinal cause of the national strife in Sri Lanka.

This pluralistic theory of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual Sri Lankan social formation was advanced by Hector Jayawardane at

Thimpu talks to reject outright the demands forwarded by LTTE and other political organisations seeking recognition for Tamil homeland, for Tamil nationality, for the Tamils' right to national self-determination. We are dismayed to find that the Government of India has adopted similar theoretical constructs and definitions utilized by Sri Lankan chauvinists to distort the real issues underlying the Tamil problem. Therefore, the Indian position entrenched in the Sri Lankan ideological terrain rejects the very conceptions of nationality and self-determination which are fundamental to our political struggle.

TAMIL HOMELAND

The people of Tamil Eelam have a homeland, a soil of their own upon which they lived and toiled for centuries, a historically constituted territory embracing the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Our people have an inalienable right to this homeland. This homeland is the basis of our national identity and the very foundation of our socio-economic existence. Therefore, the recognition of the Tamil homeland is a crucial element for any rational and permanent resolution of the Tamil question.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord does not recognise the concept of a Tamil homeland. Instead, the Accord contains within itself dangerous clauses that might eventually lead to the bifurcation of our homeland.

The Accord, while recognising that "the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people", it further qualifies the statement by adding, "**who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups.**" This qualified statement conveniently ignores the critical problem of the forceful annexation of vast territories of Tamil land by State aided Sinhala colonisation in the last 40 years and to some extent legitimises such illegal encroachment.

The geographical merger of the North and East to form a single Tamil regional State with adequate powers over the land has been the central demand of the Tamils. This demand for the re-unification and reconstitution of our homeland was the major issue figured in the past agreements and pacts. The question of merger was cardinal, since the Tamil people aspired to enhance their national character and identity and determined to protect their historical homeland from being swamped and swallowed by planned sinhala colonisation.

Does the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord meet this longstanding, legitimate demand of the Tamils? We are of the opinion that the Accord fails to meet this demand. Contrary to the Indian claims that the question of merger is resolved, the Accord only provides for a temporary linkage; it proposes a single administrative unit consisting of Northern and Eastern Provinces only for an interim period followed by a referendum in the Eastern Province to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether the province remain linked with the Northern Province.

The LTTE is firmly opposed to the idea of a referendum. We hold the view that the Tamil homeland is one and indivisible and that the geographical contiguity and territorial unity of our homeland should be given unconditional recognition for any meaningful solution to the Tamil question.

The proposal for a referendum for linkage or de-linkage is unacceptable to the Tamils since it has dangerous implications. The Eastern Province is already a seething cauldron of communal tension primarily due to the manipulations of the Sri Lankan government to disrupt the demographic composition of the population. Jayawardane's government is hell bent on

devouring the Tamil lands with the objective of reducing the Tamils to a minority in the area. Though a party to the accord, the Sri Lankan government has publicly declared that it was opposed to the merger and would campaign against it. With thousands of Tamils uprooted and driven away from their homes, with thousands of Sinhalese settlers re-allocated in the deserted Tamil villages, one can easily predict the outcome of a referendum, possibly a rigged one.

The people of Tamil Eelam are deeply dismayed that the Government of India, which is fully aware of this sensitive issue, has failed to workout a satisfactory solution. A referendum on this issue questions the legality and validity of our right to homeland which is a historically given reality.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord rejects the fundamental political demands of the Eelam Tamils i.e. the demand for the **recognition of our homeland**, for the **recognition of our people as a nationality**, for the **recognition of our people's right to national self-determination**. These demands were proclaimed at the Thimpu talks as a unanimous decision of the Tamils setting out the basis for a permanent resolution of the Tamil national question.

In total disregard to Tamil aspirations, the Accord attempts to impose a settlement within the framework of the unitary constitution of Sri Lanka which is nothing but a legalised embodiment of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism, thereby subjugating our people to the tyranny of the dictatorship of the majority. The Accord, therefore, fails to take into account the long history of our political struggle, fails to recognise our people's quest for national identity and freedom, fails to realise the significance of the torrents of blood and tears shed in Tamil Eelam for the cause of our liberation struggle. Having completely ignored the aspirations and sentiments of our people the Government of India has entered into this agreement which does not deal with the fundamental issues of our national struggle nor in any way promotes the interests of the Tamil people.

THE PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Let us now critically examine the set of proposals offered by the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord for the settlement of the Tamil issue. The scope and theme of this document does not permit us a detailed exposition of all the aspects of these proposals. We will confine ourselves to a brief analysis of the important themes.

A collection of incomplete set of proposals negotiated between the Government of India, Sri Lanka and the TULF from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986 were recommended in the Accord as the basis for the resolution of the issue. These set of proposals, called the December 19th framework, at that time, were presented to us for consideration by the Government of India in January 1987. Our leader Mr. Pirabakaran, submitted a written response to the Government of India through Hon. M.G. Ramachandran, then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. Mr. Pirabakaran rejected the framework outright pointing out the inadequacies of the proposals. Mr. Pirabakaran argued that the proposed devolution of powers set-out in the proposals were extremely limited and failed to meet the legitimate political aspirations of the Tamil people.

This same set of proposals are now presented to us again in the Accord with a commitment that, "the residual matters not finalised during the negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka". But to the disappointment and dismay of the Tamils, these residual matters were not taken up for discussions. In blatant violation of the commitment given in

the Accord, Jayawardane's regime refused to consider the residual matters, but rather rushed through the Parliament two Bills - **THE 13th AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS BILL** - which contains most of the unresolved, incomplete collection of proposals.

A critical elucidation of the provisions of these Bills brings one important truth to light. That is, the Provincial Council framework envisaged in these Bills is not specifically addressed to the specific grievances of the Tamil people with the specific objective of resolving the Tamil question. Rather, these laws propose the creation of an island wide administrative structure rigidly controlled by the Centre with limited distribution of political authority to all the provinces of Sri Lanka. Provincial Councils are thus reduced to local administrative bodies serving to the dictates of the State. They do not enjoy any autonomous powers of their own. The institutions of the Centre - the Presidency, the office of the Governor and Parliament - are invested with sweeping powers to interfere and control the functions of the Provincial Councils. In essence, the provisions of these Bills, instead of delegating powers from the centre to periphery allows absolute concentration of power to the Centre.

DICTATORIAL POWERS

The 13th Amendment confers on the President totalitarian emergency powers to dissolve or to make redundant any Provincial Council at his whim and fancy. The President can make a proclamation of Emergency on the ground that the maintenance of essential supplies and services is threatened or that the security of Sri Lanka is threatened by war or external aggression or armed rebellion or **in the President's view there is imminent danger of such happenings**. Having declared Emergency, the President can give directions to the Governor on the course of action and that the presidential direction cannot be questioned by any court of law.

The Governor, who will function as the Agent of the President will not be a ceremonial puppet but rather endowed with far-reaching executive powers. Acting on the directions of the President, the Governor's role is to supervise the functions of the Provincial Councils and super-impose the authority of the Centre over them.

By bestowing extra-ordinary powers to the President and to his appointee, the Governor, the architects of these proposals have deliberately thwarted de-centralisation of power to the Provinces and extended the Presidential authority to grass-root level, subjugating the entire Provincial administration of the island to the dictates of the Centre.

It is well-known that President Jayawardane has been abusing emergency powers for the last 10 years to continue his regime of racist repression. With additional emergency powers conferred on him by these laws one can safely assume that Jayawardane will not hesitate to use his power to stifle and suffocate any attempts on the part of the Tamils to assume political power.

With Presidential authority exerting rigid control over the functions of the Provincial Councils, the powers accorded to Parliament to amend or repeal the chapter pertaining to the P.C.'s make this 'devolution package' a mockery. The legislative powers devolved to the Councils become meaningless and impotent since Parliament retains the power to legislate even on matters allotted to Provincial Councils. In brief, the provisions of these Bills, having effectively constrained devolutionary power, allow the perpetuation of the tyranny of the Parliamentary majority which has been the medium of repressive racist policies against the Tamil people.

CENTRAL CONTROL OVER VITAL SUBJECTS

The severe limitations of the functional authority of the Provincial Councils can be best ascertained by the list of subjects that are allotted to the Provinces. While all the crucial subjects that are vital for the social and economic development of the regions are brought under the Central Government (under Reserved and Concurrent lists) only a limited number of unimportant subjects fall within the Provincial administration.

Important subjects like agriculture, industries, fisheries, land development, colonisation, higher education, reconstruction, rehabilitation, local government and several others are excluded from provincial authority.

The powers of the Provincial Councils are extremely limited over the issue of land and land settlement which is an important and sensitive matter to the Tamils. The Provincial Councils are denied the right to utilise lands which fall within their regions. The right of alienation of what is described as 'state lands' is vested with the Centre and the President is given power over alienation and disposition of such lands. Furthermore, the State is empowered to allot or acquire lands, or initiate colonisation projects under the cover of inter-provincial irrigation and land development schemes. In brief, the proposals governing land settlement deprive the Tamils their right over their own lands, their right to develop their own soil for their own economic well-being, and their right to protect their own homeland against Sinhala encroachments.

In terms of the limitation of subjects and powers delegated to the Provinces one can safely conclude that Rajiv - JR peace Accord falls short of Bandaranayake-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957. In the B.C. Pact, 'It was agreed that Regional Councils should have powers over specified subjects including agriculture, co-operatives, lands and land development, colonisation, education, health, industries and fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, water schemes and roads'. Did not the B.C. Pact offer more to the Tamils 31 years ago than the present agreement?

The proposals concerning law and order, a subject of grave concern to the Tamil people, is the most defective. The proposals fail to meet the demand for a Tamil police service independent of the Centre's interference and domination. Rather, it proposes the creation of a dual police system - National and Provincial - with more powers to the national division to appoint senior positions to the Provincial police and even to interfere directly in the affairs of law and order of a province under the cover of emergency. This police system fails to provide adequate security to our people but rather it will allow the perpetuation of Sinhala police tyranny in Tamil areas.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: A MYTH

The supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord argue that one of the positive elements of the Agreement is the elevation of Tamil language to the status of an official language on a par with Sinhala. But a close scrutiny of this matter will dispel this myth.

The Sri Lanka constitution accords to sinhala language the full status of the official language, **'to be the sole official language'** and provides for the manner of its use.

The status of the Tamil language or its usage is not guaranteed by constitutional provisions. Instead, the 13th Amendment states the Parliament, shall by law, provide for the use of Tamil as an official language. By bestowing such power to the Sinhala majority Parliament the status of the Tamil language as an official language is negated and its use is severely undermined.

FORCEFUL REPATRIATION

A deliberate attempt by both India and Sri Lanka to de-link the burning issue of the plantation Tamils with 'the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka' is the most serious defect of the Accord. The LTTE and other Tamil organisations, at Thimpu talks, insisted on the inclusion of the problem of plantation Tamils in any meaningful attempt to find a permanent political solution to the Tamil issue and demanded that citizenship and other civil rights should be granted to plantation Tamils who consider the Island as their mother country.

The Accord offers nothing to resolve the plight of this section of the Tamil population. Instead, the Government of India's pledges "to expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu". The Accord, allows for forceful repatriation of plantation Tamils, thereby violating the right of human beings to choose their own country.

TAMIL INTERESTS BETRAYED

In total perspective, the provincial council framework fails to meet the legitimate and reasonable demands of the Tamils; it fails to recognise their political and national aspirations; it fails to promote their socio-economic interests; it fails to guarantee their security concerns. The proposed devolution plan is not designed to redress the longstanding grievances of our people. On the contrary, it allows the perpetuation of the domination, oppression and exploitation of the Tamil masses by the racist Sinhala state. Thus, the Indo-Sri Lankan accord offers an inadequate, insubstantial and impotent set of proposals for the resolution of the Tamil issue. This is the offer given as an alternative to a politically conscious nation of people who have been waging an armed struggle for more than a decade to establish an independent sovereign state. This total disregard shown to Tamil political sentiments and aspirations by both India and Sri Lanka brings to surface one important political truth. That is, **the signatories of the Accord have little or no concern about the interests of the Tamil people.** The Accord was hurriedly signed not with the acknowledgement of "the imperative of resolving the ethnic problem" as proclaimed in the preamble to the Agreement. The impelling and compelling imperative was something else. As far as India is concerned, the imperative is her geo-political interests and the Accord secures such national interests. What shocks the Tamil nation is that the Government of India, in persuasion of her geo-political interests has betrayed the Tamils by totally disregarding their political aspirations and interests.

Indisputably India has given primacy to her national and geo-political interests over and above Tamil concerns. But the manner in which the Government of India chose to secure her interests at the cost of Tamil aspirations is what has deeply disillusioned the Tamil people. Utilizing the Tamil struggle to interfere in the conflict, encouraging the Tamil resistance movement to bring pressure on Jayawardane, taking the responsibility upon itself to mediate on behalf of the Tamils, the Government of India has finally achieved her strategic interests but the Tamils are left alienated, helpless, defenceless, with their fundamental political problems unresolved.

INDIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Let us now examine the aspects of the Accord that secures India's strategic interests.

Sri Lanka, since the assumption to power of the right-wing UNP regime under Jayawardane, has been drifting away from

India's sphere of influence and was moving towards the power axis of western imperialism. Sri Lanka's open economic policy, her desperation to crush the Tamil freedom movement, her fear of India's hegemonic dominance in the region, propelled Jayawardane to drift closer to western imperialism. Such a drift of a neighbouring country, whose strategic importance is considerable, has irritated India. Furthermore, the subversive activities of Israeli intelligence personnel, the induction of foreign mercenary forces in the war against Tamil guerrillas, the military assistance and training facilities provided by Pakistan, the clandestine operations of the American and West German broadcasting stations, the U.S. bid to take over the oil farms in Trincomalee — all these factors posed a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. Therefore, an Accord of peace and friendship with Sri Lanka, to bring the Island back into India's sphere of influence and to put an end to the penetration of the international forces of subversion became an imperative need for India. The precise objective of the Accord is to secure these strategic interests of India.

First of all, the Accord binds Sri Lanka to India's strategic sphere of influence in the region.

Secondly, it puts an end to the employment of foreign mercenary forces in Sri Lanka.

Thirdly, it stops the activities of Israeli Intelligence agencies in Sri Lanka.

Fourthly, it prevents foreign broadcasting organisations in Sri Lanka to use their facilities for military and intelligence purposes.

Fifthly, it allows India to undertake the task of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank farm.

Sixthly, it prevents the use of Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka for military purposes by any country 'in a manner prejudicial to India's interest'.

Thus, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord secures India's geo-political interests and strategic objectives. The LTTE is sincerely pleased that the Government of India was able to put an end, through the Agreement, to the dangerous activities of the international subversive elements who operated in Sri Lanka as agents of imperialism. **As a revolutionary liberation movement committed to anti-imperialist policy we recognise India's security concerns in the region and support her cardinal foreign policy of making the Indian ocean as a zone of peace free from interference of extra-territorial powers.** In this context, we wish to point out that it was the LTTE fighters who put up a heroic and relentless fight against foreign mercenaries. It was the LTTE fighters who shed their blood to contain these evil forces. Our liberation movement is not opposed to India's interests. **We have no objection whatsoever to India's strategic aspirations to establish her status as the regional super-power in South Asia.** We always functioned and will continue to function as a friendly force to India. We would have extended our unconditional support to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord if the Agreement is only confined to Indo-Sri Lanka relations aimed to secure India's geo-political interests. But the Accord interferes in the Tamil issue, betrays the Tamil interests. It is here the contradiction of interests between the LTTE and India emerges.

The Accord posed a serious threat to the role and function of our liberation organisation, to our armed revolutionary struggle, to our political objectives. The military structure of our organisation, which was built by blood and tears, by the supreme sacrifices of our heroic fighters, by relentless toil of our cadres for the last 15 years was ordered to be dismantled within 72 hours. The Accord stipulated such stringent conditions on our organisation without providing an acceptable solution

to the Tamil issue, without providing adequate guarantees for the protection of our people.

The Accord proscribes the armed resistance movement and the political struggle for self-determination. The armed struggle is depicted as terrorist activity, while the demand for the right to self-determination is characterised as 'separatism or secessionism'. These activities are considered 'prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka' and would not be permitted to be practised on the Indian soil. Those who practice such activity in India would face deportation. The Indian territorial waters will also be closed for 'militant activities'. The Accord also threatens Indian military action against any Tamil organisation that rejects the Agreement and refuses to lay down arms.

Thus, the Government of India, suddenly and mercilessly, closed her doors for the Tamil freedom movement and imposed upon the Tamils, at the point of a gun, a framework of proposals that fell very short of their legitimate demands. Tamil interests are the price paid by India to Jayawardane's regime to secure its consent for the Accord. By subordinating the island to India's regional supremacy, Jayawardane has secured from India what his imperialist masters couldn't provide, that is the total suppression of the Tamil liberation movement and the permanent subjugation of the Tamils under Sinhala hegemony.

WHY WE DECIDE TO CO-OPERATE

The Accord posed an unprecedented challenge to our liberation movement; it signalled a monumental turn of events. As our leader Mr. Pirabakaran has put it aptly at the Suthumalai convention, "Today there has taken place a tremendous turn in our liberation struggle. This turn has come suddenly, in a way that has stunned us, and as if it were beyond our power to influence events".

We had no alternative other than to co-operative with India on the implementation of the Accord or to face the full might of the Indian armed forces.

We were taken unawares by the haste and hurry in which the diplomatic carpet was pulled under our feet. The Accord was framed secretly between the Government of India and Sri Lanka without our knowledge. Our leader Mr. Pirabakaran was rushed to Delhi in a hurry on the pretext of a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister. There, in Delhi, the Agreement was read out to him. He was told that the Accord has been finalised and there cannot be any alterations.

Pirabakaran refused to accept the Accord expressing serious reservations on the Provincial Council proposals. He was firm in his conviction that the proposals envisaged in the Accord would not pave the way for the permanent settlement of the Tamil question. At this stage, the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi met the LTTE leader and had a lengthy dialogue. The Indian leader gave a patient hearing to Mr. Pirabakaran's concerns and misgivings, particularly to his anxiety about the security of his cadres and his people. The Indian Prime Minister assured the following:

- * The problems and limitations of the proposed framework would be resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamil people.
- * The LTTE would be given its due recognition. An interim Government would be formed with LTTE playing a dominant role.
- * A Tamil regional police service would be set up under the Interim Government.
- * The Government of India would pay compensation for the LTTE for the maintenance of the organisation following the

decision of the LTTE to withdraw the system of taxation in Jaffna. This relief fund would be paid on monthly basis until the formation of the Interim Government.

- * The Government of India also promised funds to the Interim Government for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tamil refugees.

- * The Indian Peace Keeping Force would take over the responsibility of protecting the Tamils in the North and East until an adequate Tamil security system is created.

Following the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister we decided to lay down our arms. We also pledged to co-operate with the Government of India on the implementation of the Accord if the Tamil interests are promoted and the Tamil people are protected.

As pledged, we handed over a substantial portion of our arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force. We parted with our arms as a gesture of goodwill towards India and as a symbolic act signalling our willingness to co-operate with India in her efforts to implement the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. We also pledged that the rest of the arms would be handed over once the Interim Government is established. While we handed over our arms, we also handed over to the Government of India the responsibility of the protection of our cadres and people. Our leader Mr. Pirabakaran declared at the Suthumalai Convention: "What ardent, immeasurable sacrifices we have made for the safety and protection of our people. There is no need to elaborate on this theme. You, our beloved people, are fully aware of the character of our passion for our cause and our feelings of sacrifice. The weapons that we took up and deployed for your safety and protection, for your liberation, for your emancipation, we now entrust to the Indian Government.

In taking from us our weapons - the only means of protection for Eelam Tamils - the Indian Government takes over from us the great responsibility of protecting our people. The handing over of arms only signifies the transfer of this responsibility...

The soldiers of the Indian army are taking up the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting us against our enemy. I wish to emphasise very firmly here that by the virtue of our handing over our weapons to it, the Indian Government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils."

On his part, Pirabakaran fulfilled his pledges. He showed his goodwill towards India. In the hope that the lives of his people would be protected he laid down his arms, co-operating with the implementation of the Accord.

We need not elaborate or discuss in detail how the Government of India carried out its responsibility of protecting our people. It has now become the knowledge of the entire world how the Indian army unleashed terror in Tamil Eelam, turning our homeland into a killing field, how the promises and pledges given to us were betrayed, how the terms of the Accord were violated.

The LTTE did not violate any provisions of the Accord. But it was the signatories of the Accord who chose to violate the Agreement. Let us document here, very briefly, the breaches of the Accord made by both Sri Lanka and India.

VIOLATIONS OF THE ACCORD

Sri Lanka Government violated the Accord by:

- * Failing to release the Tamil political prisoners.
- * Failing to withdraw the Emergency rule in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

- * Failing to disband the Sinhalese homeguards in the Eastern Province.
- * Failing to confine the armed forces in the barracks.
- * Intensifying Sinhala colonisation in Tamil areas.
- * Opening up Sinhala police stations in the North and East.
- * Arresting LTTE regional commanders and cadres and attempted to take them to Colombo for interrogation and execution.
- * Refusing to merge the North and East.
- * Rejecting talks on residual matters concerning Provincial Councils.

The Indian Government withdrew its commitments and pledges by:

- * Failing to set up an Interim Government for the North and East.
- * Failing to set up a Tamil police system.
- * Arming the other Tamil groups while disarming the LTTE.
- * Allowing these armed groups to hunt down LTTE cadres.
- * Allowing our political wing leader Thileepan to die from fasting.
- * Allowing the LTTE regional commanders and cadres who were in the custody of the IPKF to die.
- * Declaring an unjust war against the LTTE.
- * Being responsible for the senseless slaughter of thousands of innocent Tamil civilians.

These are the remarkable achievements made by both Sri Lanka and India since the signing of the Accord to promote the well-being of the Tamil people and to establish peace and normalcy in Tamil areas. From this impressive list of achievements it is easy to assume who is responsible for the present chaotic state of affairs in Tamil Eelam, whether it is the LTTE or the signatories of the Accord.

In theory and practice, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord is a monumental failure. It is a disastrous failure in so far as its acclaimed objective of resolving the Tamil problem is concerned. The Accord has miserably failed to bring about peace and normalcy in Tamil areas, nor has it promoted "the safety, well-being and prosperity" of our people. Instead, it brought war, violence, death and destruction; it brought a holocaust to the Tamil nation; it brought a colossal human tragedy.

The Accord is a failure because the parties who entered into this diplomatic contract paid no attention to the pathetic plight of the Eelam Tamils, to their profound suffering and anguish, to their complex problems and grievances.

The Government of India is only concerned with securing and consolidating her national interests and geo-political gains. Whereas, Sri Lanka is only concerned with the liquidation of the Tiger movement and the destruction of the Tamil freedom struggle. The people of Tamil Eelam have become the unfortunate victims of these different designs of a regional super-power and a racist state.

It is our liberation movement which is sincerely concerned with the interests of our people. It is because of our earnest and genuine commitment to the cause of our people we stand in conflictual relations with India and Sri Lanka. It is this conflict of interests that has exploded into a war.

This war undertaken by India with its full military might against our liberation movement has been continuing for the last seven months causing unprecedented suffering to our people. The reason advanced by India to legitimise her military misadventure is that the Tamil Tiger are opposed to the Accord and that they have to be disarmed as a necessary condition for the implementation of the Accord. This argument is untenable and far from truth. **The real objective of this massive military**

exercise is to terrorise the Tamil population and to impose upon them against their will - a defective political arrangement.

Why India, the ardent advocate of global peace, of non-violence and non-alignment, the master of the world's largest democratic system, a crusader against oppression who intervened in Bangladesh, a champion for the world liberation movements and struggles for self-determination, chose to adopt an unpopular method of military repression and domination against a nation of people who are its ally and friend, who are culturally and ethnically bound to its blood and history, is the most perplexing question that torments our people. We do not think that the interests and aspirations of the Eelam Tamils, which are articulated in the political goals of the LTTE, are necessarily incompatible with India's national and strategic interests. What we demand is freedom from fear, from oppression, from genocidal annihilation; what we demand is justice, peace and security; what we demand is the recognition of our inalienable rights, our birth rights, our fundamental human rights; what we demand is liberty to shape our own destiny, to shape our own social, economic and political life; what we demand is a rational political system that could ensure our rights and liberties so that we could live like civilized humans with freedom, honour and dignity.

These demands are fair, reasonable, and legitimate and are not incompatible with democratic political thought and practice. If there had been an earnest and sincere effort on the part of India to resolve the national conflict, a political model could have been evolved to accommodate the aspirations of the oppressed Tamil masses without prejudicial to India's geo-political interests. But the policy makers in Delhi chose to ignore completely the concerns of the Tamil people.

We hope that the Government of India will give up its militaristic approach and opt for a path of peace and negotiations. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord can only succeed if Tamil aspirations are recognised and the deep, complex, historical problems of the Tamils are resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamil people.

INDIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

Morally and spiritually we are opposed to this war. We do not want a conflictual relationship with India. This war is imposed on us against our will. We are only fighting to defend ourselves, to protect ourselves, against a formidable military machine far superior in manpower and fire power which is determined to wipe us out. While fighting a defensive war against severe odds, against extreme conditions, we are trying to impress upon the Government of India that the will and determination of a people cannot be subjugated or crushed by military means however formidable it may be.

Since the beginning of this war, we have been pleading with the Government of India to call off the military offensive operations and to resume negotiations to settle the issues by peaceful dialogue. We have indicated our willingness to lay down our arms and co-operate with the implementation of the Accord. At the same time we continue to insist that the interests of our people should be secured and their lives protected. In several communications to the Indian Prime Minister our leader Mr. Pirabakaran has expressed his desire for peace and reconciliation. But to our great disappointment India's response was negative. There is no indication whatsoever on the part of India to bring about peace and normality in Tamil areas. It is easy to discern from the belligerent and the intransigent attitude shown to us and from the malicious propaganda carried out to malign our movement that the Government of India

aims none other than the total destruction of the LTTE. In other words, the strategic objective of this war is the 'total immobilisation' - to use the current Indian military jargon - of the armed resistance movement of the Eelam Tamils, and to put an end to the struggle for national emancipation. Therefore, there is no doubt that this war is conducted, in such a callous and ruthless manner, for such a prolonged period of time, against all pleadings from the Tamil people, to serve the chauvinistic designs of the Sinhala regime. There is no doubt that India is playing into the evil hands of Jayawardane. This is the most dangerous aspect of the present Indian policy. By destroying the Tamil resistance movement which has been the protective shield of the Tamils against Sinhala state terrorism and the only bargaining card for political negotiations, India is committing a grave political blunder and also doing a grave injustice to the Tamils. The Indian Government will realise the folly of the present policy when it finds that Jayawardane regime going back on its commitments of the Accord once the Indian army succeeds in its strategy of totally immobilising the Tiger movement. It is unfortunate that the Government of India has embarked on this disastrous policy at this critical juncture when Jayawardane has already violated the terms of the Accord, when a political process in Tamil Eelam is not instituted, when Tamil concerns particularly their security is not guaranteed, when the immense problems of the uprooted Tamil refugees are not resolved.

Another aspect of the Indian policy that causes serious concern among the Tamil people is the plan to hold Provincial Council elections in Tamil areas under the umbrella of Indian military occupation and domination. This plan to induct an electoral process under the conditions of war and violence without creating conditions of peace and normalcy constitutes a serious breach of democratic practice. The people of Tamil Eelam want peace; they want the restoration of normal life; they want the creation of an appropriate atmosphere where free, unhindered expression of political will is possible. The prevailing conditions in Tamil Eelam is not conducive for the induction of a political process. The IPKF which has been behaving as an army of occupation has destroyed the free press, banned public meetings and assembly, and imposed rigid control over political expression. Our people are denied all democratic rights and freedoms which are fundamental to free political expression, therefore, this Indian plan to hold elections under these circumstances is nothing but a travesty of democracy, a mockery of democracy.

In view of these dangerous policies and plans envisioned by India in collision with Sri Lanka, it is of utmost importance that the international Tamil community should campaign effectively to bring maximum pressure on the Government of India to abandon its militaristic, authoritarian approach and to seek peace and reconciliation with the LTTE.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

We do not want a protracted war with India. We want to put an end to this unfortunate conflict as early as possible. As our leader Mr. Pirabakaran has declared at Suthumalai, our organisation is prepared to co-operate with India in her effort to implement the Accord. As he said, we have no alternative but to offer India an opportunity to find a political settlement to the Tamil question. We are also prepared to face a democratically constituted electoral process to convince the world that the wider sections of the popular masses are behind our liberation movement.

It is the consensus opinion of all Tamil political organisations

that the Provincial Council framework in the present form is defective, has serious limitations and falls very short of Tamil aspirations. Therefore this framework cannot be the basis for a permanent political settlement of the Tamil issue.

We are of the opinion that the Government of India should re-negotiate with Sri Lanka with the active participation of the Tamil representatives to work out an adequate framework with satisfactory devolution of power for a regional Tamil State. The LTTE holds the view that the principles enunciated at Thimpu demanding the recognition of Tamil people as a nation, the recognition of Tamil homeland, the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Tamils. The recognition of the right to citizenship of the plantation Tamils - should be the basis for a permanent solution to the Tamil national question.

The urgent and immediate task facing India today is to restore peace and normalcy in Tamil Eelam. The establishment of a congenial atmosphere of peace in the war torn territory is a necessary condition to initiate a political process. To create the conditions for peace, the Government of India should call for a ceasefire and withdraw its offensive military operations against the LTTE. Laying down of arms by the LTTE is not the stumbling block for a reconciliation. What the LTTE demands from India for the handing over of arms is appropriate guarantees and safeguards for the protection of life of the Tamil people.

It is the considered opinion of the LTTE and of the Eelam Tamils that an Interim Government should be established until appropriate conditions are created for the induction of an electoral process. This would facilitate, apart from other matters, the rehabilitation and resettlement of the Tamil refugees which is of utmost importance to alleviate the suffering of our people and to create conditions of normalcy in Tamil areas.

The future direction of our struggle is contingent upon actions and responses of the Government of India to our fair and reasonable suggestions which are predicated upon the interests of our people. But we can assure you that the LTTE will continue the struggle in the forms and modes that are suited to concrete conditions and historical necessities to advance the cause of our people.

At this critical historical juncture, when the Eelam freedom struggle is facing a grave crisis, it is the duty and responsibility of all patriotic Tamils living abroad to unite into a single force, into a single voice to articulate and campaign for their beleaguered brethren in their homeland. We suggest that an international forum of expatriate Tamils should be formed to organise an international lobby to:

1. Bring to book the human rights violations and other atrocities committed by the Indian troops in Tamil Eelam.
2. Expose the undemocratic, totalitarian methods adopted by the Indian government to terrorise the Tamil civilian masses and to impose upon them, against their will a political formula that is totally unacceptable to them.
3. Campaign for immediate cessation of hostilities and negotiations with the LTTE without pre-conditions.
4. Campaign for the establishment of an Interim Government as pledged by India.
5. Campaign for a political settlement based on the cardinal principles enunciated at Thimpu **giving primacy to our struggle for national self-determination.**

We hope that the international Tamil community will provide unrelenting support to the LTTE in its determined struggle to advance the cause of the Eelam Tamils. The LTTE is fighting for a right cause, a legitimate cause, a noble cause and righteousness and truth will eventually be victorious.

C R P

IPKF Offensive in Mullaitivu

On 23.05.88 three IPKF men were killed and 15 injured in a landmine blast at Alampil near Mullaitivu. Following this incident 6000 IPKF men converged on Alampil and surrounding villages of Semmalai, Nedunkerni, Kumulamunai, Mulliyavallai and Aandankulam. Some residents started fleeing; others were prevented from fleeing. Area was bombarded and intensive fighting continued for the next three days. The IPKF claimed to have killed 36 LTTE cadres and injured 45. Unconfirmed reports say civilians suffered hardships and some of them died.

In Brief

Ponnudurai News agent for "The Hindu" an influential Indian daily, air lifted everyday to Jaffna was shot dead. LTTE claimed responsibility and stated Ponnudurai was also agent for RAW, Indian Intelligence Agency.

Karunaiswaran (25) a Tamil youth walking along Manning Place Wellawatte, Colombo was shot dead on 25.5.88 Assilant escaped.

Jaffna Commercial Banks and Municipal Offices to work only on three days of the week. Jaffna Government Secretariat to work only during last week of every month- LTTE Writ being faithfully carried out.

Parents of 194 youths held by IPKF at Vavuniya protest to IPKF and District Citizens Committee. All youths being held without being charged for over 6 months. President of District Citizens Committee Dr. Pararajasingham threatened to resign if no response by 15.6.88.

Anura Bandaranaike, Leader of the Opposition and leader of S.L.F.P. spoke at a Seminar in Gampola held on 21.5.88. he said that when SLFP came to power it would abrogate Indo-Lanka Pact and with help of Armed Forces raise the lion flag in the North.

Nadarajah Palaninathan Grama Sevaka (Village Headman) of Pokarippu in Vadamaradchi East was arrested along with his father and brother by IPKF on 16.5.88. Father and brother were released on 17.5.88. When inquiries were made about Palaninathan on 19.5.88, IPKF stated Palaninathan released on 17.5.88. No trace of Palaninathan.

On 18.5.88 IPKF men entered the Jaffna General Hospital premises. Hooded men who accompanied the IPKF pointed out youths who were arrested.

On 18.5.88 on Puliyanakulam-Nedunkerni road IPKF officer and soldier were killed in Landmine blast.

Lorry from Jaffna carrying Cement was stopped at Madawachchi on night of 19.5.88. Lorry burnt. Two skeletons found in burnt portion of the cab of the lorry.

Law Courts in Trincomalee have ceased functioning from 19.5.88.

Mankanai near Valvettiturai was searched by IPKF from 8.45 p.m. on 20.5.88 till 5.00 a.m. next day. Two youths in a house committed suicide to avoid arrest. Owner of house, Mrs. Kandasamy was arrested by IPKF. During the course of the same search, Mrs. Selvarani Sambasivam was injured by gunfire. Husband who tried to remove her to Hospital was assaulted by IPKF. Both husband and wife removed to IPKF Camp at Udupiddy. Next morning, husband was released in presence of the Assistant Government Agent of the area and the body of Mrs. Sambasivam handed over to husband.

A F F I D A V I T

Mr. PONNUTHURAI YOGENDRAN (35)

Secretary to the Valvettiturai Fishing Community Development Organization.

On the 9th day of May, 1989 at about 6.20 a.m., while I was waiting at the gate of my house at the above address, one of the IPKF Personnel who was standing at the Main Street in front of the Market Building signalled me to come to him. When I went near to him, he ordered me to proceed to the Junction at Valvettiturai.

I carried out his order and proceeded to the said Junction. There, I noticed that the drivers and conductors of the Mini-Buses were seated on the middle of the road at the Junction.

At that time, I saw that one of the Conductor had been badly assaulted by one of the soldiers. The Commander of the "Para Troops" of the IPKF was also present there.

When the abovesaid Commander saw me, he asked me whether I am a member of the Citizen Committee. Following that he asked me that the CTB Bus at Udupiddy had been burnt down at the request made by us. When I denied to this effect, the said Commander started assaulting at my cheeks and chest.

While assaulting, he asked me to resign immediately from the Citizen Committee and that advertisement should be published in Newspapers. He threatened me that, if I do not comply to this he will shoot and kill me.

Following this, three IPKF soldiers surrounded me and attacked heavily. Due to this, blood started oozing from my ears. Then I had been asked to sit on the road at the Junction.

After the Forces leaving the Junction, I was admitted to the Govt. Hospital, at Valvettiturai.

In the evening of the same day, the members of the Citizen Committee went to the IPKF Camp at Udupiddy and complained about this incident to the Officer-in-Charge COLONEL BEDI.

On the following day, I came to know that the "Para Troops" went to the abovesaid Hospital and inquired about me, as I feared. The following morning the Colonel Bedi of Udupiddy Camp and Major Sutharsan, Officer-in-Charge of Valvettiturai Camp visited me and tendered apologies to the incident took place.

On honour, I wish to state that the particulars furnished above by me are true and correct.



SELLAN PUTHIAL (49) Puttur East, Puttur.

The deceased person Sellan Rasvarajeewa aged 25 years was my son.

He was a farmer.

On 10.5.88 my son left home saying that he is going to Nelliday to purchase onions.

He did not return home afterwards.

When my eldest son went in search of him on the following day he came to know that my sons lifeless body was lying at the Point Pedro Base Hospital with gunshot wounds.

We came to know that he was shot and killed by the army.

I have a son named Mathirasuvaran aged 28 years.



VISWASAM RASIAH (53) Urumpirai East, Urumpirai.

The deceased person Rasiah Udhayapalan aged 20 years was my son.

He was a casual labourer

On 12.5.1988 at about 3.00 p.m. my son left in his bicycle saying that he is going to Jaffna Town.

At about 4.30 p.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army about half mile distance from our house.

His body was buried at the Roman Catholic burial grounds North Urumpirai.

I have five children all of them being students.

My son was a hardworking labourer and used to supplement my income which is not sufficient for maintaining our large family.

சின்னவன் பாலசிங்கம்

Mr. SINNAVAN BALASINGAM

Punnalaikattuvan.

On 17.5.1989 at about 2 p.m., about fifteen Indian Peace Keeping Force jawans came in trucks and on foot and as they turned into Punnalaikkadduvan-Neerveli Road started firing at all directions and proceeded towards Neerveli. They entered all the houses and started beating people irrespective of sex or age with rifle butts, rods etc. At the place called Mathalodai, they walked into houses and fired indiscriminately. In the firing Muththar Sinnakuddy (40) and Ratnam Lalitha (18) died on the spot and above ten persons were wounded, some of them seriously.

In this area iron rods and axes were used to assault people. Some of these persons had to be hospitalised for long periods.

ILAYAVI SAMBASIVAM, (33) Driver by occupation.

Sinnakathavarayar Kovil Lane, Manankanai, Valvettiturai.

On 20th May 1988 at about 8.30 p.m. I returned home with my whole family, after attending the special (Friday) Pooja at the Sinnakathavarayar Temple, situated within about 50 yards from my said residence.

After about 5 minutes, I noticed some IPKF personnel passing along our lane and our gate. A short-while later I heard few reports of gun followed by bomb blasts.

Out of shock, fear and excitement, my children who are all of tender age started screaming. The people in my neighbourhood too got panicky, raised cries and started running hither and thither.

Although I did not know the cause for the pandemonium, I decided to get out of that area for safety, asked my wife and children to follow me and rushed towards our entrance door, carrying our youngest child - the baby girl. Whilst we were getting out of the house in an excited disposition, it was indeed a most pathetic sight, my wife was shot at and fell down pathetically in pangs. As result, the disc of her right knee got totally smashed.

I had no other alternative, but carry my wife on my shoulder leaving all my young children in the lurch and rushed to the Government Hospital (Peripheral unit) which is about 200 metres from the scene of incident.

We were again confronted by the IPKF personnel. We were assaulted mercilessly to such an extent, that we were forced to go into the house of Late Mr. Appusundaram located close by.

We were again manhandled by another batch of army personnel who gained entrance to the above-mentioned house about one hour later by breaking open the cadjan fence. Our begging and pleadings fell on deaf ears. Later, both my hands were tied behind my back. They assaulted me with hands, legs and even clubs I received injuries near my right eye, lips, legs and hands.

Subsequently we were shoved into a truck and taken to the IPKF camp at Udupiddy. Until we reached Udupiddy I was continued to be tortured.

Soon after, I was locked up in a room from where I was shedding tears recalling the memory of my children left alone and considering the plight of my sinking wife.

On the day following (21st May 1988), at dawn, I was taken out of the room to be shown my wife as a corpse. It was only at this stage my hands were untied.

Later on, I was brought to Valvettiturai Nediakadu Pillayar Temple outside courtyard along with my wife's corpse. I was then in a most inhuman manner asked to unload the corpse without anybody's assistance.

Then some of the soliders, went to the house of Mr. V. Velumyylum, the Assistant Government Agent, Point Pedro and got him down to the spot. He was asked to take charge of the corpse. He consented to do so, but requested the IPKF to have the body taken in one of their vehicles and delivered at my door step. Unfortunately, there was no response.

I took my wife's corpse on my shoulders and walked towards my house. Due to the continued presence of the IPKF, my villagers were not able to come to my assistance until I covered about 200 yards.

Later I got to know that my eldest son Srikanth (aged 13 yr) too received gun-shot injuries in the course of the same incident and was warded in the Government Hospital, Valvettiturai and later was transferred to the Base Hospital, Point Pedro. As a bullet was embedded in his knee he has to undergo a surgical operation there. He is still warded there.

Two other boys from our neighbourhood by the names of Selvarajah (12 years) and Chandrakumar (8 years) also sustained injuries in the above-said incident.

சிவயோகராஜ சரசுவதி

SIVAYOGARAJAH SARASWATHY (38) years, widow, Kachchai South, Kodikamam.

The deceased person Sivayogarah Gunarajah aged 17 years was my son.

He was working as a labourer.

On 27.5.88 at about 5.00 a.m. my son left home.

At about 9.00 a.m. I learned that my son was shot and killed by the army during a cordon and search operation at Appachi mavadi, Chavakachcheri.

His body was recovered and cremated at Kachchai Cemetery.

I have five children.

சுப்ரமணியம் தியாகமூர்த்தி

SUBRAMANIAM THIAGAMOORTHY, (45) Navalarmadam, Karaveddy.

The deceased person Thiagamoorthy Krishnamoorthy, aged 17 years was my son.

He was a student at Vigneswara College Karaveddy.

On 28.5.88 during the Operation Liberation our area was subjected to intensive military offensive.

At about 2.30 p.m. some soldiers came to our residence and arrested me along with my son and my two nephews.

After taking us, little distance from our home, they shot and killed my son and two nephews in front of my eyes.

After shooting them dead, they put their bodies in an aircraft bunker and cremated them.

I was released on the following day.

S. J. J.



IPKF OPERATION IN VADAMARADCHI

The I.P.K.F. imposed a curfew in Vadamadaradchi East comprising, Nagarkovil, Thaalaiyadi, Vettillaikeeni and Aliyawallai, on the night of 30.4.88.

The curfew was continuous until lifted on 13.5.88. During the first few days, the IPKF discovered a cache of arms and a petrol bowser full with petrol buried underground. This led to IPKF men assaulting residents and torturing youth for information about militants. Shops and 20 schools in the area remained closed. The residents were on the point of starvation. People of neighbouring Valvettiturai township outraged by the ill-treatment of people in Vadamadaradchi East took out a procession demonstrating against IPKF harassment in Vadamadaradchi East.

The curfew was finally lifted to enable students to sit the Year-6 scholarship examination to be held on 14.5.88. Only a few students presented themselves for the examination. Whereas the people of Vadamadaradchi suffered untold miseries at the hands of the Lanka Army during 'Operation Liberation' in May, 1987, this year in May the IPKF has taken over the function of tormenting the people of Vadamadaradchi.

1

COLOMBO, May 1.

At least 26 persons, including women and children, were killed and 32 wounded when a bus was blown up in a landmine explosion at Sitaru in the eastern Trincomalee district of Sri Lanka today.

Official sources said the landmine was planted by members of the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The bus belonged to the Government-owned Sri Lanka Transport Board.

Among the dead were five women and two children. Seven bodies were mutilated beyond recognition.

One LTTE militant was shot dead and three were wounded yesterday in exchanges of fire between the IPKF and the militants in the Northern Vavuniya sector, Lankapuvath said today.

Four Indian soldiers suffered minor injuries in one of these encounters, the Sri Lankan military sources said. A cyanide capsule was recovered from the body of a killed militant.

The news agency said 30 LTTE militants, including a hardcore activist named Puttu, were caught yesterday from the northern district by the IPKF.

Quoting reports from Jaffna, Lankapuvath said five improvised explosive devices were recovered by the IPKF during a search operation at Karaveddi. — PTI, Reuter

2

COLOMBO, May 2.

A big time-bomb explosion in a building in the heart of Sri Lanka's eastern Batticaloa town today left about 15 people, including several women, seriously injured, reports reaching here said.

The two-storeyed building, which housed some department stores and textile shops, collapsed completely under the impact of the deafening explosion which took place at 0920 hours. Terrified people ran helter-skelter as the explosion raised strong vibrations in the vicinity.

According to authoritative reports from Batticaloa, the building, about 200 metres from the police station, was located next to a three-storeyed building where the IPKF had a sentry post.

4 killed in violence: Delayed reports received here said one Indian soldier and three suspected Tamil militants were killed in a number of incidents in the North and East Provinces on Saturday.

The official news agency, Lankapuvath, quoting the reports said one IPKF soldier was killed and another injured when a patrol walked into a boobytrap laid by the LTTE at Bamankulam in eastern Trincomalee. It said one LTTE element swallowed cyanide and died at a place near Mannar in the northern Vavuniya sector during an exchange with the IPKF. Three other militants were captured after the encounter.

The IPKF also shot dead two suspected LTTE militants as they tried to escape on cycles when challenged.

3

COLOMBO, May 3.

Nine men of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed in separate encounters with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka's North and East yesterday, a spokesperson for the Indian High Commission said today.

Two militants each were killed in Jaffna and Pankulam, in Trincomalee district, while five were killed in the northern Vavuniya sector.

She said the IPKF also captured four militants at Palaly in the Jaffna peninsula and recovered arms and ammunition from militant hideouts in Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Batticaloa.

Ten militants captured: The national news agency Lankapuvath reported that the IPKF captured ten militants from Akkaraipattu, Palai, Atchuvelli, and Championpattu. — UNI

4

While passing by a street at Akkaraipattu, Amparai a LTTE cadre and 2 supporters came across the IPKF patrol. The three star boys in the patrol identified them. In the encounter three IPKF jawans lost their lives to LTTE grenade. Being in a no-win situation the LTTE fighter consumed cyanide. The IPKF shot dead the supporters.

In Vantharumoolai of Batticaloa Dt. a LTTE cadre Vikki consumed cyanide in a round up IPKF.

6

COLOMBO, May 6

One Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) soldier and three LTTE militants were killed, a number of rebels surrendered and a regional telecommunication engineer, along with several other militants, were apprehended during the past 24 hours in Sri Lanka's North and Eastern provinces, official sources said.

The regional engineer, described as Mr. Ambiraj, was arrested yesterday at Kopai South in Jaffna peninsula, suspected of being a "terrorist," the national news agency 'Lanka Puvath' reported today.

The IPKF jawan was killed in an improvised explosive device at Urumpirai in Jaffna yesterday.

Of the three Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam militants killed in encounters with the IPKF, one was 'Chokan,' area leader of Akkaraipattu in Eastern Batticaloa district.

Another militant, whose name was given as 'Michael' and known to be a communication expert of the LTTE, committed suicide by swallowing a cyanide capsule in a confrontation with the IPKF at Akkaraipattu. In the same engagement, one more rebel Ramanathan was killed.

While an LTTE militant named Papa was apprehended in eastern Batticaloa town, three more, including one Sinnavan, of the rebel group's political wing, and two other cadres, Vimal and Vijayaruna surrendered to the IPKF in Batticaloa district yesterday.

IPKF toll 400: With the yesterday's death, 400 IPKF personnel have been killed — PTI.

7

COLOMBO, May 7. (UNI) — One man was killed when militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation clashed in Kokkuvil (Jaffna peninsula) on Friday, security sources said today.

The clash took place as a number of towns in the north and east observed a hartal in response to a call by the TELO to mark the second death anniversary of group leader Sri Sabaratnam and 300 members in clashes with the LTTE.

The sources said one Indian Peace Keeping Force jawan was killed and another wounded in a Claymore-mine explosion, set off by the LTTE, at Elaveli in the peninsula.

In another incident, an IPKF patrol was fired upon by unidentified men in the northern Vavuniya sector. The IPKF returned fire and arrested three home guards armed with shotguns.

The sources said the LTTE shot dead two women, at Mullaitivu on suspicion that they were IPKF informants.

8

LTTE man killed: One member of the LTTE was killed when the IPKF returned fire in Amparai district this morning, Indian sources said. The incident occurred during a search operation at Kovilpuraititu village near Akkaraipattu. The IPKF recovered one AK-47 rifle and a walkie-talkie from the dead man.

The sources said four suspected LTTE men were captured and two carbines of nine mm calibre and 15 rounds of ammunition recovered during search operations at Vakaneri village in the Batticaloa sector yesterday.

9

IPKF jawan killed: Sources said one IPKF jawan was killed by a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sniper in the Northern Vavuniya sector, while another was wounded in Trincomalee, also in the same sector.

Sources said two LTTE men were killed by the IPKF during an operation in the Batticaloa sector, while LTTE gunmen killed two of their former colleagues on suspicion of being IPKF informers in Trincomalee district.

TELO's charge: A spokesman for the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) alleged that six of their members were shot dead by the LTTE in Jaffna.

26 militants held: Twenty-six militants were apprehended yesterday in the North and Eastern provinces in various incidents, according to official sources here.

COLOMBO, May 9.

At least 14 persons, including two provincial council candidates and one Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan, have been killed in Sri Lanka, security sources said today.

The sources said two candidates of the United Socialist Alliance (USA), which had finished a close second to the ruling United National Party (UNP) in the just-concluded elections to four provincial councils, were killed in the southern and western provinces yesterday by suspected members of the outlawed Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). The two provinces are scheduled to go to the poll on June 2.

Mr. Amara Wellapili, the USA candidate for the Southern provincial council election and his brother-in-law, Mr. Pathinayake were shot dead by suspected JVP elements. Mr. Wellapili, who was to contest from the Hambantota district in the Southern province and Mr. Pathinayake were gunned down around 4 p.m. yesterday while returning after electioneering. His security guard was critically wounded and taken to hospital.

Two gunmen riding a motorcycle fired at Mr. A. Amaradasa of the USA at Minuwangoda, 32 km north of Colombo on Sunday, a military spokesman said.

Nithi, a 2nd Lt. from LTTE was shot by an IPKF sniper on his way to Jaffna.

10

Two LTTE fighters Venkatesh and Ravas encountered the IPKF patrol on their way to Valvettithurai from Point Pedro. As they ran out of ammunition in the combat Venkatesh shot himself. Ravas threw his lost grenade before consuming cyanide.

12

COLOMBO, May 12.

Six Indian Peace Keeping soldiers were killed in a landmine explosion at Velverikulam on the Trincomalee-Anuradhapura road in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province today, according to official sources. The landmine was believed to be laid by the Liberation tigers guerillas.

The IPKF launched a massive "Cordon and search operation" to trace the "terrorists" responsible for the explosion, the national agency 'Lankapuvath' said. — PTI

13

The IPKF entered Vetrilaikeni and Kattaikadu, Jaffna areas for search and destroy operation. A LTTE cadre Surendran faced them and lost his life. The IPKF then stormed the village and burnt down 3 two storeyed buildings.

A LTTE fighter Tabin was killed by three star men in Kayankeni, Batticaloa.

In Thangavelayuthapuram, Panichageni areas, IPKF launched shell attack casualties not known.



14

COLOMBO, May 14.

Nine persons, including two Indian Peace-Keeping Force soldiers, have died in Sri Lanka, officials said here today.

The two soldiers were killed and another wounded in a landmine blast in Eastern Trincomalee district on Friday, a military spokesman said. The mine was believed to have been laid by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Indian troops shot dead an LTTE gunman after militants ambushed an Indian patrol in Eastern Batticaloa yesterday, the spokesman said. The body of a Tamil civilian, abducted by unknown men, was found with gunshot wounds in Batticaloa. — AFP

16

COLOMBO, May 16.

At least four militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed, three Indian soldiers wounded and 12 other Tamil militants apprehended in a number of encounters between the Indian Peace-Keeping Force and the LTTE in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces on Sunday.

The Indian soldiers were wounded when the militants ambushed an IPKF patrol at Jaffna. The IPKF countered the attack and left one LTTE element dead. A hand grenade, one AK-47 rifle and a cyanide capsule were recovered from the body of the militant, according to Sri Lankan military sources.

In three other encounters in the eastern Batticaloa and northern Jaffna sectors, the IPKF killed three more LTTE militants yesterday. The names of two of the killed guerrillas were given as "Chavi" and "Attoman", known to be hardcore elements.

The 12 "terrorists" were apprehended during the course of intensive cordon and search operations by the IPKF in the north and east, the news agency Lankapuvath said.

Bharathan and Alex the LTTE cadres, took cyanide in the IPKF roundup at Santhiveli. The Indian soldiers carried the dead bodies to their homes and demanded Rs. 400/- for each one and got away with it.

18

COLOMBO, May 18. (AFP) —

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force has sealed the office of a Tamil rebel group in Northern Sri Lanka and arrested 25 of its members, a rebel spokesman said today.

The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) office in Mannar town was sealed and the members arrested on Tuesday, according to a TELO spokesman. He gave no reason for the action.

The Indian High Commission here could not confirm the report.

Meanwhile, sources said two members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules

during search operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) at Karativu and Kattankudy in eastern Sri Lanka yesterday.

The sources said the IPKF also captured 28 militants in the north and east including a member of the Muslim fundamentalist group "jihad" at Kattankudy. They said a 12 bore shot-gun and nine cartridges were found in the possession of the man, identified as Salim Anver.

A LTTE guerrilla Kingsley died in an encounter with the IPKF at Kutchaveli, Trincomalee, some boys were arrested by IPKF.

19

In Kumpurupitti, Trincomalee area LTTE killed two IPKF men, wounded 3 including an IPKF top brass.

20

IPKF shot and wounded a civilian N. Yogarathnam at Manankanai.

21

Colombo, May 21: Eight persons were reported killed in incidents in the north, east and south of the island in the last 24 hours.

According to Indian High Commission sources, two LTTE members, Jaya and Sivam were killed in an encounter with the IPKF. Two fleeing militants were killed in Trincomalee and Batticaloa in the east. According to independent sources two members of TELO were killed by PLOT cadres who fired at them as they drove past in a vehicle.

The closing of PLOT as well as TELO offices in the north is seen by the observers as a move to placate the LTTE who have accused the IPKF of arming other militant groups as well as turning a blind eye to their harassment of the civilian population in the north.

The IPKF also apprehended LTTE helper Punyamoorthy, a brother of an LTTE area leader in Jaffna and apprehended six more militants in Vavuniya. According to the same sources an Indian aircraft spotted a boat with 10 persons in Pooneryn Vavuniya and fired warning shots. The persons believed to be militants, abandoned the boat.

At Valvettithurai the IPKF rounded up a house. Three LTTE cadres who were trapped in the house faced the attack with stiff resistance. Soon they went out of ammunition. Captain Ramesh consumed cyanide. Jay and



22

COLOMBO, May 22.

At least eight Tamil militants and one officer of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka were killed in a number of encounters in the North and East of the island during the last 36 hours.

Official sources here said three Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam cadres and an IPKF officer were killed in an encounter near Polykandy in Jaffna peninsula on Saturday. One sub machinegun and 79 rounds of nine mm ammunition were recovered from the person of the militants.

In another encounter, also in Jaffna, one Tamil militant was killed while he was trying to flee on being challenged. One nine mm pistol and a few rounds of ammunition were recovered from him.

In another incident in Puthukkudirippu in Mullaitivu district one LTTE cadre was killed yesterday and one AK 47 rifle, one grenade and a few rounds of ammunition seized.

At least five IPKF men were injured in two different encounters in Batticaloa and Trincomalee on Friday, the news agency Lanka Puvath, reported.

At Kondavil, Jaffna in a combat, a LTTE guerrilla Edrik tried to break up the IPKF round up and got fatal wounds. He shot himself.

23

In Cilani at Jaffna, an IPKF military jeep was destroyed, 4 soldiers and a lieutenant were killed by the landmines set off by LTTE.

In a three day pitched battle between IPKF and LTTE in Alampil of Mullaitivu Dt. 23 IPKF personnel were killed and 20 wounded. Not a single casualty at LTTE side.

24

The high commission spokesperson said one IPKF officer and five soldiers were killed yesterday when they came under heavy fire from a well-entrenched LTTE hideout south of Alampil, in the northeastern Mullaitivu sector. She said about 25 militants were believed killed or wounded when the IPKF returned fire.

While heading towards Eluthumadduval, three LTTE cadres came under the IPKF sniping. Captain Nakulan and Niresh were dead and Thavam was captured with fractured leg. Two IPKF Soldiers were killed in a battle with LTTE, and many wounded at 6th mile post in Nedunkeni area, Mullaitivu Dt.

26

Van explodes: The sources said two of the IPKF personnel were killed during the past 24 hours, raising the number of IPKF men killed in the operations to 10. Besides, 21 sustained injuries. A van loaded with ammunition exploded during the raid. The Sri Lankan National News Agency, Lankapuwath reported that the IPKF recovered one van, two jeeps and one tractor from the base. The sources said 11 other IPKF personnel including an officer were wounded in three incidents in the northern Vavuniya sector yesterday.

Four IPKF men were wounded in a landmine blast. Four others including an officer sustained injuries while defusing a booby trap. They said three others were wounded when an LTTE sniper fired at them.

The sources said the IPKF shot dead an LTTE militant, who tried to escape after being apprehended in Jaffna, while seven others were taken into custody.

In the Eastern Batticaloa sector, one LTTE member was captured at Eravur and two at Mangam, the sources added.

27

Militant boat destroyed: The sources said one of the LTTE men killed in the operation was identified as "Jeyam", a group leader. They said in separate operations, a naval helicopter of the IPKF engaged a militant boat off the Devils Point on the north-western coast and destroyed it. The fate of the occupants of the boat and their number were not known.

Informed sources in Colombo said that an unknown number of LTTE men had been trapped by the IPKF in the Mullaitivu jungles.

In the long battle between LTTE and IPKF in Mullaitivu Dt, 35 IPKF soldiers lost their lives. Many wounded. No one died in LTTE.

The IPKF rounded up Kachay area near Chavakachcheri and shot at random. While withdrawing from the scene, Pirappan, a LTTE cadre got severe wounds and consumed cyanide.

Hari, a LTTE fighter died in a combat with IPKF at Tambalakamam, Trincomalee.

The IPKF damped curfew over Kumpurupiddy and 3rd post. They entered each and every house, arrested almost all the people and took them to the army camps. People stood under hot sun throughout the day without food and water. Then the three star boys separated some sixty people from the rest as LTTE supporters and arrested them. Most of them were muslims.

Appar, a LTTE cadre consumed cyanide in the IPKF round up at Elalai, Jaffna.

29

MADRAS, May 29.—Fifteen Indian troops and 11 others, including two Provincial Council members, were killed in continued violence in Sri Lanka during the past 24 hours, report UNI and PTI.



CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE SPREADS TO THE EAST

As a further step in the civil disobedience campaign now being observed in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, the LTTE has appealed to the public in the Batticaloa and Amparai districts to boycott the banks for two days in a week. At present all banks in the Jaffna peninsula are closed on Mondays and Fridays.

PROTEST MARCH IN VADAMARADCHI

Recent press reports from Sri Lanka state that the people of Valvettiturai, including school children, took out a massive procession on Sunday, May 15, 1988, protesting against what they claimed the cruelty of the IPKF against the general public of Vadammaradchi East. The reports further state that the IPKF's search operations had been intensified in the Vadammaradchi area during recent weeks.

The troops were killed when the tractor in which they were travelling on a "search and destroy" mission at Vattakkachchi in the northern Kilinochchi district was blown up by a landmine planted by LTTE guerrillas this morning.

Nine of the bodies were captured by the guerrillas, an LTTE release hear said.

I 5 IPKF Soldiers on a tractor ran into landmines set by LTTE and died on the spot in Vadakachi of Kilinochi Dt.

In retaliation to the above ambush, an IAF helicopter strafed indiscriminately at Vadakachi area. Several houses were damaged and some civilians wounded.

A LTTE guerrilla, Roshan die din an encounter with IPKF in Ninthavur at Amparai.

At Alampil, Mullaitivu Dt. 7 IPKF soldiers were killed in LTTE's landmine attack. Many wounded.

31

NEW DELHI, May 31.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) continued its operations against militants in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, it was officially stated here today.

In the Northern province, the IPKF seized a shotgun and two explosive devices from the Vavuniya sector. Intensive search operations are in progress in the area.

The IPKF killed an LTTE militant during an encounter in the Muttur sector in the Eastern province.

In the bitter battle on the 8th day at Mullaitivu many IPKF soldiers were killed and wounded. At Karchilaimadu in the encounter 6 IPKF persons shot dead and many wounded. No casualties on the LTTE side.

C R P

Five Tamil youths held for the last five months by the IPKF at Thanniyoothu near Mullaitivu are on hunger strike since 22.5.88.

Nearly 700 Tamil detenues are still held in Boosa Detention Camp and in prisons in Colombo and Negombo. Of those held, eight are females, one a boy under fifteen years of age and five of unsound mind.

Mr. Kamalanathan, a teacher of St. John's College, Jaffna was arrested and detained by the IPKF. The Students and Teachers' Guild of St. John's threatened to take out procession protesting arrest/detention. IPKF threatened to impose curfew if procession taken out. Later Mr. Kamalanathan was released after IPKF obtained statement that Kamalanathan was treated well. On being released Kamalanathan had to be taken to hospital as he could not even walk. Kamalanathan is still in hospital.

Vattakadchi 5 miles off Kilinochchi landmine blast on 29.5.88 near Vavuniya, IPKF forced farmer on night watch in his field to take them to IPKF hideout. As farm went ahead, LTTE fired at IPKF. Farmer tried to escape from IPKF was shot at by IPKF and injured. IPKF lost three men in the confrontation with LTTE.

IPKF OPERATION IN VADAMARADCHI EAST:

The IPKF imposed a curfew in Vadamaradchi East comprising, Nagarkovil, Thaalaiyadi, Vettillaikerni and Alliyawallai, on the night of 30.04.88. The curfew was continuous until lifted on 13.05.88. During the first few days, the IPKF discovered a cache of arms and a petrol bowser full with petrol buried underground. This led to IPKF men assaulting residents and torturing youth for information about militants. Shops and 20 schools in the area remained closed. The residents were on the point of starvation. People of neighbouring Valvettiturai township outraged by the ill-treatment of people in Vadamaradchi East took out a procession demonstrating against IPKF harassment in Vadamaradchi East. The curfew was finally lifted to enable students to sit the Year - 6 scholarship examination to be held on 14.05.88. Only a few students presented themselves for the examination. Whereas the people of Vadamaradchi suffered untold miseries at the hands of the Lanka Army during 'Operation Liberation' in May 1987, this year in May the IPKF has taken over the function of tormenting the people of Vadamaradchi.

Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald,

17.5.88



வீர வீணக்கம்

LITE MARTYRS

‘மீன் உண் கொக்கின் தூவி அன்ன
வால்நரைக் கூந்தல் முதியோள் சிறுவன்
களிறு எறிந்து பட்டனன்’ என்னும் உவகை
சுன்ற ஞானினும் பெரிதே; கண்ணீர்
நோன்கழை துயல்வரும் வெதிரத்து
வான்பெயத் தூங்கிய சிதரினும் பலவே.
பூங்கணுத்திரையார்.



Prince 15.5.88



Ramesh Master 20.5.88

Mathi 1.5.88
Karnan 2.5.88
2nd. Lt. Simon 2.5.88
Vikki 4.5.88
Michael 4.5.88
Lt. Suresh 4.5.88
Ramanathan 4.5.88
2nd. Lt. Sarath 4.5.88
Venkatesh 10.5.88
Ralass 10.5.88
20.2.88 to 10.5.88
Prasanna
David
Raheem
Arun
Charles
Sugandan
Patcham
Sekar
Rome
Vijayan
Bhaskaran
Umakanthan
Lingam
Saleem Rahman
Anbu
Radha
Anandan

Kennedy
Ravi
Rizwan
Joseph
Dhanendran 13.5.88
Kamal 13.5.88
Lt. Prince 15.5.88
Thabir 16.5.88
Bharathan 16.5.88
Alex 16.5.88
Khaleel 17.5.88
Kingsley 18.5.88
Ramesh Master 21.5.88
Jeyam 21.5.88
Jeeva 21.5.88
Edrich 22.5.88
Capt. Nakulan 24.5.88
Suresh 24.5.88
Thavam 24.5.88
Purapunar 27.5.88
Razack 27.5.88
Mahesh 27.5.88
Viji 27.5.88
May 88
2nd. Lt. Gandhi
Nidhi
Yasodharan
Charles
Anandan
Rohan
Vamadevan
Suman
Ruban
Dias
Kutti
Nagavel
Rosan



Karnan 2.5.88



Magesh



Lt. Michael 4.5.88



Roshan 27.5.88



Hari 30.5.88

claims	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
	IPKF	LTTE	S.L. ARMY	OTHER MILITANTS	CIVILIANS					
IPKF	* 4	* 1	* 33						* 26	* 32
LTTE		1								
MEDIA									26	



22	1*	5*	8*							
			1							

23										
	28	20								
	3	15							1	

2	1		5							15
			2							
										C 12

12	6*									

24	6		25							
	2		3	1 ^C						

3			9	10*						
	3	4	1							2

14	2		1						1	

25										

4										
	3	5								
									1	

15										
			1							

26	2	21	1	10 ^C						
									2	



6	1*		3*							
									6 ^T	

17										
									1	

28										
	1									1

7	1*	1*								3*

18			2	28 ^C						
			1							
	2								25 ^C	

29	15									11
	22									
	3		1						2	5

8			1	4 ^C						

19										
	2	3								
									2	

9	1*	1*	2*	26 ^C					2*	

20										
									1	
			3						3	

31			1							
	6									
			1							



10										
			2							

21			4							
			3							

36	35	68	23 ^C		2		41	47
98	32	63	1 ^C					1
18	19	6			6	25 ^C	40	5 ^C 12

TOTAL

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P-PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen's Voluntary Force

LTTE claims 20.2.88 to 10.5.88- 21 LTTE killed & May'88: 13 LTTE killed.

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12

CHAPTER 12

India withdraw 3000
IPKF soldiers.

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	

JUNE



IS OPPRESSION INFECTIOUS?

Arjuna

COMMENT

If anyone likes to know the answer as to how this vast democracy called India with its swarming population of 800 millions nearly half of which live below the poverty line keeps ticking, a part of the answer was provided by the distinguished economist and former U.S. envoy to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. He described the country as 'a functioning anarchy'. But that of course is not an explanation; it is only an accurate description. So how does this 'anarchy' function? One way it does is through a huge, mindless, thoughtless, insensate bureaucracy that has an octopus-like grip on the lives of the people and keeps the country going. Someone on the top, in Delhi, presses a policy button, and a clumsy set of officials take over the entire works. An inanimate machinery is set in motion, which mows down everything on the way - democratic rights, fundamental rights, human rights of every description, and ultimately when the damage is done, both to the system and the image of the country, no one becomes responsible, and not many seem to care.

Why these profound thoughts about India, you might ask? It is because the Sri Lankan Tamils who have sought refuge in this country, and who thought they were escaping from governmental oppression in their own country, are now getting a taste of it here. Various pinpricks, pressure moves and acts of open discrimination are being employed to ensure that they get back to Sri Lanka. The latest of these is an order made by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Internal Security New Delhi, dated 22.3.88, which shuts out educational opportunities to a vast section of Sri Lankan Tamil students in Indian schools, colleges, polytechnics and universities. Under this order - (1) All students in schools below Class XI should get back. (2) Those in Class XI will be allowed to continue for one more year until they complete XII. (3) Those who have completed XII will not be given admission to colleges, universities and polytechnics. (4) There will be no new admissions to Sri Lankan Tamil students in colleges, schools or universities. (5) Those who are already in colleges and universities will be allowed to complete their courses. As if to rub salt into the wound, the order goes further to say - 'However, the extension of the student visas would be subject to the condition that the parents of such children would not insist on staying back in India on the pretext of completion of the respective courses of their wards'. (emphasis ours)

The implications of this order are many: (1) For the first time, India is denying facilities for higher education to Sri Lankan Tamil students, and thereby ending a tradition that existed for over a hundred years. The first graduate of the Madras University was a Jaffna Tamil - Carol Viswanathapillai. (2) India is probably the first country and only country in the world to shut out Sri Lankan Tamil students. (3) The order specifically shuts out only Sri Lankan Tamil students. For example, the Sinhalese naval rating who publicly humiliated the Indian Prime Minister by attempting to bash his neck with a rifle butt is free to admit his child (if he has any and if he is interested) to an Indian school or university! (4) If all these are a consequence of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, one wonders how India can claim that the Agreement was meant to benefit the Tamils!

The order addressed to the Tamil Nadu state government states in the concluding para: 'I shall be grateful if you could please let us know the total number of students who are studying in various schools/colleges/technical institutions in the states, giving detailed break-up thereof. For obtaining due recognition for the certificates/degrees obtained by these students in the educational institutions in India, the matter is being taken up by the Ministry of External Affairs with the Government of Sri Lanka. We shall let you know as and when a decision is taken'. A classic example of putting the cart before the horse! One would have thought the sensible step would be to first obtain due recognition to Indian pass certificates with the Sri Lanka government and thereafter call upon the Tamil students to get back.

Several protests and appeals have been made over this order, by various organisations and individuals, but until the first week of June there has been no official response. The Jawaharlal Nehru University Students' Union in New Delhi has also joined in the appeals. But an Indian politician who took up the matter personally with officials concerned had an amazing experience - they appeared to be only vaguely aware of the order itself, and ignorant of its implications!

Meanwhile, visas have yet to be extended beyond June. But the pressures continue. Late last year all Sri Lankan Tamils living outside camps were called upon to register themselves (under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement). These included those on tourist visas. There was no talk of repatriation, only registration. The deadline fixed was December 31, 1987. Very few

responded. The deadline was extended to February 29, 1988. Knowing how the Indian official mind works, and rightly suspecting that it was a trap to send them back, the majority did not respond even then. Veiled threats were made by some busybodies at certain official levels and the deadline was further extended to May 31. We are informed that up to now, only a quarter of the expected numbers have their names and addresses on the refugee register, not more than 15,000 out of a possible 60,000. The ones who thought that they would abide by the rules and registered themselves now regret their 'foolishness'; they are being summoned through Radio and Television to report at the Mandapam camp - to be repatriated to Sri Lanka. The 45,000 who decided to defy the order are under no pressure whatever; privately, they chuckle and say that in India it is foolish to try to be upright. Greasing palms is the accepted method of solving problems!

Talking of pressure, on the night of May 25, the Tamil news reader over the country's TV came out with a rude announcement. All Sri Lankan Tamils who had registered themselves *should* report at Mandapam camp before May 28, the announcement said, failing which stern action will be taken against them! Now imagine families in Madras with school and college going children, living in rented houses and flats, having paid advance deposits ranging from Rs.5000/- to Rs.10,000/- which advances will not be returned except with a minimum of one month's notice, abandoning home, advance, furniture, education and setting forth on a 12-hour journey to Mandapam camp! And onwards to Jaffna where they might not have a house to move into! If that announcement was not an example of crass insensitivity on the part of some bureaucrat, what else was it? Was it a show of hostility?

What are the facts relating to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee presence in Tamil Nadu in India? The influx began soon after the July-August 1983 massacres, the then government of India under Mrs. Indira Gandhi opened both doors to the fleeing Tamils - the front door via the airport and the back door via illegal country boats. The total number of refugees amounted to no more than one lakh and thirty thousand - in a State that has a population of over 55 million. The camp refugees were in a minority, a mere 30,000, housed in about 160 camps, mostly cyclone shelters meant for temporary use. The majority of one lakh persons were mostly those permitted to

remain in the country on periodically extended tourist visas and a smaller number who came across the Palk Strait either in the then functioning Talaimannar-Rameswaram ferry boat or in hired boats, but living outside the camps and self-supporting.

Practically all the middle class families renting out houses and flats, and sending their children to Indian schools, colleges, universities and technical institutes in Madras, Madurai, Trichy, Coimbatore and other places are foreign exchange earners. They were not only *not* a burden on the Indian government; every paise of the money they received went to enrich

at segment of society of which they became a part – the high-fee levying schools, the Postal Department, the banks, the house and flat owners, the grocer, the vegetable seller, the house broker, the autorickshaw man, many of whom even learnt to exploit the 'Ceylon people'. A family in search of a house, having to overcome local prejudices against letting out houses to Ceylonese, and with no local contacts, is thrown at the mercy of unscrupulous house brokers who jack the rates to their own benefit (a month's rent as brokerage) and the benefit of the owner. The Sri Lankan Tamil refugees did not mind all these, and anyway they had no choice. They were prepared to buy PEACE in their lives with money, buy an education for their children, and freedom from bombing and shelling and ten-

sions.

Today, as in early June 1988, the position is: there are no refugee camps except two, the main one at Mandapam and the other at Kottapattu in the Trichy district. All Mannar refugees have left; in fact about 10,000 of them left on their own, between the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the IPKF operations in October. Only about 7500 camp refugees remain, those from Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and elsewhere.

Outside the camps, over 20,000 appear to have left on their own during the 10 weeks of peace in the north-east following the Accord, some of them leaving for foreign countries. Between December '87 and now, the Indian authorities have sent back either to Talaimannar or to Kankasanturai, about 15,000 persons, among whom were about 2000 non-camp Jaffna residents. Every Saturday a ship is scheduled to leave for Kankasanturai and every Wednesday another one to Talaimannar. The KKS ship has a capacity to take 1500, but the authorities are prepared to run it if given a minimum of 300 passengers. But alas, the last one scheduled for Saturday the 4th June did not leave, because there weren't sufficient numbers of passengers.

So what does the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee presence in India mean? Less than 70,000, as compared to over 25,000 in the Federal Republic of Germany, over 20,000 in France, over 4000

in Switzerland, and probably another 10,000 in other Western countries, such as Holland, Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom etc. While a government like the Canadian had openly shown a human heart, it cannot be said that the German or French governments had shown the kind of hostility towards the Tamil refugees as what 'Mother India' does now!

Perhaps there is a moral in this. The last straw that led to the growth of youth militancy in Sri Lanka was the restrictions imposed on Tamil students in the field of higher education. It is happening in India now. Are governments imitative? Or is it that the Indian government having taken on the role of the Jayewardene government in suppressing Tamil nationalism (under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement) now feels impelled to carry on the discriminatory policies that the Sri Lanka governments practised? Governments develop an itch to oppress; as innumerable examples in history have shown, leading to tragic chains of events – Tsarist Russia began oppressing Jews, Hitler continued the pogroms, which ultimately led to the growth of a militant Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish homeland, which itself has become a threat to peace in the region. Oppression anywhere is a threat to people everywhere, because unlike small pox and cholera, oppression is a virulent virus that infects nations!

JUNE 1988

OFFENSIVE & 'TALKS' CONTINUE

'NO AGREEMENT YET' SAYS LTTE

The seven week offensive against the LTTE, in which an estimated 15,000 troops of the IPKF have been involved, in the Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts in northern Sri Lanka is reported to be continuing with casualties on both sides.

Newspaper reports about the LTTE leader, V. Prabhakaran, and his deputy, Mahendrarajah (Mahathaya) being surrounded and trapped and their imminent capture by the IPKF would appear to have been exaggerated. Some accounts said that, although trapped at one stage, Prabhakaran known to be

moving around freely under several disguises has given the slip to the IPKF.

The offensive and the reported attempt to capture the LTTE leader sparked off many demonstrations in Tamil Nadu where posters appeared saying, 'If Prabhakaran is killed, Tamil Nadu will erupt like a volcano'.

Even as the IPKF offensive was continuing, there was confirmation about continuing negotiations between officials of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the LTTE leaders in Madras. The previous talks came to an abrupt end two months ago when one of LTTE's members, Johnny, was shot dead by the IPKF in northern Vavuniya where he had gone on a mission initiated by Indian officials to establish contact with Prabhakaran. Anand Narain, RAW chief, has reportedly made several trips to Tamil Nadu last month to oversee the ongoing negotiations.

A Reuter report datelined 16 June

stated that, 'India and the LTTE are close to an agreement to end the five year conflict... and only two important points remained to be decided after lengthy talks with Indian officials'.

In a press release, the LTTE said that the Indian government had not reached an agreement with the LTTE on the issue of a ceasefire though informal talks have been going on between its representatives led by Krishnakumar (Kittu) and Indian officials. The statement further alleged that the story of an agreement had been purposely released by the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to divert the peaceful agitation launched by the Tamil people against the IPKF offensive and also to appease aroused sentiments of the people of Tamil Nadu.

The LTTE statement added that it had made an open commitment to hand over weapons and co-operate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, but India was continuing the war refusing pleas for a ceasefire.

JUNE 1988

When General K.Sundarji retired as Chief of Army Staff on April 30 he must have ended his term of office as one of the most controversial army chiefs the country has ever had. Sundarji, who has been described as India's first soldier-intellectual, fell out of favour with the Prime Minister and officials in the Defence Ministry following three mismanaged operations -Operation Brasstacks, the 'forward policy' on the Indo-China border and the Indian peace-keeping action in Sri Lanka. The last mentioned offensive against the Tamil Tigers has been roundly criticised and Sundarji's detractors point out that the Indian Peace Keeping Force's (IPKF's) action in Lanka has had a demoralising effect on the entire Indian army.....

But can Sundarji be castigated for the so-called lapses on his part? And is he alone to be blamed for the debacle in Sri Lanka?.... It is quite likely that the disastrous result of the lack of co-ordination between the Defence Ministry and the External Affairs Ministry was palmed off on to the former army chief.

Another reason why the Centre may not have been very happy with Sundarji was the fact that the General was known to be vocal in expressing



General K. Sundarji

his disagreement with any government strategy involving the army which he found unfeasible. **Thus the former army chief was the first to criticise, and future events have proved him right, the hurriedly drawn up Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Indeed the General even questioned the wisdom of deploying Indian troops on the island and expressed his displeasure at the extensive combing operations to flush out the Tamil Tigers.** Sundarji's reservations on the Lanka operations reportedly did not go down well with the Prime Minister and differences between Rajiv Gandhi and his army chief became evident. (*The Indian Post (Bombay) May 3, 1988*)

● Ponnudurai News agent for 'The Hindu' an influential Indian daily, air lifted everyday to Jaffna was shot dead. LTTE claimed responsibility and stated that Ponnudurai was also agent for RAW, Indian Intelligence Agency.

● Karunaiswaran (25) a Tamil youth walking along Manning Place Wellawatte, Colombo was shot dead on 25.5.88. The Assailant escaped.

● Jaffna Commercial Banks and Municipal Offices work only three days of the week. Jaffna Government Secretariat works only during last week of every month. LTTE Writ is being faithfully carried out.

● Parents of 194 youths held by IPKF at Vavuniya have protested to IPKF and District Citizens Committee. All youths are being held without being charged for over 6 months. President of District Citizens Committee Dr. Pararajasingham threatened to resign if there was no response by 15.6.88.

● Anura Banadaranaik, Leader of the Opposition and leader of S.L.F.P. spoke at a Seminar in Gampola held on 21.5.88. He said that when the SLFP comes to power it

would abrogate the Indo-Lanka Pact and with the help of Armed Forces raise the lion flag in the North.

● Nadarajah Palaninathan, Grama Sevaka (Village Headman) of Pokarippu in Vadammaradchi East was arrested along with his father and brother by IPKF on 16.5.88. The father and brother were released on 17.5.88. When inquiries were made about Palaninathan on 19.5.88, IPKF stated Palaninathan was released on 17.5.88. There is no trace of Palaninathan.

● On 18.5.88 IPKF men entered the Jaffna General Hospital premises. Hooded men who accompanied the IPKF pointed out youths who were arrested.

● On 18.5.88 on Puliyankulam-Nedunkerni road an IPKF officer and soldier were killed in a landmine blast.

● A lorry from Jaffna carrying Cement was stopped at Madawachchi on the night of 19.5.88. The lorry was burnt. Two skeletons were found in the burnt portion of the cab of the lorry.

● Law Courts in Trincomalee have ceased functioning from 19.5.88.

COMMENT

INDIA'S INFLUENCE AS A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER

Dr A. Jeyaratnam Wilson,

In the first place, I would refer to India as the major super power in South Asia, not as a major regional power. Dismembered Pakistan, heavily militarised by U.S. weaponry is also a major regional power. But India has command over larger resources and has the world's fourth largest standing army. India as a major super power is in a category of one, there being no such regional super power in the globe, neither China, nor South Africa nor Israel, nor any one of the West European states or of South America. One reason is India's overwhelming dominance among powers that are less strong. Another is that India's policy makers have deliberately sought to create such a position for the Indian subcontinent.

INDIAN HEGEMONY

Two factors must be taken into account in what I would call Indian hegemony over the subcontinent. One is the cultural imperative. Therefore India regards her immediate neighbours, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as the cultural expressions of Indian unity. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself in one of his prison musings described India as a cultural unity. In unstable domestic situations when foreign adventure may provide some distraction to India's politicised class which sustains India's political structures, and in unstable international conditions where the Indian ruling class is uncertain of foreign policy objectives of neighbours sensitive to foreign penetration, the idea that the

subcontinent is one cultural entity could provide the rationale for aggressive assertions of India's dominance over the region.

Together with this cultural impetus for action, post-independent India is very much influenced by the imperative of one of the sternest of British Viceroys that India had, Lord Curzon, who always held to the opinion that the Indian subcontinent is one strategic unity.

Britain's heirs, India, being the dominant successor, the men of the Indian National Congress and their bureaucratic functionaries took into consideration the cultural and strategic imperatives in the pursuit of foreign policy. In March-April 1947, Nehru complaining at the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi stated that "the neighbouring countries, even culturally, look towards Europe and not to their own friends and neighbours (Nehru meant India) from whom they had derived so much in the past." Within a short time, the Indian Prime Minister for all his neutralism and non-alignment, brought India's weakest neighbours under Indian suzerainty. In August 1949, **India signed a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan.** India guaranteed non-interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan. Bhutan in turn pledged to be guided by India's advice in external relations.

Sikkim suffered a worse fate. On 5th December 1950, **India signed a Treaty of Perpetuity with Sikkim which made Sikkim an Indian protectorate.** I would say that the cultural, and more importantly, Lord Curzon's strategic imperative, had determined India's interventionary role.

Under Mrs Indira Gandhi, India took several steps beyond what her father, Mr Nehru, had accomplished. These were deliberately intended to establish India's hegemonistic, not merely dominant role, in the subcontinent. Mrs Gandhi set the stage for implementing her policies when, while in opposition during 1977-79, she accused Morarji Desai's Janata government (1977-79) of appeasing India's neighbours "so much, that

even tiny countries like Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh are showing eyes at us." Earlier in 1972, not so much in pursuit of cultural or Lord Curzon's strategic imperative, **Mrs Gandhi freed Bangladesh from Pakistan President Yahya Khan's tyranny.** In this case she had no alternative since 10 million refugees from Bangladesh crossed into India. A year before, in August 1971, **Mrs Gandhi signed her Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union** in which the high contracting parties agreed to come to each other's assistance if the other is attacked. The agreement, however, was at that point of time not a step towards the cultural-strategic nexus.

MONROE DOCTRINE

When Mrs Gandhi was firmly ensconced in office (1972-77) after winning a victory in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war and after defeating the Janata Party government (when she again became Prime Minister, 1979-84) the firm outlines of the hegemonistic role of a regional superpower were drawn. Firstly, she indicated her version of a Monroe Doctrine for South Asia. There were three aspects, two of which Mr Rajiv Gandhi applied to the Sri Lanka situation:

1. The doctrine held that South Asia was a troubled region emphasising that in the context "Indian interests must be protected."
2. If law and order breaks down in a neighbouring state, India's assistance should be sought to arrest the destabilizing process; help could be solicited from within the region but not to the exclusion of India.
3. Mrs Gandhi stated that a national consensus had been obtained between her Congress(I) party and other political parties. India, the contention was, could not be excluded in regional developments which involved regional security. Indian concerns relating to U.S. military assistance to Pakistan were thus spelled out.

To provide meaning to this new doctrine, **Mrs Gandhi shifted India from the non-aligned state of Mr Nehru to a national security state.** The chief features of the national security state were:

- (a) high defence spending at the expense of developmental needs;
- (b) high mobilisation of national energies against an external threat, often imaginary;
- (c) an atmosphere of beleagueredness, and therefore an expansionist foreign policy, supposedly to break out from the encirclement.

The three pillars of India's hegemonistic stature as a regional superpower therefore stand on

- (1) the cultural and strategic imperative,
- (2) Mrs Gandhi's Monroe doctrine and
- (3) Mrs Gandhi's inauguration of the national security state. Thus the ghost of Lord Curzon walks the corridors of the South Block in New Delhi!

OBSTACLES

It is now an Indian supposition that Mr Gandhi's policies relating to Sri Lanka are a continuation of Mrs Gandhi's policies. But even with Mrs Gandhi there were obstacles from the major powers in the region (especially Pakistan and China) and at least one of the superpowers, the USA; these powers did not concede India this status. India's Sri Lanka exercise cannot therefore be taken as absolute proof that Washington, Moscow or for that matter Beijing and the rest of the Western world had accepted New Delhi as the major regional power, leave alone superpower. At best these states expected India to settle the Sri Lankan dispute amicably.

ACCORD

I have secondly been asked to explain to you the reasons for the Accord of July 1987. I can, in the absence of evidence other than the document itself, only draw inferences. In the first place, President Jayewardene has in his interview with S. Venkat Narayan (*Island International*, 23rd December 1987) stated that **the letters of exchange between the Indian Prime Minister and him are only intentions.** These, he stated, need to be translated into a treaty. The President said that he wanted to sign a treaty of peace and friendship with India and that the

treaty was in connection with the annexures (that is, the letters) attached to the Accord of July 1987. And he added rather ominously: "if India wants us to do certain things, we also want India to reciprocate by doing something for us."

What are these things and what things will the President not do? He said that the question of Trincomalee is a *quid pro quo* and will depend on the terms of the treaty. He added that foreign trainers in his country (the Israelis, Keeny Meeny Services and the Pakistanis) will remain until a treaty is concluded. The same applies to the Voice of America broadcasts. The negotiation of such a treaty cannot be accomplished before the President's term ends in November this year and officially on 4th February 1989. Two of his possible successors, the Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and the Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali, are opposed to the treaty.

NOT THE RIGHT ADVICE

Then what were the reasons for Mr Gandhi over committing his prestige on this Sri Lanka operation? My first answer is that the Indian Prime Minister did not receive the right advice from those who counselled him. In a military venture of this kind, Mr Gandhi should have obtained bipartisan agreement between the main parties in his own country. On the other hand, Indian opinion is divided on the wisdom of continuing the war. The major parties of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and V P Singh's organisation, question the wisdom of the military adventure. War some times it is said is a reflection or extension of domestic policy. But elections in distant Haryana state were not intended to give Mr Gandhi leverage on what went on in Tamil Ceylon. The forthcoming elections in Tamil Nadu might bring the role of the IPKF to the fore; it certainly will be one of the issues. But Mr Gandhi is not likely to obtain much credit. The reasons are that **Mr Gandhi and the IPKF have committed three errors:**

1. Mr Gandhi over committed his enormous reputation as a leader of the world's largest democracy in

undertaking an open-ended military operation which has cost the Indian Army severely. It has given him little return.

2. The IPKF did not use, what in nuclear warfare is called the ladder of escalation to warn the militant groups and the Ceylon Tamil civilian population of the dangers that lay ahead at the stages when the Indian Army would step on to the next phase of its campaign. Instead, the Indian Army went for all-out victory. In this connection, I have a serious accusation against the Indian army which I feel must be thoroughly investigated by a body of international military experts. **My information is that the Indian Army tested some of its new weapons on the innocent Tamil people of Jaffna and that they continue to do so now in the Eastern Province.** This is, if true, a terrible indictment against a Government and an Army which claimed to be entering the Tamil areas to provide the Tamil people protection. I repeat this charge. My information is reasonably authentic. An international body of military experts can give us the facts or reject the views that have come to me.

3. Before a politicised military operation is set in motion, the parties to the dispute must be consulted. The Indian Government has acted hastily and thoughtlessly. There is no evidence that the Sinhalese Opposition parties were asked for their views nor was any attempt made to negotiate with their leaders. Thus the Sinhalese people are generally hostile to the Indian presence. In an operation of this kind, at the least, one friend might be helpful. The only people, the Tamils, who first welcomed the Indian Army are now not with them. This leaves Mr Gandhi with only President Jayewardene. Can President Jayewardene run a viable political system even if he wins a third term? Mr Gandhi might find himself in an unenviable situation. Already a coalition, comprising Sinhalese groups and two of the Tamil militant groups, the EPRLF AND PLOTE, have joined a United Socialist Alliance which was once headed by the assassinated Vijaya Kumaratunge. Although the Alliance sup-

ported the Accord, a political coalition that needs further support to form a government, if at all, will have to seek the backing of other oppositional elements opposed to the Accord.

4. To add to the confused picture, members of President Jayewardene's government are reported to be in touch, if not negotiating, with some of the Tamil militant groups. Where does this multidiplomatic activity (Indians and the President's ministers) leave the Indian government? The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo has made known his displeasure.

GEO-NATIONAL INTERESTS

The principal objective of this agreement, from a reading of it, was to secure India's geo-national interests. This was apparent from the approaches of G Parthasarathi, Romesh Bhandari and P Chidambaram. But these geo-national interests have yet to be secured in a treaty where there is certain to be hard bargaining on the Sri Lanka side. My view is that **India probably panicked at the future prospect of Trincomalee, and the outlet for the Voice of America.** The Voice of America broadcasts will, according to Sri Lanka's Minister for Foreign Affairs, continue. The station, it has been agreed, will not be used for sending messages to U.S. submarines in the North Indian Ocean. But who is to know? Trincomalee is according to U.S. sources of no use to them. The logistics alone, a distance of 10,000 odd miles from the U.S.A., do not make it a viable proposition. India has therefore nothing to fear from a hostile power attacking her on her most vulnerable southern flanks from Trincomalee.

Provincial councils and the merger are dubious matters. The Indians are not tuned into the political culture of the Sinhalese political elites. The latter will not implement the bill in the proper spirit. The powers conceded do not resolve the most important question, the distribution of land. **The arrangements appear half done and ill conceived.** The only way is to start anew, further negotiations with the principal militant group and others concerned. The alternative is a continuing state of disequilibrium, a hopeless outlook for all the people of Sri Lanka.

the satanic force



R A P E





D



27.6.88 Panichchankeni

1 young girl (The IPKF officer who raped this girl was then stabbed to death by the girl and she got escaped)

27.6.88 Chambur-Trincomalee
Eastern province

Parameswari (19)
Sakunthala devi (21)
Vellachchi (32) Married
Kannaki (28) Married
Sinnappillai (26) Married
Yogeswari (28) Married
Saroja (22) Married
Annalakshmi (30) Married
Thangamalar (25) Married



TIMING THE PULL-OUT

THE cryptic announcement by the Indian High Commission in Colombo that "some excess (IPKF) troops and military hardware will be taken back very soon, probably beginning June 7" may well have been a token response to the growing fear of Sri Lankans that the Indian military presence in the island is now a permanent fixture. The statement that Mr Gamini Dissanayake made in New Delhi last month regarding a phased withdrawal of the IPKF was believed to have set the stage for an announcement by the Defence Minister, Mr K. C. Pant, on a time-table for departure, but last week's confabulations in Colombo resulted in only a vague assurance that surplus troops would return home "in the near future" and that the IPKF's presence was imperative to oversee election arrangements in the Northern and Eastern provinces in July. Understandably, there was considerable disappointment in ruling party circles in Colombo at being deprived of the means of countering anti-accord propaganda by the opposition SLFP and the JVP, although it is

impossible to dismiss New Delhi's own hesitation in the matter.

Notwithstanding President Jayewardene's optimism after the first round of provincial council elections earlier last month, the poor turn-out and the violence that marked the second round of polls suggest that far from having been tamed, the JVP has, in fact, made alarming inroads among educated Sinhalese youth. Indeed, had Mr S. Thondaman's supporters not ensured a substantial turn-out by the Indian Tamils in Nuwara Eliya, last weekend's elections may have been reduced to a mockery. To compound this disturbing trend there is no guarantee that the IPKF's offensive against the recalcitrant LTTE cadres in Batticaloa will be an unqualified success resulting in the liquidation of the Tigers' strength. With elections in Tamil Nadu round the corner, and New Delhi's anxiety for a quick settlement, a high price will undoubtedly have to be paid for winning over Mr Pirabhakaran. At the same time, the knowledge that President Jayewardene's hold over the Sinhalese

heartland is at best tenuous inhibits New Delhi from agreeing to anything more than a token gesture.

This is not to suggest that even the anti-accord elements in the UNP are in too much of a hurry to get rid of the IPKF. Since India has been conducting its anti-insurgency operations quite efficiently, even Mr R. Premadasa and Mr Lalith Athulathumudali have grudgingly let the battle go on to its logical conclusion. Moreover, the political benefits of an imminent withdrawal would accrue mainly to Mr Gamini Dissanayake, which is one reason why New Delhi went out of its way to offer him a face-saving sop. Ideally, both New Delhi and Colombo would like the announcement of a substantial IPKF withdrawal to be timed to yield the maximum political dividends. But, unfortunately there is no sign yet of a date that suits both governments which may be why Mr Pant's keenly awaited visit resulted in no firm announcement of any significance, and why last Saturday's pull-out promise may not be more than eyewash to conceal the high level of uncertainty.

Jawans waving from the m.v. *Kokanasevak* at Madras harbour after arriving as part of the first IPKF contingent withdrawn from Sri Lanka.



Little sign of Tamil compromise

Indian troops set for long stay

REPORT

Michael Hamlyn, Colombo

There's a sour joke doing the rounds in Colombo. An Indian soldier — known as a *jawan*, a young man — tells his colleague who asks how long the Indian peacekeeping force will stay in Sri Lanka: "We will stay at least until my son goes to school."

The implication is that the *jawan* has fathered a child with a local Tamil girl in the north or east of the country, and that there is no chance of a troop withdrawal by the Indians for the next five years.

There was, it is true, a token withdrawal last week to help the electoral chances of the ruling United National Party, and it may have helped. But in reality no one believed that very many troops were going, and the party won the election by a comfortable margin anyway.

But as General Nalin Senaviratne, the commander of the Sri Lankan Army, told *The Times*, it would need the recruitment and training of another two divisions of troops before his men could hope to take over from the Indians, and that would take two to three years to achieve.

The Sri Lankan armed forces number around 32,000, and are fairly stretched dealing with a terrorist campaign by a Sinhalese chauvinist left-wing group, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south and west of the country. The Indians, by most recent counts, have around 52,000 troops here.

Moreover, Mr Ronnie de Mel managed — before being compelled to resign as Finance Minister after falling out with his party over the calling of elections — to cut one billion rupees (about £20 million) from the defence budget.

There is a belief among certain Indians that world opinion will impel Mr Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, to bring his *jawns* home. But Western diplomats here scoff at the idea, insisting that no foreign government will do anything on this matter to annoy the Indians.

There is also a belief that domestic pressure might persuade Mr Gandhi to withdraw. But again, there is no indication of such pressure except among a few opposition politicians, and there is no real sign of any groundswell of public opinion objecting to the continuing loss of life among the Indian Army's *jawns*.

The *jawns*, then, are only likely to leave if some agreement can be reached with the principal Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, under which it would surrender its guns and join the mainstream of politics. But there seems to be precious little sign of that either.

Surreptitious negotiations are reported to have been going on between the Indian authorities and the Tamil Tigers in Madras, where the former commander of Jaffna, Mr Sadasivan Krishnakumar, alias Kittu, is in exile.

However, many people here are sure that the negotiations will come to nothing. The Tigers' leadership is likely to repudiate any agreement reached by Kittu, and in any case are said not seriously to be interested in any settlement falling short of the establishment of an independent Tamil homeland.

There is also a feeling that

they will not wish to participate in any election in which they stand a chance of losing. Caste and other factors are all likely to operate against them in a democratic poll.


Elections have just been held to seven provincial councils established in the rest of the country under the devolution of powers forced on the Government by the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. They were boycotted by the principal opposition party and violently opposed by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna gunmen. Now they must be held in the north and east to elect a joint council for the predominantly Tamil area.

A senior Indian diplomat last week assured me that elections will be held and that the Tamil Tigers are sufficiently cowed not to be able to interfere. Such optimism is derided by other observers, who forecast that the Tigers will threaten with death anyone who takes part.

"If they do not reject the LTTE now and take part in these elections," said another senior Indian, "then I fear it will be the end for the Tamils."

The situation is equally fraught for the ruling party. Elections are due soon, and such is the unpopularity of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord that the party is in danger of losing them. President Jayewardene, who will be 82 in December, is technically not allowed to succeed himself, but a committee has reported that a minor change in the Constitution could change that. Diplomats believe firmly that he will run again.

13.6.88



MR.V.GOPALSAMY IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT

Mr.Vice-Chairman, Sir, On the 28th April, Shri Upendra put a question to the Government as to how much money had been spent in respect of the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka so far. But the Hon.Minister stated that the Government is not in a position to inform Parliament about the actual expenditure. **Such is the arrogant attitude, irresponsible attitude, which the Government is persisting in.**

When a pointed question was put to the President of Sri Lanka by the pressmen, he stated, it has appeared in India Today also, *'I am in charge of the Indian forces'*. So, we are spending money on the forces of India, whereas the supreme commander happens to be the President of another country.

Sir, a memorandum was given by the Association of Tamil Refugees in Tamil Nadu to the hon.Prime minister of this country. The office-bearers of that Association started a fast unto death at the Marina sands. I put a question whether any memorandum was received by the Government. I was shocked to receive the reply that there was no such memorandum from any association. I got a copy of the memorandum also. **That memorandum was sent to the Prime Minister. But this Government dares to say, "there is no such memorandum."** Even Goebbels would become a pygmy before this Government. **It is a very serious matter, Sir.** Governments of the Western countries are pressurising those refugees to go back. Where should they go? Death is awaiting them there. It is hell there. They cannot go back. **But our armed forces are hunting and hounding not only the youths but also the girls.**

Under the Geneva Conventions, the crimes committed by any army are crimes against humanity. Now this crime of genocide, this atrocious crime, is committed by the Indian forces against our brothers and sisters in the island of Sri Lanka. There are sanctuaries in that island for wild animals, but there is no sanctuary for the Tamils where they can live in peace and harmony.

Sir, Lt.Gen.Pande of the Indian Army has given a press statement, which has appeared in all the national dailies and the magazines, and there he says, **"90 per cent of the population in the Tamil areas totally support the LTTE."** If somebody is not supporting the LTTE, he says, then something is wrong with him. It is the statement of an Indian General.

In the Conference held day before yesterday in London the speech made by the LTTE representative impressed even Justice Krishna Iyer who said, *I had a misconceived notion about the LTTE.* But now he has changed it after listening to this speech. In the speech he said: *We love India; we love the people of India; we are for the Government of India. Even now, in the Indian Ocean we wish India should be the leading power. We are against the role of imperialist forces, but not against India.* In times of crisis in the past, the Tamils have stood by you in the past. But, you are crushing their backbone which is the only shield for the Tamils. If you crush that movement which has been all along protecting the Tamils there against the Sri Lankan forces, when you are crushing them, the only shield for the Tamils, then one day Mr.Jayewardene or somebody will say, *Your dirty job is over. You quit.*

Then, what will happen? Will the Tamil people be thrown before the wolves? So, this is a mad war pursued by the egoism of a particular individual.

Sir, when they are prepared even for talks, unconditional talks, everyday you are launching your troops in all the areas. It is a very wrong policy. For every drop of blood being shed by the jawans of the Indian army, also the cadres of the LTTE, this Government is responsible.

Sir, after the accord, 10,000 Sinhalese families have been brought to settle in the traditional home areas of the Tamils. Even our Minister in his statement has admitted to a certain extent that the traditional home areas have been colonised by the Sinhalese. It was done by the Israelis in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Sir, have we got the audacity to tell the Palestinians not to have their homeland? Have we the guts to tell the Blacks of South Africa not to have their homeland?

When Indra Gandhi was shot dead, the Tamils in the North and the East came on the streets with black flags. What happened? Eleven Tamils were shot dead by the Sinhalese army. Now you are pursuing the same policy. Instead of the army of the Sri Lankan Government, you have sent your army. **You are doing the dirty job of Jayewardene. You are playing the role of mercenary there.**

Only one thing I would like to ask before I conclude: whether this Government is prepared to permit the international press and the International Red Cross in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Why are international press and the International Red Cross not permitted there?

Southern PC Elections — a Political Defeat

COMMENT

THE recent round of provincial council elections in Sri Lanka, except in the north and east of the country, came to a close on 9 June when voters in the southern province went to the polls which were marked and marred by violence, intimidation and allegations of electoral malpractice including vote-rigging. The elections for the other six provinces had been completed, on 28 April and 2 June.

The JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera and his staunch henchmen hail from the southern province which, from JVP's inception, has been regarded as its strongest base. The elections in this province provided the setting for the test between the determination of the government to go ahead with its plans for establishing the Provincial Council system and the decision of the JVP to sabotage it.

The orgy of violence unleashed by the JVP prior to and during the 9 June elections ensured the lowest poll ever recorded in the island's history — a mere 27.9 per cent in the whole province. An abysmal 7.5 per cent voter turnout was reached in the Hambantota district. When counting began, it was noted that not a single vote was cast in ten ballot boxes and 16 ballot boxes were counted in just under 23 minutes.

Although the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) had called for a boycott of the elections, it cannot be doubted that the crucial factor contributing to the unprecedented low vote recorded was the campaign of violence unleashed by the JVP on election day and before. Candidates and supporters of the ruling United National Party (UNP) and the opposition United Socialist Alliance (USA) were ruthlessly gunned down in surprise attacks in their homes or as they went about campaigning. Government and security officials were shot. In some areas huge trees had been felled to ensure obstruction of roads. Buses belonging to the state transport board and private vehicles used for campaigning were set ablaze. Party offices and buildings earmarked for polling stations were attacked. Electrical installations were set on fire resulting in a cut to power supply in certain areas. On election day polling booths were stormed and polling officers attacked. Land mines exploded in certain public places striking terror to the hearts of many.

The scene in substantial areas of the southern province was as if a total curfew had been clamped down — shops and restaurants remained closed, vehicles were missing from the roads and very few people ventured out of their homes. One after another, polling booths manned by terror-stricken officials were seen completely deserted.

Neither the SLFP nor the JVP can legitimately claim that the thousands

who failed to vote supported their cause. Besides the generalised violence and individual attacks it had launched, the JVP had put up posters threatening to kill the first five persons who appeared at polling stations to vote. Worse was that this threat applied not only to those who actually voted but also extended to all the members of their families. Not that the people love the vote less but they feared the gun more.

The government had mobilised all the security services at its disposal, including the army, navy, air force and paramilitary outfits, in an attempt to prevent the disruption of the poll and ensure a reasonable voter turnout. Although the government's security efforts prevented a complete abandonment of the elections, they did not prove adequate to avoid substantial disruption or ensure a respectable showing in terms of voter turnout. Of the 1,289,000 registered voters, approximately 940,000 did not vote.

As Kendall Hopman of the 'Sunday Times' (Colombo, 12 June 1988) put it, 'a military victory, a political defeat, is perhaps the most fitting epitaph for Thursday's provincial council elections in southern Sri Lanka. From a military perspective, the fact that the election was not disrupted was a victory for the government forces. Politically the under 30 per cent voter turnout was an ignominious show of democracy versus the T-56'.

JUNE 1988

LETTER

TAMIL RESILIENCE

An important meeting was held last week at Vaddukoddai, the home town of the Secretary General of the TULF, Mr Amirthalingam.

Though this meeting was connected with the Church of South India, most of the speeches highlighted the present political and military actions of the North and East of Sri Lanka.

This was a function organised to receive three dignitaries who arrived from South India in Jaffna last week.

The IPKF's actions, other activities and excesses were brought to focus by four speakers and some other participants.

An important question posed before the South Indian dignitaries was, 'Is India for a political solution or a military solution to the Sri Lanka Tamils Problem?'

The Bishop for the church of South India Rev. Fr. Ambalavanar posed the question before the assembly.

'Our guest nation, India, since July

1983 told the Sri Lankan Government, there can never be a military solution to this problem.

The way lies clearly in a political solution. But within a mere eight weeks of their arrival in this country, they lost their patience and their preaching and started fighting. What is the meaning of this? is the first question raised by Bishop Ambalavanar.

His second question was: Is India really interested in Sri Lanka's peace or have they any other interest?

Lastly he told the South Indian guests that the IPKF soldiers did not know what they were doing! And why they were here!

At their function the Archbishop of Jaffna Rev. Fr. B. Deogupillai briefly and lucidly explained the Tamils' problems since 1958.

At one point the Archbishop said that 'The general Tamil public will not say this. But I say that they are all with the militants. Foreign countries do not know what's going on here. We are the abandoned people.'

A noteworthy speech was by the Jaffna Municipal Commissioner Mr C.V.K. Sivagnanam.

'The Indian Govt. claims that had they not intervened soon after the Vadamarachchi Operation Liberation, the entire Jaffna peninsula would have been annihilated. I am not prepared to accept it.

'I would rather say, Vadamarachchi Operation Liberation did not destroy the entirety of the Vadamarachchi, and did not kill the entire population of the area.

'So, it follows even if there had been a repetition of the Sri Lankan forces operation over the rest of the peninsula, these areas too would not have been totally destroyed nor would the entire population have been killed.'

Mr. Sivagnanam went on to remark 'One character of the Tamil race is resilience. They may suffer terribly; but undaunted they should come back for more.'

— Letter from Jaffna,
The Sunday Times, 26.6.88

REPORT

Political Acrobatics

State leaders equivocate on the Sri Lankan issue



RAJIV Gandhi's biggest achievement on the tortuous Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic issue was winning over the late Tamil Nadu chief minister M.G. Ramachandran to his side.

And as long as "Puratchi Thalaivar (revolutionary leader)" was alive and backing the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, Tamil Nadu remained relatively quiet despite the fierce battle that broke out between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

But with MGR's death—and the subsequent turmoil in the state—the Sri Lankan Tamil issue has again revealed the dark side of Tamil politicians. Most of the prominent leaders have done a dizzying volte-face. The prospect of imminent elections has exposed an array of political carpet-baggers, all equivocating on the Tamil issue. As L. Ketheeswaran, spokesman of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front says: "The Sri Lankan conflict has become a football, kicked around by Tamil Nadu politicians to score points in the electoral arena."

The sudden reversals of policy can be attributed to three factors. First, the local politicians need to project themselves as the true custodians of Tamil interests. Second, the desire to capture a part of the halo of LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran, who is still seen by many Tamils, particularly the youth, as a hero. Third and most crucial, the regional parties' temptation to hit the Congress(I) exactly where it hurts. Says A. Amrithalingam, leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF): "Their (local parties) attitude to the conflict seems to depend on their relationship with the Congress(I). If they want to oppose it, they criticise the IPKF." Tamil Nadu Congress(I) Committee (TNCC-I) President G.K. Mooppanar argues: "None of the Dravida parties has a clear-cut stand on this issue. There's no commitment; only sheer opportunism."

The Janaki faction of the AIADMK illustrates this point. To persuade the Congress(I) into continuing its support, Janaki Ramachandran as

chief minister openly supported the accord. On January 25, she declared: "We firmly believe that the implementation of the agreement will go a long way in finding a permanent solution to the ethnic problems in Sri Lanka." Yet, precisely three days after her ministry was dismissed on February 3, Janaki asked the Centre to "restrain the IPKF from attacking innocent Tamils".

Overnight, the IPKF became "an army of murderous rapists" for the Janaki faction. Asked to explain this turnabout, Janaki insists: "We're following MGR's policies." That's not quite true. MGR had, in fact, disowned his MP; Aladi Aruna's description of the IPKF as a 'killing force' in Parliament late last year. "Our strategy now is different," says Aruna blithely.

Jayalalitha has been little different. All these years, nobody had heard the eloquent Jayalalitha plead for the Sri Lankan Tamils. After the dissolution of her rival Janaki's ministry following the Congress(I)'s withdrawal of support to it, a grateful Jayalalitha had even backed the accord. But this March, after her relationship with the Congress(I) soured, she

exploded: "If Pirabhakaran is harmed, there will be a bloodbath in Tamil Nadu." Veiled references were made suggesting that she was in touch with LTTE leaders. Says satirist Cho Ramaswamy: "Jayalalitha's sudden love for Pirabhakaran is stunning." Like Janaki, Jayalalitha denies any change in stand and states imperiously: "We're following in MGR's footsteps." But the timing of her outburst reveals her motives. Points out A. Nallasivam, CPI(M) secretary of the state unit: "It's a pressure tactic aimed at impressing the Congress(I) that if it doesn't accept her demands on seat adjustments, she could stir trouble on the sensitive issue."

Local LTTE leaders confirmed that they had not been in touch with Jayalalitha. Evidently, she is creating a myth to suit her political interests. Says Rangarajan Kumaramangalam, a Congress(I) MP: "Jayalalitha is indulging in silly pressure plays that will only harm her cause."

Matinee idol Sivaji Ganesan has also



gone through political acrobatics. His love for the Sri Lankan Tamils remained a secret while he was a Congressman. The minute he walked out to form his own Tamil Welfare Front on February 10, Ganesan changed his tune. Now he says: "The barbarous IPKF is doing exactly what Jayewardene wants to do—liquidate Tamils." Claiming he could not criticise the accord earlier being a "disciplined Congressman", he now vows to "expose the mistakes of the Congress(I)"—mistakes which he had been a party to. Last December, for instance, Ganesan had participated in a public function in Madras in which the TNCC(I) handed over gunny bags containing 50 lakh signatures supporting the accord to the prime minister. "Bogus signatures," fumes Ganesan now.

FOR the matinee idol, the Sri Lankan problem is a stick to beat the Congress(I) with. And it fits in with the Tamil chauvinism he's whipping up. His signature tune is "Vadaku Vazhigirathu, theku theigirathu" (the north flourishes while the south languishes). Says M. Shankar of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation: "We haven't heard him speak for us before."

It is only DMK President M. Karunanidhi who has shown a certain amount of consistency in his stand. But he too is guilty of ambivalence in his attitude to Pirabhakaran. MGR, when he supported the LTTE, had only one condition—that it must avoid the DMK at all costs. Pirabhakaran agreed as a chief minister's friendship was more important. Ka-

runanidhi then supported the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). When the LTTE liquidated TELO in the summer of 1986, the furious DMK supremo called Pirabhakaran a *paavi* (sinner). Posters appeared everywhere describing him as a *kolaikaran* (murderer). The LTTE fuelled Karunanidhi's anger by spurning the Rs 50,000 he had collected for it in September 1986.

However, after MGR's death, an orphaned Pirabhakaran wrote to Karunanidhi: "At a time when death is stalking the north and east, you alone are the Tamils' Nambikai Nakshatram (trustworthy star)." Karunanidhi soon hailed Pirabhakaran as a hero. Since February, a rash of red, green and white posters has appeared all over the state showing Karunanidhi and Pirabhakaran as godfather and protégé. Unlike the AIADMK faction leaders, Karunanidhi doesn't prevaricate. He admits: "I don't deny (the change). Now I must support Pirabhakaran because he's the only person in the field."

Jayalalitha supporters, who see Karunanidhi as their main foe, charge that he is only trying to reap political dividends. AIADMK leader S. Thirunavukkarasu points out that when Karunanidhi was chief minister (between 1969 and 1976) he was responsible for the extradition of TELO leader Kuttimani who was later murdered in Colombo's Welikade prison in July 1983. There is another shift in Karunanidhi's line. He is no longer particularly vocal about Eelam, as his electoral allies, the two communist par-

ties, don't support the concept.

What is clear in the cacophony is that most parties in Tamil Nadu will use the Sri Lankan problem to attack the Congress(I) during the polls. And sanctimonious Congressmen chide the Dravida parties for stooping low to exploit this sensitive issue. But that doesn't mean the Congress(I) is itself above scheming. Popular belief is that polls in Tamil Nadu are linked to a solution in Sri Lanka. Says Karunanidhi: "Till things are sorted out there, they won't hold elections."

But political chicanery on such a sensitive issue bristles with dangers. These include:

- ▶ Needless whipping up of Tamil chauvinism which can become uncontrollable and harm national unity. (One of the earliest calls of secessionism was made by the DMK in the early '60s.)

- ▶ Spread of the cult of violence. Due to their close ties with the militants, the local parties may assimilate the country-bomb politics of the Tamil separatist organisations and thus graduate from the use of soda water bottles and cycle chains. This was demonstrated during the 1986 DMK stir when a series of bomb blasts ripped the state. Ultra-left chauvinistic groups like the Tamil Liberation Army that masterminded the Ariyalur train bomb blast last March have also cropped up. This group, involved in two other bombing incidents this year, is believed to have acquired explosives from the LTTE and PLOTE.

- ▶ Relegation of the real issues in Tamil Nadu to the background.

- ▶ Resurgence of anti-Sinhalese sentiments that will jeopardise healthy relations with Sri Lanka.

- ▶ Erosion of public respect for the defence forces and damage to the morale of the army since the political attacks on the IPKF have been vituperative.

- ▶ A cynical public, made more so by the legerdemains of political parties which have exposed their bankruptcy of values.

But so obsessed have the local parties become in their craving to extract political mileage out of the Sri Lankan Tamils that they have forgotten the human tragedy.

Though they make lofty proclamations about their concern for the suffering Tamils, none of them—be it MGR or Karunanidhi, Janaki or Jayalalitha, Moopanar or Ganesan—has ever visited a Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camp. The refugees, after all, have no votes.

—ANITA PRATAP in Madras
JUNE 15, 1988



JUNE 19-25, 1986

REPORT

Arms and the LTTE

COLOMBO House in Singapore is a well-known landmark. This building houses many an office of maritime companies. And in this building, under an innocuous name functions an organisation that has been a 'front-office' of LTTE.

No doubt, the Indian army was surprised by LTTE when there was a head-on confrontation. But if there is one thing that surprised New Delhi more than the determination and fighting quality of LTTE, it is a near-magical feat that the Tigers performed: they could get arms at will.

Where did all these arms come from? The search ultimately led them to Singapore. The Colombo House.

The original and the main supplier of arms to LTTE had been—and there is no reason to hide this any more—India itself. India provided training as well. By 1986, India had 39 training camps for the Lankan militants. The Tigers had modern arms, training and latest communication equipment. They had and still have an office in Madras as well. They also had speed boats and the ramshackle Sri Lankan Navy could not stop them. They travelled back and forth at will.

And at one point of time, LTTE had even some anti-aircraft weapons.

The Tigers did not surrender their arms after the treaty between Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi. On August 4, a week after the treaty, Prabhakaran appeared in public at a temple in Jaffna. He addressed the gathering. (Incidentally, photographs show that he did not wear the cyanide capsule that day.

He said: "We had no choice. We are not prepared to go into battle against Indian army." However, he made it clear that the treaty was no solution.

Next day, at the IPKF headquarters at the Palaly airbase, Dilip Yogi, chief of the LTTE political wing, handed over his 9 mm Beretta pistol. The other LTTE men threw in their weapons.

They included AK-47s, heavy machineguns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 150-mm mortars and some rusty World War II rifles.

IPKF knew that the Tigers had not surrendered all their weapons. The Sri Lankan intelligence had informed India that the Tigers had 6,000 weapons. They surrendered only 200.

But what surprised the Indian army was not what the Tigers had hoarded: they had been quietly adding to the arsenal. Where were they getting the arms? They could not have come from the air, nor by land. The only way was by sea.

Later, when LTTE and Indian army went into real battle, this problem became acute. The army had to stop the supply of arms to LTTE.

The search by the Indian intelligence led to some interesting findings. And that is where the shipping company in Singapore figures.

Indian intelligence traced a ship. In fact, this carrier was not unknown to India. When relationship between India and LTTE was smooth, this ship was a frequent visitor to Madras.

By mid-1987 the company added one more sea-going vessel to its fleet—a trawler.

The Indian authorities guessed the reason: the arms were being transferred from the ship to the trawler.

The effort was to stop this supply. But the Indian authorities faced a difficult task. The Singapore company was, for all practical purposes, above board. It violated no law of that land or of the high seas. The Indian sleuths knew what was happening. But they could do nothing about it. The arms came not from Singapore, though the money for the arms was very much there.

So the only way was to patrol the seas around the northern part of Sri Lanka. And that is precisely what the Indian Navy did.

Of course, it was 'leaked' to the press that the navy was patrolling the seas to prevent Tigers from escaping from Jaffna.

Reality was different. The idea was to stop arms reaching LTTE.

The foreign operators were given "friendly warnings" that they should

not indulge in gun-running.

This worked. It is said that after the signing of the treaty, LTTE received some 48 boatloads of weapons. But slowly this tapered off.

But Prabhakaran and company did not give up so easily. They tried two other methods to get arms. The first one was an old trick: getting the arms to India and smuggling them to Jaffna.

That required some guts. Both India and Sri Lanka were on guard. Yet, come to think of it, such an operation was the most natural. For one thing, the Tigers knew every inch of the coastline. Also both countries in their overconfidence might not have expected such a step from the Tigers.

In fact, they almost did. By an accident—details of which have not still been revealed—India came to know about this. Soon India moved and stopped it.

But the LTTE effort to get arms from the enemy was the most adventurous. At one point the Tigers sought arms from the JVP, the militant Sinhala organisation, and from the disgruntled elements in Sri Lankan army.

Indian intelligence has in its possession certain radio communications to this effect. Of course, it is not yet known how far LTTE succeeded in it.

Yet, there is some evidence. The arms captured from LTTE are a clue. In the first phase, they were of Russian make. But some of the arms recently captured match with those used by the JVP and the Sinhala army. But one can prove nothing. After all in the free market all types of arms are available.

The Indian Navy has succeeded in almost crippling the maritime supply of arms. The speed launches have been either sunk or captured.

The Tigers today face an arms shortage. Most of their arsenals have been captured. Of their 4,500 men, at least half have been immobilised—dead, injured, captured or missing. They do not have enough material to create large-scale violence. But their single largest handicap is lack of weapons or, to be precise, the realisation that what they have got is limited.

But they are not friendless. In the recent world Tamil conference in London, £ 50,000 was collected from Sri Lankan Tamils in a matter of minutes. However, there is little chance of this money reaching LTTE in the form of arms.

The Singapore-based ship still sails. But there is no evidence that it carries anything for LTTE.

—SRV

'We're close to restoring normalcy'



A successful operation. Lt. Gen. Kalkat (right) GOC, IPKF watching the return of first batch of troops.

LIEUTENANT-General Amarjit Singh Kalkat, GOC of the IPKF, was at the scene of action in the Alampil jungles in northern Sri Lanka, said to be the last of the Tiger strongholds. Kalkat believes that disarming the Tigers and restoration of normalcy are at hand. He told THE WEEK in Madras: "As you come to the finish (of the operations), the process becomes very slow. We are very close to normalcy. Very close to having a situation where the democratic process can start." Excerpts:

On the recent IPKF pullout.

It has not been a pullout, really. The troops that are not required for operations now have come back. We have a continuous reappraisal of operational requirements. This time the combat troops were not required. Also equipment like APCs were sent back. Coming in or going back all depends on the ground situation.

On the Alampil operation.

This was not an extraordinary operation. It was part of the operations to disarm the militants that is on in the north and the east of Sri Lanka. One of our units came across this camp with about 150 to 200 Tigers. We flew in more troops to isolate the area, since it was of importance to the Tigers. The operations were a success. Some militants were killed, some rounded up, some might have slipped away. Now, the Tigers may be in very small groups. They avoid a straight fight with the IPKF. We will have to search the villages and locate them. It's a very slow process.

On the present strength of LTTE.

With the Alampil operation, the Tigers have disintegrated. We have broken the cohesiveness of their military force.

On the military power of LTTE on the ground.

I can talk only from what is visible on the ground.

They do not contest our operations. They avoid engagements. A fair amount of weapons are being buried away. They are now resorting to acts of sabotage. Setting off explosive devices at public places.

On the state of normalcy in the north and east of the island.

We are coming to a situation of very near normalcy but in some areas there is trouble, like in the east. People wanted schools and colleges to open. Shops and banks are functioning. Mail is delivered and we provide security for cash transactions at banks. Our engineers have rebuilt public places. People come to us for assistance. We will carry on our operations to create normalcy. We are fast achieving it.

On the future role of the IPKF, once normalcy is restored.

I will not venture an opinion on that question. The Indian government has clearly said that the genuine, legitimate fears of the Tamils will be taken care of in the democratic process. The IPKF will get back when the government is sure that all aspects of the agreement are honoured.

On the Tamil fears of a Sri Lankan backlash and on elections.

If the groups join the political process and we have a government with the Tamils in the majority, they will be there to take care of everything. We are there as catalysts in this process. We will ensure that there is no coercion, no threats in the conduct of polls. We will provide full security. We are very close to restoring normalcy. Those people with arms and who have evaded us are few in number. And there will be no let up in the operations. The refugees are coming back and we have resettled many Tamils who stayed on on the island. You will be surprised by the rehabilitation work that we have done.

JUNE 19-25, 1988

—VINCENT D'SOUZA

Troop Pullout Is Symbolic

June 17, 1988

By MOHAN RAM

Special to India Abroad

COMMENT

NEW DELHI

There is no time frame yet for an end to India's military involvement in Sri Lanka, which began at the end of July 1987. The token pull-out of an assault brigade of 400 men with heavy equipment on June 7, as India has hastened to clarify, is not the commencement of the final withdrawal.

The June 7 spectacle at Trincomalee harbor was timed unmistakably for the June 9 elections to the Council in the sensitive and crucial Southern Province, a stronghold of the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna.

The token withdrawal was meant to help President J.R. Jayewardene and his United National Party blunt opposition

criticism that the continued presence of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, though limited to the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern Provinces, compromised the island republic's sovereignty.

Turnout Only 25%

And as expected, the voter turnout in the Southern Province was a chillingly low 25 percent. Sri Lanka's tradition of Adult Franchise elections dates to 1933 (when no third world country had perhaps known this political luxury). Sri Lanka is known for a 75 percent voting turnout.

The Southern Province was the seventh to elect a provincial Council in the plan for devolution of power under the India-Sri Lanka agreement of last July 29. All seven Sinhala-majority provinces have now elected councils, the UNP having a majority in all.

The United Socialist Alliance of four leftist parties, dominated by the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party and including the Communist Party, emerged as a close contender in some provinces and is the main opposition in all.

Like the UNP, the USP supports the India-Sri Lanka agreement, so that was not the issue. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, which is the mainstream Sinhala opposition party, boycotted the elections because it opposed the 1987 agreement.

Regarded as Sellout

The Sinhala youth radical Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, which regards the agreement as a sellout to India (rather than to the island's ethnic Tamils) tried to enforce the boycott through a campaign of terror.

Voter turnout has varied in the provinces from 56.35 percent to 25. But then there have also been charges of rigging and "state violence" to increase the chances of the UNP.

Overall, the poor turnout in the Southern Province was a setback as much to Jayewardene as to India, whose token withdrawal was seen by the voters as an election gimmick.

The withdrawal of 400 personnel, declared a "surplus," means little when the admitted combat strength of the peace-keeping force is 52,000, against a few hundred guerrillas. It is more than

the combined strength of Sri Lanka's military and paramilitary forces.

Strength Misleading

Further, the IPKF's presence is limited to the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern Provinces, which geographically account for only a third of Sri Lanka's territory.

The officially admitted strength of the IPKF is misleading because it does not include the auxiliary forces and paramilitary forces. Together, the Indian force is closer to 100,000. It began 10 months ago with 6,000.

India's position is that the entire IPKF is not engaged in operations, with most personnel just stand-by. But Sri Lanka's perception is different. It seems convinced that India has deployed more troops than necessary.

Sri Lanka's Land Development Minister, Gamini Disanayake, aired the difference with India on this point early last month in New Delhi when he hinted at the possibility of a phased withdrawal.

Reports from Colombo had said about 3,000 Indian troops were withdrawn, but Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit said the exact number could not be divulged for operational reasons.

When Defense Minister K.C. Pant visited Colombo at the end of May, it was widely speculated that all that needed to be announced was a timetable for withdrawal. But at the end of his visit, it was clear that nothing dramatic was in the cards. All that the world was told was that forces not required would return to India in the "near future."


But it is significant that Pant also announced that the IPKF would be able to insure the physical conditions to begin the process of holding elections to the councils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces by the end of July.

The councils were contrived essentially to enable devolution of power to the Tamils, but paradoxically all the Sinhala majority provinces have elected the councils but not the Tamil provinces.

Pant promised only physical conditions for holding the elections. It is not the same as insuring the people's participation in them.

The best construction now is that the IPKF is confident of restoring normalcy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces by the end of July. But then India has also been hedging its desire to withdraw its force early with the condition that the 1987 agreement be implemented in full. So the IPKF withdrawal is contingent on India's subjective satisfaction that the accord has been implemented.

Outside the Indian government there are weird arguments favoring a prolonged



stay of the IPKF. One is that Jayewardene's hold on the Sinhala provinces is tenuous, thanks to the JVP challenge. And such a challenge is a threat to the 1987 accord. The obvious suggestion is that the political challenges Jayewardene faces at home is India's concern. This smacks of hegemonism.

The IPKF went to Sri Lanka with a limited brief. It was to demilitarize the ethnic conflict by getting the Sri Lankan forces to stop the operations and return to barracks and the guerrilla groups to lay down arms. The first goal has been achieved but not the second, though the IPKF launched an all-out war against the rebels beginning last October.

There is no let-up in the war, and the prolonged IPKF presence has raised doubts among the Sinhalese about India's intentions. For instance, Father Tissa Balasuriya and Bernadeen Silva of the Center for Society and Religion in Colombo say

"Many in Sri Lanka are wary of Indian intentions. Are they incapable of handling the guerrilla situation which they themselves helped build up? Or are they unwilling to deal with it? Or worse still, are they making use of it to prolong their stay and achieve their own military or political objectives."

The longer the IPKF stays in Sri Lanka, the more unpopular it will be with the Sinhalese and the Tamils. It will be a counterproductive mission.

But a new-fangled argument has been endorsed in India by quarters as diverse as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Janata Party: The Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces would face brutal Sinhala reprisals the moment the IPKF left.

First, the IPKF, by virtually liquidating the military wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, has eliminated the buffer between the Tamil people and the predominantly-Sinhala Sri Lankan armed forces. The vacuum thus created is now cited as the alibi for the prolonged IPKF presence in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka, in theory, might have established the point that it has the say on the IPKF because the latter's presence is at Colombo's invitation. India has maintained that the Indian force-level is a matter to be jointly determined by it and Sri Lanka. But in reality India seems to think that the present level must be maintained for some time, the withdrawals being token.

However, Sri Lankan apprehension that India has objectives other than the Tamil rights behind its presence in the island is too well-founded to be wished away.

MURDER OF FR. CHANDRA FERNANDO

D.B.S. Jayaraj

The funeral of Rev. Fr. Chandra Fernando was a moving event. The people of Batticaloa attended in large numbers. The pamphlet distributed by the EROS titled 'Are you a Brutus' was well received. The death of the priest is the first of its kind to occur after the Accord. Earlier during the conflict between the Sri Lankan forces and the Tamil groups Catholic priests like Fr. Mary Bastian of Vankalai and Bro. Wenceslaus of Tholakatty have been killed. Priests like Frs. Singarayer and Sinnarasa have been arrested. The killing of Fr. Chandra was the first murder of a Catholic priest in the internecine warfare among the Tamil groups.

Fr. Chandra did yeoman service to the people of Batticaloa in his capacity as Joint Secretary of the Citizens Committee, earlier as Joint Secretary and later as President. Of the many incidents that occurred people recall with gratitude and admiration his performance during the ceasefire-monitoring panel sittings in Batticaloa, the Kokkatcholai massacre, and the Indian army killings in Valaichanai and Kumburumoolai. The man who had the courage to stand up to the might of the Sri Lankan and Indian states in the interests of his people has been gunned down by a section of his own people.

Various reasons are adduced for the killing. The chief one is the allegation spread by interested parties that Fr. Chandra was a Tiger supporter. Earlier his brother, the president of a Batticaloa trade union federation, was detained by the Indian Army for a long time.

When elections to the Batticaloa Citizens Committee occurred last time, the LTTE allegedly interfered and saw to it that the new administration comprised people who were not hostile to the LTTE. Fr. Chandra was among those re-elected. Later when the Indian army had flushed the Tigers away from Batticaloa, other Tamil groups re-emerged. The TELO, EPRLF and ENDLF began functioning openly in Batticaloa. Thanks to the benevolent patronage of the Indian forces in return for services rendered by 'singing' information about LTTE, those groups walked freely in the land of the singing fish.

The EPRLF put pressure on the Citizens Committee to dissolve itself. When asked the reason, the EPRLF said that the Citizens Committee was not truly representative of the people and was a Tiger appendage. They had no objection to a genuinely independent people oriented Citizens Committee, the EPRLF said. Fr. Chandra resisted

pressures and continued to function until his death.

Before that rumours were spread that 'Tigers' were being kept hidden in the Bishop's House by Fr. Chandra and another priest. When a Colombo-based foreign correspondent innocently revealed the 'source' who was 'planting' the stories to Bishop Kingsley Swampillai, the angry prelate had allegedly rung up the source and berated him.

So now Fr. Chandra is dead. The EPRLF has issued a public statement condemning the killing. Whoever was responsible for the killing has proven one point. 'When in power' do as the Tigers, which in effect means eliminating all those who disagree with you. In practice, people who get killed usually are not ordinary people but those who have some stature, those who are of service to the community etc. For these are the people who can shape public opinion and are therefore potentially dangerous. What is saddening is that when this process goes on the community will be deprived of its leaders, the men with a social commitment and independent spirit.

In this context one also recalls the plight of Mr. Sam Thambimuttu who was Joint Secretary of the Citizens Committee with Fr. Chandra earlier, an abortive attempt on his life was made by 'Pottu' of the LTTE. Mr. Thambimuttu had to come down to Colombo for sometime. Today 'Pottu' has left the LTTE and gone abroad, but Mr. Thambimuttu continues to live in Batticaloa.

The killing of Fr. Chandra also reminds one of the LTTE action against the TELO. When remonstrating with the then Jaffna leader 'Kittu' about the massacre of TELO cadres. Kittu's defence was a standard one. 'It was a preemptive strike. They were planning to wipe us out. We were quicker. Otherwise you would be remonstrating with Sri Sabaratnam about my death'. Today it seems that 'Kittu' was right after all. Despite all the glib talk and professed ideals, the group that killed Fr. Chandra has shown that basically there is no difference between them and the Tigers.

The complacent Colombo-types who casually dismiss the LTTE and JVP as 'Ethno Populists' and 'Neo-Fascists', and hail the pro-Indian groups as progressives would do well to take note of this killing. The vendetta against Tiger supporters goes on unabated in the East. Many people have died. To use a Churchillian phrase 'the War of the Giants is over, the war of the pygmies has started'.

JUNE 1988

COMMENTARY

WHITHER HUMAN RIGHTS?

It cannot be doubted that the action taken by the Indian government at various times before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights played a crucial role in turning the spotlight on the human rights abuses committed by the Sri Lankan government and its security forces against the island's Tamil community. The Indian government's forthright condemnation of Sri Lanka's massive military attacks on Tamil civilian areas and its eventual decision to send its planes to drop 'humanitarian assistance' to the beleaguered Tamils went a long way towards preventing the Sri Lankan government from seeking the final military solution it was seeking.

With the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement came the India Peace Keeping Force. The agreement and the arrival of the IPKF were portrayed and projected as favours done by India for the Tamils. The Tamils welcomed the IPKF and thought there would be no more atrocities, no more civilian killings and no more human rights violations. But events have proved otherwise. The recent report of Amnesty International (see page 5) highlights, even though to a lesser extent than actually is the case, the violations to which the Tamil people are continuing to be subjected. It is ironic but true that, India which quoted AI reports in the past to support its denunciations of the Sri Lankan government for human rights violations against the Tamils now finds itself indicted on the same count by the same AI.

The AI report also draws attention to the dramatic increase in violations of human rights against members of the Sinhala community in Sri Lanka. In the past we warned the Sinhala people that the draconian and authoritarian structures — the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Emergency Regulations, the para-military outfits like the Special Task Force, Counter-Subversion Unit, the Home Guards etc. — that were being constructed and increasingly employed against members of the Tamil community, would, sooner than later be deployed against members of the Sinhala community. That is exactly what has been happening in the recent past. When AI spotlighted the abuses committed against the Tamils, there were many in the Sinhala community who labelled and denounced AI as a 'Tamil lobby' trying its utmost to tarnish the image of Sri Lanka. But today it is the same AI which has come forward to focus attention on the abuses which members of the Sinhala community are being made to suffer.

The Tamils of Sri Lanka had a just cause against a government which was denying the basic and fundamental rights to which they were entitled. And to win back these rights, they launched a struggle, peaceful first

and then armed. It is the human rights abuses which accompanied the attempt by the government to suppress that struggle by arbitrary and military means that attracted a measure of international legitimacy to the struggle of the Tamil people. The Tamil struggle for the restoration of their fundamental rights was fought on an international programme of human rights. And this platform was made possible and stronger not through the power that flowed through the barrel of an AK-47 or a T-56, but by the sheer hard and dedicated work of individual human rights activists. At great risk and cost to themselves, they collected, collated and documented volumes upon volumes of human rights abuses in Sri Lanka. Some constituted themselves into Citizens Committees which became the only body to which the suffering and helpless ordinary people could turn to complain and seek assistance. It is to this rare category of individuals that Rev. Fr. Chandra Fernando belonged until he was brutally and callously gunned down reportedly by two Tamil gunmen within the precincts of his own church. The enduring testimony to this priest's contribution was the many thousand people who came to pay their last respects at his funeral. Their presence also constituted a testimony of condemnation and disgust with which they viewed this cowardly murder.

Now comes the tragic news of the abduction of another committed human rights activist and a dedicated rehabilitation social worker, Mr. K. Kanthasamy. The selfless and self-effacing Kanthasamy has carried on his work for the last 25 years or so without seeking publicity or position. Having earned the status of persona non grata with the government of Sri Lanka, he arrived in London to become the live wire and backbone of the Tamil Information Centre. Although he shunned publicity, he was well known among members of the international human rights and humanitarian community. Kanthasamy returned to the island after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord to continue working for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the lives and livelihood of the Tamil people. But he was seen abducted by a group of Tamil men in Jaffna on 19 June and has not been seen since. His abductors have not yet had the courage to admit responsibility.

The senseless murder of Rev. Fr. Chandra Fernando and the abduction and disappearance of Mr. Kanthasamy (there have been other cases too) compel the Tamil people to ask themselves some fundamental questions: can the platform of human rights that enabled the Tamil cause to be advanced remain firm or valid when individual Tamils, dedicated human rights activists at that, are deprived of their most precious of human right, the right to life.



Fr. Chandra Fernando



Mr. Kandasamy

DETENTION, TORTURE & DISAPPEARANCES CONTINUE IN SRI LANKA

Human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, disappearances and torture continue to be reported in Sri Lanka, the world-wide human rights body, the Amnesty International said in a report released on 21 June.

While the report notes that there was a reduction in the scale of human rights abuses in the north and east of the country following the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, Amnesty International states that, since the beginning of hostilities between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) stationed in the Tamil areas and the LTTE, it has received reports alleging that members of the IPKF have been responsible for rape and other acts of brutality including killing of unarmed civilians in reprisal. It also received reports of 'disappearance' of persons belonging to the Tamil community after having been taken into custody by the IPKF.

The AI report further reflects a dramatic increase in human rights abuses in the south of the island where hundreds of men and women belonging to the Sinhalese community have been arrested and detained for alleged connection with the Peoples Liberation Front (JVP) — the proscription of which was recently lifted — which has been accused of acts of violence including the killing of government officials and others who support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. There have been disturbing reports of many 'disappearances' among those taken into custody from this group.

Amnesty International has expressed concern at the refusal of the Sri Lankan government to permit an AI mission to visit the island although its President had previously given an assurance that such a mission would be permitted in the course of an interview with the BBC broadcast in February this year.

685 DISAPPEARANCES

The AI report states that the Sri Lankan security forces were responsible for the 'disappearance' of 685 persons belonging to the island's Tamil community between 1983 and July 1987 and, having listed the names and other details of all 685 cases, states that none of the victims have been accounted for by the government despite the fact that the United Nations Working Group on 'disappearances' had called for explanation from the government of Sri Lanka.

The AI states that there is evidence

that many of the 'disappeared' had been tortured while they were held incommunicado and others had been shot dead and their bodies disposed of in secret.

Among the many thousands of prisoners released in an amnesty following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Amnesty International has also documented a number of cases in which the victims had been subjected to prolonged torture by the security forces. Some of the released detainees have submitted sworn testimony that they had also witnessed the deaths of other detainees following torture. Several released prisoners have testified that they had been forced to bury bodies of detainees shot by the Special Task Force (STF) and that they had been present when tortured prisoners died in custody.

DEATHS IN CUSTODY

One released detainee described how, in June, he was in the STF camp at Tirukovil when another detainee was brought in with multiple injuries on his face, chest and thighs; he was unable to walk or eat food. He told other detainees that he had been hit with clubs and pickaxes, had been buried in hot sand and had had his genitals pricked with needles. His mother visited the camp in late June, but was not allowed to see him. On 28 June, fellow detainees were ordered to dig a pit to which firewood and tyres were brought. Several detainees saw the body of the tortured man being taken to the pit by police commandos. Gunshots were heard and the men who had dug the pit were told that 'three had been shot'.

Another detainee released under the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement swore that during the first seven months of 1987 he had burnt the dead bodies of 25 youths whom STF men brought as suspects to their camp at Akkairapattu. One of them was a man arrested in June whose arrest and detention were denied by the officer-in-charge of the STF camp where relatives and fellow detainees saw him. In June fellow detainees saw how this man was taken to a place nicknamed 'the slaughter house' where he was apparently tortured, after which he was kept separate from other detainees in a cell with two others. On the night of 2 July, detainees in the camp heard shots being fired from the backyard. After this, one detainee, who had previously

taken food to the three detainees in their cell stated that he had been told to take food for only two. This detainee also said he assisted the next day in taking the fingerprints of four bodies, one of whom he identified as that of the detainee who had previously been held in the separate cell. All four bodies bore gunshot wounds. That evening, detainees were ordered to carry firewood, coconut husks and tyres to a place where after dark the four bodies were seen carried for burning.

TORTURE, A ROUTINE

The sworn testimony, the photographic and medical evidence produced by AI establishes beyond doubt that detainees were subjected to torture as a matter of routine. Nearly all those who testified after release gave detailed accounts of repeated prolonged torture by security service personnel, especially the STF in the eastern province which confirmed evidence previously received by AI. Many of them bore marks of torture. One of them had marks all over the body of severe burns consistent with his allegations that melted foam rubber was made to drip on his body. Another released detainee described how he had been beaten while being suspended from his thumbs tied behind his back, and was made to inhale fumes from a pot of burning coal which was later placed on various sensitive parts of his body. This man, who, to Amnesty International's knowledge, was never charged with any offence, suffered severe burns and said that he was unable to walk and work effectively, complaining of frequent headaches and an inability to concentrate. Many others complained of after-effects and physical and mental disabilities, resulting in their inability to work.

The AI report also notes that, despite the fact that the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka agreement provided for release of detainees, over 800 Tamils continue to remain in detention without trial under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the country's Public Security Emergency Regulations.

VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTH

The AI report states that during 1987 hundreds of members belonging to the Sinhalese community were reported to have been arrested and detained without charge or trial under Emergency Regulations which provide for indefinite detention.

In May 1987, according to the police, 500 members of the proscribed JVP were arrested and held under the Emergency Regulations. Many were arrested for putting up posters or painting slogans. That same month, the

Chief Justice granted compensation to three men whom the Supreme Court ruled had been illegally detained by the police in connection with the alleged distribution of pamphlets (Emergency Regulation 28 requires that prior permission must be obtained from the Inspector General of Police to display posters or distribute leaflets.) The Court observed that ER 28 'gives the Police absolute discretionary power to control the right of citizens to exercise their right of expression . . . It is unconstitutionally overbroad. It strikes at the foundation of the fundamental rights of speech and expression by subjecting it to prior permission. Hence that Regulation is invalid and cannot form the basis of an offence in law'. But arrests continued to be made under these and other provisions of the ER. (ER 28 has since been amended: although the prohibition to publish or distribute posters considered to be prejudicial to public security interests remains, prior permission from the Inspector General of Police is no longer required for publication).

After the signing of the July accord, many more arrests were made under the ER, especially among people alleged to be members or supporters of the JVP and the Deshapremi Janata Viyaparaya (People's Patriotic Movement (DJV), with which the JVP is closely linked. Both parties strongly opposed the peace accord. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the Communist Party issued a statement saying some of their supporters had been arrested and denying that they were involved in the violence which occurred after the signing of the accord. By mid-August 2,000 arrests had reportedly been made, apparently under the ER, in the south since the signing of the accord, and although many detainees were later released, hundreds of alleged JVP supporters continued to be held on suspicion of opposing the accord, giving classes about the JVP, possessing explosives or participating in acts of violence. In October the government announced that persons held under the ER without positive evidence of the commission of any offence would be released, but added that this would not apply to members of 'proscribed organizations' such as the JVP. The President was reported to have stated in December that members of the JVP had to be eliminated and offered the security forces immunity from prosecution for any action taken in combat.

DISAPPEARANCES IN THE SOUTH

Arrests in the south were made by the police and after July, by the Special Task Force, a paramilitary group earlier based in eastern Sri Lanka where it

had been accused of serious human rights violations. After the July accord many STF members were stationed in the south, especially in areas where the JVP is believed to be active. Many of those arrested were reportedly held in police stations for months without being brought before a magistrate. Family members, including wives and aged parents, were reportedly arrested if the police could not find the wanted person; relatives were often not informed about arrests or places of detention and were often unable to establish detainees' whereabouts, at least during the initial detention period.

Scores of Sinhalese men arrested have 'disappeared' while the security forces either denied knowledge of their arrest or whereabouts or said they had been released. The three instances cited in the AI report are typical of the many cases of disappearances: (1) Ariyasena, aged 30, son of B.G. Siethis of Kahawatte village in south Sri Lanka was taken into custody in November 1987 at Beliatte. His brother, Dayaratne aged 24 who went in search of his arrested brother was also taken into custody shortly afterwards. The security forces have denied any knowledge of their whereabouts; (2) Leslie Ranasinghe, aged 30, of Ruhuna University was arrested at Talawa on 21 October 1987 around 4.30 pm. His father visited him twice while in detention, but on the third occasion he was told that he had been released but never returned home and his whereabouts are still not known; (3) S. Wannigama, a lecturer at the Ruhuna University and reportedly a sympathiser of the JVP was arrested by the Mideniya police in the Hambantota district on 13 November 1987, but his whereabouts remain a mystery as the security forces deny that he was ever arrested.

VIOLATIONS BY THE IPKF

After its forces had entered Sri Lanka the IPKF faced increasing charges of human rights violations, notably after it started its military offensive to disarm the LTTE. Many of these allegations were made by the LTTE itself and most could not be substantiated, being hard to have corroborated by independent observers. Nevertheless, several first hand and independent reports became available of such violations. In particular, members of the IPKF were accused of raping Tamil women and of deliberately killing dozens of unarmed Tamil civilians, among them elderly people, women and children. Even though Indian Government spokesmen said that those killed were members of the LTTE or civilians who had been killed in 'crossfire', evidence mounted that in several cases the victims were

non-combatant civilians apparently shot without provocation or in reprisal for the killing of IPKF men by the LTTE. No such complaints were made against the IPKF, however, during their most recent military operation in February, when they conducted a major search operation for LTTE members in Batticaloa.

For example, on the night of 12/13 October Indian commandos descended by helicopter to capture an LTTE base near Jaffna University campus at Kokuvil, two miles from Jaffna, in the course of a major Indian military operation launched to obtain control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. Twenty-nine Indian commandos were reported shot dead by the LTTE, but several others fled and allegedly killed an estimated 40 non-combatant Tamil civilians living in the area. Relatives of the victims said that several IPKF soldiers took refuge in nearby houses and shot inhabitants at point blank range, including women, children and an elderly couple, shot on 13 October in their homes at Pirampaday Lane, Kokuvil.

Allegations that Indian forces deliberately killed non-combatant civilians were also made in the Indian press. On 27 October, for example, Indian forces launched their first aerial attack on the LTTE stronghold of Chavakachcheri. An Indian journalist present in the area reported that the IPKF had deliberately struck at civilian targets. At least 20 civilians were reported killed and witnesses were reported as saying that many of the victims were non-combatant civilians shot at the local market.

In eastern Sri Lanka Tamils as well as Muslims were alleged to be victims of such indiscriminate or reprisal killings. In many cases, there were conflicting reports about the nature of these killings and who carried them out and specific allegations were difficult to confirm because of denial of access to outsiders. For example, the local citizens committee was denied access to the village of Kaluwanchikudy, 16 miles south of Batticaloa, to investigate allegations that 14 civilians had been killed in reprisal by the IPKF after four IPKF soldiers had been killed on 23 October in a landmine explosion. An Indian Government spokesman claimed that only three people had been killed, and in fighting, not as a measure of reprisal. But an independent observer present in the village said that Indian soldiers had got out of control, and that civilians had been killed as a result.

The Indian Government assumed responsibility for one of these alleged extrajudicial killings: on 22 November it court-martialled a soldier who had the previous day killed two Muslims and wounded five others when he fired

on a crowd near the Trincomalee clock-tower. The Sri Lanka Government has been investigating conflicting reports of another incident in which at least 25 Muslim civilians were shot dead in the eastern village of Ottamawadi on 2 December. The IPKF maintained that victims were killed in crossfire, but residents said villagers were indiscriminately killed after nine Indian soldiers had been killed in an LTTE ambush. To Amnesty International's knowledge, this is the only instance of a Sri Lankan Government investigation into IPKF activities. And in no instance, it seems, has an impartial body attempted to carry out investigations into these and other alleged IPKF killings.

WOMEN RAPED

There have also been an increasing number of allegations that lower ranking IPKF personnel had raped Tamil women. Several dozen Tamil women, some of whom needed hospital treatment, have testified on oath that they were raped by IPKF personnel, for example in Kondavil East in the north and in Sathurkodanan and Morakkadanchenai villages in eastern Sri Lanka. Several of these allegations have been investigated by the IPKF itself, although the Indian Government continued to deny any such charges. But in December 1987 a local magistrate reportedly found the IPKF responsible for seven cases of rape. In January 1988, moreover, four Indian soldiers were discharged and sentenced by an Indian court martial to one year's imprisonment for raping Tamil women.

Amnesty International also has been receiving reports of 'disappearances' of some Tamils taken into custody by the IPKF. AI has documented four such typical cases, all occurring in the northern Jaffna district in which young Tamil men reportedly arrested by the IPKF between November 1987 and February 1988 have 'disappeared'. The four persons concerned are: S. Varatharajah, aged 36, of Nallur arrested on 16 November 1987; M. Baburaj, aged 14, of Valvettiturai arrested on 16 November 1987; A. Thandauthapani, aged 40, of Vaddukoddai arrested on 8 January 1988; and N. Kirupakaran, aged 19, of Urelu arrested on 23 February 1988. In all these cases, the IPKF had confirmed the detention saying that they would be released after investigation. But the relatives have been unable to establish their fate or whereabouts, and it is feared that they might have died while in custody.

(A summarised review of 'Reports of Torture and Killings in Custody and Recent Allegations of Disappearances' by Amnesty International released on 21 June 1988 prepared by the HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (SCOT))

Amnesty's charges against IPKF baseless

From K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, June 20.

The Government today denied allegations of rape and brutality levelled by Amnesty International against the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka.

The charges were fabricated and unfair, a Foreign Office spokesman said when asked to comment on the Amnesty International report. 'Every specific complaint received from any source about the behaviour of IPKF troops has been investigated. Most of these charges have been found to be baseless. Wherever such charges have been proved, quick and salutary action has been taken against the guilty', he added.

The IPKF, according to him, operated in Sri Lanka with the utmost restraint, and used minimum force to avoid or reduce civilian casualties as far as possible. As a result, the IPKF took extraordinarily heavy casualties, a sacrifice which only a highly disciplined force was capable of.

The Indian Army is a highly professional body of troops, and acts according to a professional code. There is no question of the Indian Army, or of the Government of India, tolerating any action by its soldiers which would violate the rights of the very people whom they have gone to Sri Lanka to protect', said the spokesman.

IPKF SOLDIER RELEASED

Lance Naik Dilip Bali Shagakar, a soldier belonging to the Indian Peace Keeping Force operating in Sri Lanka, was released by the LTTE on May 13.

The LTTE announced in Madras on May 11 that it was willing to release the Indian soldier because of its 'love and respect for the people of India.' The 26-year-old Shagakar, of the Army Service Corps, was captured by the Tigers on March 6 at Nellukulam village in Vavuniya district during a clash between the IPKF and the LTTE.

A helicopter brought reporters from the airfield in Vavuniya town to the designated spot. Three tents had been pitched in the field for the use of the IPKF, the LTTE and the press corps. But there was hardly any use for them as the journalists fell to chatting with the IPKF officials.

Around 1.25 pm 'an advance party' of five Tiger representatives arrived at the pre-arranged location. They included, besides Castro, Dinesh, Inpan, Arjuna and Deepan. While Dinesh had a walkie-talkie, Inpan carried the red LTTE flag with the yellow Tiger emblem and Deepan and Arjuna were armed with AK-47 rifles. The IPKF officials offered them tea and biscuits, and there were discussions. After some time, Castro left for Sastrikoolankulam.

Around 2.05 pm, Shagakar came walking to the designated spot, accompanied by Castro, Visu and Nawaz of the LTTE. He was handed over to Col. P. S. Khanna of the IPKF. The journalists were given a couple of minutes to take photographs of Shagakar, dressed in a lungi and a white shirt. He carried a bag. The handing over was complete with Dinesh saying that the release marked the LTTE's 'love and respect for the people of India.'



After the release of Lance Naik Dilip Bali Shagakar (in lungi), Dinesh of the LTTE shaking hands with an IPKF officer..... pointer of things to come?

T. S. Subramaniam

THE TAMIL EELAM STRUGGLE IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

COMMENT

Strategic Implications

To view the Tamil national question as an internal issue in the island of Sri Lanka would be extremely myopic. The external impingements are too many. **Placed as we are on a sensitive sea route in the Indian Ocean, a sea route that has vast trade and strategic implications, in a seabed with potentially rich resources, in an area that is rapidly getting militarised, in a waterway that carries constant super-power naval movements, the Tamil Eelam struggle cannot be viewed anymore in isolation.** Our close physical proximity to India itself enmeshes us in that country's security concern; and India being a vast country surrounded by smaller nations, themselves increasingly alert to their own security interests and suspicious of every Big Power policy move, the Tamil question is fast becoming a focal and vital point of interest for the entire Indian Ocean region; and could indeed threaten to become a cockpit of international power intrigue. That is a danger one cannot be unaware of.

With Trincomalee, one of the finest natural harbours in the world and Admiral Mountbatten's main sea base in the anti-Japanese war, in the east, and with Katunayake, an international airport, in the west, the strategic vulnerability of Sri Lanka is accentuated. **The future of the Tamil people is therefore inextricably linked to the power-play in the region, and to that extent the political, economic, trade and military interests of not only the regional power, but even of the super-powers have a direct bearing on the final outcome of our struggle.**

US's Vested Interest

Although the present posturings by

By Thirumalai Nathan

the Big Powers tend to underplay the value and significance of the Trincomalee harbour as a military base, it cannot be forgotten that as recently as mid-1986 there existed a draft agreement between the Sri Lankan and U.S. governments, in respect of Trincomalee harbour. In fact, it is suggested that this was one of the major ingredients that contributed towards the Indian initiative in signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. **It has to be realised that U.S. imperialism has a vested interest in the Indian Ocean region; has an eye on the potentially huge export and trade market in the area; has therefore a logical interest in preserving the freedom of the sea for its own navies; both commercial and military shipping; and in pursuance of all these objectives will want, without upsetting the present balance of power, an ultimate dominance in the region.**

Various visible preparatory moves in this direction have been already taken over the years. The U.S. needs in the Gulf and West Asia are already met, through bases and facilities in Oman, Egypt, Somalia and Bahrain, and possibly through further facilities in Pakistan. The search for Air Force and Naval communication facilities in the Indian Ocean region is bound to be the next logical step in U.S. ambitions in the area. **The Voice of America station in Sri Lanka was the first intrusion.** Diego Garcia ceded to Britain and thereafter leased to the United States began as a communications facility, but is today enlarged into a major military base.

US Encirclement of India

It is also no secret that while the super-power presence in the Indian Ocean region is, in the absence of any direct conflict largely 'invisible', a **U.S. encirclement of India and the**

Indian Ocean region is being pursued with vigour, both by air and sea and undersea nuclear-powered submarines. U.S. satellites are constantly monitoring, probing and recording all earth-based military installations in this part of the world. Backed up by the U.S. facilities in the Australian continent, both naval and air, and with Pakistani willingness to permit Karachi for use by the U.S. forces in an emergency, and with Diego Garcia a formidable base already, **it is obvious that Sri Lanka would have suited American interests admirably, in order to complete the triangle of U.S. encirclement, and become the pivotal centre and the strategic post of U.S. in the Indian Ocean, in the same way as Israel serves U.S. interests in the Middle East.**

US and British Policy


It would seem that the thrust of both U.S. and British policy would be to keep India perpetually on a state of self-defence by militarising the Indian neighbourhood, and in effect destabilising the whole region. As far as Sri Lanka was concerned, the island's history during these past ten years has been one of U.S. involvement, but by proxy - funding through international aid agencies and supply of arms and weapons through satellite countries like Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. In return, President Jayewardene's government was prepared to grant the powerful VOA base that could undermine the security interests of the entire South Asian region as well as exclusive operating rights in and around Trincomalee harbour including the use of tank farms through front companies. The rationale behind the U.S. and British designs was to weaken India's interests without seemingly appear-





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 நடுத்திப் பொழுதில்
 பல முகங்கள் காணுது போவதும்
 விடிந்ததும் ஒருசில வீதியில் கிடப்பதும்
 இன்னும் ஒருசில கடலில் மிதப்பதும்
 எஞ்சிய மிதி
 முகவரியின்றி தனித்து நிற்பதும்
 ஆரம்பமான அன்றிலிருந்தே
 இரவின் வெறுத்தோம்.
 காலையே நீ வெற்றிகொள்
 இரவின் கொடிய தனங்களும்
 அந்நியக் கூச்சலும்
 அழிந்துபோக
 காலையே,
 நீ இரவின் வெற்றிகொள்.





நாடு.....!
நம்பிக்கையின்
கடைசித் துளியும் வடிந்து
மரணத் தருகே.

குழவும்
உடையதும் கடைகளின் ஒலியும்,
வெறிக் கூச்சலும்,
வேற்று மொழியும்,
விண்ணுயர்ந்த தீச் சுவாலையும்.



ing to do so, and by giving no opportunity to India to interfere openly in that grand design. To that extent, the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement could be seen as a successful attempt on the part of India to checkmate U.S. designs; and the Indian secret boast that it was a turning point in India's regional and international ambitions could be seen as justified. But the moral of all these is that **the Tamil Eelam question has to be resolved within this mesh of regional and super-power interests and their mutual clash of wills and antagonisms.**

Soviet Policy

The present Soviet policy in this region cannot be anything other than what it is today. **The Soviets would indeed have to ensure that the trade and shipping routes have to be freed from U.S. control, the region safeguarded from U.S. hegemony; and towards this objective, will want to back all Indian initiatives in the region, while continuing to subscribe to the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.** In India, the major power in the region, she has an effective proxy, unlike the U.S. which has none. But this again has an unfortunate bearing on the Tamil Eelam question.

Indian Foreign Policy

Having achieved a formidable military strength, with the fourth largest army in the world, and a fast building up on naval strength, India will certainly want to hammer a foreign policy that would not only ensure its regional predominance but lift the country into an accepted status of a major power in the world. At the same time, as a founding father of the Non-aligned Movement, as a country with a history of opposition to colonialism and Western imperialism, as an opponent of racial discrimination and as a champion of oppressed peoples, India has to preserve her credibility in these areas, which credibility has brought her both respect and political benefits in the world comity of nations. While on the one hand forging a foreign policy

that would ensure that the Indian Ocean region remains a zone of peace and that would insulate it from super-power presence, India would also like to project herself into a position where she would be accepted as a leader of the SAARC region, and as an umpire and mediator in problems arising within this region. **Although the basic thrust of Indian policy is to develop friendly links with neighbours in order to achieve this status, there have occurred many instances where that same policy had been handled with high-handedness - making the smaller neighbours to complain of an overbearing, Big Brotherly attitude, unethical dealings, postures of intimidation, underhand actions in the execution of policy, and show of military muscle. How India handled the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka and continues to handle it is one such example.**

Firstly, the Government of India exploited the Tamil freedom struggle in Sri Lanka to browbeat the Government of Sri Lanka. While extending support of various kinds including arms and training to Tamil militant groups, it brought pressure on the Jayewardene government. Thereafter it profited by the Sinhalese fear of an Indian invasion on behalf of the Tamils by selling out the interests of the Tamils in return for the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the establishment of Indian hegemony over Sri Lanka. Having realised that objective the Indian policy makers were in a position to disregard the Tamil aspirations and their demand for power-sharing in their own country. Although President Jayewardene had to mortgage his country's sovereignty to India through the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, it is with the help of Indian military might that he is able to crush for the time being the Tamil Eelam struggle and the force that spearheads it - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

US Blessings for the Accord

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement

received the blessings of the U.S. and British governments. If the U.S. government was prepared to give up its imperialist inroads into Sri Lanka as a result of the Agreement, it could have its own reasons for it:-

1. Since it recognised in the Agreement only a half-baked solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the problem would continue to simmer; in consequence India will get bogged down with the problem for a foreseeable period of time.
2. The calculation that, in the long run, it would get its opportunity to intervene directly on behalf of either the Sinhalese or the Tamils.
3. To make India temporarily safe for its own vast market.
4. To make the vast market in India immediately safe for economic exploitation.
5. The belief that it could be still possible to negotiate for military facilities with the Jayewardene government by striking a deal with India; a hope that cannot be dismissed in the light of the recent visit of U.S. nuclear ships to Indian ports.

Since the Tamil freedom struggle involves among its external objectives, opposition to all forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism and the working towards a peace zone in the Indian Ocean, it is a distinct possibility that the U.S. government through its agencies could attempt to infiltrate some Tamil militant groups. Given the present situation where U.S. incursions into Sri Lanka have been temporarily eclipsed, but where Indian dominance over Sri Lanka has yet to become a fait accompli, it will serve Soviet interests as well to be seen bolstering the present situation.

After Disarming LTTE?

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement has placed India in a position whereby she is called upon to underwrite the

Agreement as a guarantor. But although the foremost objective of the Agreement was to safeguard Indian interests in the region, finding a solution to the problems of the Tamils is another responsibility that India has undertaken. Since disarming of Tamil militants is a proviso in the Agreement, the Indian government has been engaging in a war with the Liberation Tigers in order to fulfil that objective. But if once India succeeds in meeting that commitment under the Accord, and manages to crush Tamil resistance what rationale can India find; or, what excuse can she offer to enforce her will on the Sri Lanka government or keep her troops there in the event of the present Sri Lanka government or any succeeding government tearing up the Accord and ordering the Indian troops to withdraw? Will she say that the Indian military presence will be required to ensure that the Tamils achieve their just demands? What if it happens that the Tamils themselves declare that the oppressive presence of the Indian troops was no longer wanted by them?

Lebanon-type situation

In Tamil Nadu itself, there is popular resentment building up over the prolonged IPKF operations against their brethren in Tamil Eelam. The Centre is coming under severe criticism. It is only by putting a halt to the war against the Liberation Tigers and paving the way for the emergence of a Tamil homeland that India can restore its credibility as a champion of freedom struggles all over the world. If the Indian Prime Minister keeps clinging to an Accord which is already proving self-destructive, for reasons of false personal prestige or for achieving objectives through the Accord which are inherently contradictory, he will be only paving the way for a Lebanon-type situation.

India's Security Concern

It will be remembered that the General Officer Commanding of the IPKF, Major General Sardesh Pande himself declared that it was not necessary that India should have actual physical control of Trincomalee in order to safe-

guard the country's strategic interests. "We have better places in India from where we can protect our strategic interests" he said.

If Indian objectives are that her security interests in the region should be safeguarded, that U.S. incursions should be prevented, that the policy of Non-Alignment should be maintained, well, these are aspirations that the people of Tamil Eelam will themselves endorse and support. That imperialist forces are at work in the Asian region is not a fact unknown to the vast majority of Tamils. But what do they do if India herself takes on the role of an assertive military power, and dons the mantle of imperialism to crush people's struggles and sit over smaller nations and aspiring small nations? While the smaller countries and the people in the region are prepared to recognise India's size, and strength, they certainly are not going to accommodate her Big Brotherly fixation. They will accept only the situation where there is equal security for all. Having lived through centuries of Western subjugation, and having emerged out of it into freedom, they cannot be expected to accept a new form of regional subjugation.

India's Image

For a country that spearheaded the efforts of many Third World countries to extricate themselves from a process of bipolarisation and the tensions caused by the Cold War and in the process became a leader of the Non-Aligned assembly of nations, to involve itself in regional hegemonic desires and to suppress national freedom struggles, is an alarming prospect, and one that has already created warning bells in the entire SAARC region. Doubts have arisen whether even those objectives that are sound and rational by themselves, such as the establishment of a Peace Zone and the founding of SAARC, are only devices that are meant to further India's hegemonic intentions. It is regrettable that Indian policy today has taken several regressive steps marking a departure from the image that this country enjoyed in the past. It would be foolish to ignore the process of history where all peoples hold it as a fundamental creed to oppose any attempts at overlordship, despotism. Liberation struggles are not new phenomena; they have the sanction and support of people themselves; and eventually it is the people's will that prevails.

● Mankanaai near Valvettiturai in Jaffna District was searched by IPKF from 8.45 p.m. on 20.5.88 till 5.00 a.m. next day. Two youths in a house committed suicide to avoid arrest. The owner of house, Mrs. Kandasamy was arrested by IPKF. During the course of the same search, Mrs. Selvarani Sambasivam was injured by gunfire. Her husband who tried to remove her to hospital was assaulted by IPKF. Both husband and wife were removed to IPKF Camp at Udupiddy. Next morning, the husband was released in presence of the Assistant Government Agent of the area and the body of Mrs. Sambasivam was handed over to the husband.

● Mr. Kamalanathan, a teacher of St. John's College, Jaffna was arrested and detained by the IPKF. The Students and Teachers' Guild of St. John's threatened to take out a procession protesting against the arrest/detention. IPKF threatened to impose curfew if a procession was taken out. Later Mr. Kamalanathan was released after IPKF obtained statement that Kamalanathan was treated well. On being released Kamalanathan had to be taken to hospital as he could not even walk. Kamalanathan is still in hospital.

WHITE FLAG PROTEST

The call by Jaffna Municipal Commissioner, C.V.K. Sivagnanam, to fly white flags on June 15 as a demonstration to those who are presently engaged in armed hostilities has received widespread support in the north and east of Sri Lanka.

The main demands behind this white flag demonstration are: (a) an end to armed hostilities between the IPKF and the LTTE; (b) resumption of negotiations between the LTTE and India; and (c) restoration of peace.

In a statement issued, Mr. Sivagnanam said that the Tamil people have suffered enormously for a long time and they are yearning for peace and the whole country and the world should know this.

Mr. Sivagnanam said that the flying of the flag by the people would be a reminder to those who are presently engaged in hostilities to down arms and declare a ceasefire. It was not a 'hartal' or a protest action. It only meant peace and encouraging ways to achieve it. Transport, schools and work in government and private establishments would not be interrupted and would function normally. Shops would open. People would hoist white flags in their homes, on their vehicles and carry the flag wherever they moved, Mr. Sivagnanam added.

TIGERS BY THE TAIL

India's Quagmire
In Sri Lanka

WILLIAM MCGOWAN

COMMENT

Jaffna, Sri Lanka

From the rubble of the nearly 75,000 houses destroyed or damaged during its drive last October against Tamil Tiger militants, the Indian Peace-keeping Force has built a city of pillboxes and fortified bunkers inside this former rebel stronghold. Normalcy now prevails past the ends of machine guns bristling from sentry posts on every street corner. Yet the Indian troops deployed throughout northern and eastern Sri Lanka still find their quarry elusive. Given the opportunity, the Tigers can still paralyze civil administration and commercial life, kill political foes and collaborators and attack unprotected Sinhalese villages as well as Indian Army patrols before melting away uncaught.

Having given arms, training and sanctuary to Tamil separatists fighting the Sri Lankan military, India originally thought it could quickly tame them under the terms of last summer's Indo-Lankan Peace Accord. The accord was an attempt to resolve the longstanding conflict between the minority Tamils (18 percent of the population) and the majority Sinhalese Buddhists (74 percent of the country). The feud is rooted in the institutional discrimination Tamils say they have suffered since independence, in 1948, in education, employment, land settlement and language. But it dates further back, into colonial times and ancient antagonisms. Since 1983, when more than 1,000 Tamils were killed in Sinhalese pogroms, the nation had been in a state of civil war and de facto partition. Upwards of 7,000 civilians have perished.

India had supported the separatists because their cause was strong among 55 million ethnic brethren in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, and because the Western leanings of the Colombo government of President J.R. Jayewardene made it anxious. But when the trouble it was encouraging in Sri Lanka began to threaten India's own equilibrium, and Sri Lankan armed forces broke the struggle's long stalemate in a successful lunge against the militants in May 1987, India stepped in—at first with only a small force to back up what was intended to be primarily a diplomatic initiative. There was nominal peace for six weeks, but now, nearly a year after the signing of the accord in July 1987, the fighting continues; more civilians have been killed in the past year than in any previous year, most of them, ironically, by the Indian peacekeepers.

Any intervention into the miasma of Sri Lanka's ethnic troubles ran the risk of frustration. But India's presump-

tuous diplomacy and military miscalculations have turned its involvement into a daily \$3 million quagmire for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, with dark implications for his political future as well as for the domestic stability and international prestige of his country. Also on the line is the government of Jayewardene, co-signer of the accord, which has for months been under violent pressure from rabid Buddhist nationalists in the southern part of the island.

Delhi's first mistake was to overestimate its leverage on the two warring sides. The Indo-Lankan Peace Accord called for the rebels to lay down their arms in return for substantial political autonomy in their traditional areas and a guarantee that Sri Lankan armed forces—99 percent Sinhalese—would be confined to their barracks. Although the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or L.T.T.E., the dominant Tamil militant group, had gotten more than its fair share in the bargain, suspicions of the Colombo government built up over several decades were not easily dissipated. The language of the hastily prepared document left several substantive issues, like land colonization of Tamil areas, vague or unaddressed, and after provocation by Buddhist hard-liners within Jayewardene's own Cabinet, the Tigers resumed armed hostilities. At first the Indians did little to hold the Tigers back; in some cases, in fact, Indian soldiers from Tamil Nadu turned a blind eye while brethren Tamils burned Sinhalese out of their homes and shops. Before long, however, the Indians came down hard on their former charges, although for years they had warned Sri Lanka of the futility of a military solution.

The drive on the rebel capital of Jaffna was a military and intelligence debacle. The Indians basically dismissed the Tigers as low-caste youths who would never dare stand against the world's fourth-largest army—which after all had entered the conflict on their side. Having scoffed at Sri Lankan warnings, the Indians had little idea of Tiger manpower, firepower, intelligence and communications capabilities. Nor did they sense the fanatic motivation of the Tigers, symbolized by the cyanide capsule each cadre wears around his or her neck to swallow if captured. Most important, the Indians did not understand the lethal force of the Tigers' form of land-mine warfare—an innovation in guerrilla strategy. Losing face politically as casualties mounted daily, Delhi poured more troops into battle, often without proper rest, briefings, maps or equipment.

What should have taken the Indians three days took nearly three weeks, and during that time brutality against civilians—which India had originally intervened to stop—was ghastly. Here in Jaffna during the October drive, I saw random shelling of civilian areas and evidence that Indians had strafed civilians from helicopters and also shot them point-blank as they hid in their own homes for safety. In direct violation of the Geneva Accords, top Indian officers ordered the storming of the Jaffna Hospital, killing scores of doctors, nurses and patients. The Indians banned foreign journalists and the International Red Cross, making it difficult to verify or dismiss consistent reports of rape and other atrocities committed by Indian troops. Likewise, reports that the Tigers had used civilians as human shields.

William McGowan is completing a book on the war in Sri Lanka, to be published next year by Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Utter bedlam reigned during the battle as a half-million panic-stricken refugees sought safety and the Tigers continued to fight—killing many more Indians than military authorities admitted—before pulling out of Jaffna still largely intact as a fighting force. When it was over, with the peacekeepers claiming victory, there was “a city of corpses and rotting flesh,” as one Indian brigadier general put it, with some estimates of civilian casualties running as high as 3,000. There was also a deep bitterness among the Tamil populace toward what had effectively become an army of occupation. Conservative estimates say India has 50,000 troops in Sri Lanka, but if higher figures given by Indian analysts and journalists are accurate, it may have up to 100,000 there—almost as many as the Russians had in Afghanistan.

Whenever they are asked about the current situation, Indian troops in the field, cued by public relations officers, no doubt, smile broadly and answer “picnic”—often the only English word they know. But a picnic it decidedly is not. Despite their overwhelming numbers, Indian forces are musclebound, their bureaucratically minded officers vulnerable to the Tigers’ hit-and-run tactics; convoys still leave the main roads with trepidation. The Tigers continue to train new, ever younger cadres and say that even with weapons deliveries interdicted, they can hold out for five years more with the matériel that they currently have hidden. The Indians have been unable to protect informers or stop the Tigers from mounting boycotts, general strikes and shut-downs of important administrative services.

Most important, the same pattern of terror from previous years continues under the Indians’ very noses. Armed bands of Tamils, Sinhalese and Moslems still massacre civilians of other groups. Sri Lankan police have broken out of their barracks to retaliate against Tamil civilians. In other cases, the Tigers have rampaged through Sinhalese settlements with impunity, intimidating government-funded colonizers. The Indian presence has made it worse for the Moslems, an important community in the Eastern Province’s war of demographics. The rise of Islamic militias has been the result, with indications of Iranian and Libyan financial support, poisoning the ethnic brew even further.

Support for the Tigers among the Tamils had been waning until the harshness of the Indian occupation. Indian commanders talk of winning hearts and minds, but detentions of suspected militants and sympathizers are arbitrary, beatings are standard and the ethnic and caste complexion of the soldiers clashes with that of the population, leading to tension. The officer corps may be Sandhurst material, but the largely illiterate rank and file have treated civilians badly and are undisciplined. The simple presence of so many gun-bearers who can’t speak their language has the population on the edge of nervous breakdown and wishing, ironically, for the return of Sri Lankan troops, who had a harrowing record of human rights offenses.

The upshot is that despite their war-weariness and the hardship brought about by the Tigers’ rejection of the peace accord, a majority of the Tamil population supports the guerrillas. And without the backing of the civilians, the Indians can do very little. The chemistry is by no means un-

alloyed. Tamils may fear the Tigers’ authoritarianism and question their lower-caste background and their political inexperience, yet they are recognized as a historically necessary force asserting long-denied rights for national identity and liberation. Besides, there is simply no alternative moderate group.

In fact, the Indians may also feel that the Tigers are the only legitimate force; there are many indications that the military drive against them is more of a bid to discipline than to liquidate. The Indians have seemed reluctant to go for the Tigers’ jugular: For example, reporters seeking interviews have sometimes had to wait for the militants to finish cricket games within half a mile of major Indian Army encampments, the Tigers keeping their AK-47s at the ready in bat bags. Such apparent laxity signals a fundamental contradiction in Indian policy, for as much as the Indians need to neutralize the Tigers militarily, they also need to preserve them politically, a balancing act requiring great delicacy and organization, which often elude them. For the accord to work, the Indians need some kind of guarantee of compliance from the increasingly disgruntled Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists in the south, which will be hard to secure without the prospect of a reactivated Tiger threat as leverage.

Gandhi’s underestimation of resentment in the south and the effect that has on Jayewardene’s ability to hold up his end of the bargain may prove the real undoing of the peace accord. The southern heartland, which prides itself as the land Buddha chose to preserve his doctrine of nonviolence and compassion, has become almost ungovernable under the emotional strains of the Indian intervention. Instead of seeing the accord as an opportunity to build bridges of trust between two warring communities, Sinhalese generally see the Indian presence on their soil as a violation of national



sovereignty as well as a threat to the existence of Buddhism, which they claim to practice in its most pristine form and to protect as part of their mythic charter. The Indian presence has been popularly depicted as a reincarnation of invasions from southern India that wiped out Sinhalese kingdoms centuries ago. Most of the Buddhist majority saw President Jayewardene's acceptance of India's "help"—Gandhi would have invaded otherwise—not as a shrewd calculation of geopolitical realities but as a selling out of national interests.

Broad popular resentment of the accord sparked other latent sources of disaffection against the ruling United National Party (U.N.P.) of J.R. (as the President is popularly known). Its Western-style economic policies, which have greatly widened the gap between rich and poor and led to official corruption on a vast scale, were attacked by the Sinhalese populace as inimical to Buddhist values. Also attacked were the regime's increasingly antidemocratic tendencies: the denial of elections for the past ten years, manipulation of parliamentary procedure and the official sanction given to political thuggery. The signing of the peace accord without popular ratification was taken as the final step in J.R.'s subversion of the democratic traditions that have been cherished since independence, even if observed more in form than in substance. The widespread feeling was that the old fox J.R. had tricked the young Mr. Gandhi into bailing him out in the north so he could better defend himself in the south, where his base of support had crumbled and a rebellion was only a matter of time.

A banned ultranationalistic political party called the People's Liberation Front (J.V.P.) has capitalized on the wave of discontent, focusing anger against the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord. Since September it has conducted a campaign of political killings and subversion that has taken the lives of almost 300 ruling-party officials, nearly brought the simple exercise of civil administration to a collapse and fed worry that the Sinhalese will repudiate their obligations toward India and the Tamils. In areas where the J.V.P. is strongest, police are reluctant to leave their stations after dark, and the public cowers behind shuttered doors. Where Buddha supposedly saw a flourishing *dharma*, the people see assassinations and assault. Most members of Parliament belonging to the U.N.P. are under threat of death and shun their home districts for the security of the capital. Provincial Council elections, which are crucial to the momentum of the peace process, were called off in over half the country due to the threat of violence. Politically moderate intellectuals who have backed the peace accord have been branded traitors to the motherland by the J.V.P. It is also likely that the J.V.P. has infiltrated cadres into the armed forces, raising the specter of unreliability and coup.

The J.V.P. taps into latent Sinhalese feelings of their special destiny, advancing a program that blends masochistic nationalism, apocalyptic rhetoric and the same chauvinistic cultural revivalism that also polarized Sinhalese-Tamil relations in the 1950s. Highly xenophobic, racist and romantic, the J.V.P. calls for a return to "indigenous" thought, values and economic development that predate European colonialism and contemporary Western influence.

The J.V.P. thrives in the economically depressed far south of the island. Most of its members—their numbers still unknown—are lower-caste youths in the universities or jobless graduates with few prospects in an economy still skewed to favor high-caste English-speakers, despite decades of lip service by successive governments to the "sons of the soil." There are also widening ranks of militant Buddhist monks in the party, who see their clerical role in political rather than spiritual terms and have defied superiors by calling for armed resistance in a Buddhist holy war. "We must weaponize," ranted one of them, clad in a brilliant saffron cloth, as a full moon bathed the sentinel face of a nearby stone Buddha. "We must weaponize to kill the traitor J.R. Jayewardene."

The armed subversion of the J.V.P. has justified the government's drift to authoritarianism in the name of preserving the only "five-star democracy" in Asia. The ruling party has armed a private militia, at least 20,000 strong, many of them recently paroled criminals. Fifty thousand troops hitherto fighting Tamil guerrillas have been redeployed in the south to quell the insurgents and their sympathizers. And the government is operating death squads, which are targeting J.V.P. suspects as well as legal political activists, opposition parties claim. Many innocents have been falsely accused and summarily punished in the bid to crush the J.V.P.—the very pattern that has fed militancy in the north among Tamils over the past five years. Police have been personally indemnified against civil actions, extending a *carte blanche* for abuse, and international human rights groups have been blocked from investigating.

The recent announcement of an agreement between the government and the J.V.P. to end the insurrection in return for the lifting of proscription was a promising sign—until it was discovered that the Minister of National Defense had been negotiating with hoaxers. But bringing the J.V.P. into the mainstream means little when the mainstream itself—including many of J.R.'s inner circle—mistrusts the accord. Parliamentary ratification of the peace agreements, despite a U.N.P. majority, could only be secured by strongarm methods. Having whipped up his hard-liners for years, even as he tried to negotiate a peace, J.R. found it very hard to contain them. Many right-wingers preferred an outright Indian invasion so they could reap windfalls of international sympathy for once.

Sinhalese government bureaucrats have shown their true colors by dragging their feet on the provisions of the accord that require them to grant equal rights to the Tamils. For example, very few of the relief supplies and funds that Western donors rushed to the country have made their way from government ministries in Colombo to war-ravaged Jaffna as was intended. Priority has been given to the plight of Sinhalese refugees instead, even though Tamils in need outnumber them tenfold. The government also refuses to discontinue its West Bank-style settlement program in the crucial Eastern Province, and has erected bureaucratic barriers to the repatriation of Tamil refugees who fled to India—100,000 of them. On a grimmer note, virtually none of the police or soldiers involved in any of the atrocities since India

June 25, 1988

stepped in have been disciplined, sending ominous signal that the security of Tamils is still not a state concern.

In essence, the Indian presence has not, as intended, provided an umbrella under which Tamils and Sinhalese can seek reconciliation. Instead it has made the scheming more byzantine and covert, with both sides jockeying around India for position. Sinhalese bloody-mindedness has made matters worse. As a recently returned Sri Lankan expatriate scholar said, "There is simply no sense of repentance on the part of the Sinhalese, no sense that they were in the wrong for many years and are now suffering for it, no sense that they brought the very intervention they feared on themselves. The reaction is just the opposite. They say they weren't tough enough. It's a very spooky psychology." Only now coming to recognize the extent of the alienation that persists between the two communities, all that Indian diplomats can say is, "Nation-building takes time."

The Indians are in a double bind. Even if they tame the Tigers, there is very little chance for lasting peace unless the Sinhalese south gives up deep-seated anxieties and accepts the legitimacy of Tamil autonomy without backsliding. Given the current mood in the south, that is unlikely to happen. Should antigovernment pressure build to a more dangerous level, or should the 82-year-old President die, the situation may become uncontrollable for the peacekeepers. The very point of India's involvement in Sri Lanka was to stabilize its own southern flank, but any direct movement of troops into the Sinhalese south could prompt a nationalistic backlash, uniting factions that are now hostile to each other. The ensuing bloodbath could further destabilize the situation and prompt a greater Indian intervention, which would be politically dangerous for Rajiv Gandhi, who already faces widespread public opposition over what many consider India's Vietnam.

Gandhi's Sri Lanka misadventure has emboldened his opponents. The unpopularity of the initiative among the 55 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu could hand his Congress Party an ill-affordable defeat in critical upcoming state elections. Bugged down by a few thousand guerrillas, the reputation of the Indian Army has been sullied under the watchful eyes of regional rivals Pakistan and China, as well as of armed separatists inside India. And its clumsy handling of ethnic factionalism bodes ill for India's role in refereeing power sharing in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

The situation in Sri Lanka may in fact have grown so poisonous that a cathartic bloodletting is inevitable. Militants on both sides—backed up by significant bodies of popular opinion—embrace the idea of a nationalistic *Götterdämmerung* much more readily than that of compromise. The psychological breach between the two communities may be much too profound for ready reconciliation, no matter what agreements are signed and what platitudes mouthed. Even if the flames are banked for a while, the fuel will ignite again. As the Indians navigating them know only too well, the currents on both sides of Sri Lanka's ethnic divide are vicious. Far from being the light at the end of the tunnel, India's involvement in Sri Lanka may well prove to be just a sidestep in a steady descent into darkness. □

CIVILIANS KILLED



K. Rathnam 8.6.88



Krishnanandamurthy 24.6.88



Maria 3.7.88



Thamarasa 17.6.88



Malathi 24.6.88



G. Vigneswari 3.7.88



S. Theodoramurthy 18.6.88



V. Nataraja 24.6.88



Malarvizi 9.7.88



Selvaratnam 22.6.88



Johnson 26.6.88



N. Nithyanandan 9.7.88



P.A. Lincoln 23.6.88



S. Kaladeepam 26.6.88



K. Eswaran 10.7.88



Yasodharan 23.6.88



Krishnalingam 29.6.88



Ranjidevi 10.7.88

CONFRONTATION

1

Colombo, June 1 (UNI): Two Indian soldiers and six Liberation Tigers (LTTE) men were wounded and more than 100 militants apprehended during IPKF operations in Sri Lanka's north and east during the last 24 hours, the Indian High Commission said today.

The two IPKF personnel were wounded in an exchange of fire with LTTE at a place north of Oddusuddan in the northern Vavuniya sector, where the 100 militants were captured and five LTTE men wounded, a High Commission official said.

The official said another LTTE member was shot at and injured by the IPKF at Kiran, in the eastern Batticaloa sector, while five others were apprehended at Batticaloa and Amparai.

A LTTE cadre Rajahavan came under IPKF sniping and died in Karuvelankandal at Mullaithivu.

2

Salam, a LTTE fighter consumed cyanide in an encounter with IPKF at Vembady, Valvettithurai. The IPKF along with the EPRLF boys came to Nallur in search of LTTE supporters and shot dead Senthanaar, a businessman and his sister Bhagyam.

3

Six militants killed: At least six Tamil militants were killed and one committed suicide in the last 36 hours in the Eastern and Northern provinces as the IPKF continued operations against the rebels.

Official sources here said two IPKF personnel were also killed during the operations. The national news agency Lankapuvath, quoting official sources, said three LTTE militants were killed in two separate incidents in Oddusudden on Thursday. — PTI

4

Two LTTE leaders swallow cyanide: Two leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules and three others were taken into custody during IPKF operations in eastern Batticaloa town during the last 24 hours, informed sources in Batticaloa said today.

Magistrate shot dead: In the northern Vavuniya town, a local magistrate, Mr. R. Villavarajah, was shot dead by unidentified men at his house this morning, sources in Vavuniya said.

In Triyai at Trincomalee, some IPKF soldiers were killed by the LTTE landmine attacks. Many wounded.

6

COLOMBO, June 6.

Two Tamil militants gunned down a Roman Catholic priest in eastern Sri Lanka today in what appeared to be part of a feud between rival Tamil groups, residents and police said.

The gunmen, believed to be belonging to the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), shot Father Chandra Fernando, 46, killing him instantly in his parish house in Batticaloa town. No one has claimed responsibility for the killing observers said.

According to the residents, the victim had ignored TELO warnings to resign from the Citizens' Committee and keep away from the LTTE.—AFP

PTI reports:

According to Indian High Commission sources, the IPKF had apprehended 10 LTTE militants in the Jaffna sector and seven in Batticaloa sector, while two militants were wounded in an exchange of fire with the IPKF north-east of Oddusuddan in the Vavuniya sector.

Tamil civilians killed: Four Tamil civilians alleged to be traitors were killed by militants early on Sunday, according to the military said.

Officials of the Joint Operations Command said the authorities found the four victims near the bus in the northern Port City of Velvettithurai.

In Paranthan, Kilinochi Dt, a LTTE cadre Bhuvanesh was rounded up by EMDLF, and he consumed cyanide.

7

IPKF jawan killed: Hours before the pullout, an IPKF jawan was killed when a patrol jeep was mined by militants some 10 km south of Trincomalee. Four other soldiers were injured.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commissioner said two IPKF men were killed when LTTE men fired at them at Alampil.

In Trincomalee dt. at Muthur 3 IPKF men were killed by the landmine attack by LTTE and in Kutchaveli 2 more soldiers died. Many wounded. In Batticaloa also, 7 IPKF soldiers ran into the landmines set by LTTE and were killed.

8

Trapped in a IPKF search and destroy mission, a LTTE cadre Thambu took cyanide at Puttur. As Thambu is so popular with them, the Puttur people mourned two days with blackflags. At Amparai in an ambush by LTTE, a Sri Lankan soldier was killed and many injured.

9

Punnalaikadduvan village at Jaffna was encircled in a search and destroyed mission by the IPKF. As left with no choice, the LTTE cadres Vinod and Kaliyugan consumed cyanide.

Indian army has ordered the closure of yet another Tamil daily "Nam Nadu". It is relevant to note that this publication had been reporting the details of harassment and atrocities, the people of Jaffna were being subjected to at the hands of IPKF. This paper was published by the citizens of Jaffna, and the closure would serve the Indian Government to keep the outside world in complete ignorance of the excesses committed by its forces against the Tamils. It should be remembered that the IPKF completely demolished two popular dailies "Eelamurasu" and "Murasoli" at the beginning of their military campaign in Jaffna.

IPKF MAJOR CAUGHT WITH GOLD !

A Major of the IPKF in Sri Lanka arriving on leave at Chandigarh airport in Punjab was nabbed by police. He was found to be carrying 100 sovereigns of gold in broken pieces of jewellery. His explanation was that he bought the jewellery. Police believe he snatched it from Sri Lankan Tamils. The Major had earlier flown from Lanka via Madras.

TEACHERS KIDNAPPED BY IPKF

Two teachers belonging to St. John's College were kidnapped by the IPKF on 17th May. The IPKF entered the college and forcibly removed the teachers Kamalanathan and Alphonsus and it is believed that they were taken to the Kankasanturai IPKF camp. Kamalanathan was later admitted to the Jaffna Hospital with severe injuries where his condition is said to be critical. The plight of Alphonsus is still not known.

DAMAGE TO JAFFNA UNIVERSITY QUANTIFIED

The damage to the University of Jaffna since the IPKF offensive has been estimated at Rs.52 million, the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Prof.S.Vithyananthan, confirmed in a media interview.

10

COLOMBO, June 10.

Two Sri Lankan policemen held captive in a LTTE camp in Batticaloa in east Sri Lanka escaped after killing their three captors, official sources here said today.

They said the policemen, held in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam camp for months, took advantage of an IPKF operation in the area on Saturday night and managed to escape.

They reached a Sri Lankan Army detachment yesterday, national news agency Lankapuvath said quoting official sources. The two told officers of the Army unit that there were about 60 militants in the camp situated in Pulpanjakal.

About 50 militants had gone into hiding following the Indian Peace Keeping Force operation leaving only a few guards at the camp. The policemen managed to grab their guns and fled after killing them, official sources said.

11

Colombo June 11: Five militants and two civilians were reportedly killed in separate incidents in the north and east of the island in the last 24 hours, according to security sources.

The body of a PLOT member was found in Batticaloa town on Saturday morning, allegedly killed by EPRLF member Sivasambo Sivakanth.

According to Indian High Commission sources, in an IPKF search operation in Jaffna two militants were killed and an Indian soldier was wounded.

Military sources also reported that a fibre glass dingy with 11 on board was taken into custody by Sri Lanka naval forces two miles north-east off Mannar. The men includes six Indians, four Tamils and one Sinhalese.

Civilians killed: Official sources said, a civilian was shot dead by some unidentified persons in Kokuvil in Jaffna and another beheaded body was found in Kamparamalai also in the Jaffna sector on Friday. Liberation Tigers militants were suspected of being responsible for both the killings.

Cops kill abductors, escape: Two Sri Lankan policemen, kidnapped by the LTTE in Vallaichenai in the Batticaloa district eight months ago, killed their captors and escaped on Wednesday night, according to police sources.

12

Express News Service

Colombo, June 12: Indian High Commission sources in Colombo

today denied a Reuter report in the Colombo media that seven Indian soldiers were killed in a landmine explosion last Tuesday in Batticaloa.

The report had said the jeep in which the Indian soldiers were travelling was blown up with the soldiers; the incident occurred at Panich Ankerni in Batticaloa district.

The LTTE statement to the news agency had also claimed that there were 1,30,000 Indian troops deployed in the north and east of the island.

13

Many IPKF soldiers were caught in the landmines set by LTTE in Samangulam, Trincomalee casualties not known. In a Grenade charge by LTTE on the checkpoint of IPKF at Visuvamadu, a soldier was killed and one escaped with wounds.

LTTE cadres Paramanathan and Illango escaped from two various camps of IPKF at Vatakatchi and Navakuli.

17

Meanwhile *The Sun* reported today that three civilians were injured in a crossfire between the IPKF and LTTE cadres in Urani in the Batticaloa district on Wednesday.

The report said that an IPKF jeep had been fired at and the IPKF had returned the fire in which the civilians were injured.

An intensified search operation in Batticaloa begun on Tuesday is said to be continuing. Indian sources reported a number of apprehensions and the killing of LTTE militant Arulapan and the injuring of another LTTE militant.

According to an unconfirmed LTTE source in Batticaloa 10 LTTE cadres taken into custody had taken cyanide during the current operation.

In a landmine blast the IPKF lost nine of their soldiers. Consequently they fired mortar shells at civilian colony at 3rd post. 3 people were killed and several wounded.

18

Colombo, June 18 (UNI): One Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan was killed and another jawan and two civilians were seriously wounded when a civilian truck in which they were travelling ran into a landmine, planted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), near Murukandy in Sri Lanka's North-

ern Killinochchi district yesterday, security sources said today.

Meanwhile, the office of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), in Northern, Vavuniya town was bombed by unidentified men last night, they said.

The IPKF encircled the villages Moothur, Sambur, Kaddaiparichan, Kiliveddi, Mallikaithivu, Manalsenai, L.V. 3 colony, all in Trincomalee dt., arrested more than 500 people and took them to their camp. They were lined up in the sun for the whole day and beaten up severely to tell he whereabouts of the LTTE.

20

MADRAS, June 20.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force apprehended a large number of hardcore Tamil militants on June 19 in Sri Lanka.

In Trincomalee district, a confirmed LTTE leader, Vijaya Raja, was nabbed in Toppur with a large amount of foreign currencies, including 19,000 francs, \$925 and Rs. 33,150 collected as taxes, according to a Defence Ministry press release here.

In Batticaloa district, where the IPKF operations were particularly successful, Chinnathampy alias Raja, Nagaraja alias Kuttum and Ganesh Murthy were trapped at Vantaramulai. Sunder, an LTTE hardcore member, was killed, while Tyagu, Rajendran alias Nimal and Ramanathan alias Sinnakamal were captured. A number of other suspects had also been rounded up and were being questioned.

21

Six IPKF men hurt: Six IPKF personnel and six militants were wounded in two separate incidents in Sri Lanka's north and east as the IPKF launched a fresh operation to disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). — UNI, PTI

23

COLOMBO, June 23.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) killed the Batticaloa leader of the LTTE, Arasan, and his deputy, Easwaran, in a gun battle in Eastern Sri Lanka today, officials said.

The Indian High Commission here confirmed the report, but said it had no details. Officials in the area contacted by telephone said soldiers seized two AK-47 assault rifles from the two LTTE men. Residents said the incident was the first face-to-face confrontation between troops and Tamil tigers in Batticaloa in recent months.

Indian soldiers launched a major search operation codenamed "checkmate" on Monday to hunt remaining the LTTE rebels in the island's troubled North and East, officials said.

25

MADRAS, June 25.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) has launched several operations in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, following complaints that the LTTE was trying to extort money from the local people.

A Defence Ministry press release here said that in Jaffna Peninsula three militants attempting to extort money were apprehended. In Mannar district eight militants, including Suji, Jose and Ceethan were rounded up and Rs.40,000 was found in their possession.

A number of cases of the LTTE forcibly recruiting school boys had been reported to the IPKF by the parents and the IPKF had assisted in securing these students to their parents.

Instances of the LTTE indulging in the killing of civilians in Vadamarachi area to terrorise locals as the civilians were not forthcoming to give money had been reported and LTTE intercepts have also acknowledged that 15 persons were killed.

The press release said that the current operations were highly successful and the IPKF had located a large group of militants in Alampil jungles in Vavuniya sector. In an operation to apprehend them more than 20 militants were killed and the IPKF suffered two casualties, including one officer.

In the Vishwamadu forest and the area around Pudukudiiruppu the militants who were in the process of setting up a camp were attacked and the camp was struck and destroyed. In Trincomalee district the IPKF was carrying out extensive operations in Nilaveli, Irakkandi and Sampaltivu and had apprehended a number of militants. In the Batticaloa sector eight militants were apprehended and in Tunukkai in Vavuniya sector the IPKF had killed 15 militants. The Operation Checkmate was continuing and the entire coastline from Point Pedro to Trincomalee remained sealed.

In Kumulamunai area, Mullaithivu the LTTE camp was under attack by IPKF helicopters (M-1-24). In the encounter one IPKF colonel was killed. No losses to the LTTE.

27

Seven IPKF soldiers were shot dead in an encounter with LTTE in Chettikulam, Vavuniya. 8 escaped with wounds.

28

COLOMBO, June 28.

At least 16 persons, including seven Indian soldiers, have died in fresh violence in Sri Lanka, officials said here on Tuesday.

Fighters of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Monday blew up an Indian truck killing four soldiers and wounding three in northern Cheddikulam village, the Indian High Commission here said.

Five soldiers were reported missing after the blast, a High Commission spokeswoman said, adding that a search for them had been launched.

The LTTE guerillas had also set off a powerful bomb in the northeastern port town of Trincomalee on Tuesday, the source said.

Six persons, including two women and three Sri Lankan policemen were wounded, the source said.



'VIRAT' AND 'CHECKMATE'

23 May, 1988 - 6,000 Indian troops converged on Alampil and surrounding villages of Semmalai, Nedunkerni, Kumulamunai, Mulliyavalai and Andankulam and attacked the LTTE bases in the jungles. Some residents fled from these areas and others were prevented from fleeing. A convoy of 265 vehicles carrying reinforcements were seen moving from Vavuniya towards Mullaitivu as the fighting progresses and soldiers are air-dropped from helicopters at Alampil, Semmalai, Kumulamunai, Tanniyuttu, Mulliyavalai, Murippu, Andankulam and Muthaiyankaddu.

24 May - Civilians from Puthukkudiyiruppu fled the strife-torn area towards Kilinochchi and residents from Alampil and Kumulamunai moved to Vavuniya to escape the hardship of continuous curfew and danger to their lives. More troops were brought into Vanni area and fierce fighting continued.

25 May - More than 15,000 troops were deployed over the entire Vanni area and search operations were carried out. During the search operation, troops harassed, humiliated and tortured the civilians and robbed them of their belongings. More than 100 civilians were arrested and detained. Petrol and diesel oil, from 30 bowzers brought in by troops, were sprayed over selected areas and set them alight. Parts of jungle were ablaze.

26 May - 4 Indian helicopter gunships strafed the area and several people were injured. Some were killed.

27 May - Indian troops stopped movement of people and effectively blocked information going out of the operation zone. Civilians were ordered to stay indoors.

28 May - Troops launched sporadic attacks on LTTE bases in the jungles. Civilians continued to stay indoors and were prevented from moving.

29 May - Search operations continued in Vanni area and many more were arrested, detained and tortured.

30 May - Four young girls were taken and raped by Indian soldiers at Muthaiyankaddu in the Mullaitivu district.

31 May - LTTE announced that they were abandoning one of their bases in the Mullaitivu perimeter. Fighting continued, and civilians were kept indoors.

1 June - Indian Military authorities confirmed that about 15,000 troops were de-

ployed in the region and they were mounting a major offensive on LTTE.

2 June - All hospitals, schools, government offices, shops and markets remained closed in the Vanni area. Fighting continued and civilians were threatened not to leave their houses.

3 to 12 June - Fighting was reported in the villages of Alampil, Kumulamunai, Puthukkudiyiruppu, Kovil Puliyanakulam, Nedunkerni, Oddisuddan and Andankulam. One civilian escaped from Alampil and reported that people were undergoing untold hardships without food and medical supplies; those who ventured out had been shot by the military, several women were raped and a few committed suicide, young men were disappearing every day and parents did not know what to do. One LTTE member Paramanathan escaped from Indian army camp at Vaddakkachchi in the Kilinochchi district.

13 to 15 June - Indian troops set up road blocks at Visvamadu in the Mullaitivu district. LTTE guerrillas launched a grenade attack on two soldiers at the road block. People from Mullaitivu defied military orders and staged protest campaign (wearing black badges) for three days against the Indian offensive on the LTTE and the Waliya Sinhala Colonisation Scheme in Mullaitivu district and called for the release of all political prisoners.

16 June - Indian troops set up more than 25 sentry posts between Kodikamam and Chavakachcheri, a distance of 5 miles apart, and people travelling between these two towns were harassed and humiliated. In Vavuniya 12 detainees were released by the Indian troops and more than 100 kept back in detention.

17 June - New weapons were used by Indian troops to attack the LTTE in Mullaitivu district. 9 Indian soldiers died in a landmine attack by LTTE when they were on their way to Skanthapuram from Kilinochchi on a search-and-destroy mission.

18 June - Tamil Welfare Societies of Vavuniya district held a mass demonstration demanding the Indian government to negotiate with the LTTE and to stop all colonisation efforts by the Sri Lankan government.

19 June - Fighting continued in Mullaitivu district. Young women were taken naked along the streets to the army camps. Various parts of their

bodies were subjected to 'cigarette burn' by the Indian soldiers.

20 to 22 June - Intensive search operations were carried out throughout Vanni area by Indian troops and almost every male was taken to army camps.

23 June - Indian troops launched military operations code-named "Operation Checkmate" throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces. A massive aerial attack was launched in Mullaitivu district by the Indian military. Indian planes and military helicopters bombed and strafed the residential areas of Alampil, Naayaaru, Semmalai and Kumulamunai in the Mullaitivu district. Indian forces were reported to have used napalm and chemical bombs and 250-kilo bombs in the aerial attacks. Hundreds of houses, schools and government buildings were damaged. Civilian casualties feared high but no accurate figures were available.

24 June - More than 1000 people went on hunger strike from the villages of Thanneeroottu, Kumulamunai, Kallappaadu, Vattakandal and Mulliyavalai against the Indian military atrocities and demanded the Indian government to announce a ceasefire and to start negotiations with the LTTE.

25 June - Four Indian military helicopters 'MI.24' bombed and strafed an LTTE camp at Kumulamunai in Mullaitivu. Fierce fighting reported between LTTE and Indian troops. One Indian Colonel aboard a helicopter was killed. More than 1,000 Indian troops from Kilinochchi and Murukandy army camps surrounded the Kilinochchi area and carried out search-and-destroy operations. Several civilians were killed and injured, but details not available. Indian troops opened up two new camps at Akkaraayankulam and the Irrigation department building at Vannerikulam.

27 June - Seven Indian soldiers died and their weapons captured in an ambush by LTTE at Puliyanakulam in Vavuniya district when the soldiers were on their way to Puliyanakulam on a search-and-destroy mission.

28 June, 1988 - Indian troops surrounded the villages of Skanthapuram, Konavil and Anaivilunthan, and assaulted villagers and some were tortured. Many sustained injuries and were admitted to Kilinochchi hospital.

'Checkmate' puts LTTE under pressure

From Thomas Abraham

COLOMBO, June 26.

The current Indian Peace-Keeping Force operations in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka, codenamed "Checkmate," has sharply reduced the LTTE's effectiveness as a fighting force. The organisation could be on its last legs militarily, according to IPKF sources.

The assessment is confirmed by sources close to the LTTE who say their cadres have been cut off from their sources of supply, and are under intense military pressure.

"Operation Checkmate" has been described as the most intense operation conducted by the IPKF since the fight to gain control of Jaffna peninsula late last year. It is a culmination of the process which began with operations Virat and Trishul in March and April.

The earlier operations pushed the militants away from towns and built-up areas into the jungles around Vavuniya, Killinochi and Mullaitivu. The IPKF has now cast a wide dragnet, in an area bounded by Talaimannar in the West, Killinochi in the North and Vavuniya and Mullaitivu in the South. The IPKF sources said with the move away from built-up areas, the IPKF was able to use its firepower more freely. "The earlier operations winkled out the LTTE cadres from built-up areas into the jungles. Now we can operate with less civilian casualties," the IPKF source said. Mortars are being used, along with machine guns and occasionally helicopter gunships.

"The fighting is now extremely intense, but you don't hear much about it because there are no civilians involved," said an IPKF source.

A focus of the operations is to ferret out LTTE cadres from their strongholds in the Northern part of Trincomalee, around Verungal, north of Batticaloa, and around Akkaraipattu in Amparai. Lt. Gen. A. S. Kalkat, the General Officer Commanding of the IPKF Land Forces, has

established a forward headquarters in Trincomalee and is supervising the operations.

Big setback: The sources said the recent operations at Alampai, where a major LTTE command centre was captured, was a big setback to the organisation. The IPKF has been trying to weaken the LTTE by denying its cadres access to bases and sources of supply and keeping them on the run. The Alampai operation, though small in terms of the amount of men and material captured, is regarded as having been extremely successful as it has denied the LTTE access to an important supply point and command centre. Wireless intercepts indicated that the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran, had directed the fighting.

When asked to sum up the effect of IPKF operations since last March, IPKF sources say that the main change has been that the LTTE is no longer capable of offering organised military resistance. Their chain of command has been shattered, their supply lines broken and they can now only operate in isolated groups of two and three people. "Their movements have been restricted and their cadres immobilised," the sources said.

They felt that the LTTE was disintegrating as a military organisation and the leadership could no longer keep a tight hold over their cadres.

While the military operations have been described as successful, there has been no corresponding weakening of the LTTE's positions in its talks with Indian Government representatives. The military operation is one of the two tracks the Indian Government is following, the other being the negotiations in Madras. The broad strategy has been to apply military pressure in the LTTE and induce it to take more flexible positions in the negotiations.

Sticky point: According to informed sources, a broad agreement has been reached on the number of arms to be surrendered but the timing appears to be a sticky point. The LTTE is

reportedly keen that a ceasefire is announced as a first step to any agreement while the Indian side wants a surrender of arms to precede any ceasefire. The LTTE has argued that its cadres and arms supplies are scattered and that it would take weeks for all the weapons to be gathered and surrendered. A ceasefire would allow the LTTE to collect its weapons, the organisation has argued. One compromise which is being worked on is the declaration of a ceasefire, followed by the surrender of a few arms, first and then by the handing over of the remaining weapons within a given time period.

The payment of money to the LTTE, dubbed as aid for the relief and rehabilitation of LTTE cadres, and for the reconstruction of the "industries" the LTTE ran in Jaffna, is another area of negotiation. The Government of India has taken the position that any money given for rehabilitations should go through Sri Lankan Government channels and not directly, as it happened last year after the accord was signed. India also wants relief to go to all the militant groups and not just the LTTE. As a compromise, a formula is being worked out under which each group will be compensated according to its number of cadres.

The Indian Government is also reportedly demanding a commitment from the LTTE that it will enter the democratic process and participate in the Provincial Council elections. The LTTE has raised several political preconditions for this, including an improvement of the devolution package, which is unrealistic at this point of time.

The Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant, had publicly stated during his visit to Colombo last month that conditions for starting the election process could be ensured by the IPKF by July. With that deadline approaching, there is pressure on the Indian Government to reach an agreement with the LTTE quickly.

IPKF using napalm bombs: LTTE

Madras, June 25: The LTTE today accused the Indian peacekeeping force of using napalm bombs with the intent "to exterminate the Tamil race and the Tigers" and said several animals have perished in forest fires set off by the bombs.

The IPKF began napalm bombing on June 22 and were still continuing the assault on civilian places at Mullaitheevu and its surrounding areas, an LTTE statement in Madras said this evening. The information was based on a message received by the Tigers' propaganda office

here early this morning, it said.

Besides destroying many houses, schools and office buildings, napalm bombs had resulted in several kilometres forests being set aflame, the LTTE alleged.

Even as the media speculations about talks between the Tigers and the Indian intelligence agency RAW abound, now this charge of India using napalm bombs to disarm the LTTE would constitute a serious setback to the peace process.

Some recent rumours have also said the Tigers were merely buying time by pretending to negotiate with India even while preparing for bigger warfare. A shipload of arms is on its way with an European supplier, reports have said. However the local LTTE office has denied this.



SINNAVAN PARREY, RAJAKERAMMAN, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

Miss. Sinnavan Thaivanai, age 29, is my only daughter.

It was army operation and shelling over Karaveddi West area, on 1.6.88.

She above said Miss. Sinnavan Thaivanai went to the market to sell and buy things.

On her return on 1.6.88, She sustained gun shot injury, and died at the spot.

Her body was cremated at Verenddai Cemetery.

My husband who was the father of the deceased was blind for the last five years.

My above said deceased daughter was the sole bread winner of my family of two members.

MISS KAMALESWARY RASARATNAM, Cemetery Lane, Ward-6, Myliddy.

The deceased Rasaratnam Pasunkili, aged 53 years was my mother.

My late mother was engaged in selling vegetables at Myliddy market since 1985 to look after the family as my father was old and feeble and is bed-ridden.

On 17.6.88 at 7.30 a.m. my mother left home for the market as usual.

At about 11.00 a.m. my younger sister Mrs. K. Rajeswary came home and informed me that my mother had been shot dead in the myliddy market when the IPKF opened fire during their search operations.

Immediately I rushed to the spot along with my brother Maheswaran and brought home the dead body.

The dead body bore bullet injury of her left chest.

The dead body was cremated the following day morning at Myliddy cemetery.

I have no means of living as the bread winner of the family is dead.

இந்த உண்மையை

VAITILLINGAM SIVAPACKIYAM (63) Pillayar Kovil Veethy, Erlalai North, Erlalai.

The injured person Vaitilingam Raveendran alias Indran aged 30 years is my son.

He is deaf and dumb and a casual labourer.

On 27.6.88 at about 6.00 p.m. my son was seated at our gate.

An army patrol unit came that way fired at him.

As a result he sustained an injury on his left leg.

He was taken immediately by the army itself to the Punnalaikattuvan army camp.

I went to the camp at about 8.00 a.m. on the following day where I was told that my son is alive and well.

My son was not shown to me.

I returned to my home.

Later I heard that my son was admitted at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

I rushed there and found my son minus his left leg.

I learned that his left leg was amputated at thigh level in the army Hospital prior to his admission to the General Hospital.

At present he is being warded at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

AFFIDAVIT

C R P

IPKF OFFENSIVE IN MULLAITIVU :

The IPKF operation (VIRAT) which commenced during the last week of May continued into the first week of June. More troops had to be moved to the area. It was reported that a convoy of 265 vehicles carrying reinforcements was seen moving from Vavuniya towards Mullaitivu as the fighting progressed. LTTE Chief's Deputy, Mahathaya was reported encircled by the IPKF. Civilians from Pudukudierruppu fled the strife torn area towards Kilinochchi. Residents from Allampil and Kumulamunai moved to Vavuniya to escape the hardships of continuous curfew and risk to their lives consequent on the fighting. The Indian High Commission press release said that 100 LTTE cadres were killed and 40 captured while admitting losing 30 of their men. The LTTE claimed to have killed 62 IPKF soldiers. The operation was intended to make an impact on the ongoing LTTE - India talks but the operation did not turn out to be decisive.

R. Rajkumar (16) arrested by the IPKF near his home at Navatkuly by the IPKF stationed at Navatkuly died in custody within 3 days of arrest. Body briefly shown to parents and disposed of by IPKF.

Perinam Thiru of Akkaraipattu was kidnapped from his home on 10.06.88 by two youths who came on motor-cycle. Parents followed kidnappers to Tirukovil. Kidnappers promised release youth next day but early next morning, body butchered into pieces found on Pottuvil-Akkaraipattu main road.

IPKF men passing Polikandy village near Valvettiturai on 07.05.88 were annoyed with a young boy beating on a tin can. They assaulted the boy and his father severely. Father Arunasalam Sivalingam (48) was admitted to hospital and succumbed to his injuries on 05.06.88.

Attorney at Law Vilvarajah (58) of Vavuniya shot dead by unidentified men.

Subramaniam Keerthirajah, Colombo TELO leader shot dead in Colombo on 03.06.88.

A Tamil youth was shot dead near Kollupitiya lane, Colombo on 08.06.88.

Tamil detenus held at Boosa at present number 524. No further release states Attorney General. Meanwhile IPKF without any legal sanction held 194 youths at Vavuniya and about 1000 youths at Kankesanthurai and Palaly.

Cordon and search operation go on apace both in the North and East. At Batticaloa during search operation Velupillai Uthayashankar is shot dead. Sinnakutty Thavarasa of Valvettiturai takes cyanide during IPKF search operations. Urany near Batticaloa search by IPKF on 4th June Killikumar is shot dead.

Two IPKF soldiers leaving textile shop in Point Pedro are shot and killed and their arms removed. More IPKF men arrive on scene and attack civilians. Several hospitalised consequently.

IPKF OFFENSIVE CONTINUES

The IPKF operation VIRAT centred in the Mullaitivu District during the first three weeks of June has been enlarged to cover a wider area from 21.06.88 under operation code named 'CHECKMATE'. The extended area besides Mullaitivu includes Vavuniya and environs. More IPKF troops have been inducted into operation 'CHECKMATE' than in the earlier operation 'VIRAT'. The IPKF claim to have destroyed the LTTE hideouts at Visvadamu and Thunukai. Fifty youths were

30

COLOMBO, June 30.

One Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan was killed and a few others were wounded in an ambush by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka's north-eastern Mullaitivu district on Wednesday. In the ensuing exchange of fire three militants were killed and two others were apprehended.

The IPKF men were returning from Oddusuddan to Mullaitivu when they were ambushed in a jungle area.

Meanwhile, two of the five IPKF men reported missing in Monday's ambush by the LTTE in the northern Vavuniya district were found by villagers in an unconscious state and handed over to the Sri Lankan troops, who in turn handed them over to the IPKF, the sources said.

Capal, a LTTE guerrilla was rounded up by IPKF para commandos. After throwing his grenade he took cyanide. Two soldiers were dead. Vadamarachi people mourned his death with homages. The enraged IPKF entered Valvettithurai, Point Pedro, Tikkam and Polikandy and severely assaulted whoever they caught.

In Pudukudiyirupu, between Mullaitheevu and Othiyamalai 6 IPKF soldiers were killed in an encounter with LTTE. An IPKF officer was killed.

In a landmine attack by LTTE, 4 IPKF men were killed.

CRP

Two leading Tamils of Akkaraipattu, P. Kanapathipillai (59) and Kariyan Vadivel (60) kidnapped on 21.06.88, whereabouts still not known.

A teenaged student and a girl from Karaitivu kidnapped and killed.

A Muslim youth, Mohamed Nazeer (26) of Akkaraipattu was stabbed to death by another Muslim of the 'Three Stars' group.

Drop-outs from the various groups other than the LTTE are roaming the Batticaloa District robbing people, especially at Chenkalady, Kalmunai, Pandiruppu and Akkaraipattu.

IPKF have intensified their searches in Akkaraipattu.

EPRLF, TELO, and PLOTE have jointly opened an office at Tirukovil near the IPKF camp. Members of this joint office accompany the IPKF on their rounds. They also inquire into disputes. Attendance of the parties is ensured by threats.

DIES IN IPKF CUSTODY

A Batticaloa Citizens' Committee member said that on the 28th May, 1988, one Kanapathipillai Thiruchelvam, one of the eight persons taken into custody by the IPKF at Kirankulam, died hours later.

CRP

arrested on 21.06.88 during search operations at Sastrikoolankulam and Thandikulam. Another 34 youths were arrested in the same locality on 25.06.88. Parents and spouses of arrested persons complained to the Government Agent on 23.06.88. An IPKF officer was killed in an encounter with the LTTE in Vavuniya. On 27.06.88 at Cheddikulam IPKF truck ambushed. 4 IPKF men killed, 5 missing and 3 injured. On 29.06.88 at Thaniyootu near Mullaitivu one IPKF soldier was killed. On 30.06.88, 3 IPKF men killed at Nedunkerny near Mullaitivu. On 30.06.88, 4 IPKF men killed in a landmine blast at Tiriyai near Trincomalee.

One IPKF soldier killed and another wounded at Murikandy on 16/6 as a result of a landmine blast.

TELO office at Vavuniya blasted on 17/6.

On 18/6 at Vavuniya there was a protest march parents and spouses of nearly 200 detenus held without charge by the IPKF. Protest march was organised by Citizens' Committee Vavuniya and led by the President Dr. Pararajasingham and other officials. There were nearly 5000 persons including school children. At the first check point the marches were stopped by the IPKF and armed youths believed to be TELO and EPRLF cadres. Dr. Pararajasingham had been threatened by the same groups. He has since relinquished office and left Vavuniya.

Kathankudi 21.06.88 - Kalideen arrested and released earlier by IPKF in connection with the killing of Mr. Ahamed Lebbe ex Chairman T.C. and respected member of area was shot dead. IPKF at Kathankudi is attacked with grenades. IPKF counter attack and kill two militants and arrest about 20 others. Shop and other buildings damaged.

On 21.06.88 about 25 members of 'Three Star' group cordon Iruthayapuram area in Batticaloa. Residents panic. Nesan of the LTTE trying to escape on bicycle is shot dead.

Two youths Kandiah Nesan and Pathinathar Babu taken off passenger bus from Colombo to Jaffna and killed by a group which alleged victims were PLOTE members.

Nagulan, LTTE leader killed in cordon and search operation. Hartal observed to commemorate him in his area - Chavakachcheri, Kodikamam and Pallai on 23.06.88.

Hartal in Atchuvvely, Avarangal and Puttur on 23.06.88 to commemorate S. Rasavarajeeva LTTE leader of the area killed during first week of April.

On 23.06.88 Arasan and Eeswaran of the LTTE were killed at Mamangam near Batticaloa by the EPRLF.

At Trincomalee on 27th June, two P.Cs and three Sinhala civilians injured in grenade attack. In a second grenade attack, one sub-inspector and two P.Cs injured.

600 mothers march and hand over petition to IPKF. Demands - to dislodge colonists from Welioya former Manalaaru; to order cease fire and enter into talks with LTTE. Tamils had suffered and youths detained both under Sri Lankan Security Forces and later under IPKF. Demand also to free all detenus.

Mr. Veluatham and elderly businessman at Batticaloa was kidnapped on 28th June. The kidnappers are demanding a ransom of Rs. 2 lakhs. The kidnappers believed to be the 'Three Star' group have blamed it on LTTE.



விடுதலை வீரன்

அன்பே வடிவானவர்களுக்கு
மரணம் எப்போதும் நண்பன்
எனவே எனக்குப் பயமில்லை

‘முதுகில் கனக்கும்
எந்திரத் துவக்குடன்
வனங்களில் அலைகிறேன்
காலடிகளில் பதிகின்றன
நம்பிக்கையின் கவடுகள்

நான் நிழல்
எனது செயல்களே நிஜம்
கண்ணிவெடிகளின் முழக்கம்
படைத் தளபதியின்
உறக்கத்தைச் சிதறடிக்கும்
நேற்றிருத்த சிப்பாய்
இன்று இறந்திருப்பான்

எல்லோரும் தங்களை உலகுக்குக்
காட்டத் துடிக்கும் போது
நானே உலகத்தின் கண்களிலிருந்து
மறைந்து நின்று போராடுகிறேன்
‘எனது மக்களே எனது மலைகள்’
தங்கள் குகைகளில் என்னை
மறைத்து விடுவார்கள்.
என்றைக்காவது ஒரு நாள்
எதுவும் நிகழலாம்
இராணுவத்தால் அரவமில்லாமல்

பிடிக்கப்படலாம்.
யாரும் காணாமல் நதிக்கரையில்
பிணமாகக் கிடக்கலாம்.

அது நானல்ல. என் நிழல்
நிழலை மட்டும் தான்
அவர்களால் அழிக்க முடியும்

எந்தக் கவிஞனும்
என்னைப் பாடமாட்டான்
ஆனால் கிராம மக்கள்
என்னை மறக்க மாட்டார்கள்
துயரம் மெளனமாய் கவிய
நான் இல்லாமல் போனதெப்படியென
நண்பர்கள் நினைத்திருப்பார்கள்

எப்போதும் காணமுடியாதவாறு
எனது உடல் அழிக்கப்படலாம்

அலைகளோடு எழுந்து
இரவியில் வருவேன்
பனிப்படலமென இறங்கி
வனங்களில் மிதப்பேன்

தொழர்கள் தாகத்துடன்
குளங்களில் குளியும் போது
நீரலைகளில் தெளியும் என் வடிவம்
என்னையே அருந்தி
பயணத்தை தொடர்வார்கள்
போராட்டத்தை நோக்கி.

— முகம்மது ஜமால்

வீர வீணக்கம்

LITE MARTYRS

'நகுதக் கனரே, நாடுமீக் கூறுநர்;

இனையவன் இவன் என உலையக் கூறிப்,
படுமணி இரட்டும் பாவடிப் பணைத்தான்
நெடுநல் யானையும், தேரும், மாவும்,
படைஅமை மறவரும், உடையம் யாம்' என்று

உறுதுப்பு அஞ்சாது, உடல்சினம் செருக்கிச்
சிறுசொல் சொல்லிய சினங்கெழு வேந்தரை
அருஞ்சமஞ் சிதையத் தாக்கி, முரசுமொடு
ஒருங்குஅகப் பட்டேன் ஆயின் பொருந்திய
என்னிழல் வாழ்நர் சென்னிழல் காணுது....

தலையாலங்கானத்துச் செரு
வென்ற நெடுஞ்செழியன்.

Capt. Vadavooran 14.6.88

Yasodharan 12.6.88

Capt. Mahendi 31.6.88



Maria 3.7.88



Capt. Kasim

Subash 3.6.88

Udhayan 24.6.88

Lt. Nidhi 30.6.88

Dhamu 8.6.88

Kones 6.6.88

Capt. Vadavooran 14.6.88

Sam 2.6.88

Buvanesh 6.6.88


Vinod 9.6.88

Kaliyugan 9.6.88

Lt. Surdar 19.6.88

Nakulan 26.6.88

Sambal 30.6.88



Maj. Salam 2.6.88

June 88

Maj. Kala

Capt. Raghavan

Sabesan

Mano

Anex

Ramu

Harisada

Pirim

Thiyagu

Arasan

2nd. Lt. Ravi 3.7.88

Maria 3.7.88

Kandeeban 4.7.88

Capt. Kasim 16.7.88

Vaithi 17.7.88

Thadi 19.7.88

Hari 21.7.88

Raja 27.7.88

Edwin 29.7.88

Capt. Mahesh 30.7.88



Capt. Mahendi



Capt. S. Krishnalingam 29.6.88



Subash 3.6.88



Gandhi 30.7.88

claims	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
	IPKF	LTTE	S.L. ARMY	OTHER MILITANTS	CIVILIANS					
	2	106						2	2	
IPKF										
LTTE										
MEDIA										

11	1	2			1 _P	2*	
	7					1	

22							
					1 _P	1	

12							

23		2					
	1	3					

2							
	1					2	

13							
	1	1					

24							

3	2	9					
	2			3	1 _T		



25	2	35	8 ^C			15	
	1						
						1 ^C	34

4		2				1	
							3

15							
						1	

26							
	1						

5							
	3	2					4

16							
	1	1					

27							
	7	8					
	4	8				4	4

6			10 ^C			5	
		1					

17		1	1			3*	
	9					3	

28	4	8			3		3
				3	2		3

7	3	4					
	12						
						1	1

18	1	1				2 ^C	
						500	

29							
	1						3

8							
		1					
		1		1	2		1

19							
		1					

30	1	3	2 ^C				
	13	1					
	7						

9							
		2					
						1	

20		1	8 ^C				



10		3*					
						11	

21	6		6				
		3	20				52 ^C

13	22	58	7 ^C	3	1	23	8
50	9	17	1			2	3 ^C
30	10	7	20	6	4	4	8 ^C
							86

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12

CHAPTER 13

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	

A year passed with no peace in sight. Curfew in Colombo and Jaffna. Strike in Tamil areas observed successfully.

July



Tamil Tragedy in Sri Lanka and Contradictory Strategy by India—I

V.R. Krishna Iyer

COMMENT

The Sri Lankan Constitution does not vest in the Indian prime minister the power to direct the Tamil citizens of Sri Lanka to accept the India-Sri Lanka accord and surrender arms or die. This is the concern of the government of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis its citizens. By what magic of law can the Indian army become the Lankan civil authority and be bound by any accountability in that country?

A DYNAMIC re-thinking of India's Sri Lanka policy is overdue because the rapid flow of forces affects political logic and parties which are committed to humanist dialectic must respond to new social realities. When the story of the bleeding peace-keeping in Sri Lanka by Rajiv Gandhi's government comes to be written the world will be shocked by the savage sins some jawans have committed against Tamil human rights. To wish away army crime, because our jawans have committed it, is not patriotism, as some bigoted chauvinists claim, but unconscionable nationalism, as Gandhiji would have declared. All of us are vicariously guilty, if the charges of torture and massacre and sex and theft, now coming to light, were even fractionally true. Lanka's Tamils expect much from India as their saviour. India too is concerned for justice to the Tamils. Some perverse moronism has stultified our massive effort. We must with nationalist impatience examine the whole development. That criticism is constructive duty.

I

Death Sentence by Colombo on Jaffna

First, the history of the brutal suppression and escalating alienation of the Tamils of the island by the Simhala regimes since independence culminating in the pogrom of 1983 and after by the Buddhist version of the Ku Klux Klan and the military of Jayewardene, alas, now taken over more bitterly, violently and professionally by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the name of implementing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) and tracking down the Tamil Tigers.

Ceylon attained independence and became a republic in 1948. 72 per cent of the population are Simhalas, but the Tamils—a separate ethnic entity with a long history—are a significant presence, having made substantial developmental contribution to the island. There are other tiny yet distinctive groups. The island is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and culturally plural. The Simhalas had a brutal bracket, from the beginning, hell-bent on the liquidation of the Tamils, the dominant demographic factor in

the northern and the eastern sector. Electoral engineering, in this climate of communal hostility, preponderantly projected the Simhalas into state power, and over the decades, the Sri Lanka rulers, whoever formed the government, were abetted by the hard-core hoodlums and Buddhist monks to crush the Tamil ethnics. This meaningful minority had occupied high positions, key places, strategic roles and had contributed to the enrichment and building up of the national economy. With the divisive politics gripping Sri Lanka, Tamils were gradually flushed out, crushed down. It was not mere discrimination; discrimination is a very mild word to describe such a situation. In matters of employment, discrimination. In matters of education, discrimination. In matters of police and army posts, discrimination, until at last it reached a stage when armed violence was openly practised to inflict blood and death on masses of Tamil civilians to jettison them from the island, with no court to give justice, no right to share power in the executive or legislative branches. The Tamil people whose almost sole surrogates in parliament were the TULF members were *de facto* disfranchised by a constitutional device. The Supreme Court became helpless because the judges were rendered toothless by the Emergency and remained robed as boneless wonders in the face of constitutionalised authoritarianism. Human rights agencies found the administration grossly guilty. Indeed, the heartless approach to Jaffna Tamils reached the boiling point of betrayal when in 1986 the Indian government rightly felt so enraged that it took upon itself the responsibility of unusual measures of humanitarian intervention without the assent of the island government. The refugee deluge and Jaffna under siege are testimony of the oceanic violations by the Colombo throne.

Amnesty International, Law Asia, the International Commission of Jurists, independent media and other well known human rights organisations and champions all over the world expressed shock at the state-engineered macabre happenings. Progressive forces inside Sri Lanka, including some left elements, and the church, protested in vain. India's Tamil Nadu was in convulsive anger.

Simhala encroachment in the Tamil areas, breach of ethnic demography wherever the Tamils were a vast majority, state-sponsored colonisation in the Trincomalee district to break ethnic homogeneity, discriminatory demarcation of new rural councils, and like measures steadily accelerated and intimidated the Tamil minority with the dismantling of their integrity. The confidence of the community in state justice collapsed. The Tamils apprehended imminent extermination from their historic homeland. Nightmarish violence, which was simmering below the surface, was let loose after 1983 and people could not know whether they would survive for the morrow. Scenes of woe, the like of which only the Indian partition tragedy had witnessed, became common. Electoral rolls were used by racist street-roughs to identify the Tamils, even in the city of Colombo. You go to this house, this is a Tamil house; that shop, it is a Tamil shop. Therefore, kill the people there, destroy their belongings and, if it is a Simhala shop or house, leave it.

There are some crises of communal terror when a prison may be a sanctuary for the victims. But here the Tamils inside the Welikade prison were dragged out, killed and the blood of the prisoners was offered to the Buddha statue within the prison premises. Civilised law says that when a man is killed there will at least be a post-mortem. But a law was made by which the basic minimum of even a post-mortem on a person killed was said to be not necessary. And detentions galore and no court's writ could run. To make a long story short, there was state terrorism, not merely the fear of the Sinhalese sector going berserk. State terrorism practised at that time was so terrible that the president shamelessly declared: "I am waging war". Imagine a president of a country saying that he is waging war against a substantial minority in that country itself.

True, the LTTE, in raging reprisal and struggling for Tamil survival, hit back and innocent Simhalas perished. Brute force begets brute force and increases exponentially. To kill, by reckless bombs, Simhala civilians is savagery. Even so, for the state to starve and shoot and bomb out an ethnic minority with genocidal intent during times of peace is a crime against humanity.

The venerably gerontic president, Jayewardene, was an extremist in violence, yet a 'Buddhist' and 'Gandhian'. He could bomb and starve his own citizens and call them for conferences. Tamils knew his clever treachery, never trusted him and dreaded his killer plots.

Unless we have a live historical memory, we oftentimes forget the present issues which are projected by the past. Terrorism is a false label for the struggle of a people in despair facing genocide by state massacre and communal terrorism. It was in this macabre background that the Tamils, with Indian government's empathy, fought back. There was an outcry then that this was terrorism. But at the same time, when the Sri Lankan army gunned down people all round, it was

called an innocent army operation. Inevitably, like a wounded tiger at bay, the Tamil militants struck back. Once we appreciate the gory, grim and ghastly scenes which had been spreading over the decades, from 1948 onwards, we will realise the dialectical forces at work. Tamils wanted a historic home and home rule *within* the republic, if possible, without the republic, if necessary.

Indira Gandhi, moved by the suppressive strategies of the JRJ regime, sent her emissaries to negotiate a national reconciliation with justice to the ethnic Tamils of the north and the east. When she fell victim to a dastardly assassin Rajiv Gandhi emerged as prime minister and brought to bear a fresh approach to the Sri Lanka issues. He too sent his representatives to Colombo, some of whom were misfits but others able hands. But president Jayewardene, a consummate artist of contradictions, of double-think, double-speak and new-speak, outwitted neophyte prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. He discussed proposals but simultaneously waged war. The tomfoolery was so baffling and the siege on Jaffna so heartless that Rajiv Gandhi, in rare a mood of humanity, rushed mercy ships of food and medicine to the north, and on the Lankan navy turning them back, the IAF blitzed into the island to drop compassionate supplies to the starving Tamils. This action transformed the situation and after some hectic activity there suddenly emerged, on July 29, 1986, the India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) which was hailed at first blush as a benign beginning of ethnic justice. The gestation and the midwifery of this agreement are a riddle wrapped in a mystery; the cumulative meaning of the ambivalent clauses of this hasty document is an arcane enigma; whom it benefits in the short and the long runs is as yet difficult to decode. The India-Lanka Accord must be tested by measuring its clauses, their viability and credibility with the triple imperatives of Tamil justice within the republic. With hindsight, we may apprehend that the accord is grinding to a halt unless courageous self-criticism and policy changes bail us out of the requiem situation.

II

India-Lanka Accord and IPKF Imbroglio

Since the Sri Lanka soldiery and the Sinhala skinheads together menaced the Tamil future, the IPKF landing in Jaffna was welcomed as a propitious presence. Notwithstanding the fatal processual weaknesses of failure to consult Sri Lanka's Tamil groups or Sinhala opposition or even the prime minister of the island or, for that matter, India's opposition parties; despite the poverty of devolution of provincial powers, the tricky triarchy whereby president and governor could, and would, cipherrise the elected council and make a mockery of ministers; although the fusion of north and

east is sought to be sabotaged by the referendum trap, some prospect of ceasefire, national reconciliation and ethnic justice through Indian guarantees was a note of hope. It must be assumed that prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's original intentions were to secure effective devolution and enduring linking of north and east, sans which the solemn agreement would be a *mareecha* instrument. For those with dialectical vigilance and political sense the ISLA project is counterfeit. Even so, giving a charitable meaning to the instrument, we still find gaping gaps which make the pact a defeat for the Tamils. Sad that some leftists blink at realities and support the accord.

Most favourably read, the anatomy of the accord consists of a luminous preamble, a string of resolutions, an annexure to the agreement and an integral exchange of letters of even date between the high signatories. The political essence of the Tamil position, abandoning the demand for 'eelam', is that in the setting of Lankan pluralism, ethnic, linguistic and religious, two fundamental demands must be granted with grace. Firstly, "that the northern and the eastern provinces have been areas of *historical habitation* of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with the other ethnic groups". The second basic is the Tamil right to "live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations". These aspirations are a Tamil homeland and home rule within the republic. Strong political structures, with Indian guarantees, are the desideratum, having regard to the dreadful discriminations, privations, and tortures of the past. Tamil mistrust of Colombo is natural. Clear and concrete clauses fleshing out the formula of inviolable autonomy and fusion of the historic home of north and east, guaranteed by India and agreed to by the broad Sinhala community—not merely Jayewardene—is the sensible solution. Remember JRJ is a lame duck president and cannot constitutionally contest beyond his second term expiring within months, and the parliament itself is running out its term. And, what is worse, even his own prime minister as also the leading opposition, the SLFP, are open critics of vital aspects of the accord. Alas, our prime minister's dialectical literacy about Sri Lanka's historic realities and political prognosis does not measure up to the grave challenges and constitutional problems.

The agreement half-heartedly proceeds to implement the historical habitation thesis by promising a North-East Province (NEP). But the provision is precariously subject to a condition precedent of referendum for the east. We, in India, know the snares and snags of plebiscite in Kashmir. Sinister manipulations, false alarms may undo the link-up and frustrate this life-and-death demand for Tamil territorial integrity.

Be that as it may, during an interim

period, the north and east, it is stated in the accord, would form one administrative unit, having one elected provincial council with one government, one chief minister and one board of ministers. Thus the immediate step was to initiate these processes. After the newborn NEP worked for some time, a referendum was provided for the east to express its wish to opt out of the NEP. There are many traps here to defeat the joinder. That apart, what is of critical importance is the immediate formation of the NEP as 'one administrative unit'. Assuming the accord to be inviolable, as obsessively and obdurately asserted by our prime minister, this condition remains a dead letter. Blaming the LTTE is poor alibi. Again, the elections to the north and the east assured within three months from the end of July 1987 (the date of the agreement) and "in any event before 31st December 1987" is a broken word. The "interim period", when the NEP experiment would be worked out and communities could make their choice in the light of that experience, has never materialised.

The next part of ISLA relates to normalisation processes relaxing the repressive regime. Constitutional terrorism flourished under the umbrella of the Emergency. To extinguish this suppressive situation, a condition precedent was prescribed that the "Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987", all arms with the militant groups were to be surrendered to designated authorities and the Sri Lankan Army was to be confined to the barracks. The deadly Emergency is disgracefully extant and Rajiv Gandhi is silent. Preventive detention and indiscriminate prosecutions had benumbed and killed all liberties. Therefore, as a step towards restoration of normalcy, the agreement mandated the president to grant "General Amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws... as well as to those persons accused, charged and convicted under these laws". What a tragic truth that many still wallow in jails even today. There is a further clause that all residual matters—and they could be most critical, such as the constitutional amendments and legislative enactments to give full effect to the provisions of the accord—would be "resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement" (i.e. middle of August 1987). Audaciously, this clause was by-passed when the fraudulent amendment bills were moved and passed in the Lankan parliament with none in the South Block to protest.

Now we move on to the military mantle of India in the island—the peace-keeping outfit. When the government of Sri Lanka requests the government of India "to afford military assistance to implement these proposals", the latter will co-operate "as and when requested" (clause 8). One is entitled to know what particular military assistance

has Sri Lanka demanded and what specific 'proposals' of the covenant are sought to be implemented by the Indian forces. Is it to enforce surrender of arms by militant groups, as stated in clause 8? "The law enforcement and maintenance of security in the northern and eastern provinces", stipulates clause 9, will be through "the same organisations and mechanisms" of Sri Lanka's government as are used for the rest of the island. Reading clauses 8 and 9 together, the Indian army has no peace-keeping or law and order business. There is no other indication anywhere in the agreement about the use of the Indian military for an offensive against any group, and certainly none to hound and hunt and shoot and kill the Tigers wherever they are. This is a self-imposed bleeding blunder or sabre-rattling mission beyond the accord orbit. The IPKF's terrible peace-keeping violence, spreading death, blood and tears, has no warrant in Sri Lankan law nor in the accord. It is outrageously *ultra vires*. In truth what is expected of India, according to clause 2.15 (c) (and the annexure), is to offer military assistance and to co-operate with the Sri Lankan government by giving such assistance. The principal role is thus of Sri Lanka and the co-operative or assistance role is that of India. Once these limitations are understood, the deadly distortions in the frenzied operations indulged in by the IPKF will become indefensible. Another co-operative venture indicated in 2.15 (e) also implies functional limitations. Sri Lanka and India, says the sub-clause, "will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities" inhabiting the northern and eastern provinces. The north is virtually Tamil and therefore India is expected to defend, not offend, to save, not slaughter, the Tamils there. What is being done, or has been done during these months, excels the Sinhala genocidal chapter, if the reports related to me by those who had come fresh from Jaffna are true—a rabid reversal of physical security and safety of the Tamils. Even in the eastern province, a substantial number, speaking demographically, is Tamil, with a mentionable minority of Sinhala and Muslims. The IPKF has done nothing to defend the Sinhala and the Muslims. Tamil suspects and even innocents are anathema to them. Several hundreds or more of civilians have died under shocking conditions and the IPKF suffers from some kind of trigger-happy occupation-army syndrome. Why do I speak so harshly? Because I apprehend that the India of Gandhi and Nehru is involved abroad in lawless violence of diabolic dimensions. Let us scan the situation under the accord and Sri Lankan jurisprudence.

The functional relevance of the IPKF under the accord is (a) co-operate and assist the Sri Lankan government, (b) to defend the Tamils against aggressive Sinhala, and (c) take into custody arms surrendered by Tamil militants. To take into custody arms

surrendered is a very limited operation, if words mean anything. Similarly, protecting the communities living in the north and the east, by no stretch of imagination, extends to killing Tamil civilians or suspected militants. Strangely enough the IPKF, obviously with South Block clearance, has taken upon itself the power to chase, liquidate and subjugate the LTTE—Operation Pawan. For this purpose, they make house-to-house searches, clamp down curfew, take into custody suspects, kill many, including humble civilians. Under what legal authority, and that in a foreign country? An accord is not law and approval of that instrument by parliament is not equal to legislation. My brief study of the constitution of Sri Lanka (as of 1978) with particular reference to Article 155 (Public Security) and Fundamental Rights (Chapter III) persuades me that the IPKF action is indefensible if that republic's constitution means anything beyond words. My hurried enquiry with a couple of well-informed Sri Lankan lawyers also is to be the same effect. If "amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent... in war and in peace", the IPKF is guilty of horrendous violations. Even in an Emergency, presidential regulations have to be made to suspend the provisions of any law. A proclamation and communication thereof to parliament are protections implanted by Article 154 of the constitution, so that rights of citizens, Tamil or Sinhala, shall not be trampled over by executive fiat or by sten-gun writ. Inevitably, the question shoots up whether any proclamation and regulation, authorising foreign forces to shoot down Lankan citizens, or even to arrest them or make house searches has been promulgated. None, said the lawyers I consulted over the phone. It is significant that Article 11 forbids torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment of any person and Article 13 insists that no person shall be arrested except according to legal procedure. Other protections, as in the Indian constitution, are also fundamental rights in Sri Lanka, including freedom of residence and movement, of association and assembly, including the right not to be arrested except according to legally established procedure, to be informed of the grounds of arrest, to be produced before the nearest competent court and afforded a fair trial. To anticipate my charge against the IPKF, these basic rights have been crushed by the jawans as a body above the law, even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this background, foreign army invasion of the Citizens' Bill of Rights is brash unconstitutionality. If we believe in the rule of law, Indian soldiers have no business to get into Sri Lanka territory, search, seize, arrest, and shoot. They may assist Sri Lanka's civil authorities or afford defence (only) when Tamils are attacked. Is there—it would be extraordinary if there were—any legislative sanction empowering foreign soldiers by name or designation to search, seize, arrest, roam the streets with sten guns and fire upon anyone they fancy, with no inquest, no case

registered, no magisterial enquiry, no answerability to Lankan legal authority? It is a shame for Lanka's parliament and people if the law is dead and police and administrative authority is usurped by alien forces invited by the president but acting under their own command.

The Sri Lankan constitution does not vest in the Indian prime minister the power to direct the Tamil citizens of Sri Lanka to accept the accord and surrender arms or die. This is the concern of the government of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis its citizens. India's writ is *ultra vires* unless there is validating legislation justifying one hundred thousand Indian soldiers hunting for Tamil militants. Their killings are mass murders unless legitimated by clear statutory empowerment which sets

What most distresses the human rights sensitives is the savagery of some of the Indian soldiery. Maybe they were expecting a meek Tiger surrender but were surprised at the stiff resistance of the LTTE. But the LTTE had political reasons not to give up arms and would not take orders from India's chief executive. Their accountability is to their people. Under what law should they surrender? Even if provoked by the sophisticated fire power and the superior guerilla wits of the Tigers, how could a disciplined army run amok with their guns and do worse? Many cases of rape by jawans have been reported. In some instances, jawans have been caught red-handed and taken to court.

limitations on the exercise of such police powers. By what magic of law can the Indian military become the Lankan civil authority and be bound by any accountability in that country? Even president JRJ must rely upon some specific constitutional provision and subsidiary legislation if he is to deprive the Tamils of Jaffna and the east of their fundamental rights. This lawlessness par excellence is a matter of grave importance which deserves to be examined by constitutional lawyers and human rights watchdogs worldwide. From the angle of the Indian people, the IPKF operation has exceeded reasonable bounds and has been responsible for bitterness, butchery and loss of property, if the reports from the island are believed. By getting away with it now you cannot escape the verdict of history later. We are treated to disinformation and misinformation, making the LTTE the Ravana of the island and the IPKF the self-appointed Rama.

Tamil Tragedy in Sri Lanka and Contradictory Strategy by India—II

V R Krishna Iyer

Jaffna has been conquered, maybe. But the spirit of the people there will resist, long after their defeat. We are now disowned by the Sinhalese and detested by the Tamils, thanks to our tragedy of strategy and hurry to win international glory. Let us look to the future and take measures of statesmanship. What are they?

III

Political Audit of The Accord

AN implementation audit of the Accord and a performance audit of the IPKF are important at this stage since president Jayewardene has broken the Accord and, if so, why does Rajiv Gandhi keep mum? Nearly a year after the signing of the ISLA, its imperatives remain in suspended animation. The lifting of the Emergency (Article 2.9), the general amnesty (Article 2.11), the disbanding of the Home Guards (an armed auxiliary force of non-Tamil civilians established by a directive of the president and functioning under the responsibility of the ministry of internal security) and the withdrawal of all paramilitary groups from the Northern and Eastern provinces (Annexure to Agreement, Article 3) are pledges betrayed. Similar is the fate of the interim administrative unit of North and East, of polls in three months (at least before December). Residual matters, left over by the pre-Accord negotiations, were to be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within six months of the agreement. Tragic but true, India was not even consulted, notwithstanding a Joint Committee overseeing the implementation. Nay, worse, the 13th Constitutional Amendment and concomitant legislation are a caricature of the requirements in the Accord, thus making the very conscience of the Agreement a casualty.

Is the LTTE right in vacillating about the Accord? It must accept the Accord if, at least in fair measure, the basic claims of (a) an unconditional fusion of the North and the East (home land) and (b) a viable provincial autonomy (home rule), are accomplished. If the ISLA is a *fraud on these demands* for which years of struggle have claimed thousands of martyrs, and the Bandaranayake-Chelvarayagam Pact of 1957 had laid the foundation, will any Tamil militant, save some Judas, agree to the Accord except under coercion? My brief discussion with various shades of Tamil militants from the

LTTE to the TULF showed that all of them were disgruntled and, about the XIII Amendment, thoroughly disenchanted. They looked to India as saviour and now feel betrayed by their own trustee. The LTTE respects India's role. In a recent speech by Tilakar of the Central Committee of the LTTE at a London Conference, he voiced the view of the Tigers:

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord secures India's geo-political interests and strategic objectives. The LTTE is sincerely pleased that the government of India was able to put an end, through the Agreement, to the dangerous activities of the international subversive elements who operated in Sri Lanka as agents of imperialism. As a revolutionary movement committed to anti-imperialist policy we recognise India's security concerns in the region and support her cardinal foreign policy of making the Indian ocean as a zone of peace free from interference of extra-territorial powers. In this context, we wish to point out that it was the LTTE fighters who put up a heroic and relentless fight against foreign mercenaries. Our liberation movement is not opposed to India's interests. We have no objection whatsoever to India's strategic aspirations to establish her status as the regional superpower in South Asia. We always functioned and will continue to function as a friendly force to India. We would have extended our unconditional support to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord if the Agreement were only confined to Indo-Sri Lanka relations aimed to secure India's geo-political interests. But the Accord interferes in the Tamil issue, betrays the Tamil interests. It is here the contradiction of interests between the LTTE and India emerges.

The 13th Amendment to the constitution confers on the president abundant power to impose emergency. Even during non-emergency periods, the president can govern through the governor who will be the agent of the centre. Thus constitutional puppetry, with strings pulled from the presidential palace, sabotages provincial autonomy. Even otherwise, the governor has 'discretionary powers' emasculating the executive and legislative authority of the elected surrogates of the people. This *triarchy* is worse than the British dyarchy in India. Apart from these factors, the ac-

tual transfer of legislative powers is quantitatively and qualitatively chimerical. And proclamation of Emergency is a perpetual damocles' sword! Taking the ISLA as a *fait accompli* the Tigers who represent the large majority (Rajiv Gandhi says LTTE represents none but, says General Pande, not from Jaffna, 90 per cent of Jaffna peninsula is pro-LTTE!) are agreeable for a solemn cease-fire, but not a total surrender of arms. Why? JRJ is on his way out, his second and final term running out. His successor and the majority in the next parliament are anybody's guess. The provincial elections, even when the leading opposition boycotts the polls, give him a negligible majority. What certainty is there that the ISLA would not be rejected, in the light of open UNP opposition to the North-East joinder? In that event, how will the Tamils, already wounded and weakened in their militant might, resist the next suppressive wave? And, more awesome to contemplate, the IPKF would be ordered to quit by JRJ or his rivals before the general and presidential elections, whether India likes it or not. The K C Pant palaver is a face-saving device for phasing the return. It is humiliating to think that after losing some thousands of jawans (the number 640 or so is an incredible underestimate) and spending well over Rs 1,500 crore or so and despatching around a hundred thousand military men, India should be asked to quit, politely of course, with none of the major clauses in the ISLA yet fulfilled by Colombo! But Sinhala voice will rise against large foreign forces on their soil and India is not their favourite. For sheer survival, both UNP and SLFP will order India out. And if the IPKF is off, the Tamils are back to square one and must fight with their fists since all weapons are to be surrendered, according to Rajiv Gandhi. Please note, the most virulent, violent JVP is back in the open, with ban lifted and weapons not surrendered. Why is the LTTE denied what the more dangerous JVP *de facto* enjoys?

What most distresses the human rights sensitives is the savagery of some of the Indian soldiery. Maybe they were expecting a meek Tiger surrender but were surprised at the stiff resistance of the LTTE. But the LTTE had political reasons not to give up arms and would not take orders from India's chief executive. Their accountability is to their people. Under what law should they surrender? Even if provoked by the sophisticated fire power and the superior guerilla wits of the Tigers, how could a disciplined army run amok with their guns and do worse? Many cases of rape by jawans have been reported. In some instances, jawans have been caught red-handed and taken to court. Shock and

shame gush from our patriotic bosoms when we listen to the inhumanity of IPKF activity condemned by many at a recent London meeting as crimes against humanity. A P Venkateswaran, among others, was there and both of us turned pale at the tales of woe. IPKF today is an acronym for Innocent People Killing Force. The Tamils, of course, whispered this in private for fear. A recent paper I received says:

The worst crime committed by the Indian troops was the rape of Tamil women. Hundreds of Tamil women were raped brutally and most of them were done to death after sexual violence. This brutality deeply wounded the sentiments of the people and the hate for the Indian army became widespread. (*Tamil Voice International*, March 15, 1988, p 12.)

Likewise is another excerpt:

Among the most brutal massacres committed by the IPKF was the mass killing at the Jaffna General Hospital. The Indian troops stormed into the hospital and killed in cold blood over a hundred and injured scores of people. Four doctors were senselessly slaughtered and several nurses raped and murdered. In this ruthless military campaign, 1,400 innocent Tamil civilians were killed and several thousands injured. Colossal damage was done to Tamil property.

Even today, after three-and-a half months of the declaration of war, dusk-to-dawn curfew continues. (*Ibid*, p 12.)

News black-out notwithstanding, here is what Rev Fr M E Pius, director, Jaffna Diocesan Human Development Centre, states:

IPKF moves into houses and institutions at any time under the pretext of search for the LTTE. Many people have been beaten beyond recognition after tip-offs due to past rivalry, enmity or jealousy between individuals, families or movements. Many parents spend sleepless nights to prevent the raping of their children—a fear not without firm foundation. Due to the war situation, more than 90 per cent of the people in the Jaffna Peninsula are without any source of income (*Ibid*, April 1, 1988, p 5).

If you have the heart, read another short extract:

On 29th the curfew was lifted for four hours. We visited the hospital on 29th and 30th. Only on the 29th did we learn about the brutal killings of nearly 100 people including doctors and patients, nurses, attendants, etc. I had the chance to speak to some doctors and patients; and here is an account given by a doctor: 'On 21st, at about 4 pm some Sikh soldiers walked into the hospital shooting at random. I was trying to get into the doctors' lounge, but was thrown to the ground by the people who were running all over for safety. I remained there for quite a long time, as long as the shooting lasted. When everything was quiet I tried to crawl back to my room; and as I did so I realised that I was crawling over some dead bodies. I remained in the room till morning.'

The more horrifying scenario makes painful reading:

When I heard that Dr Sivapathasundaram, consultant paediatrician, had come to the hospital I tried to come out of the room. Dr Sivapathasundaram and two nurses were walking with raised hands and shouting. "We are doctor and nurses, we are surrendering". They were shot at point blank range. I also learnt that my good friend and colleague, Dr Ganesh, had been shot dead the previous evening when he came out of the doctors' lounge. Later on we were called and asked to remove the dead bodies. Dr Parimelalathan was also among the dead. We were given three hours to dispose of the bodies. Dr Sivapathasundaram lives within a mile and we begged of the Indian officers to hand over the body to his wife, but they refused. We tried to get the identity of those killed by searching their pockets and cutting away pieces of clothing. It was humanly impossible as there was so much of mutilation, disfigurement, blood and smell.

The official count of the dead is less than the number actually killed. According to official number, among the dead were three doctors, one matron, two nurses, eleven attendants, one driver. In all there were 62 bodies inside the hospital compound, and another 25 outside the hospital gate and along Stanley Road. All the bodies within the hospital compound were burned inside the premises (*Ibid*, April 1, 1988, p 16).

Torture and electrical shocks, burning of genitals and hanging upside down were devices employed on the arrestees. Looting and destroying of houses were also common. I was given in London many affidavits by simple folk narrating their terrible travails of killings and so on. I will refer only to portions from one of them—Nirmala Kumari, age 28, Valvettiturai:

...the members of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) assumed control over our Valvettiturai area on 6.11.1987 without resistance and continued to be in peaceful possession...

My husband Mr Mylhanam Aathinarayanapillai (31 years) was a fisherman by occupation...

On that day (i.e., 24.11.1987) the IPKF had a house to house search in our area. At about 12.00 noon five of them entered our house. One of them shouted at us to come out of the house. Then, I was in the kitchen which is located in the front compound of our house. My husband was having a sound sleep inside...

My eldest son Sivachandran (5 years) also went with the army men and put his father up. While he was getting up one of them who is presumably a gorkha soldier fired a shot into my husband's mouth from a very close range and killed him then and there.


...we all started raising hue and cry. All other IPKF men scolded the particular officer in some unknown language—probably in Hindi. He left the house with his head stooping down.

...after almost 10 minutes about 10 other IPKF men visited the scene. The officer-in-charge repeated by tendering apology by telling 'very sorry', 'very sorry'.

...then they insisted us to have the funeral without delay. Out of fear we had the funeral at 1.30 pm on the very day, without having magisterial inquest and post-mortem [Affidavit (1 to 8)].

There are hundreds of such instances.


A doctor (Jaffna Tamil) narrated how one day a hospital was a scene of indiscriminate massacre. The IPKF, suspecting Tigers in hiding, rushed into a hospital. Three doctors and nurses were in attendance and over 50 patients. They pleaded there were no militants but the soldiers opened fire, killed all the patients and some medicos. One doctor who escaped told me the story in London. More pathetic is the tragedy of many women and young men being recklessly shot at point blank range, with no post-mortem nor inquest. Surprisingly, some Indian officers were gentle and consolatory but the savage terror and



mean treachery of our army will take Tamils generations to forget or forgive. Of Operation Pawan, as an Indian I can only borrow the words of Burke: "An event has happened upon which it is difficult to speak, and impossible to be silent". Indians, collectively, are answerable morally to history. Did not Gandhiji say: "All humanity is one undivided and indivisible family, and each of us is responsible for the misdeeds of all others. I cannot detach myself from the wickedest soul."

We must—our parliament must—demand of our prime minister to appoint a national commission of three Supreme Court Judges to inquire and report comprehensively on the legality, morality and criminality of the operations of our forces and publish it. That is courageous

patriotism. The political balance-sheet of the Accord can then be struck by our performance auditors. If the president (i.e., prime minister) declines, a People's Commission of Human Rights activists and retired judges must set sail. Disinformation and misinformation by Colombo and Delhi have incarcerated all information. Are the Tamil Tigers truly or wholly responsible for IPKF's blood-stained record? True, the LTTE did exceed in their methods and used terrorist tactics against informers, spies, rivals and the aggressive and over-powering IPKF. They had a cause, a cause which would not die even if the last Tamil Tiger was killed. They were savage in reprisals because the IPKF allowed one of their leaders to die of Gandhian fasting, handed over for torture their several leaders who committed cyanide suicide to save themselves, the



jawans indulged in orgies of violence, even sex, on civilian brothers and sisters under guise of searching for terrorists and demanded surrender of arms with no evidence, that Colombo would implement the Accord. The Tigers have abundant *extenuation*, though not exculpation. In any case, that is no alibi for the IPKF turning blood-thirsty.

Jaffna has been conquered, maybe. But the spirit of the people there will resist, long after their defeat. We are now disowned by the Sinhala and detested by the Tamils; thanks to our tragedy of strategy and hurry to win international glory! Let us look to the future and take measures of statesmanship. What are they?

Let there be cease-fire right now. To kill is easy; to breathe life impossible. But no surrender of all weapons because no one

knows what tomorrow (will it be like yesterday?) holds for the Tamils struggling against Sinhala chauvinists. I feel that the LTTE will fully accept a gentleman's agreement on cease-fire. Another important understanding with the LTTE is that they cannot, shall not, exterminate by violence the other militant groups. Political monopoly? No. LTTE hegemony? Yes, if you earn it by convincing the people. Today, the reality is that the LTTE is overwhelmingly supported by the Tamils, as even TULF leaders agree. I told the LTTE activists at the London conference that a united front, with a socialist slant, of all Tamil militant groups under the powerful leadership of the LTTE must spearhead the movement. India must insist, not in secret whispers but peremptorily, that a North-East administration be immediately announced with LTTE as leader of a united front. Each group will choose its ministers, not Jayewardene. Then come a few crucial issues which may summon the creative courage of both sides to reopen and review the Agreement to assure ethnic and political justice to the island minorities. The vague and jejune aspects *vis-a-vis* devolution and North-East fusion, from the angle of a viable Tamil homeland-cum-home rule within the sovereign republic, abandoning the *eelam* demand, require serious and substantive attention. The IPKF need not—some say, must not—withdraw, lest history should repeat itself. Even pro-Tiger Tamils do not want the IPKF to leave now, but they must stop the *dance macabre*. K C Pant notwithstanding, the IPKF may be directed by JRJ to quit, to soothe Sinhala militants, since elections are in the offing. Even Indians, considering the casualties and colossal funding, with only negative returns, may ask South Block to call them back. Already, the Indian army, bowing to the pressure of Sinhala allergy, is forced to get out, by stages though, and none will shed a tear for them.

World opinion also may tell on India's dubious role. India has acceded to the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR), though not ratified the protocol. There is a broad accountability to the international community on its human rights performance. In Sri Lanka, Articles 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration and Articles 6, 9 and 10 of the ICPCR have suffered asphyxiation at the hands of the IPKF and JRJ. My casual conversations with Tigers persuade me that the LTTE still wants India to play a dynamic part. It can, it must. But that needs statesmanship. Where is that endangered species? Not Prabhakaran, but the cause he represents, is the end. And after all, for a real solution, Prabhakaran may well be the instrument.

Accord has failed to protect Tamils' interests: LTTE

MADRAS, July 29.

The Indo-Sri Lankan accord could succeed only if the Tamils' aspirations were recognised and the deep, complex and historical problems of the Tamils were solved to their satisfaction, the LTTE said.

In a statement issued on the eve of the first anniversary of the accord, the Political Committee of the LTTE said: "The accord as a whole aids and abets Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism. In such a situation, it is unreasonable and unjust for the Indian forces to engage in a war with our organisation to disarm us."

It said that the Government of India should accept the fact that it was the Government of Sri Lanka which was the root cause for the failure to implement even a single provision of the accord fully since its signing. "While fighting a defensive war against severe odds, against extreme conditions, we are trying to impress upon the Government of India, the historic fact that no force on earth, however formidable it may be, can impose a solution on a people through genocide and oppression."

"The trust we have placed on the people of India, the necessity to avoid any conflict with the Government of India, the longstanding friendship the people of Tamil Eelam have with India, and apart from these, considering the circumstances in which a force beyond our power of influence has placed before us this accord, it is our position to extend our cooperation for the implementation of the accord if the Tamils' interests and aspirations are safeguarded," the LTTE said, adding that in accordance with this position, they handed over their weapons and agreed to give away the remaining weapons also.

After an year, has this accord safeguarded the interests and aspirations of the Tamil people? the LTTE asked, pointing out that an interim administration till the holding of the elections which should have been constituted in accordance with the accord, had been disregarded; the assurance of the Indian Prime Minister that autonomous provincial councils will be created with adequate measure of autonomy or powers enjoyed by the Indian States, has been abandoned; the Tamil language has not been given equal status; as stated by the Government of India, Indian forces have failed to protect the Tamil people; and the Tamils' homeland is being annexed through Sinhala colonisation.

A SRI LANKAN TAMIL VIEW

Encourage Democratic Forces in Island-State

V. RAMA KRISHNAN

COMMENT

It is eleven months since the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived in Sri Lanka. Initially, the mission was for enforcing a ceasefire, as the condition essential to initiate the peace process. The transition to a peaceful state was to be in stages as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. The Sinhalese armed forces were to return to their barracks as the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups lay down their arms. The implementation of the other provisions were to follow thereafter. But this, however, did not work to plan and the force that went for peace is now at war.

What went wrong and where? These, however, do not seem crucial questions now, as the forces bent on sidetracking the core issues, strive hard to steer events in different directions. Their perceptions, tainted by the interests they uphold or serve, leads them to adopt postures that prevent understanding and adjustment. The outcome of it all is conflict on the ground and deadlock at the negotiating table, while the Tamil people lay sidelined and frustrated.

The first shot fired at the IPKF came from the Sinhalese side of the racial divide. This happened in Trincomalee, when the Tamil majority was celebrating the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The Sinhalese Home Guards, hitherto given a free-hand in terrorising the Tamils, saw in the IPKF's presence a serious obstacle to their routine activities. In two separate instances, the IPKF personnel were shot at and an Indian jawan was fatally wounded. The vehicle the Home Guards travelled in, when given chase, was seen entering the compound of the Sinhalese Regional Commander.

The behaviour of the Home Guards at Trincomalee was symbolic of the general frustration in the ranks of the Sri Lankan (Sinhalese) establishment. In the North and the East at least, the accord and the IPKF presence had put a stop to their regular activities.

Earlier, the governing circles, who had it their way in destroying the economic base of the Tamils in the South, carried the campaign right into the Tamil country, and all this, after obtaining Tamil help to be voted into power. Shocked into disbelief that the Tamils dared resist, the Government proceeded to arm the Sinhalese settlers. The Tamils were to be driven away from the rural regions of Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Amparai districts. Cabinet Ministers vied with another in settling armed Sinhalese in the regions cleared of the Tamils. The Tamil militants, in turn, picked on their spots to attack with equal ferocity. Then followed the Paki-

stani and Israeli trained Sinhalese Commandos. They were squeezing in by land, air and sea when India intervened and sent the IPKF. This certainly was occasion for shock and frustration.

The Sinhalese establishment, that relies on Tamil hatred for an added lease, feels the accord was imposed on them, at the stage when the Tamils were almost on their knees. To the contending caste-groups within the government and their leaders aspiring for the succession the aged President appears to have struck a deal, with the 'big brother'. This is true in a way. In the power equation that emerged, the President required Indian assistance to continue in office, for without power he is not assured of peace and, for that matter, personal safety too. This, the shrewd old man is fully aware. What was in fact the threat of intervention by India was skillfully transformed into an accord among equals. He conceded all India's demands related to her geo-political interests while the areas concerning the ethnic issue were left slippery to make escape routes a possibility.

The accord's emphasis on the 'unity, sovereignty and the territorial integrity' of Sri Lanka, often deliberately confused with a unitary Constitution, absolves the President of the sin of conceding to Tamil Separatism. This gives him a free hand to deal with his Sinhala critics. Simultaneously criticism, both genuine and inspired, is presented to Indian authorities as 'compulsions' and therefore grounds to replace 'vague provisions' with 'firm assurances', for assurances of any kind mean plain nothing in Sri Lankan politics. As for Tamil militancy, the Indians were led into a situation of dealing with it with their arms, men and money. In turn, the strategy of saving the lives of Sinhalese soldiers becomes propaganda material to justify IPKF presence. He also asserts periodically that the IPKF is under his command.

President Jayawardene's diplomacy, which until recently linked him with forces hostile to India, now carries overtures of a different kind, acceptable to policy makers in Delhi. This apparent shift in direction and the arrest of some of the top leaders of the LTTE that led to their suicide, sees the beginning of the Indian entanglement with the Tigers. Solving the Tamil problem attracts less attention now as the focus shifts on to hounding the Tigers out of their hideouts. In the meanwhile President Jayawardene strives hard to empty the accord of its contents vis-a-vis the Tamil demands.

The merger of the North and the East as a Tamil political unit with an interim administration preceding elections to the Provincial Council, now seems irrelevant to the normalisation process. 'Normalisation', in the President's strategy, means return to

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the very political and administrative arrangement, resistance against which led to the liberal flow of Tamil blood.

President Jayawardene may have won a battle but not the war raging in his backyard. Ten years of unmitigated power with the attendant abuse of authority by a militarised administration has its limits to a people accustomed to regular change of government. The wave of sentiment, forcefully displayed when two millions filed past the body of the assassinated Vijaya Kumaranatunga, reveals the state of rage.

Vijaya it may be noted, had also espoused the cause of the Tamils. The immense popularity he enjoyed in spite of his pro-Tamils stand is Index to the shift of opinion among the Sinhalese. And yet, the state controlled media strains hard to present the unrest as opposition to the accord. True, the groups involved in the infighting within the Government are adopting anti-accord postures. But this is a stick aimed at the old man at the helm. They have their followers within the armed forces who pick on select targets as their victims. The problem of identifying the area where formal politics ends and the JVP underworld begins therefore becomes a very difficult exercise. The Mossad legacy just cannot be erased off, for the doors are yet kept open to foreign pressure. Hence the distinction between popular upsurge and the fascist backlash, with President, Jayawardene sandwiched in between.

On the Tamil side, the polarisation of forces becomes more marked, except that the democratic majority is silenced into near submission by the LTTE. The Sri Lanka Governments' efforts to wriggle out of their commitments becomes favourable grounds for the Tigers to beat up all opposition. (The evidence available is inadequate to read an overall design in geo-political terms.) Nor is there an effort to reaffirm Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's post-accord declaration of a permanent majority for the Tamils in the North and the East with developed powers comparable to that exercised in the States of the Indian Union. This, at least, could have inspired the silent majority to speak out.

With a free flow of funds, sophisticated weapons and a mafia like organisation, the LTTE was able to decimate all other Liberation groups militarily. The elected representatives of the TULF too, were kept off the scene, with threats of death sentences hanging on some of them. The strategy was to assume the role of sole spokesman for the Tamils. The favoured treatment from the late MGR and their ability to win over the lesser mortals of Tamil Nadu, along with the initial boost given by the Indian Government, convinced them that they were entitled to assume this role.

What went wrong and where? Why did the LTTE reverse its stand agreed upon and confront the IPKF? Was it the arrest of their top commanders and the inability of the IPKF to prevent it? Did this make them suspicious of Indian intentions? Did Mahathya supply cyanide to his arrested comrades with instructions to consume them, when he visited them in detention? If so, were these men on a secret mission, whose purpose was not to become

public knowledge? More importantly, was there instructions from a more powerful third party to scuttle the accord? These and several other questions remain theoretical now, for the fact is that the Peace Force and the LTTE are at war. But they remain relevant, for any effort at peace must not ignore commitments that constitute the background.

The IPKF began their operations with inadequate intelligence reports, in particular on the quality and quantity of arms in the LTTE's possession. They lost many of their men at the initial stages and this lent ferocity to the Indian retaliation. The outcome was disastrous for their public relations and the LTTE never hesitated to exploit it to their full advantage.

The scene of the IPKF's main operation has now shifted to the jungles of the main land in the North and the Batticaloa District in the East. With the Tiger's Communication network in disarray, their cadre has resorted to adventurist tactics. Other militants too have joined the fray. Add to this an enraged Catholic Church and the Muslim fundamentalists and the scene gets as complicated as it can be. It also becomes difficult to discover where the 'Liberation' struggle ends and brigandage begins.

The reaction in India appears equally discouraging. Many seem confused, and this legitimately so. News of destruction of LTTE hideouts and capture of arms is matched with information related to loss of the lives of Indian soldiers. It also involves a serious drain of resources. President Jayawardene's periodic claims to be in total command, makes people wonder whether his war is fought at Indian expense. Domestic Political rivalry besides prevents the emergence of a consensus on basics. Some demand the withdrawal of the IPKF, while some slogans, from questionable quarters, demand that it be displaced by a UN Peace Keeping Force.

The impending elections in Tamil Nadu threaten to make Sri Lanka an issue. The DMK and AIDMK of the two J's have come forward to express concern over the safety of Prabhakaran. Some analysts even predict that the Congress-(I) Government may, in the circumstances, strike a deal with the LTTE in the efforts to stage a come-back in Tamil Nadu. In fact the GOI's talks with the LTTE are understood to have reached a crucial phase. However, in the struggle for power, extremist postures are being adopted by assain contestants in Tamil Nadu and this certainly will not help ease tensions in Sri Lanka.

What really matters most are the developments in Sri Lanka itself. If the anti Indian JVP in the South and their LTTE blood cousins in the North were to emerge as sole spokesman, they may jointly demand the withdrawal of the IPKF. In this effort, they may not hesitate to appeal for powers hostile to India's interests in the region. The only option, in the circumstances, is for India to encourage democratic forces to emerge and play a more effective role. As it is, sensitive sections with commitments of friendship, are awaiting the right signals. They need to be identified and encouraged, for this is the best guarantee of peace in India's southern border. □

July 2, 1983

— a Sri Lankan Tamil Report

A Reporter at Large

Excerpts :

Mary Anne Weaver

On October 9th, General K.Sundarji, India's Chief of Army Staff, flew to Colombo to consult with an outraged Jayewardene and with Sri Lankan government officials and members of the general staff. Mincing few words, Jayewardene demanded that India meet its obligations under the peace accord: it must disarm the Tigers; otherwise, he would be compelled to send the peace-keepers home. **Stung into action, Indian forces set out the following day upon Operation Pawan (the word means 'wind'), to destroy the Tamil Tigers as a guerrilla organisation, beginning with their stronghold in the city of Jaffna.**

It is impossible to say how many died in the battle that followed, but the number was at least two thousand people - between seven hundred and a thousand of them civilians. (The Catholic Church of Jaffna disputes the generally accepted civilian toll, claiming that between three thousand and four thousand civilians lost their lives). Of the Tamil Tigers, between three hundred and four hundred died in the battle for the city, and Indian Army lost more than five hundred soldiers and twenty-five officers. (This is the figure the Indian defence officials concede privately). It was the highest death toll that the Indian Army had suffered since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War - evidence of astonishing blunders and miscalculations on the part of the fourth largest army in the world.

No longer a ragtag group of fishermen's sons, the Tamil Tigers had evolved into one of the most effective guerrilla forces in Asia. They had

been trained, after all, by the Indian Army and India's RAW. Yet the Indians now fatally underestimated their former proteges dedication and strength, their fighting skill, their insane bravery, and their intimate knowledge of the local terrain.

In late October, the Indian Army duly claimed to be in control of Jaffna, but it proved a hollow victory. During the last days of the battle, Prabakaran and twelve hundred Tiger fighters slipped through the Indian net into the swamps and jungles; other guerrillas, many of them teenagers, remained behind. After coating their weapons with grease and wrapping them in plastic sheeting, they hid them, dropping them into the myriad lagoons and harbours of Jaffna, or burying them in the powdery red soil. Then they slipped quietly into the refugee camps dotting the north. A nameless, faceless army, unknown and unseen, had blended into the civilian population from which it came. One Sri Lankan Intelligence official concluded, two months after the battle began, that as a fighting force the Tamil Tigers had survived largely intact.....

However, the advantage is shifting to their side again, as a full-fledged guerrilla war takes its toll in the east and the north. Booby traps and mines set by the Tigers, often with the aid of civilians, have made the Indian troops jumpy and confused, and they patrol in a perpetual crouch to avoid sniper fire. The soldiers have shot and killed civilians - sometimes intentionally, sometimes not. According to lawyers and human rights activists, there is strong evidence of widespread atrocities by the Indian troops in Jaffna and the east. They have reportedly raped women and pillaged homes and shops. (On December 15th, a Sri Lankan court found six Indian soldiers guilty of raping Tamil women during house-to-house searches in the north).....

Eight months after the Gandhi-Jayewardene accord, the agreement is in tatters, and in the east and north

more than sixty thousand Indian 'peace keepers' are occupying a fourth of Sri Lanka's countryside. And in the face of a vengeful guerrilla army, an increasingly hostile civilian population, and a peace agreement that has brought none of its promised rewards, India's peace-keeping operation shows every sign of becoming a painful long term occupation - one that invites comparison not just with Ulster but with Vietnam and Afghanistan. **Indian forces are bogged down in a foreign country, fighting a counter insurgency war they cannot hope to win.**

For the Indian Peace Keeping Force (which is costing New Delhi more than three million dollars a day), it is a matter of face and honour that the provincial polls be held - after which, at least technically, some of the unhappy peacekeepers would be eligible to go home. But no one, including the Indians, is under any illusion about the difficulties of holding them. It will be impossible to have peaceful elections unless the Tamil Tigers and the JVP bless the polls, and a new wave of large-scale violence could be precipitated when a hundred and twenty-five thousand Tamil refugees in India are repatriated and find that Sinhalese are now occupying their former homes.....

The conflict in Sri Lanka - independent India's longest war - is rapidly becoming an embarrassment for Rajiv Gandhi. Indian flags now fly throughout the north and east, and those areas are blanketed with Indian Army checkpoints and small army camps, but thus far the Indians have been unable to intercept the vessels plying the east coast which ferry to the Tigers ammunition and weapons, now most often from Singapore.

Sinhalese friends have spoken to me proudly of how 'the lad' Velupillai Prabakaran kept the Indian army out of Jaffna for more than two weeks. Ironically, the rising tide of criticism of the tactics and behaviour of the Indian troops has at last brought Sinhalese and Tamils to a consensus -

the Indian 'peace-keepers' must go home. The Sinhalese resentment of India has always been there, and what happened when the Indian troops arrived in the north was that the Indians saw Jaffna, and the people of Jaffna saw the Indians, and neither liked the other very much.

There is now a realisation among the Tamils that they have to look south, to Colombo, instead of north, to India. Also, I think there is a realisation in the Sri Lankan government that the Tamil Tigers, defanged, would be a better bet to negotiate a political settlement with than any other group in the country, including the Indians. Two government ministers, Lalith Athulathmudali and

Gamini Dissanayake, the Minister of Lands, were attempting to initiate such talks. When I brought up the possibility of direct talks between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, Dixit said, "I am not certain these talks will take place. There is a firm understanding between my Prime Minister and President Jayewardene that no arrangements will be made without India's involvement and India's advice....."

In November, Mr. Jayewardene told a journalist from the 'Madras Hindu', "About Jaffna I must say that I am rather ignorant, although we have people coming and telling us about the situation".....

(When I met the President in the last

week of February, I asked him if he was having second thoughts about the peace accord.) The anti-Indian feeling sweeping Sri Lanka is extremely high", I said. "My Sinhalese friends have expressed admiration for the Tamil Tigers for standing up to the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and my Tamil friends have told me that the Indian Army is ten times worse than the Sri Lankan Army was." "Well, yes", the President said. "On your second point, the Sri Lankan Army has behaved much better than the Indian Army".....

I asked Mr. Jayewardene what, after ten years in office, he considered his greatest achievement. He laughed, and said, "My greatest achievement is that I'm here."

"ACCORD, A CHARTER FOR SERVILITY"

The following is a text of a press statement dated 9 July issued by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam:

'During the 9 months war of attrition, being waged unjustly by the Indian army large number of civilians have been killed, women have been brutally raped, millions worth of property destroyed and the wild life and jungles were devastated.

'India is trying to teach democracy to the Tamil nation, that has suffered 40 years of oppression to the extent of genocide, by spending millions of rupees to bomb and burn Tamil areas.

'India's propaganda seems to be that once the North and Eastern provinces are merged together temporarily and an election is held the grievances of the Tamils would be over. It must be remembered that enormous sacrifices made by the Tamil people and martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth was not to effect a temporary merger and elections for powerless provincial councils.

'What is described as North and East is the Motherland of Tamils and that is indivisible. The Sri Lankan government rejoiced, rather vainly after "Operation Liberation" in Vadammarachchi, that the liberation struggle of Tamils had been crushed. However with the suicide attack by Black Tiger Miller at Nellyadi on July 5th 1987, the Sri Lankan government was stunned. The Sri Lankans and the whole world realised that the Tamil liberation struggle has not ended and the Liberation Tigers have not been subdued or liquidated.

'India which entered Sri Lanka under the pretext of protecting Tamils claims to have crushed their liberation

struggle after committing greater atrocities than the Sri Lankans and also declares that elections could be held soon. India also seems to be exploring the possibilities if it could hold elections with the help of quislings. India mistakenly believes if they could hold a show election and install a puppet administration in the Tamil homeland which had been made a big garrison of Indian army, they could convince the world that democracy has revived in Tamil Eelam. Since it is obvious that Tigers will not accept any solution couched under the veil of peace, that does not afford genuine protection for the Tamils, India is hellbent on eliminating Tigers and liquidating its leaders.

'India is wrong if it believes that it could implement the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, a charter of servility for the Tamils, by destroying the LTTE and its leaders. If India continues to engage in its effort to eliminate Tigers and kill Tamils, it would become inevitable that the Tigers would withdraw from the farcial peace talks and prepare the Tamil Nation for a long and protracted struggle against foreign domination.

'In the military engagement, last month 80 Indian soldiers were killed and 15 were wounded. The number of Indian soldiers killed in various districts are as follows. Kilinochchi-26, Mannar-7, Jaffna-2, Trincomalee-16 and at Mullaitivu-15. On our side, Major Salam, Captains Ragavan and Sabesan and Mano, Alex, Thamu, Hari, Sutha, Prince, Thiyaagu and Arasan attained martyrdom, to whom we pay homage.'

INDIA'S REACTION TO AMNESTY REPORT

The Government of India denied allegations of rape and brutality levelled by the Amnesty International against the IPKF in Sri Lanka. "The charges were fabricated and unfair", a foreign office spokesman said. He said every specific complaint received from any source about the behaviour of IPKF troops has been investigated. Most of these charges have been found to be baseless. Whenever such charges have been proved, quick and salutary action has been taken against the guilty. The IPKF operated in Sri Lanka with the utmost restraint, and used minimum force to avoid or reduce civilian casualties as far as possible. As a result, the IPKF took extra ordinarily heavy casualties, a sacrifice which only a highly disciplined force was capable of. The Indian army is a highly professional body of troops, and acts according to professional code. (Unfortunately, facts have proved otherwise and Rajiv Gandhi and the Indian forces stand indicted. Ed.)

Lessons from Sri Lanka

A Subcontinental experiment in power projection

IDR RESEARCH TEAM

COMMENT

Introduction

As we go to press, Operation Pawan, one of the most significant politico-military experiments in power projection in recent times, is apparently in the process of being wound up. It is one of the longest wars fought by our armed forces. Though classically it may be called low-intensity conflict, its scope and scale have been that of a full-blooded conventional conflict. It has been a bitterly criticized and controversial venture. The media has been severely critical. Snide innuendoes have been passed on the so-called 'pacto-mania' current in our highest echelons. The armed forces are confused. For the first time they have had to wage a bitter campaign which did not have the unequivocal support of the entire nation. In its later stages it was blanked out of the media because of its impact on Tamil politics. Fighting troops thrive on recognition and glory. That denied, it becomes a cruel and thankless grind. Our erstwhile Army chief himself appealed for a national consensus on the issue before he laid down office. That by itself is a clear indication of the bitter divide it generated. As our legions return home, it is time for us to pause and take stock. It is still too early to come to definite conclusions for we are living too close to the events. However, enough has been published in the media for us to make a spot appraisal and check course.

The subcontinental Monroe Doctrine

Operation Pawan is the first real example of power projection in the subcontinent on the American RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) model – a model designed to enable a superpower or a regional power to project force in the defence of its perceived vital interests in other states. Bangladesh, our first real intervention, was a war in the classical Clausewitzian sense. The Sri Lanka operation fits the doctrines that have emerged in the post-Second-World-War phase. It is an extension of what may be called the 'South Asian Monroe Doctrine', that had been enunciated during Mrs Gandhi's regime to safeguard Indian interests in the South Asian region. Such an assertive diplomatic stance was a natural outgrowth of India's emergence as a pre-eminent regional power.

Today India has the fourth largest and amongst the world's best-equipped armies, the fifth largest air force

with top-of-the-line aircraft like the Mirage 2000 and MIG-29s and above all the seventh largest blue water navy which can boast of two aircraft carriers and a nuclear submarine (with more to follow).


The unwritten South Asian Monroe Doctrine spells out India's determination to draw political mileage out of this military power. India is now a significant military power. Its growing naval strength ensures that even a superpower will now be forced to think twice before it intervenes physically in any conflict involving India in this region. It will have to be prepared to pay a heavy cost in capital ships and lives, should such physical intervention take place. It is a logical corollary to assume that the Indian ruling elite should try to convert this military capability to further national interests in this region.

Sri Lanka is the first concrete instance of India's willingness to use its military muscle in the pursuit of its regional interests. It is a crucial test of India's will to use its enhanced power to secure regional clout. It has set alarm bells clanging in Pakistan (who has hastened to call it India's Afghanistan). What is more important is the intense debate that it has stirred up in the country itself. In the long term the domestic fall-out will be far more important than the external dimensions of this campaign.

An analysis of options

Sri Lanka is a tear-drop-shaped island. The agony of its intra-national conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils is too well known to bear repetition. What happens to the Tamils in Sri Lanka has a material effect upon the Tamils of South India. India, therefore, cannot insulate itself from the fall-out of this intense ethnic conflict caused by the violent clash of Tamil and Sinhalese sub-nationalisms. So, when in 1987 the Sri Lankan authorities decided upon a 'final military solution', the impact was bound to be felt in India.

Computer war-gaming is an in-thing these days. Let us therefore replay the problem again and analyse the options of the Indian nation state in the face of the Sri Lankan crisis. These can be summed up in the following flow chart:



Let us now analyse these options in detail.

Non-intervention

The fierce media criticism of the operation seems to suggest that overt non-intervention was possibly the best course. Such a view is naive in the extreme. It is arrant nonsense to advocate that we should have sat back and watched the Sri Lankan crisis go into a violent tail spin; or that we should have turned a Nelson's eye to the creeping encroachment by foreign covert agencies (the Israeli Mossad and the British Keeny Meeny Services etc.). India has vital security stakes in Sri Lanka. These are:

(a) *Ethnic*. India has a large Tamil population in its southern region with close ethnic ties with the Sri Lankan Tamils. The emotive fall-out of a military solution designed to beat the Sri Lankan Tamils into submission could only be ignored at great political peril in India.

(b) *Geo-strategic location*. Sri Lanka lies at the tip of the Indian peninsula. It dominates all the important sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Its ports of Colombo and Trincomalee assume great strategic significance. In the hands of an inimical naval power they can serve to cut off the Indian Eastern and Western fleets and seriously dislocate our maritime traffic.

(c) *Springboard for covert operation*. Separatist sentiment had been fairly strong in the Indian southern state of Tamil Nadu. Kerala was the first Indian state to turn communist by the electoral process. The death of MGR and the fall-out of the Sri Lankan crisis can lead to a highly volatile situation in this region. Already reports have surfaced of a Tamil extremist organization which has been behind a number of bomb blasts and train derailments in Tamil Nadu. Any hostile presence in Sri Lanka could serve as a springboard for covert intervention in the peninsula politics.

It is obvious therefore that no Indian government worth its name could have been oblivious to these vital security interests in its own geo-political backyard. We had to intervene. The vital question was how? One obvious answer was covert intervention. Apparently

this had been the course pursued by Mrs Gandhi's regime. Covert support to the Tamil separatist guerillas could serve to raise the costs for the Sri Lankans. Severe attrition imposed on the Sri Lankan armed forces could perhaps wear down the 'military solution lobby' and lead to a resumption of political dialogue and mutual reconciliation between the two communities. It could equally have the opposite effect. A bitter, fratricidal conflict could breed permanent alienation and leave bitter scars on the collective psyches of the two communities. Ethnic conflicts tend to be brutal and bloody. The Harvest of Hate goes into the collective racial memories to breed permanent divides. That was how a bitter and unrelenting war started between the Sinhalese and Tamil sub-nationalities in Sri Lanka.

By early 1987 the position on the ground was that the LTTE-dominated Tamil militants had consolidated *de facto* control of the Northern Province of Jaffna. For two years they had held on to it in the face of concerted attacks by the Sri Lankan armed forces. The Sri Lankan authorities raised the ante by a ham-handed campaign that included economic blockade and aerial bombing of the Jaffna peninsula. In the Northern Province at least 'Tamil Eelam' was a physical and *de facto* reality.

The present Indian regime had now to grapple with the consequences of this bitter, fratricidal war. It had to decide whether it wanted an independent state of Tamil Eelam to come into being or not. It is apparent that unequivocally seemed to have decided that such a result was not in its long-term interests. From the purely geopolitical and military point of view this conclusion itself can be debated.

Invasion: The extreme option

If we question this basic end result it leads us to an examination of the second hypothetical option that the Indian state had: outright invasion à la Bangladesh. It brings about the emergence of a Tamil Eelam state spanning the Eastern and Northern Provinces of Sri Lanka. Let us paint the hypothetical scenario a little more in detail and examine the advantages and disadvantages that could have accrued from such a course.

A HYPOTHETICAL INVASION

It is apparent that the Indian armed forces had been preparing for quite some time for such an eventualities. The high media profile exercise Tri Shakti that involved air and amphibious assault rehearsals in Goa had clearly driven home this message to all decision-makers in the subcontinent. Let us turn the clock back and wargame the hypothetical scenario. Let us go back to end June or early July 1987.

MILITARY COUP IN SRI LANKA

Prof. Girilal Jain had disclosed in an editorial in the *Times of India* that it was the threat of a coup by the Sri Lankan armed forces that forced President Jayawardene to execute a neat volte-face and sign the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. Let us assume that India had decided not to come to the rescue of President Jayawardene. The hypothetical scenario that could have emerged could be as under:

(a) *End July 1987.* Sri Lankan armed forces stage a coup and depose President Jayawardene. The new military regime vows to wipe out the Tamil Eelam militants and intensifies air, land and sea assaults on Jaffna. It uses Napalm on population centres.

(b) India warns the new military regime against escalating this conflict. It refuses to recognize this regime and pledges support to the democratic regime of the deposed civilian president.

(c) The military regime refuses to call off the offensive and appeals for support to USA, Pakistan and China. Pakistan promises support and recognizes the new regime. Embattled Tamil militants appeal to India to intercede.

(d) *13 August 1987.* Elements of India's 54 Air Assault Division and the Para Brigade land at Jaffna and Trincomalee. Air heads are secured with LTTE help at Pallaley and Trincomalee airfields. An air bridge is established and the ports are secured. Amphibious troops storm ashore a few hours later.

(e) *Jubilation in South India and amongst Sri Lankan Tamils.* There is wild jubilation all over South India. The Indian Prime Minister is hailed as an incarnation of "Shiva" – the saviour of the Tamil people.

(f) India inducts an armoured and a mechanized brigade with total air supremacy. Indian forces clear all Sri Lankan armed presence from the Northern and Eastern provinces. By end August 1987 both these provinces are fully secured.

(g) There is intense world-wide condemnation of the Indian invasion. Pakistan alerts its forces. The USA places its Central Command on full alert. The United Nations Security Council asks India to withdraw its forces. The Chinese condemn Indian hegemonism and warn of serious consequences.

(h) An LTTE-dominated government comes up in Jaffna. On 3 September 1987 it declares a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The state of Tamil Eelam comes into being. Most of the countries in the UNO refuse to recognize it.

(i) Elements of the US Seventh Fleet commence an exercise off the Philippines. The Soviet Union pressurizes India to withdraw its forces from Sri Lanka. Troops withdrawals commence in end September 1987. There is a second coup in Sri Lanka and another General assumes charge in Colombo.

(k) The deposed president of Sri Lanka forms a government in exile in India. Tamil refugees return to the new state of Tamil Eelam. There is great tension on India's Northern and Western borders. India prepares for covert intervention to topple the military dictatorship in Colombo and restore democracy.

World media headlines accuse India of brinkmanship. Fights break out in Tamil Eelam between LTTE and other guerilla groups. The LTTE secures its hold after a virtual bloodbath.

(l) India goes in for a snap mid-term election in December 1987. The war euphoria causes a landslide victory for the Congress(I). Border incidents escalate on the Western border. The forecast is grim.

ANALYSIS OF THE INVASION OPTION

The above was a highly imaginative and rather optimistic account of what history could have been if India had decided not to go in for the accord but opted for an invasion. Let us dispassionately examine its pros and cons.

Advantages

(a) Such an easy 'win' could possibly have unleashed a lot of war euphoria and chauvinist sentiment and would have been very popular especially in the South. It may have been the Indian 'Grenada'. Its domestic effects would have been very positive indeed.

(b) Such a sharp, swift and decisive war could possibly have served to bridge the psychological divide, North and South of the Vindhyas. It would have given India a cheap military victory.

(c) The Tamil refugees would have been repatriated – a large-scale and long-term military presence could have been avoided in Sri Lanka. A long and costly counter-guerilla operation may have been obviated.

Disadvantages

(a) *International reaction.* Such a course, though domestically very popular, could have had disastrous repercussions internationally. India would have been totally isolated in all world forums.

(b) *The South Asian Lebanon.* A divided Sri Lanka would have become South Asia's Lebanon – perpetually unstable – a feuding ground for international intrigue and ceaseless strife.

(c) *Unrepresentative character of LTTE regime.* The LTTE has shown itself to be a brutal and fascist organization that is totally intolerant of dissent. It could never have provided a moderate and representative government to the Tamil people of Sri Lanka.

(d) *Fanning Tamil separatism.* Would the establishment of a Tamil Eelam state have fanned Tamil separatism in South India? There is a distinct likelihood of such a development though it is logically plausible to

propose that such a Tamil state could equally have sought a merger with India a la Sikkim.

The third option:

Intervention by invitation

Obviously the Indian nation state chose the middle course or the softer option of intervention by invitation. It responded to President Jayawardene's distress call and decided to underwrite the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. Given the historical animosities between the two feuding communities it was bound to be a herculean task. Holding such a state together needs far more fusion energy than a cold-blooded attempt at dismemberment would take. By underwriting Sri Lanka's unity and integrity India has chosen to play the role of Syria in Lebanon. It has chosen to intervene on the side of order and oppose the entropic and centrifugal forces in the subcontinent. Given our commitments against China and Pakistan do we have the military wherewithal for such an awesome and long-term undertaking? Did we rush blindly into the accord without realizing the full long-term implications? These are moot questions and only time can give us the complete answers. We started by trying to safeguard Tamil interests in Sri Lanka. Events have led us to engage in a thankless counter-insurgency campaign against the LTTE, the chief Tamil militant organization which had more or less succeeded in carving out a Tamil Eelam in Jaffna. The chief criticisms of the accord option are:

(a) *Long-term nature of CI operations.* Counterinsurgency campaigns usually stretch out over a decade and more – can LTTE insurgency be tamed in a one or two years time frame?

(b) *What happens after IPKF withdrawal?* (i) Will the LTTE regain its erstwhile hold and lead to a new stand-off between Tamils and Sinhalese? Will things regress back to square one, once we leave? (ii) Will we have alienated ourselves both from the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka? What about the long-term post-Jayawardene scenario?

(c) *What will be the repercussions in Tamil Nadu?* The demise of MGR has unleashed considerable uncertainty in the political situation. He was one of the key supporters of the accord. Will it lead to any long-term alienation of the Tamils? So far this has not happened and maybe the prophets of doom are wrong. We will have to wait and watch.

It is obvious that time alone can vindicate the accord option. It may turn out to be the only workable option that we may have had. *Though internationally applauded it has led to domestic confusion and sharp divergence of opinions. It has demonstrated the fact that it is essential, nay vital, to prepare domestic public opinion before we undertake large-scale operations at home or abroad.* A concerted media campaign to prepare

the population and soldiery and sustain its enthusiasm is essential. A war that is relegated to the back pages and obscure corners of papers is not likely to be prosecuted with zeal for long.

Our strategic thought has of late been shaped to an acceptance of the use of 'Force without War'. Highly sophisticated doctrines of coercive diplomacy have been worked out in detail. However they appear simply too sophisticated to impress the common man or for that matter the common soldier. Before each of our past wars our propaganda organs had switched into the highest gear to psyche up our soldiery for conflict. The conspicuous absence of this media mobilization even by government organs is disconcerting. A quick campaign may have been better played up by the media to mobilize public support and raise and sustain the morale of the armed forces. The radio, television and press mediums had been mobilized to the highest pitch in our past wars. This has not happened in the Sri Lankan conflict and its absence has been keenly felt.

India: A status quo power?

In deciding against invasion and opting to underwrite the integrity of Sri Lanka, India has highlighted her credentials as a 'status quo power'. Any analysis designed to generate new options will need to address itself to the central question – Does the present status quo in the subcontinent suit us? We have lost most of the advantages we gained after our 1971 victory and a restructuring of our overall security environment may become inevitable in a few years time frame.

Most military observers are predicting Armageddon on the subcontinent well before this century is out. We need to psyche ourselves for the coming Apocalypse. We can therefore do without a lot of dovish cooing and crooning in the official media. We may have reasons to regret our peace paeans later. We cannot send our troops to war on slogans of peace. We are today a regional power. We need to inculcate the chauvinist attitudes that go with this power. The Hans are ultra-sensitive to the treatment given to the overseas Chinese in other countries. As a self-respecting nation we should acquire this sensitivity to the treatment other nations give to the overseas Indians. God willing in the years to come the growing power of our navy may just give us the means to make others conscious of our deep sensitivities even as far as Fiji. But before we adopt such a high-profile stance we need a major and concerted media blitz to psyche up our people and glorify our military traditions.

The confusing dichotomy of peaceful rhetoric and aggressive military postures will have to be resolved. Only a xenophobic, revivalist regime can sustain the mass mobilization required for distant foreign interventions or even bitter wars to the finish that may erupt in the subcontinent itself. Despite all this talk of

peace and Buddhism the world today is unfortunately headed for Armageddon. Students of military history will recall that the Second World War was preceded by a similar peace blitz. We have to see the writing on the wall. We have done well to modernize and streamline our armed forces. We need to prepare as a nation for more vicious times ahead. Sri Lanka may only be the tip of the violent iceberg.

An analysis of our performance

The intervention by invitation option was decidedly attractive. It was indeed a major diplomatic coup pulled off by our External Affairs Ministry. Dixit, as the Sri Lankans said, "Fixed it". And so we went in. Let us now leave aside all hypotheses and analyse our performance. Did we fix it or have we been fixed in the bargain? A great deal has been published in the media to enable any dispassionate military observer to piece together a fairly accurate picture of events on the island.

Phases of the Sri Lankan campaign

The campaign as such can be divided into four major phases:

- (a) *Insertion* (End July—first week of August 1987). The fly-in of our RDF in terms of the 54 Air Assault Division and the initial surrender charade that lasted till October 1987.
- (b) *Battle for Jaffna* 9 October—end November 1987.
- (c) *LTTE: Eastern shift.*
- (d) *The Eastern offensive.*

Let us now analyse each phase in greater detail to draw object lessons.

INSERTION

The accord was signed and on 29 July 1987 the Indian RDF comprising the 54 Air Assault Division was rapidly flown in. The Indian Air Force and civilian aviation assets seem to have been pressed in. India has clearly demonstrated its capability to airlift an entire division. The air bridge lasted some 7 to 10 days and despite poor airport facilities at Jaffna, seems to have been successful in inducting the entire RDF by the first week of August. There are press reports to indicate that the Indian armed forces seem to have been caught unawares by the sudden move. The general accord euphoria seemed to have spread to the troops. Early reactions were of bonhomie with the LTTE whom the soldiers felt they had been sent to assist. The LTTE went through the motions of a sham surrender. The accord soured rapidly. Intra-militant clashes broke out. The LTTE, a combat-hardened force of some of the most experienced guerillas in the world, had seen the Indian army come in sans its heavy weapons. Bristling as the militants were with some of the best automatic weapons and mortars from the Singapore arms bazaar, they soon lost their awe of



the Indian army. This was a serious underestimation and belies a lack of maturity on the part of the LTTE leadership. By the end of August 1987 the accord seemed to be in a shambles.


The battle for Jaffna

Sun Tzu had said, 'The worst policy is to attack cities. Armies traditionally dread the concrete jungle and would avoid it like the plague. The best armies of the Second World War had met their Waterloo in the streets of Leningrad and Stalingrad. The city sucks in troops like a vacuum cleaner. The LTTE had made their stronghold in the concrete jungle of Jaffna. For two years it had become a *de facto* state of Tamil Eelam. They had held it successfully against the Sri Lankan Army in conventional combat. The motivation of the LTTE cadres (symbolized by the cult of the cyanide capsule) was amazingly high. The defences of Jaffna itself were organized in two concentric rings — one based on the city core and the other on its outskirts.

In retrospect this seems to be the phase of maximum confusion on the Indian side. The accord was tottering and the reactions had the tinge of panic. The LTTE had very deliberately set its course for collision. Another division (the 36th Infantry Division as per media reports) now seems to have been flown in — shipped in panic. Slightly confused and apparently disoriented troops were thrown into battle in what *India Today* has described as 'indecent haste'. In their terrible anxiety to get the IPKF to crack down on the LTTE the Indian decision-makers seemed to have lost all respect for organizational cohesiveness and formation boundaries. A desperate numbers game came into evidence as the IPKF went into high gear to do something it had not been structured or psyched up to do initially. The greatest fiasco was the commando raid on the LTTE HQ at the University of Jaffna at night on 12 October 1987. The para commandos landed slap in the middle of a football field (a traditional fly-in port for clandestine support to the LTTE) that was raked by heavy LTTE fire from all around. The heroism of the para commandos in this desperate situation was commendable. Equally tragic was the fate of a company of the Sikh Light Infantry sent in for link up (*India Today* has given a detailed account of this episode).


The creaky start of the Jaffna offensive launched in the most desperate and indecent haste left quite a few red faces all around. But the Indian army is a seasoned and historic army and soon got its act together. Five Indian Brigades began to squeeze in on Jaffna city centre along the five major roads. It was no CI campaign. It was regular war — brutal, bloody and desperately fought. The fanatic motivation of the LTTE and their amazingly skilful use of mines came as something of a shock. Lord





கை வேறு கால் வேறு
சிறகரிந்து கிடந்தவோ பறவைகள்





எனது கதவைத் தட்டிக்கேட்காதே எதுவும்
மரணத்தால் விறைத்திருக்கிறது என் வீடு

.....
இந்த நாட்கள்
காக்கி நிறப் பேய்களால் நிர்வகிக்கப்படுகின்றன.

இன்று
பூக்களும் பறவைகளும்
குழந்தைகளின் புன்னகைகளும்
பெண்களும் எரிந்து போயினர்
உறுப்புகள் வெட்டப்பட்டவர்களின் குரல்கள்
வெளிகளில் தடுமாறுகின்றன.

.....
மணலில் பதியும் ஒவ்வொரு கவட்டிலும்
ரத்தமும் சீழும் படிக்கின்றன
சிலந்திகள் பின்னிய வலையில்
சரித்திரத்தின் ஆந்தைக் கண்கள்
வெறுமையாய் உறையும்.

எனது கதவைத் தட்டிக் கேட்காதே எதுவும்
இன்று
மனிதனாக இருப்பதே குற்றம்

Roberts' martial race theory went up in the dense smoke of Jaffna.

After a brutal slog, the outer perimeter of Jaffna defences seems to have been secured by the third week of October 1987. The painful slog for the core of Jaffna began thereafter. By now the IPKF had recovered its élan. The high ratio of officer to men casualties showed that the junior leadership had withstood the test of fire. (It also showed that the LTTE were specifically targetting them.) The Indian infantry, which is largely peasant-based, is one of the toughest and best infantries in the world. In the long run it was bound to prevail and it did.

By end November 1987 the IPKF had secured Jaffna completely. Flushing-out operations to mop up LTTE pockets in Vedamarachi and Kyats islands proved quite successful. From the military history point of view, the LTTE decision to resort to conventional combat in an urban setting, with a professional army, was flawed. Historically the only other precedent is the uprising of Polish Jews in the Warsaw Ghettos during the Second World War. The ratio of troops to space in a restricted urban area dictates that a guerilla outfit cannot hope to survive in a conventional war in such restricted geographic settings.

For the Indian army the chief lesson is epitomized by Mao's dictum, 'Do not fight an unprepared Battle.' Another Chinese dictum says, 'Four fast and one slow' — the one "slow" aspect is for preparation. Methodical and careful preparation goes a very long way in ensuring a smooth and rapid campaign and minimal casualties. Commanders owe it to their troops and must be able to stand up to the political leadership who may, for their own compulsions, be in a desperate hurry to show results. Montgomery in the Second World War and Sam Manekshaw in 1971 are excellent examples of military commanders who refused to be hustled into battles without full preparation.

LTTE: EASTERN SHIFT

The LTTE leadership seems to have realized that continued conventional combat in the restricted confines of the Jaffna peninsula was suicidal. It needed greater and more open spaces to melt away. To shift to the Eastern province was its most logical course. By end November 1987 it seems to have achieved this aim. A very large number of the LTTE cadres did manage to slip out to the Eastern provinces (whether over the narrow Elephant Pass isthmus or by sea or a combination is difficult to guess). Had the IPKF campaign not been launched in such a rush, perhaps a major portion of the LTTE could have been bottled up in Jaffna and destroyed. Media reports indicate that thereafter the 36th Infantry Division was switched to the Eastern province for more classical CI operations.

THE EASTERN OFFENSIVE

It was patently obvious to the Indian military planners that far greater force levels would be needed to cater for the greater geographical dispersion of the LTTE in the Eastern province. Jaffna also had to be held securely — for prestige reasons and to deny the LTTE its greatest source of finances. Classical CI operations need force ratios of 10:1 or more between security forces and insurgents/guerillas. The basic guerilla strategy is to extend the war in space and time, to survive and to wear down the will of the regular army by constant pinpricks. If that was so, we were in for a long and hopeless CI campaign that could last a decade or more. The Americans in Vietnam and very recently the Soviets in Afghanistan had failed to subdue guerillas in such long-drawn-out wars. Would we succeed? We seemed to be in a logical *cul-de-sac*. The only solution was to take advantage of the Himalayan winter, accept a risk and substantially raise force levels in Sri Lanka for a concerted knockout blow in a quick time frame. Provided we were able to mount sufficient pressure the LTTE could be induced to accept the accord and climb down from its inflexible 'Eelam-at-any-cost' stand.

The second phase of the induction of more troops now commenced. Two more divisions were now taken across the subcontinent. (*India Today* identified one of them as 57 Mountain Division that had years of experience in counter-insurgency operations in the North East.) Preparations were deliberate and methodical this time and the pay-offs have been highly visible in the operations that followed. *India Today* (15 June 1988 issue) gave out a total strength of the IPKF as 51,356 which appears reasonable. The earlier wild guess-estimate by Ravi Rikhye of over 100,000 troops seems far-fetched and implausible.

The LTTE had now concentrated in two major strongholds — one the urban setting of Batticaloa and the second in the Vavuniya-Maluitivu forested belt. To ensure successful operations it was essential that the LTTE cadres be prevented from slipping out by sea like slippery eels. A three-tier sealing of the coast was effected. The coastline itself was sealed by the Army; the Navy and the Air Force formed the second and third cordons respectively. After a methodical build-up and sealing the 57 Mountain Division launched the major cordon and search operations in Batticaloa in end March 1988. In a series of skilfully conducted search operations it combed Batticaloa and 30 villages in the adjoining jungles. This operation dealt a body blow to the LTTE in Batticaloa and led to the capture of a number of their top leaders and cadres.

The IPKF now turned its sights on the Vavuniya area. A chance encounter in June 1988 at Alampil led it to stumble on the largest insurgent hideout of the LTTE. Mahatya Sri, the intransigent leader of the military wing

of the LTTE (along with a number of other top military leaders), was holed up here. The IPKF had hit pay dirt at last. The whole area was a maze of fortified bunkers. Bitter fighting broke out in what could turn out to be the most decisive battle of this campaign. As we go to press media reports indicate that negotiations between the LTTE and RAW are in the final stages. If that is so, we can indeed claim victory. All is well that ends well. The hero of this long and bitter saga will then be the tough and stoic Indian jawan, the rugged peasant infantryman who has proved that he is still one of the best in the world.

In conclusion: Armageddon 1990

A perceptive student of military history will note a number of parallels between the situation in the subcontinent and its peripheral regions today, and the situation in Europe in the 1930s. To that extent Sri Lanka fits the analogy of the war in Spain that preceded the main conflict in Europe. Gorbachev and all the world leaders may be on a peace offensive today. Chamberlain and Stalin were also on a peace offensive in 1939 just before the Second World War. Chamberlain had returned triumphantly from Munich crowing 'peace in our times'. The words have a tragic tinge today in hindsight. One hopes one is wrong but the turbulence in Afghanistan, the spread of the Kalishnikov culture in Pakistan, China's perception of India as the main regional adversary, all seem to point to very turbulent times ahead. Spain had become a combat laboratory prior to the Second World War. Sri Lanka may well turn out to be the subcontinent's combat laboratory.

Maybe a few years later when the crunch comes Indian soldiers will fall upon their knees and thank Heaven for this God-sent intervention. Peace time 'squad-post' training breeds disaster in the early stages of any war. That is true of any army in the world. Dunkirk proved it in the Second World War. Fortunate is the army that gets a fore-taste of combat before the real crunch comes.

Alarmist? Insane? Ultra-hawkish? Call it what you will but today someone must ring the alarm bells. In the midst of all this dovish cooing – this cacophony of bland peace platitudes in our media – there is a need to strike an ultra-hawkish stance. *You just cannot send an army to war on slogans of peace.* The Indian peasant troops are simple, emotional and amazingly tough. They are simply the best fighting material anywhere in the world. We should stop confusing them in a difficult situation. The committal of 50,000 troops to combat calls in for a concerted media mobilization to raise and sustain high motivational levels. Soldiers do not fight for bonuses but

for recognition and glory. This has been done before in each and every one of our post-independence wars. Today its absence is being keenly felt.

Prime lessons

We may just have pulled it off in Sri Lanka despite all odds. The peasant-based Indian infantry is tough. Unlike the American, Soviet or European infantry it has not gone soft and can combat the insurgent at his level of basic skills and hardihood. The prime lessons that emerge are:

(a) *Grenada not Afghanistan.* Sun Tzu said, 'No country ever profited from a long war.' A long-drawn-out campaign for which we have not prepared militarily or psychologically is best avoided. Short, sharp, swift and highly successful interventions, though unpopular internationally, are music to the domestic audience. If we are brash enough the world will lump it anyway! Any campaign has an external (or international) and a domestic dimension. Sri Lanka shows that the domestic angle can only be ignored at great peril. Long-term interventions that are likely to bog our troops down in counter-guerilla/insurgent roles are best avoided in the future. A model of long-term covert intervention on the American Green Berets pattern followed by a short, sharp and swift denouement is best. *When a nation state goes consciously into a long-term war it has to mobilize all its resources for a total effort in a very deliberate and conscious manner. A nation cannot go into war and forget to mobilize psychologically and materially.*

(b) *Methodical Preparation.* Methodical preparation and a deliberate and sustained build-up pay very handsome dividends in combat. Let us not go back to the Second World War for analogies. 1971 is the best example. Initially in Sri Lanka, we grossly violated this dictum.

(c) *Organizational cohesiveness.* Let us not tamper again with organizational cohesiveness of units and formations. We tried that in 1962 by putting together a disparate and rag-tag 4 Corps. I don't think very many of us will live to forget the disaster that followed. The initial mistakes in the Sri Lanka campaign (caused by what *India Today* has called 'indecent haste') were however duly corrected in the campaign itself.

(d) *Grassroot lessons.* It is for the units involved to draw grassroot lessons on basic fighting skills. Let us not be unduly alarmed. All peace time armies have found sudden transitions to actual combat very jarring. If the times ahead are dark and turbulent let us thank Him for this God-sent combat laboratory and make the most of it while it lasts.

One year of Lanka accord reviewed

By RITA SEBASTIAN

Colombo, July 20: "The maximum is on the table now on which the government of India and Sri Lanka are agreed, although the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) say that the devolution package is less than what they wanted. Let further improvements come about through the institutions envisaged, not in terms of compartmentalised ethnic pleas but on the general political re-structuring of Sri Lankan society as it lends itself to the processes of decentralisation", said Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit on Tuesday. He was addressing the Foreign Correspondents Association of Sri Lanka.

Mr. Dixit, Lands and Mahaweli Development Minister Gamini Dissanayake, and Sri Lanka Freedom Party MP Anil Moonesinghe were panelists discussing an year of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.

Mr. Dixit's comments came in his assessment of why the Indo-Sri Lanka accord came into being and what it has tried to achieve.

There was the presence of a large number of Tamil refugees in India after 1983, an upsurge of militant Tamil separatism in the north and Tamil militancy which posed a security problem. India's involvement, said Mr. Dixit, was not to foist a Tamil sovereignty on the island as India is accused of trying to do. If India did that she would be sowing the seeds of her own disintegration. India's intention was to interact with the government of Sri Lanka, overcome the gulf of suspicion and help restore normalcy to the island.

There was sufficient pressure of events and motives and a consciousness of the political realities that led the leadership of the two countries to evolve a situation that would satisfy both Sinhala and Tamil aspirations, he said. Contrary to what was being said, the accord had the close scrutiny of

Nikhil Chakravarty **COMMENT** *Facing a Fiasco*

THIS week marks the completion of one year of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed by President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at Colombo on July 29, 1987. As the Agreement was widely hailed at that time as a great achievement by the Governments of the two countries — though there were warning notes as well, from many quarters including this journal — it will be useful and necessary to make an appraisal at this stage how far the expectations entertained at the time of the accord and the objectives held out in it, have been fulfilled. It is worth recalling that Rajiv Gandhi, at a public meeting in Madras four days after the signing of the accord, bombastically declared: "It is an Agreement without precedent in history. It is an Agreement, which does not have a parallel in the world. It is an Agreement, which puts into practice the ethical ideals of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indiraji."

Broadly speaking, the Agreement was meant to ensure the "nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka"; to acknowledge "the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka and the consequent violence"; and to provide for the "safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka" (quotations from the Text of the Agreement itself). It is necessary to evaluate how far these laudable objectives have been realised.

What was the scenario when the Agreement was signed? First, the massive military operation mounted by the Sri Lankan security forces against the Tamil northern province had failed. Secondly, the Jayewardene Administration had to face the attack of the Sinhala militant organisation, Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), and the very survival of his own regime was precarious, as even the capital, Colombo, was facing arson and disorder the very day the Agreement was signed. The very same night Jayewardene sought the help of the Indian troops to take over northern districts so that the Sinhala armed forces could be rushed to protect the capital, particularly the Presidential Palace. It was indeed a case of the Agreement virtually saving the Jayewardene regime, thereby making India appear as exclusively safeguarding the Government of one party in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Agreement was regarded by a large body of the Sri Lankan public as a commando operation to rescue President Jayewardene from political collapse. The wide base of goodwill that India always commanded even among the Sinhala public has shrunk in the course of this year as the traditional ally of India — Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), for instance — has turned from a position of neutrality in the crisis to one of antagonism.

This erosion in terms of political goodwill was, however, not compensated by the gains expected out of the Agreement itself. The direct Indian intervention in the island's affairs — militarily as well as politically — has earned for it the goodwill of neither the Tamils

every single member of the cabinet and all the Tamil groups before it was signed, said Mr. Dixit. Referring to the demand of the militants for Eelam, India's answer was a categorical 'no', for accepting Eelam would be rejecting what India has always stood for, a united country in the framework of a multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious society.

Talks continuing: Mr. Dixit admitted that the time-frames en-

visaged in the agreement had not been met. A specific factor contributing to it was the difficulty the LTTE was finding in making the transition from a violent guerilla force to a political force. The talks with the LTTE had not stalled but were continuing.

Mr. Dixit charged that while at the highest level there was agreement there were still pockets in the LTTE side as well as the Sri Lanka side to pull back on certain issues which were further aggravating the situation

available wisdom and should not be made a close preserve of the Prime Minister and his yes-men coterie.

The importance of political intervention as distinct from official negotiations lies in the fact that the party with which the talks have to be conducted is highly sensitive about its mass image. It could bend before political allies as an act of being persuaded by peers but would not like to appear as being conducted by officials, however seasoned or highly placed these might be. This mishandling of a delicate political question has persisted throughout in the dealing with the Tamil groups and the LTTE is not the only one to make such a complaint.

Even in the recent round of the Government's talks with the LTTE, the job has been entrusted to RAW, no doubt a competent intelligence agency but totally unsuited to pacify the ruffled feathers of the highly sensitive LTTE leaders, made more self-conscious after the military reverses they have had to suffer. If New Delhi's objective is to win over and not to humiliate the LTTE leaders, it has had no business to leave them to be handled exclusively by official agencies.

The mishandling by the Government of India has, therefore, much to do with the aggressive intransigence of the LTTE leadership today. In this context, if the responsibility for this sorry state of affairs has to be apportioned it would be incorrect to throw the blame on the obduracy of the LTTE leadership alone: it has to be shared in good measure by the Government of India the bankruptcy of whose policy is writ large in the terrible predicament into which our armed forces have been placed.

It has become fashionable for the Government to condemn any criticism of its involvement in a protracted military operation in Sri Lanka as casting an aspersion on our armed forces: obviously it is convenient for the Government to take cover behind such a cheap argument. The point to note is that the policy pursued by the Government — if there is a well-thought-out policy at all — is responsible for the mess in which our armed forces have been placed, and not the leadership of the armed forces.

For one thing, it is a misnomer to call the Indian Army now engaged in military operations as a Peace-Keeping Force. By no international norms an Army engaged in full-scale military combat can be called a Peace-Keeping Force. The fault certainly does not lie with our armed forces, which have a proud record of discipline and fighting mettle, but with the political leadership which seems to use the armed forces with cavalier irresponsibility.

It needs to be recalled that the Government, in the first flush of excitement after the Agreement, had given out that the operation, when launched against the LTTE, would not take more than two weeks to finish it off. Now it is engaged in the ninth month of its operation, in which more than 60 thousand armed personnel are engaged, involving all the three services. In the public eye, it hardly brings credit to the Indian Army that it could not overpower a small armed band of about two thousand, now might have been reduced to several hundred. Apart from the expenses involved — the amount of the drain scrupulously kept out of even Parliament's scrutiny — the fact that about 550 have been killed and over two thousand wounded hardly helps to enhance either the morale of the armed forces or

mutual understanding between the public and the armed forces.

It is a grotesque situation that through the folly of the political leadership of the Government our armed forces today have to face the odium of being maligned in a country which at one time was friendly. If one were to ask as for whom the jawans had to give their lives in Sri Lanka, it can hardly be said that it was for the defence of the motherland, nor could it be for the upholding of democracy. One need not be a cynic to say that this was to prop up the tottering regime of Junius Jayewardene whose political credentials do not warrant him to be regarded as a close friend of ours in the arena of world affairs.

There are some who demand that the Indian Army must decimate the rump of the LTTE leadership now entrenched in the jungles of the north. These self-styled military strategists do not seem to realise that no insurgency in history has been wiped out by military means: the job is done by concerted political offensive. A desperate guerrilla band fighting on its own terrain dedicated to die for the land, can go on harassing and unnerving the best army in the world. And the Indian Army leadership must never be blamed if they cannot exterminate Prabhakaran's intrepid Tigers.

The prospect today is that the Government, after having failed either to win over or overpower the LTTE leadership, seems to have resigned to the holding of the elections to the proposed provincial council of the north and the east. There is talk of inducting more reinforcements of the Indian Army to ensure the election. What is not being realised is that an election at gun point never succeeds nor can it help to set up a stable government. It needs to be noted that even staunch supporters of the Agreement like Minister Gamini Dissanayake, are now having reservations about the efficacy of continued Indian military intervention.

No, the way out lies not through induction of more troops but by unleashing a full-scale political offensive — not for confrontation but reconciliation.

The Indian role in the Sri Lanka crisis today demands an all-out national endeavour embracing all parties. Let such an all-party team go, unarmed, to Jaffna and to the jungle hide-out of the LTTE leaders, talk to them and bring them round to the peace process. And then the same all-party team must proceed to Colombo and meet every party — even those who are critical of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement — and persuade them to regard the problem of reconciliation with the Tamils as a national problem — and not just a party problem. This way the climate will be created for internal reconciliation in Sri Lanka, and the need for Indian armed presence would be minimised. New Delhi's objective should be to facilitate the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sri Lanka. Apart from other considerations, let us not forget we have our own frontiers to guard.

In the true tradition of Mahatma Gandhi, such a sacred mission beckons all parties in India today. The crisis in the relationship between India and Sri Lanka can no longer be left to be mishandled as a private enterprise between Rajiv Gandhi and Junius Jayewardene.

N.C.

July 28

INDIA'S EIGHT OPTIONS

By Qadri Ismail in *The Sunday Times* (Colombo) - July 14, 1988

COMMENT

"Better to let them do it imperfectly, than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their war, and your time is short."

The words are those of T.E. Lawrence, but they were probably similar to the thoughts of many Indian diplomats last week. Don't be mistaken; they are nowhere near conceding defeat. (In any case, they haven't been defeated.) Nevertheless, they are beginning to rethink. The first letters have been etched on a wall down Thurstan Road, though the full message will not be evident for many months: **No country, however large, can in the post-colonial era succeed in physically managing, over an extended period, the internal affairs of another.**

The U.S.A. in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are only the high profile examples. The Vietnamese themselves were not successful in Kampuchea, the Israelis are not in Palestine, the Syrians are not in Lebanon, etc. Just as much we would not be in the mess we are in right now if our people and government had learned from the mistakes of others, India, too, wouldn't be in the mess it is beginning to realise it is in Sri Lanka today, if it had learned from the similar follies of the "super" powers.

It was way back in 1945 that K.M. Panikkar, the noted Indian foreign policy scholar, wrote, "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea... Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores fully protected. The Indian Ocean must, therefore, remain truly Indian." The implications of this statement for countries around India are not difficult to grasp.

Jawaharlal Nehru was, being a politician, a little more ambitious and a lit-

tle less diplomatic. In 1954, he called India "the obvious fourth country in the world after the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R and China". Not foreseeing the rise of Japan and of a united (Western) Europe is forgivable. From a founder of Non-Alignment, his utterances on the relations between big powers and puny countries are not: "I can understand some of the similar countries of Europe or... of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater Powers and becoming practically satellites of those Powers, because they cannot help it..."

There has been, from those days, a basic continuity in Indian foreign policy, a steady working towards the accomplishment of these goals. This is not the place to look at Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, or Bangladesh. **Suffice to say that on July 29th 1987, slightly less than four years after Indira Gandhi walked through an ante-room in her office and told the various leaders of the Tamil militant organisations assembled there that she would look after them, Phase One of the recent Indian initiative on Sri Lanka was virtually over. The militants had been successfully used to gain the leverage India wanted over Colombo. All that remained was for them to be quietly neutralised. And all that stood in the way was one man, without even O levels, called Velupillai Prabhakaran.**

PRABAHARAN

RESISTED ACCORD

He resisted the accord and was dragged kicking and screaming into "co-operating with its implementation" in August. He fought back "non-violently" and won virtual control over the north and east in September. Dissatisfied, he fought back violently in October. In February, he authorised his former Jaffna commander, Sathasivam Krishnakumar, to begin another round of peace negotiations. When these seemed close to fruition, he struck again.

The Tiger statement of July 9th is ominous. It is also the most noteworthy political event so far this year. The "enormous sacrifices made by the Tamil people and martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth was", it states, "not to effect a temporary merger and elections for powerless Provincial Councils. What is described as north and east is the motherland of Tamils, and that is indivisible." After accusing the Indians of "committing greater atrocities than the Sri Lankans", it goes on, in the strongest language used by the Tigers to date, to call the accord nothing less than "a charter of servility for the Tamils." By those words, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has categorically rejected the accord and lost the chance of entering the "main stream" of politics except on Indian terms.

The statement goes on to say that the Indians are wrong if they hope to implement the accord by destroying the Tigers and imposing a set of quislings on the Tamils. Then follows the threat, which the Tigers no doubt hoped would make the Indians tremble. "If India continues to engage in its efforts to eliminate Tigers and kill Tamils, it would withdraw from the farcical peace talks and prepare the Tamil nation for a long and protracted struggle against foreign domination."

Reacting to this, an important Sri Lankan official said, it has "frightful implications" and was worried that the Indians would now increase the heat on Colombo to immediately improve the devolution package. The Indian High Commission, however, reacted with equanimity. It regretted the LTTE's stance, "in the context of the very earnest endeavours made by the Government of India to invite the LTTE to the processes of democratic policies"; and added that India would "continue its various efforts at persuading them to give up violence."

WHAT INDIA CAN DO

Actually, there is very little new that India can do. On paper, it has the following options, presented in order of unlikelihood:

1. Withdraw the IPKF, say they made a mistake in getting involved in the first place and leave the Sinhalese and Tamils to sort things out;
2. Militarily destroy the LTTE;
3. Make the Sri Lankan government announce a permanent merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces and change the devolution package substantially;
4. Go through with elections in the north and east without LTTE participation - while the battle is still on - and claim that their obligations under the accord have been fulfilled;
5. Close down the LTTE office in Madras;
6. Arm more effectively and unleash groups like EPRLF, ENDLF and TELO on the Tigers;
7. Intensify rehabilitation and other efforts to drive a wedge between the Tamil population and the Tigers;
8. Continue doing what they are now.

To look at each option in turn. **Firstly**, the IPKF cannot withdraw. The Sri Lankan government will protest at India leaving without completing the job, and also leaving it to fight on two fronts at the same time. **More importantly from the Indian perspective, this would mean that all Indian regional ambitions, the main thrust of their foreign policy since 1948, would crumble.** (And the Pakistanis would celebrate Ramzan for the second time this year!) No, the Indians are still some years away from having to humble themselves before the world. Though, as with all "great" powers, their time, too, will come.

As for two; even if the Congress (I) forgets its ambitions in Tamil Nadu, **the IPKF cannot (attempt to) militarily defeat the Tigers because no army has, in the post-colonial age, vanquished a guerilla foe.** **Three;** the Indians can't put more pressure on Colombo and ask for permanent merger at this stage because it is politically impossible for the UNP to grant this (as long as an election is pending here); and now that India is actually in Phase

Two of its Sri Lanka operation, **it is more important for it to "protect its investment in Colombo."** **In the words of one Indian diplomat, "We can't sacrifice Colombo for the Tigers."**

Four: elections cannot be held in the north and east as long as the LTTE and IPKF are fighting because, under the Provincial Councils Bill, the President cannot proclaim a merger of the Provinces until he is satisfied that there is a cessation of hostilities. (K.C.Pant's timetable gets added to the long list of irrelevant pronouncements on Sri Lanka.) It is possible for Mr. Jayewardene to amend this particular clause. Or he can say that he is satisfied that there has been a cessation of hostilities - if the Indians persuade him - even though slight fighting continues. But (again, as long as an election is pending) this is not likely.

Five: closing down the Madras Tiger office would be counter-productive as long as the Indians can hope that the "moderate" Kittu can in any way influence Tiger thinking. **Options six and seven will probably be employed to whatever extent possible. But what the Indians are most likely to do is continue to meander along as they have been doing since February "intensifying" military operations and praying like hell that the Tigers see reason.**

TIGERS HAVE 2000 WEAPONS

The Indians face many difficulties in moving for decisive victory against the Tigers. Sri Lankan intelligence estimates that the guerillas have 2,500 fighters, of whom only about half carry weapons all the time - for fear of getting caught at Indian check points. The Tigers are estimated to have around 2,200 weapons, including 80 to 100 heavy weapons. In certain areas, these sources say, like north of Vavuniya, Vantharumoolai and north of Mannar, no serious moves have been made against the Tigers. Which is where the bulk of them are meant to be found now. (The Tigers are also meant to be low on supplies; they do not engage the IPKF in direct confrontations, and no longer, always kill

suspected informants with bullets, but were using knives etc.)

Currently, 15,000 troops are employed in some of these areas in "Operation Checkmate", which is described by the Indians as "just a name given to the checking of movements of men and materials into the Vavuniya sector." Soldiers of the 4th division, who specialise in "information and disinformation", are being used here. The specialist counter-insurgency division, the 57th, is currently deployed in Batticaloa. This has seen anti-guerilla activity in Mizoram and Nagaland. "But," said a senior Sri Lankan officer who had trained with the Indian Army in Mizoram, "the terrain is very different. Those areas are hilly, wet and with thick jungle. While Mullaitivu has the thickest forests in Sri Lanka, those are dry and scrub and in flat land.

"The current Indian strategy," he said, "has to be changed to one involving protracted missions into these forests. They must be prepared to stay there for long periods - and even then their chances of success are not certain. They have to improve their intelligence and hit selected targets, hard and fast. That is the only way." For a proper cordon and search operation in such terrain, a soldier is needed every five yards. No army has this kind of man-power. In Nagaland, the Indian Army used as much as 6,000 men to cover areas of 30 square miles - and still had not very impressive success.

The LTTE operates now in groups of five to eight, each group a minimum of five and a maximum of ten miles from the next. Young, "innocent looking" children perform sentry duties; most of them have radios, but close to a camp, exploding a grenade alone would suffice as warning. With their superior knowledge of the terrain, the Tigers, who break into ones and twos when retreating, would find it easy to exfiltrate if attacked. "Besides", said the Sri Lankan officer, "the Indians are fighting with SLR's, which are not as effective in close combat as the AK-47. Like they did recently in the

Golden Temple, they should use AK's themselves."

FULL-THROATED PRESSURE

In time, the IPKF will no doubt sort these things out as much as they can. Now that the Tigers have effectively given up the negotiations option, the Indian Army will have to change from putting half-hearted to full throated military pressure on the guerillas. By failing to deliver the Tigers, it is RAW, which has been conducting the negotiations, that will find its credibility weakened. In contrast, Jotindra Nath Dixit, who has been advocating a tougher line with the Tigers, was smiling this week.

RAW, badly needing to restore its image following the widely touted intelligence failures that led to major IPKF mistakes after October 10th, must have decided to make a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The cost of a short term triumph for RAW, of course, was long-term disaster for India. (Since the Tigers would have used the deal only as breathing space

to be able once again to destabilise the situation.) RAW would have considered climbing this wall when they came to it.

Mr. Dixit would like to avoid it, he is careful. "They are not responding to political contacts, so military efforts will continue," reveals only the thin edge of the wedge. What that statement actually says is that no deal is possible with the LTTE and the political option has to be abandoned. With his friend Narasimha Rao back in the Ministry of External Affairs, and with circumstances proving him right, Mr. Dixit's clout with his Prime Minister can only increase.

"A DEMOLISHED SCHOOL IN JAFFNA"

The LTTE clearly fear this. Mr. Dixit's refusal to be alarmed about their July 9th statement must have led to the one four days later, where the Tiger threat of protracted war was changed into an almost desperate plea that one must be prevented. "Heroic freedom struggles of the oppressed people were never

defeated in history," it concluded. Its author is right; but that fact does not mean that the LTTE has the ghost of a chance of winning, either - whether their goal is Eelam or anything else. The IPKF expects a long war of attrition, and this is what will happen, with the LTTE being steadily marginalised. (Though this does not rule out the occasional spectacular attack, say in Jaffna, for media purposes.) The only consolation for Mr. Prabaharan and his deputy will be that they will take the Indians down with them. Eventually.

From a country-wide perspective, what this means is continued instability. And, as long as conditions are unsettled in the north and east, it can be argued that national elections - whether General or Presidential - cannot be held. It will then be of little consolation to the SLFP, considering together all four electorates that voted on Thursday, they polled more votes than the UNP.

'BASIS OF ACCORD IS WRONG'

INTERVIEW

The President of the Ceylon Workers Congress and Minister of Rural Industries, Mr. S. Thondaman in a statement issued on the anniversary of the Indo Sri Lanka Accord said that India had acted in good faith in entering into the agreement with Sri Lanka. Though the IPKF actions had caused much hardship, one could not deny that the Tamil people wanted the Indian army to enter Sri Lanka. But the main reason for the lack of success of the agreement was its wrong basis, he added.

The following is the full text of Mr. Thondaman's statement:

'The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord came into existence because India wanted a peaceful solution to the Tamil demand for a separate state. Though India did not endorse the Tamil claim, it did recognise the fact that the Tamils were fighting for their legitimate rights. One cannot I think, doubt India's good intentions in conceiving the Accord and entering the island with substantial arms in the form of a Peace-Keeping Force.

'After India moved in, however, it found that it did not possess the resources to implement the Accord. And since it had signed

an agreement with the Sri Lankan Government, it was anxious to honour the terms, and consequently began to resort to military measures.

'The main reason for this turn of events was the basis of the Accord. Rather than having the two principal protagonists sign the Agreement - that is, the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamils - with India underwriting it, the Accord was signed by the two governments, without involving the Tamils directly in the process.

'Though India negotiated with good faith in the interests of the Tamils, as it has demonstrated by its subsequent actions, India did not really understand the aspirations of the Tamil people. It felt that a minimum degree of devolution under the Accord would satisfy the Tamil people. But it did not. The Tamil demands at present centre on a merged North and East, substantial devolution of power and a halt to Sinhala settlements in the Eastern Province. The crux of the matter is that if the Tamils and the Government had

been the main negotiators and India only a guarantor, this problem would not have arisen. India did not understand the true aspirations of the Tamils and found that it had to use the IPKF against the very people whose interests it came to protect.

'Though the IPKF actions have caused much hardship to the Tamil public, one cannot deny the fact that the Tamils, too wanted the Indian Army to enter Sri Lanka. The IPKF is here to fulfil a specific task - the implementation of the Accord.

'And since they have been called in by the Sri Lankan Head of State, who feels that is the best thing, there is nothing that can be done about it. The best solution to this problem would be for India to recognise and acknowledge the aspirations of the Tamil people, and draw up a satisfactory formula which would meet the just demands of the Tamils. This will lead to the gradual cessation of hostilities after which the IPKF will not have need to resort to militarism to control the Tamil people.'

EDITORIAL

A YEAR AFTER THE ACCORD

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed on 29 July 1987 was intended to bring an end to the then raging ethnic conflict and violence that had rocked Sri Lanka for several years and inaugurate an era of peace and harmony among its people. A year has elapsed. But the violence and conflict continues unabated. Indeed the violence has spread to other parts of the country which had previously remained relatively unaffected.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force which arrived in the wake of the Agreement has failed to restore peace. On the contrary, it is engaged in a violent and tragic confrontation with the most dominant Tamil militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In this confrontation, many innocent Tamils have been killed, and many others subjected to untold hardship and suffering. In several instances, the personnel belonging to the IPKF have behaved as bad or even worse than the Sri Lankan security forces from whom they came ostensibly to protect the Tamil people.

'Operation Leap' and 'Operation Liberation' previously undertaken by the Sri Lankan security forces have been followed by 'Operation Pawan', 'Operation Virat', 'Operation Trisul' and now 'Operation Checkmate' launched by the IPKF. The successes claimed as a consequence of these operations have not brought peace, but death, destruction and misery to the people.

The basic cause of the continuing violence resulting from the confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE is that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement does not adequately provide for meeting the national aspirations of the Tamil people. With all its reservations, the LTTE is on record as having pledged to cooperate in the implementation of the Agreement. That being the case, it is hoped that the ongoing talks between India and the LTTE would lead to a resolution of the areas in dispute thus bringing peace to a long suffering people.

Ironically, the cause for the campaign of violence unleashed in the south of the island by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) with the tacit support of the

Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is that the same Agreement has granted too much to the Tamils and the limited devolution for which it provides is equated with the division of the country. These parties ought to realise that gross distortions of this type and the continued denial of the legitimate rights of the Tamil people resulted in the emergence of Tamil armed resistance. The cause of Indian intervention, to begin with indirectly and later directly, in Sri Lankan affairs has been the inability or rather the pig-headed unwillingness on the part of Sinhala political leaders to resolve a problem which was essentially an internal one.

If the SLFP or the JVP, or for that matter any other party or group, desires an early exit of the IPKF and to see an end to Indian meddling in Sri Lankan internal affairs, then they should come to terms with and recognise the legitimate aspirations and national rights of the Tamil people. The advance towards the realisation of those aspirations and rights have reached a point of no return. No amount of anti-Tamil propaganda based on misinterpretation of history or distortion of present day realities is going to prevent that advance.

Mass struggles against a government which subverts representative democracy by frequently monkeying with the Constitution, or extends the life of parliament by depriving the people of their right to periodic general elections, or suppresses political dissent and opposition by resorting to draconian, arbitrary or military means is one thing. But combining some elements of such a struggle with a campaign of individual terrorism which draws its inspiration and nourishment from an essentially chauvinist anti-Tamil stance is politically and morally wrong, counter-productive and reactionary and therefore should be resisted. For all the marxist rhetoric of the JVP, it has not only failed to recognise and understand the basic tenet that national minorities are the natural allies of all progressive forces, but has also ganged up with the most reactionary chauvinist and fascist elements in Sri Lankan society while engaging in a vicious and sustained campaign of individual terrorism.



'The Island' 7/7/88

INDIA'S FIRST YEAR IN LANKA

Mohan Ram writing in 'India Abroad' of July 29, 1988

COMMENT

India's military involvement in Sri Lanka is a year old. Though aimed at securing implementation of the July 29, 1987 agreement to solve the island republic's conflict, it has produced mixed results. The conflict remains. The sharpest criticism of India's role came on the eve of the first anniversary of the agreement, described by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as *the accord of the century*. It came from Gamini Dissanayake, a Sri Lankan minister who, unlike some of his cabinet colleagues, was known to be its supporter. Dissanayake said in Colombo on the eve of the anniversary that the Indian Peace Keeping Force (in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka for a year to demilitarise the conflict) had failed in its role. He also declared that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the most powerful of the secessionist groups, should be made either to accept the accord or be eliminated as a military factor. That perhaps sums up India's problem.

The biggest weakness of the accord, as the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) member of Parliament, Anil Moonasinghe, said, was that the majority of the Sinhalese and Tamil people did not agree with it.

Not Demilitarised

At the end of the first year, the balance sheet of the agreement is as follows: The conflict has not been demilitarised. The Indian Peace Keeping Force was sent to secure a disengagement between the Sinhalese forces and the Tamil secessionist guerrillas in the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern provinces. The Sinhalese forces were to be confined to their barracks. This was achieved. The next step was to get the Tamil guerrillas to lay down their arms. This was not done because the surrender of arms by the LTTE in early August 1987 was a token affair. It became a conflict between the IPKF and the LTTE begin-

ning Oct. 10, climaxed by the fall of Jaffna later that month. It is a continuing operation, laying India open to the Sinhalese charge that either it is incapable of liquidating the LTTE militarily or it is prolonging its operation deliberately to justify an indefinite stay of the IPKF. The IPKF could neither break nor bend the LTTE, which is holding out despite its heavy loss of manpower and arms and the Indian claim to have annihilated it militarily. **Politically, the provisions of the agreement, which provides for a measure of autonomy to the Tamil provinces through a devolution package, have not been realised.**

President Junius Jayewardene says he has delivered his part of the bargain having legislated for implementation of the devolution package. Ironically the provincial councils, through which the devolution is to be effected, were constituted through elections in stages between April and June in the seven Sinhalese majority provinces that really did not want autonomy. The two Tamil provinces for which the devolution package was designed have not been able to hold elections.

India has promised to create physical conditions for holding elections in the Tamil provinces by the end of July (that is, by the end of the first year of the agreement) but not the political participation.

The devolution package is inadequate even to the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which welcomed the July 1987 agreement. India has been unable to revive the political processes in the Tamil provinces which in effect means getting the LTTE to participate in the political process, for without its participation no election would be legitimate. This leaves unrealised the essential component of the 1987 agreement - autonomy for the Tamil areas short of giving them a

sovereign homeland. Strategically, India might have realised its objective of pre-empting the direct involvement of outside powers or a foreign naval base at Trincomalee.

Few Tamil Gains

While it might be a welcome respite for the Tamil provinces from the depredations of the Sinhalese forces, the Tamils have gained little since the political processes have not been revived in their areas.

But the 1987 agreement has helped polarise Sinhalese opinion on concessions to the Tamils and sharpened the opposition to Jayewardene and his United National Party (UNP) in the form of a nexus between Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Sinhalese chauvinist militant youth organisation called the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). These two groups called for a boycott of the provincial council elections while the JVP tried to enforce it through terror tactics.

No Endorsement

Though the UNP could win all the provincial councils, the voting outcome is by no means an endorsement of the India-Sri Lanka agreement because the other contender, the United Socialist Alliance (USA), comprising the leftist parties, was not opposed to the accord either. The drop in voting in a country with a tradition of universal adult franchise, dating back to 1931 and known for a 70 per cent turnout at the polls, witnessed a sharp drop in voter participation at the council elections.

The 1987 agreement was between two governments, and the Tamils, who are its central concern, were not a party to it. Secondly, the Sri Lankan government that signed it lacked legitimacy because the 1977 parliament had prolonged itself through constitutional gerrymandering and the country had not had a national election since 1977. Jayewardene has placed the onus of securing the implementation of the agreement - that is, getting the LTTE to accept it - on India, which is seen in a number of roles - a party to the agreement, its guarantor and its enforcer.

COMMENT

Year of the mauling of the Tigers

A year after India sent its soldiers into Sri Lanka, that unfortunate country is still in the grip of civil war. For India's Prime Minister, Mr Gandhi, this is a disheartening comment on his long and patient pursuit of a peace plan based on a mixture of force and negotiation.

In early July it looked as if Mr Gandhi's strategy was going to succeed. Many of the Tigers' arms caches had been seized, the main channels through which they obtained weapons had been blocked, at least 200 of their best fighters had been killed or captured, and intercepted messages revealed low morale in their ranks.

Meanwhile, the negotiators in Madras were already discussing the duration of a ceasefire, the number of weapons the guerrillas would hand over, and the deadline by which they would be handed over.

And on June 30 Sri Lanka's President Mr. Jayawardene had renewed his offer of an amnesty for Tigers who laid down their arms.

On July 10, however the Sri Lankan Government issued a statement repeating that the proposed merger of the island's Northern and Eastern provinces would become permanent only if the people of Eastern Province, where Tamils are in a minority (by reason of colonisation) approved it in a referendum to be held not more than a year after the election of a joint council for the merged provinces. This statement touched on the most sensitive element in the India-Sri Lanka agreement of July 29 last year.

Tamils in Sri Lanka had long demanded the creation of a single "Tamil homeland" comprising both provinces. Until last year the Government in Colombo had refused to consider the merger fearing that it would be a stepping

stone to secession. When Mr Jayawardene accepted its inclusion in the July agreement, he insisted on making the permanence of the merger conditional on ratification by a referendum in Eastern Province. The Indian Government was not happy about this, but it hoped Mr Jayawardene would postpone the referendum and let the issue fade away.

But the Sri Lankan President was left with little room to manoeuvre when the Tamil guerrillas proved intransigent and the Island's Sinhalese majority began to react angrily to the presence of the Indian troops.

The statement issued on July 10 was evidently meant to reassure the Sinhalese on the eve of four by-elections in which the ruling United National Party was to face a challenge from Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Freedom Party.

On July 13 the Tigers said they did not accept this condition for the merger of the two provinces. Officials in Delhi say the Madras talks have merely "hit a snag." However in talks with the Economist in Madras, the Tigers' spokesmen have made it clear that the merger issue is not the only one on which they want changes. They are unhappy about an amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution that was adopted in April. This 13th Amendment empowers the president to declare an emergency in any part of the country for a wide range of reasons. In the past, Mr Jayawardene has made much use of the emergency powers. The Tamils fear that the 13th Amendment will make Tamil autonomy permanently subject to Sinhalese vote.

They have made it clear that unless India puts pressure on Sri Lanka to reverse the 13th Amendment, it would be suicidal for the Tigers to surrender their arms to the Indian Army.

Mr Gandhi faces a difficult choice. He can order an all out onslaught on the Tigers or he can concede the validity of their objections to the present scheme. He seems to have chosen the first course. Operation Checkmate, the latest of the assaults on guerrilla

bases in the north, has been intensified and several Tiger commanders have been killed.

In the long run, however, a policy of bashing the guerrillas has its limitations. The Tigers voice is shared by many non-combatant Tamils in Sri Lanka. The more the Indian troops succeed in weakening the guerrillas, the more India will make itself morally responsible for the future welfare of Sri Lanka's Tamils. That could mean a long involvement in the island's affairs. The Indian government may find satisfaction in a great-power role; but not all Indians find the prospect attractive.

July 30, 1988

PEACE NO CLOSER ONE YEAR AFTER SRI LANKA ACCORD

One year on, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka can be seen to have singularly failed to achieve all of its main objectives.

Worse, an Indian Peace Keeping Force which has grown from 6,000 to 50,000 (Indian official figure) seems no nearer to subjugating Tamil militants fighting for a separate state in the north and east of Sri Lanka than when it first arrived 12 months ago.

Worse still, the IPKF is indefinitely locked into such a pursuit by the terms of the agreement, a task which has so far cost the lives of 500 Indian soldiers and seriously injured 1,500 others.

With months of talks in Madras between Indian and LTTE officials to try to achieve a negotiated settlement ending in stalemate in recent weeks, there is growing criticism coming from the Sri Lankan Government that the IPKF has failed in its task of forcing the Tigers to sue for peace.

A year on, that peace is no nearer, the possibility of valid elections in the north and east seems remote, and Tamils and Sinhalese alike are today hanging out black flags in protest at the accord.

NO PEACE IN SRI LANKA

It took a Sri Lankan army curfew in the south of the island yesterday to hold back protests of Sinhalese chauvinists; it took an Indian army curfew to restrain the Tamils in the north. Both communities were trying to mark the first anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Both proposed a continuation of their campaigns of mayhem and murder.

When Mr Rajiv Gandhi put his signature to the accord last year he can scarcely have imagined the trouble that was in store. He signed for all the right reasons. By that stage there was no possibility that the Sri Lankan Government could reach an agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on their own. The Tigers were sheltered in India and widely believed to be armed and trained there too. Sri Lanka with 30,000-man army simply did not have the power to crush them, though it was strong enough to cause vast suffering among the Tamils.

The Sri Lankan Government, meanwhile, was also imprisoned by the strength of Sinhalese feeling against any settlement that would have been acceptable to the Tamils. Mr Gandhi felt able to lean on President Jayewardene to force one more concession after another out of him. In return Mr Gandhi could offer to cut off support to the Tigers.

Mr Jayewardene perhaps did see what he and Mr Gandhi were letting themselves in for. He asked Mr Gandhi for troops. They would free his troops to look after the Sinhalese extremists in the south, and they would be there if the accord should go sour and the Tigers should take up terrorism again.

Outside the Tamil areas the establishment of provincial councils has gone ahead, and elections have been held to them, despite the murderous efforts of the Sinhalese militants. In the north and east the Indians who are now 50,000 strong are still trying to hold the Tigers down.

The killing of more Sinhalese villagers to mark the anniversary show-

ed that their control is far from complete, but the experience of Punjab shows that such complete control is simply not possible. In the meantime unofficial talks between Indian intelligence and Tigers are said to be nearing another agreement.

If there is another agreement the Indians must ensure that the Tigers are thoroughly disarmed this time. The Sinhalese should avoid stoking Tamil fears by renewed colonization. The Sri Lankan opposition should exercise restraint in opposing the settlement. The sad thing is that none of these things is likely to happen.

The Times (Editorial) - July 30, 1988

SRI LANKA LOSES FAITH IN ROLE OF INDIAN TROOPS

By Vijitha Yapa

The anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is being observed today with both the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils seemingly united in not wanting the Indian troops to remain in Sri Lanka.

Officially there are 52,000 Indian troops in the Northern and Eastern provinces, although Indian analysts say the number is double that.

One of their tasks was to disarm the Tamil guerillas fighting for a separate state. But, with nearly 600 soldiers dead, the Indians have found that having the fourth largest army in the world does not mean that the guerillas, mainly of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), scare easily.

Even the most pro-Indian of the Cabinet Ministers and the architect of the accord, Mr. Gamini Dissanayake, says that the peace keeping force has not performed its functions well.

"One year after the accord, when the LTTE should be either conforming to the principles of the Accord or eliminated as a militant factor, they are still able to defy the Indian Army," he said. Sri Lanka is committed to holding elec-

tions in the North and East, but it is the responsibility of India to bring about the condition for this, he added.

The arrival of the Indian troops also gave an excuse for the extremist Sinhalese party, the People's Liberation Front, to whip up feelings. It has committed more than 200 murders, mainly of officials of the ruling United National Party and Government. They have called for a day of protest today and warned people to stay away from work.

The demands were sent through the postal system, which led the Government to take the unprecedented step of suspending the delivery of all letters for a week.

The Government also imposed a 24-hour curfew in two southern districts, Matara and Hambantota, to prevent violence after reports that the People's Liberation Front was planning demonstrations.

For President Jayewardene it is a decisive year. Presidential elections have to be held between December 15 and January 15, although general elections are not due until August next year.

Having won three of the four by-elections held this month, he is said to be keen to have the general election first. Observers feel that if his United National Party does not get an absolute majority at an early general election he will be able to manoeuvre the smaller parties into a coalition if he is still President.

But for him to contest a third term an amendment to the Constitution is necessary, which requires a two-thirds majority. So far, he has not revealed his plans.

The presence of the Indian troops will be a key factor in the elections and Mr. Jayewardene would have preferred to go to the people claiming that elections to provincial councils in the North and East had been held, the Tamil guerillas had been disarmed, and Indian troops had begun to go home.

But elections in the North and East seem a long way off. (*The Times - July 29, 1988*)



BLUNDER IN LANKA

Issues beyond
a flawed
Accord

Swapan Dasgupta

COMMENT JULY 29, 1983

IF history is viewed as a compendium of ironies, it might be opportune to recall one of Jawaharlal Nehru's early speeches on the principles of Indian foreign policy. "India", he said, "wants to do away with the imperialist notion of capturing and exploiting another country. If Indians have any interest abroad, it should be based on the goodwill and cooperation of the people of that country".

On the first anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord—an agreement for which the present Prime Minister was hailed as the "ambassador of peace" and nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize—it may be slightly embarrassing to note that this speech was made to a mass meeting in Colombo in July 1939. However, it is unlikely that this revelation will cause any serious discomfiture to Mr Rajiv Gandhi and his close policy advisers who involved the country in a gigantic misadventure that is likely to have a debilitating effect on the future of our regional policy. Having raised chauvinistic feelings early last year to an all-time high with a brazen show of might against a smaller neighbour, Mr Gandhi undertook a gamble whose failure, in Mr J. N. Dixit's words, "will set our foreign policy back by 30 years".

It is not that the July 29 accord has had no positive achievements. Within India, of the 39,860 destitute refugees ac-

commodated in the camps, nearly 35,265 have returned to Sri Lanka (although 85 per cent of the one lakh or so self-supporting refugees have opted to stay on). More important, the serious law and order problem posed by pauperized militants equipped with sophisticated arms has eased in Tamil Nadu. And crucially, the unfortunate monetary nexus between the militant groups and local politicians has been broken.

DEVELOPMENTS

Within Sri Lanka, however, the post-accord developments have not been so encouraging. The passage of the 13th Constitutional amendment offered hopes that a measure of regulated federalism would find acceptance within Sinhalese and Tamil polity. But the generally indifferent response of voters to the provincial council elections suggests that it is only a matter of time before these bodies fall by the wayside, more so since the Tamils—for whose benefit they were established in the first place—are loath to participate in the venture.

Secondly, New Delhi's belief that the Tamil secessionist movement was a pliant instrument of the Indian intelligence services that sustained it with weapons and other resources for four years turned out to be completely misplaced at least in the case of the LTTE. Not only did Mr V. Pirabhakaran refused to sing Mr Rajiv Gandhi's tune, he had no inhibitions against training his guns on his former mentors. Perhaps this should have been obvious to New Delhi from the LTTE's conduct at the 1985 Thimphu talks and its subsequent sabotage of all peace initiatives, but it wished away these embarrassing details and focussed on playing its one-upmanship games against a vulnerable regime in Colombo.

Even after the recalcitrant Tigers bared their fangs in Jaffna and the Eastern Province in October last year and Mr Rajiv Gandhi publicly denounced them as a "small, unreliable and untrustworthy group", New Delhi insisted on perpetuating the fallacy that no peace was possible without the cooperation of the LTTE. In the process, Mr Pirabhakaran was encouraged to exploit the political uncertainty in Tamil Nadu following M. G. Ramachandran's death as a bargaining lever against decisive military action. The recent negotiations with the LTTE conducted by the Research and Analysis Wing—against the

advice of the External Affairs Ministry—may have reinforced Mr Pirabhakaran's conviction that India is desperate to bury the hatchet in order to give the Congress(I) a fighting chance in the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections. The fact that strong domestic compulsions determine its attitude to foreign policy has hardly enhanced India's projected image as a regional power, especially when it is known that the Government in New Delhi is leading a precarious existence and unsure of its political future.

In a sense, New Delhi's tragic vulnerability is a consequence of a short-sighted policy of brinkmanship against its smaller neighbours. While there is no doubt that some pressure on Colombo was imperative after the 1983 riots and the failure of the all-party conference, Mr Rajiv Gandhi erred by not coupling his favourable equations with President Jayawardene with an understanding of majority sentiment within Sri Lanka. By issuing blanket endorsements of both real and imaginary Tamil grievances, particularly on the complex question of the Eastern Province, India enabled the sophisticated Eelam propaganda machine to capture the public imagination. Rather deftly, the LTTE and its associates managed to convey the popular impression that Indian interests and Tamil interests were very similar indeed. The profound ignorance of the Opposition parties to the Sri Lanka problem did not help matters either, and in their anxiety to score debating points over the Government they, in effect, pushed New Delhi towards a disastrous course.

But if the accord and subsequent events have exposed the limitations of India's regional clout, its effects on the politics of Sri Lanka have been catastrophic. Article 2(9) of the accord confining the Sri Lankan "army and other security personnel" to the barracks in the Northern and Eastern provinces and the concomitant article 2(16c) whereby the IPKF was called in to "underwrite and guarantee" the accord have been widely perceived as violations of national sovereignty. This is not an abstract and academic question as New Delhi often maintains, but an issue of immediate political significance that has delegitimized President Jayawardene's Government in the eyes of the majority of the Sinhalese.

The obvious manifestation of this is the alarming growth in numbers and influence of the

Janatha Vimukti Peramuna in the south of the island. While part of the reason for Mr Rohan Wijeweera's ability to win fresh adherents to his adventurist brand of chauvinistic politics is undoubtedly the economic dislocation of what is close to civil war, it would be short-sighted to deny that what really spurs on the JVP is simple patriotism. The presence of foreign troops—besides lending credence to the oft-repeated charge of Indian expansionism—violates one of the central tenets of Sinhala-Buddhist consciousness, its fierce and resurgent nationalism.

True, the JVP's adroit use of selective terror may have exaggerated the problem, but it is significant that President Jayewardene has failed to elicit any substantial public support against terrorism in the south. In short, the accord has created a new second front in Sri Lanka and in the process destroyed some of the more stable political institutions of the Sinhalese heartland.

For example, it is significant that while there has been no formal challenge to President Jayewardene's leadership, few the private armies of the UNP MPs; the three-star combine of PLOTE, EPRLF and TEL O, and the tough and resolute soldiers of Sri Lanka's regular army. The most recent addition is Al Jihad, a shadowy Muslim militant group.

There are constant rumours of

a deal being worked out between Colombo, New Delhi and the LTTE. The return of the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front leader Mr A. Amirthalingam, to the island after five years in Madras is indicative of some accommodation. But the tentative nature of each step recognizes that there can be no orderly elections without LTTE cooperation in the north and east. There were no nominations on an earlier occasion when the Government tried to bluster through Pradeshyan Sabha by-elections in the north-east. Now the speculation is that the LTTE is demanding a common slate of LTTE-approved candidates, with perhaps some TULF and EROS nominees thrown in.

But there are also complaints of being excluded from even tiny groups like the Tamil Congress. Nor are the more powerful contenders for power, EPRLF and PLOTE, likely to take kindly to exclusion from the democratic process. Progressive left groups which have just found their feet might also like to contest in alliance with moderate Tamils, while the UNP and SLFP, which have committed followers in the north and east, would like to make some sort of a showing.

WISDOM

Simple wisdom suggests that an LTTE-dominated Provincial Council is better than a violent and chaotic electoral free-for-

all. But this begs the question of whether in fact the LTTE wants to play electoral games in accordance with the official timetable without first wresting fundamental concessions with regard to the content of the devolution package.

The progress of devolution in the north and east is vital to the south's continuing stability and to the success of the new decentralization efforts. The Sinhalese polity has temporarily suppressed its suspicions about the motives of Indians and of their own Government. The token IPKE withdrawals immediately after the elections sent the right signals. But any indefinite postponement of elections in the Northern Province, or further concessions to the LTTE would disturb the delicate balance of consensus that President Jayewardene has managed to maintain in the south. Any obstacles in the decentralization experiment would also renew fears of Colombo's collusion in Tamil ambitions of total independence, Indian hegemony and the island's disintegration.

Alternatively, if a Provincial Council is established in the north and east, the Indian presence could quickly be reduced so that the normalization process is further facilitated. However, a minimal presence seems inevitable to ensure the success of parliamentary politics, though the level of dependence remains to be seen.

RELIEF WORK GRINDS TO A HALT IN TAMIL AREAS

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Refugee relief and rehabilitation work undertaken by religious and non-governmental organisations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces have ground to a halt.

The killing of the Catholic Priest Fr. Chandra Fernando in Batticaloa on June 6 and the abduction of a prominent social worker Mr S. Kandasamy by unknown persons on June 19 has led to this situation.

An office-bearer of the Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organisation (TRRO) said that most international agencies that were giving aid to the TRRO for refugee relief and rehabilitation work had expressed horror at the plight of Mr. Kandasamy. Several of these agencies particularly those from Scandinavian countries had already suspended financial aid following Mr. Kandasamy's abduction. In view of this situa-

tion the TRRO was constrained to suspend its refugee settlement programme including free-medical aid. Mr. Kandasamy was primarily instrumental in setting up the TRRO in 1977 after the August violence.

The TRRO had spread its activities throughout the North and East and since 1983 had been playing a prominent role in rehabilitation work. Mr Kandasamy went into self-exile in 1983 and thereafter was responsible for fund raising from western countries for the TRRO.

A west-European based representative of an aid-giving agency told The Island by telephone that the donor agencies were disappointed at the inertia of some TRRO officials, in matters concerning the release of Mr. Kandasamy. "We know personally that he is a man dedicated to upliftment of the Tamils and of unimpeachable integrity. If some harm has befallen him then we will have to reconsider the whole issue" the representative said.

A spokesman for the Catholic church told The Island that the church has suspended all its social work in the Eastern Province following the killing of Fr. Chandra Fernando who was also Chairman of the Batticaloa-Amparai Citizens' Committee.

The Batticaloa-Trincomalee Bishop Rev. Fr. Kingsley Swampillai had decided to suspend these activities as the role of the church was not being appreciated as indicated by the killing of Fr. Chandra Fernando. All Catholic priests had resigned from posts held in Citizens' Committees following the killing.

The Bishop of Jaffna Rev. Fr. Deogupillai has also advised the priests in his diocese to be 'careful' and 'go slow' in doing social work because of the political situation.

According to citizens from the North and East, the suspension of refugee work has hit the ordinary people very hard. More than half the population have been affected by the past violence.

THE WAR ACCORDING TO DELHI AND COLOMBO

COMMENT

Why is there no first hand reporting of
IPKF operations in Sri Lanka?

Rita Manchanda on the war story the
Indian press does not cover

ARE ANY of the men in the Indian Peace Keeping Force held prisoner by the Liberation Tigers? Probably not, but curiously enough it does not appear to have troubled anyone to ask the question. It is yet another disturbing reminder of how little we know or even care to know about this "war" on our very doorstep.

More than 53,000 Indian soldiers are in Sri Lanka involved in the country's longest military operation that this year has claimed 537 lives and left more than 14,000 wounded according to official figures. In its first phase "Operation Pawan" was the testing ground for many of the former Army Chief General K Sundarji's avant-garde strategies, the first occasion in which helicopter gun ships were used and the army had to fight in a built-up area. In its current phase, it is a classic counter-guerrilla insurgency operation, the stuff that commando lore is made of.

Yet press reportage has been largely limited to a perfunctory single column statistical flash.

"Three IPKF personnel were killed and two seriously wounded when the militants attacked an IPKF convoy with rocket launchers and automatic rifles at Mankeni, 35 km from Batticaloa." Few of the papers will subsequently bother to pick up even the news agency follow up that "one LTTE subgroup leader was killed and four militants were wounded in the attack".

Whatever happened to the eye witness account at the unit level, of the blood, gore, ennui and demoralisation, the war diaries, the worm's eye reconstruction of battle, the discovery of the unsung heroes of unknown battles, the investigation of alleged atrocities and the lessons of war? A John Reed covering Mexico in flames, a James Fenton reporting on Vietnam and a Susard Kapuchinski on the battle front in Angola are the models on which impres-

sionable young journalists are weaned. Then where are our own home grown war correspondents or even just mavericks? There was a Shyam Tekwani (photographer, *India Today*) and Sumir Lal (*The Telegraph*) who dared to go into the Liberation Tiger's den. But that was last November. We dream of travelling with the Afghan mujahedeen or envy the Soviet journalist who recently published an account of his days and nights with Afghan-Soviet troops. Then why not with the IPKF or LTTE in Jaffna?

But if we think to do it on the piggy back of government sponsored jamborees, then the standard five o'clock briefing in Colombo and Madras is what we deserve. The government, for quite understandable reasons, does not wish to dramatise the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka. There is to be no ceremonial gesture by the prime minister to be at the airport to receive the body of the commanding officer of the 4/5 Gurkha Battalion who dies in battle. Government officials bristle at the use of the word "war" to describe the military action in Jaffna and the eastern province. In a formal briefing on the IPKF on July 26, the spokesman in Madras was at pains to stress that "we have never been at war. The IPKF is at war against militarism and gun running." The IPKF forces are here at the invitation of the Jayewardene government under joint command. Unlike the earlier diplomatic gaffes about who commands the forces, New Delhi has been circumspect about projecting that the decision making initiative comes from Sri Lanka. Therefore even the May visit to Colombo of the Defence Minister K C Pant was announced there and not in New Delhi. No longer are there simultaneous briefings on the Jaffna-Eastern province situation in New Delhi, Madras and Colombo. The government is anxious to play down the IPKF

to counter propaganda of the hegemonistic thrust by big brother India into the affairs of its neighbours.

More important, given the special nature of a counter insurgency operation, the IPKF has to fight not only with its hands tied behind its back but a battle in which the enemy that he must kill is also the very man whom he must keep alive to transfer political power to. A viable political solution in the north and eastern provinces has to involve the LTTE and perhaps even the supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran. The battle for arms is much less important than the battle for minds. Here it is the anomaly that Thomas Hardy quipped about in *The Man He Killed*.

"Yes, quaint and curious war is!

You shoot a fellow down
You'd treat if met where any bar is,

Or help to half a crown". And it is also having to perforce to turn a blind eye to the LTTE continuing to use India as not only a place of sanctuary but also spareparts for arms. For example closely monitored by defence military intelligence Prabhakaran from a hideout in Jaffna communicated with the LTTE leader "Kittu", under house arrest in Madras, by means of a radio transmitter, their urgent need for spare electronic switches used to detonate mines that were responsible for over 60 per cent of all IPKF casualties. The supplies arrived within a week, presumably through clandestine channels from India.

Since Operation Pawan last October, the IPKF has been on an intensive combing operation to flush out LTTE hideouts and ammunition caches. The number of weapons to be surrendered has become a bargaining exercise in the LTTE-IPKF dialogue. But strangely enough there has been little attempt to do an investigation of the quantity or quality of arms with the LTTE or a reconstruction of their supply lines. Much before the IPKF operation in May 1987 there were war analysts like Robert McDonald writing in *Jane's Defence Weekly* after a six week stint with the Tigers about their inadequate fire power and their home-made weapons. Four months later, it was a heavily armed LTTE that



took on the IPKF. Were these new weapons?

There were at that time stray press reports, "LTTE gets arms via Singapore" (*The Indian Post*, October 29) yet till today there has been no sophisticated reconstruction of the LTTE's supply lines. In its June 19 issue *The Week* does address itself to "arms and the LTTE" but goes no further than vaguely alluding to the still unnamed Singapore shipping company and a possible JVP supply nexus.

In war, Hemingway's phrase has now come to be accepted as a truism, the first casualty being truth. But in the Sri Lanka IPKF operation we have shown neither much effort nor interest to get at it. What is possible was ably demonstrated by *India Today* correspondent Shekhar Gupta's foray into Jaffna in December to reconstruct the tactical battle of Operation Pawan. Till then it was still believed that in that disastrous first commando operation on October 11 to capture the LTTE leadership, the brunt of the casualties was borne by the 10 para-commando battalion whereas it was the 30-strong platoon of the 13 Sikh Light Infantry that were all but wiped out. It was also Gupta who in his subsequent analysis pointed to serious flaws at the tactical level.

Are arms supplies still reaching the LTTE? Are they coming from India? It comes as a shock to read in a report from a Colombo based correspondent that the patrolling by Indian and the Sri Lankan navy does not seem to have made much difference to bringing in fresh arms, some of this still coming from India. Quoting rival Tamil militant groups, the report speaks of an undisturbed supply line. Back in November 1987 the LTTE Jaffna commander Mahattaya had admitted, "We are short of weapons though we have plenty of ammunition. But the IPKF is fooling itself if it thinks it has cut off our supply lines." Was Mahattaya right?

The current checkmate no doubt merits another such worm's eye reconstruction but how many editors would be willing to back the rare correspondent who has the expertise to undertake such a task? Many editors shy away from what they fear would dangerously veer towards commando comic

type hype. As a last resort they say the government will not allow it. Yet time and again some correspondents have taken the risk and gone to Jaffna.

Which leaves us where we started with the official spokesman. And so we are surprised that the LTTE as a fighting force is far from finished although government sources have for weeks been stressing the success of the combing operations, the breakdown in LTTE channels of communication, the disintegration of the chain of command structure. Yet just last week the LTTE killed 21 Indian soldiers and wounded many more. This should however be balanced with the information that between July 16 to 25, 39 LTTE militants have been killed and 28 captured.

How little we still know about the LTTE becomes evident when we realise that it has taken nearly a year for the national dailies to carry reports about how the LTTE communicate with each other. It is only on July 28 that *The Hindu* carried a report about their communication network, although for months we have known that intelligence sources have been regularly intercepting their walkie-talkie exchanges.

Even this information about the "invisible enemy" is from IPKF sources. Do we have to read the reports of foreign correspondents to see the other face of the invisible enemy. For example in Trincomalee, a correspondent from *The Independent* let it be known that he wanted to meet the Tigers. He was duly contacted and taken to meet them. They were playing cricket not too far off from an IPKF post.

What about the reality of the IPKF soldier in Jaffna or Trinco? Amnesty International in its June 1988 report on Sri Lanka and a review of alleged human rights abuses says "... IPKF were accused of raping Tamil women and of deliberately killing dozens of unarmed Tamil civilians among them, elderly people women and children". It also adds that in January 1988... "four Indian soldiers were discharged and sentenced by an Indian court martial to one year's imprisonment for raping Tamil women". Does it not merit investigation or must it be left to Amnesty International?

CIVILIANS KILLED



Selvaratnam 12.7.88



T. Vallipuram 17.7.88



R.A. Ilanujan 25.7.88



C. Kalamohini 13.7.88



Grace Nesamma 19.7.88



R. Lingeswari 25.7.88



Mrs. Sakuntaladevi 14.7.88



Balendran 21.7.88



T. Manadas 27.7.88



R. Sivakaran 15.7.88



K. Yoganathan 20.7.88



Jeyaraj Jayaraman 31.7.88



V. Ponnampalam 16.7.88



Pushpakaran 23.7.88



Parantharan 25.8.88



Ponnudurai 17.7.88



Saradaman 24.7.88



C. Senthamarasevi 31.8.88

THE TAMIL NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE INDO-SRI LANKA PEACE ACCORD

(A message from Prof.C.Jeyaratnam Eliezer Ph.D.(Cantab), D.Sc.(London), President, Australian Federation of Tamil Associations and Patron, World Federation of Tamils)

OPINION

I would have urged a collective tribute to the many Tamils who have given their lives in our liberation struggle.

I do not believe in the use of war and violence as a means of settling disputes - political or otherwise. But I do believe that civilised people have a duty to defend their families, homes and their folk, when they are victims of arson and murder.

I am specially moved by the memory of those who defended the Jaffna Peninsula and the Jaffna city, first from the Sinhalese army and their mercenary bombing pilots, and later from the so called peace keeping forces.

In the nine months since the accord was signed, there is little to show of any rapprochement between the communities, which I regard as an essential prerequisite for any peace. I do not believe that the Tamil people will quickly forget their years of suffering and numerous pogroms and the cruelties they have endured under the Sri Lankan Government and its forces.

I understand that President Jayewardene is seeking re-election for a further term as President. I anticipate that in

the next few months, he would woo Tamil votes with fanciful promises. People of Wellawatte would remember his past and all will remember his promises in 1977 when the UNP election manifesto spoke of Tamil grievances and disabilities and programs for rectification. I believe that before the Tamils are taken in by any promises, they should ensure them underwritten by Indian Authorities.

The unexpected deterioration of our relationship with India is hopefully a passing phase. India as the great power of the region has the right and indeed the responsibility to ensure stability and security. I do not believe that this is in anyway incompatible with the hopes and aspirations of the Tamil people. A statement of these had been agreed on by various sections and has been called the Thimpu Declaration.

By its actions, India has so put back the momentum of the Tamil movements that it should now take responsibility for the protection of the Tamil people and the implementation of the sentiments in the Thimpu Declaration. I believe the Tamil people certainly expect this of India. The judgement of the international community would

also expect it - not to mention the judgement of history.

For all these reasons, I urge the hastening of Indian reconciliation with the Tamil people including the LTTE.

Until such time as the conditions are suitable for the restoration of democratic procedures, and the elections to be held, I believe quite strongly that Mr Velupillai Prabhakaran should be a principal spokesman for the Tamil people.

Before I conclude I would urge all concerned to take steps in the seemingly impossible task of bringing unity among the Tamil expatriate community. General De Gaulle once said "all Frenchmen hate each other, but they love France." In a similar vein one could say, all Tamils are wary of one another, but they love Tamil. By Tamil, I don't just mean the language but also its literature, its devotion, its land and its poetry. I mean all these. In our common love of all these, we ought at least to take united action on some urgent agreed objectives so that the expatriate Tamil voice may be heard and listened to at this moment of crisis and hope for the Tamil people.



INDIA USES NAPALM & CHEMICAL BOMBS

Indian forces, in their attempt to wipe out the LTTE, have carried out massive scale aerial bombardment in Mullaitivu district. Since 22nd June, Indian planes and military helicopters bombed and strafed the residential areas of Alambil, Naayaaru, Semmalai and Kumulamunai in the Mullaitivu district. Indian forces used internationally banned napalm and chemical bombs and 250 kilo bombs in these operations.

Hundreds of houses, schools and government buildings have been severely damaged. The civilian casualties are feared high but as Indian forces continue this operation, accurate figures are not immediately available.

Most of the jungle areas in Mullaitivu are on fire and the animals are badly affected, several of them dead. It is understood that Rajiv is bent in destroying the Tamil Resistant Movement and enthroning his ally J.R. Jayewardene for the third term. Tamils believe that Rajiv will meet his Waterloo in Tamil Eelam if he does not mend his ways. A nation cannot be massacred however militarily powerful India may be.

Hunger-strike protest in Mullaitivu

A mass hunger-strike protest rally was organised by the people of Mullaitivu on 24.6.88 against the Indian atrocities. Over 1,000 people from the villages of Thanneerootu, Kumulamunai, Kallappaadu, Vaddakkandal and Mulliyavalai participated in this protest and demanded the Indian government to

- * announce a ceasefire and start negotiations with the LTTE;

- * dismantle the Walioya Sinhala colonisation (a Tamil village called Manal Aru recently turned into Walioya Sinhala colony) and to release all the civilians who were arrested by the Indian and Sri Lankan forces.

PROTEST DEMONSTRATION AND RALLY

**EELAM TAMILS CALL UPON PEOPLE WITH
REASON AND CONSCIENCE TO JOIN THIS
DEMONSTRATION AND RALLY TO BE HELD ON
SUNDAY 31ST JULY, 1988**

**Starting from TYBURN WAY (Tube -Marble Arch)
to TEMPLE PLACE. Assemble at 1-30 p.m.**

**IN REMEMBRANCE OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN
KILLED IN COLD BLOOD IN THE STATE-SPONSORED
TERROR CAMPAIGN OF JULY 1983 AND THEREAFTER IN TAMIL
EELAM WHERE OVER 20,000 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED**

JOIN TO REGISTER YOUR PROTEST

**Against Rajiv Gandhi's despicable expansionist military
manoeuvres in Sri Lanka under the pretence of a Peace Accord
which remains dishonoured.**

**At the continuing crimes against humanity by Indian troops
against Tamil Eelam and its people. So far about 5,700 civilians
had been killed, about 780 women had been raped and
hundreds of young men and women had disappeared after the
Indian invasion.**

**At the devastation and destruction caused by Indian troops by
their use of high explosive, Napalm, chemical and other deadly
bombs in Tamil residential areas.**

**Against India's persistent denial of access to International Red
Cross, International media, humanitarian and aid agencies to
resist and render assistance to the long suffering people of
Tamil Eelam.**

**At the vulgarity of Rajiv's duplicity and treachery in gaining
entry into Sri-Lanka claiming to bring peace and solution to the
long standing national question and in fact trying to achieve
self and geo-political interests.**

**At the blood thirsty attempts to search and eliminate Liberation
Tigers and their leader V. Prabaharan who are authentic
representatives of Tamils with the objective of destroying the
national liberation struggle of Eelam Tamils.**

MASS DEMONSTRATION AND PROTEST MEETING BY THE D.M.K.

**The Working Committee of the D.M.K. have resolved to hold a
mass rally and demonstration on July 29, 1988, condemning the
false propaganda made by the Rajiv regime without agreeing
for a ceasefire in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, despite LTTE's
appeals for cessation of hostilities and negotiations for a
political solution.**

C R P

IPKF OPERATION CHECKMATE AND ITS CASUALTIES :

This IPKF operation begun on 21st of June is being continued. Area of operation is Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu. There was a cordon and search operation in Pavatukulam near Vavuniya on 30th June and 1st July. N. Tharmarajah (28) father of one child R. Mohan (31) father of 3 children were beaten to death by IPKF. Gangatharanathan (61) priest of Hindu Temple. N. Nithiyananthan, President R.D. Society and S. Nadarajah (35) father of 3 children arrested and severely assaulted. Body of Nadarajah was found at Cheddikulam on 08.07.88. Dead body of Nithiyananthan was handed over to next of kin on 10.07.88. Whereabouts of Hindu Priest not known.

Cordon and search at Olumadu and Manaikulam near Mankulam by IPKF on 1st 2nd July: 34 persons assaulted and hospitalised at Jaffna. Vavuniya and Anuradhapura hospitals. Residents protest to Government Agent Vavuniya and demand inquiry.

03.07.88 - Visvamadhu near Mullaitivu, 3 IPKF soldiers killed: two LTTE militants killed: a woman and a child killed in crossfire. Same day at Vavuniya, two IPKF soldiers killed and 4 injured in a confrontation with LTTE. One LTTE killed and one arrested.

05.07.88 - at Poovarasankulam near Vavuniya, during IPKF search operation eleven civilians injured and hospitalised. On 08.07.88 at Kilinochchi, 6 IPKF injured in a grenade attack. A civilian was killed and about 100 persons arrested following grenade attack. At Ramanathapuram near Kilinochchi, on 09.07.88, landmine explodes. IPKF fire indiscriminately. Shanmugam Ponniah (60) died and his son (12) grievously injured.

09.07.88 - about 20 IPKF men were riding in a passenger bus from Jaffna to Mullaitivu. Near Anandapuram the bus was attacked by unidentified gunmen. Three civilian passengers were killed. Ten civilian passengers and 5 IPKF riding in the bus were injured.

09.07.88 - Nachikuda near Punakary, coastal areas were bombed by planes. Several boats were destroyed.

12.07.88 - off the coast of Chemmalai near Mullaitivu, a boat conveying IPKF men was attacked. Two Officers killed and 16 injured. Three militants died in the ensuing cordon and search operation.

15.07.88 - IPKF sentry post in Paranthan near Kilinochchi was attacked. One IPKF soldier killed and another injured. IPKF fired indiscriminately. Six civilians were killed. Several injured. In ensuing search, several persons arrested. Shells were fired from IPKF camp at Thanimurippukulam, near Mullaitivu. Shells landed in surrounding villages of Kumulamunai. Alampil, Aandankulam and Kalikaadu. Indiscriminate aerial bombardment by IAF planes was reported over populated villages - Thanimurippu, Kumulamunai, Kalikadu and adjoining jungles in Mullaitivu District. The IAF used MI-24 helicopter gunships and bomber planes which dropped 250 kg bombs each capable of creating a 30 yards wide crater. Losses of life and property consequent on such bombings are not known owing to difficulties in communication.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT-REFUTATION OR ADMISSION BY INDIAN HIGH COMMISSION?

The recent Amnesty International report charged the IPKF with rape and other brutality. The Indian High Commission denied the charges and said

LTTE must seek 'a democratic option'

MADRAS, July 26.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force is conducting "a major operation" against the LTTE in the Nettikaikulam area of Mullaitivu district in Sri Lanka, according to an IPKF spokesman here. The operation covered a large jungle tract, where the LTTE had constructed 14 to 16 bunkers, some of them shell-proof. The bunkers could accommodate 50 to 60 persons and they had rations, explosives and even training manuals.

Briefing reporters here today, the IPKF spokesman said that "our forces hit upon this three days ago and our forces are still fighting there". Seven LTTE men were killed and 12 wounded on July 24 but "by now, it will be much higher". This was the headquarters of Balraj, the military commander of the LTTE for Mullaitivu district and he might have been wounded.

The spokesman said the "Operation Checkmate" was not confined to one area but covered all operations in the Northern and Eastern provinces including the districts of Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna peninsula. "The situation as of today is that the message must have gone home to all the groups and particularly the intransigent LTTE that the military option is not a viable one, that it will not work and they should seek a more sensible, democratic option, where everyone will have equal rights." The LTTE had been driven out of the population-centres in the Jaffna peninsula, Batticaloa, Kilinochchi etc., and they were now in the low-level population centres of Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Talaimannar. "We are operating against them and our plans and objectives are being met fully," he said.

"As far as operations are concerned, we are not at war. We have never been at war. The IPKF is at war against militarism and gun-ruling.... Our Government and the Prime Minister has said doors are open.... These doors are doors of peace," he said.

Acts of sabotage: The IPKF's last major operation in Alampil in Mullaitivu and its simultaneous operations in other areas of the North and East brought down the cohesiveness of the LTTE as a military group and it had broken into small groups of three or four persons. Thereafter, the LTTE had done various acts of sabotage and terrorism. In Mullaitivu, the LTTE had disintegrated. In the last seven days in Batticaloa, seven LTTE men were captured. In Mannar, where the LTTE tried to become active, seven hardcore men were captured in the last 72 hours. In Karaitivu island in the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE men, who were planning to carry out sabotage, were apprehended. The IPKF had also captured 15 PLOT militants in Vavuniya. The IPKF had defused hundreds of explosive

devices and booby-traps and saved countless lives, the IPKF spokesman said.

"Though the LTTE is a very important party in the Tamil politics of Sri Lanka, it is not the only party to the exclusion of other parties." If any party claimed it was the only party, there was always the ballot-box. "Apparently, they are shy of it", he added.

Replying to a question on the likelihood of a ceasefire, he said, "Personally, I have no knowledge. I don't deal with negotiations." The Government of India had said that the LTTE must lay down the arms and accept the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. On whether the situation warranted a ceasefire, he said the realities on the ground must be taken into account. When a two-day ceasefire was announced in last September, the LTTE bought time to acquire arms and explosives.

The IPKF spokesman maintained that no Sinhalese colonisation had taken place in the Tamil areas after the IPKF went there immediately after the Agreement was signed on July 29, 1987.

Answering a question on the TULF's memorandum to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, that a massive Sinhalese colonisation had taken place in the East in the last few months under the Weli-Oya scheme, he said the "main colonisation" took place from 1983 to 1986. About 60,000 Sinhalese fled the East from October 1 to 5 last year. It has taken four to six months to ask them to get back and the Sinhalese had not returned fully. About 80 per cent of the shops were allotted to the Tamils in Trincomalee town recently. "Our people are there to see that no Tamil is denied his legitimate rights," he added.

Rehabilitation: On the process of rehabilitation of the Tamil refugees from Tamil Nadu, he said that as on July 25, 4,670 persons have returned to Jaffna, 15,323 to Mannar and Vavuniya districts and 1,536 to Trincomalee district. Within Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Jaffna peninsula, and Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts, the number of persons rehabilitated were 1,87,667, 5,757, 38,123 and 33,185 respectively. There were no displaced Tamils in Jaffna but 60,000 displaced persons were there in Vavuniya sector, 11,800 inside Trincomalee sector and 11,025 outside. The total number of displaced persons who were rehabilitated was 2,82,263.

On the allegation that there was a lack of co-ordination between the IPKF, the Indian High Commission in Colombo, Research and Analysis Wing and the External Affairs Ministry, which reportedly led to the death of the LTTE emissary, Johnny, the spokesman said, "As far as the IPKF and the Indian High Commission is concerned, we have not only total rapport but we have day-to-day interface. At no stage, at no point of time has there ever been lack of coordination. ... As far as Johnny, we do not deal with negotiations. Kittu had sent Johnny. He was killed with others in Vavuniya. We really do not know who he was when the action was taken."

The withdrawal of the IPKF depended on the ground situation. The spokesman said it was not for him to decide when the provincial council elections should be held in the North and East. The IPKF had not been asked to supervise any elections anywhere. It only provided the security environment.

The IPKF was not specifically operating against one person (the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran).

CRP

they were fabrications. Almost in the next sentence the High-Commission went on to state that where such charges had been proved, quick and salutary action had been taken against the guilty.

IN BRIEF

Two IPKF soldiers were killed in an attack at Chulipuram on 16.7.88. A LTTE militant was also killed in the counter attack. Civilians were subjected to inhuman assault.

Passengers in private buses robbed of their valuables & cash by armed youths at Iratperiyakulam in Vavuniya on the night of 16.7.88 and again on 18.7.88 at a point just quarter of a mile away from a Sri Lankan army camp.

Four IPKF personnel were killed in a landmine attack on 16.7.88 at Arugambay in Pottuvil. 2 farmers were shot dead in retaliation.

The Poster campaign of 17.7.88 organised by the Mothers Front of Trincomalee demanding a cease fire and early resolution of the problems of the Tamils through talks was stopped by the IPKF.

Six IPKF personnel were killed at Pesalai on 18.7.88 in a land mine attack. 70 LTTE suspects were arrested in searches.

Twentysix terrorist suspects were arrested by the IPKF at Araipattai in Batticaloa on 18.7.88.

Nalliah Vasikaran aged 19 years arrested by the IPKF on 16.1.88 at Kerudavil and held at Udupiddy and later at Valvettiturai is reported to have escaped on 18.7.88. The mother had visited the youth at both camps. The mother now complains to the IPKF and the Citizens Committee over the disappearance of her son.

A bomb blast in a hotel in Trincomalee on 21.7.88 claims the lives of four sinhalese and a Tamil. Four Tamils are killed in Refaliation and another is reported missing.

10 LTTE militants are killed by the IPKF on 21.7.88 in operations in the Eastern Province.

A time blasted off at a sentry post near the Jaffna Secretariat on 22.7.88. An IPKF soldier was killed. A curfew clamped in the municipal is now being enforced daily from 6 am the next day. The curfew is now being enforced daily from 6 pm till 6 am in the whole peninsula. The IPKF Town Commandant in a press release warns that he may not be able to restrain his men in the event of such acts being repeated.

Consequent on an attack in which 2 IPKF soldiers were killed at Point Pedro on 1.6.88, IPKF had gone on the rampage. 279 civilians who had suffered injuries in the reprisal have submitted a signed petition to the IPKF.

One IPKF soldier was killed in a land mine explosion at Pankulam in Trincomalee on 23.7.88.

At Nochchimunai in Batticaloa 5 militants were shot dead on 24.7.88.

A hartal was observed in the North & East on 25.7.88 on a call by the TELO in memory of 53 Tamil Political prisoners massacred at the Welikade prison five years ago.

2 Sri Lankan army personnel were killed at Dehiwatte on 27.7.88 in an attack by militants.

Sticking point in reaching accord with LTTE

REPORT

By NARENDRA KEDDY
Express News Service

New Delhi, July 30: The differences between the LTTE and the Indian Government negotiators seem to be much deeper than what the officials are admitting. The LTTE is understood to be insisting that the Sri Lankan Government should have no representation on the proposed committee for the rehabilitation of the group's cadres.

The officials have been maintaining that only a minor hitch in the composition of the rehabilitation committee remains to be sorted out. But the LTTE's condition shows that despite months of fighting with the IPKF and having suffered heavy casualties, the group is not resiling from its principled stand.

The Indian Government apparently feels that the LTTE condition goes against the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. Article 2-11 of the agreement is being cited in this context. Under the provision "the Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youths with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life and India will co-operate in the process."

It is being interpreted that the rehabilitation of militant youths is the responsibility of the Sri Lankan Government and the Indian Government's role is only to assist the Sri Lankan Government. According to reliable information here, the LTTE condition is not

acceptable to the Sri Lankan Government.

Attitude hardens: According to official understanding, the LTTE has been insisting on the condition in the hope that the Indian Government would give in being anxious for a settlement before elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly. The representatives of the Indian intelligence wing negotiating with the LTTE has the definite impression that the impending elections in Tamil Nadu have hardened the attitude of the LTTE leaders.

The official sources maintain that an understanding has been reached with the LTTE on all other issues and it is not insisting on the devolution package being further improved at this stage. The LTTE is also stated to have agreed to surrender arms though no time-frame has yet been fixed for this.

The only sticking point is the composition of the rehabilitation committee, and the LTTE leaders seem to be insisting that the committee should have no representation of the Sri Lankan Government.

LTTE popular: While not agreeing to the LTTE condition, both the Indian and the Sri Lankan Governments at the same time are of the opinion that the LTTE still has popular backing and it will come to power if elections are held.

Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene, in a television interview last week, said that unlike in

the southern provinces "people in the north and east are sympathetic to the terrorists".

The Indian Government also realises that the LTTE is still popular in the northern province and the situation there is worse than that in Punjab. While in Punjab the administration is functioning, in the northern province of Sri Lanka the LTTE, it is said, is in a position to bring the administration to a halt — if it so decides.

In such a situation it is unlikely that the IPKF will be able to extricate itself from the present entanglement soon as the Indian Government has been hoping.

The Indian Government had earlier, with the knowledge of the Sri Lankan Government, given financial assistance to the LTTE for the rehabilitation of its cadres as part of the settlement. But after receiving the money, according to the Indian Government, the LTTE leader, Mr. Prabhakaran, had gone back "on his assurances and commitments". It is the feeling now that the LTTE had used the money to buy more arms to resist the IPKF.

The Governments of India and Sri Lanka, therefore, want the task of rehabilitation to be entrusted to a committee, which includes representatives of the Sri Lankan Government. The LTTE has not so far agreed to the proposal. A fresh proposal is understood to have been sent to the LTTE. But there is no indication of a positive response from the LTTE.

WHOM ARE THEY FOOLING ?

The Government of India claims to have had negotiations with the LTTE and tries to fool the Tamil Nadu, or perhaps the international community, or else whom? What understanding/accord has been reached several times with the LTTE? The LTTE denies having had any serious negotiations. TVI reliably under-

stands that neither Mr. Rajiv nor Mr. Pant is prepared for negotiations of any sort until the LTTE surrenders their arms. LTTE is willing to surrender the arms gradually and not all at the same time in view of the distrust created by the Government of India. They quote a number of incidents to prove their fear - e.g. Mr. Rajiv's OK for the removal of the 17 members of the

LTTE to Colombo in Sept. 1987 being the first betrayal and the murder of Lt. Col. Johnny the last. Mr. Rajiv is not only intransigent, but untrustworthy too! *We pity him, the grandson of the great Nehru, and, above all, the white hope of the great nation India.* The Amnesty International exposes India's actions in its report issued on June 20.



The following is the text of the communiqué issued by the Presidential Secretariat on 30th June 1988:

Following the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant's visit to Colombo for discussions with the President between 30th May and 1st of June 1988, the operations of the IPKF have achieved further successes. There has been an exchange of communications between the President and the Prime Minister of India between the 24th and 27th of June 1988. The Prime Minister has informed the President that the LTTE has given indications of their willingness to lay down their arms and cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

Keeping in view the shared objectives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka to bring an end to violence and suffering of the people of Sri Lanka and to revive the political process by giving a free, fair and equal opportunity to all to participate in these processes, the Government of Sri Lanka reiterates its willingness to take the following steps:

If the Tamil militants would lay down arms and support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the detenus will be released and all Tamil militant groups would be granted general amnesty and would be allowed to return to the mainstream of democratic process as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the latest amendments to the Sri Lankan Constitution.

The LTTE, it is understood, is now willing to do so and if they agree to surrender all arms, explosives and communication equipment held by them, in accordance with a procedure agreed between the military authorities relating to quality, quantity, type and method, and the Government of India agrees to disarm totally the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka will issue instructions to the authorities and the Commissioner of Elections of Sri Lanka to call for elections to the Provincial Council of the North-Eastern province under Article 10(1) of the Provincial Council elections law and to take further action under that law, and the North-Eastern Provincial Council to be formed with one Government, one elected Chief Minister and four elected Ministers (vide S.37 of Act No. 2 of 1987).

The question of the use of the 1982 election register by an amendment to Act No. 2 of 1988 S5(1) will be studied for its constitutionality and legislative appropriateness.

The Government of Sri Lanka will also take immediate steps to appoint one High Court for the North-Eastern Province and pass the necessary legislation envisaged in the 13th amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution to fulfil aspirations relating to Tamil, along with Sinhala, being made the official language of the Democratic Socialist republic of Sri Lanka.

If, in response to these assurances, the LTTE fulfils its stated commitment to lay down arms and fully cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the Government of Sri Lanka will initiate steps by the end of July for holding elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council.

EDITORIAL

A COUNTRY UNITED BY FEAR

The cynics could as well say: Sri Lanka is at last one united country, united by one common thread - fear!

Be it north or east, south or west, a fear psychosis is quietly gripping the whole island. There is no more, in terms of the mental state, a north-south divide. President Jayewardene who talked endlessly for the past ten years about 'Northern Terrorists' has now his hands full with 'Southern Terrorists'. The 'Northern Terrorists' anyway are no longer confined to the north - or east. Some of them have found safe living in the south as well. The AK-47 has now found a new brother in the south - the T-56!

The classic right-left divide in Sri Lankan politics is gradually getting effaced. Both rightists and leftists are together falling like nine pins under the assassins' bullets - united in death! Even the centre is unable to hold.

The liberals are under threat. Academics are leaving, both Sinhala and Tamil. Universities are closed. The Sinhala people who went along with their governments in trying to restrict higher education to the Tamils are now paying their price. There is hardly any room for the intelligensia anymore - either in the north or south. Those who remain must either lie low or serve some master. Every politician has to become a manipulator, or else end up as a lame duck, like the once powerful Finance Minister Ronnie De Mel.

The security forces themselves are not wholly secure. Desertions have become common and infiltrations a way of life. Looking at the lower ranks one cannot know whether he is soldier, sailor or subversive. Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali is himself suffering from a feeling of insecurity. Everyone is killing everyone else, and no one is wiser at the end as to who is killing, whom? Thousands of people must surely be knowing who the killers are, but no one dares to give information. What does one make of a police who could be excused for failing to act when the identity of a killer is unknown, but shrug their shoulders and do nothing because they KNOW the identity of the killer?

There was a time, in the case of democratic societies' one spoke of 'Public Accountability'. The man at the top is always accountable to his people. But no one bothers about it any more, least of all the man at the top himself. As far as President Jayewardene is concerned, the level of turpitude into which Sri Lanka has descended during his eleven years of rule has nothing to do with him! It was due either to the 'Northern Terrorists' or the 'Southern Terrorists'. But who is there to question him? The superpowers congratulate him on his accord with the Indian establishment. The regional superpower is shoring him up, because there is no other way of achieving her own regional interests. The press, muzzled and threatened, has become a dull dog, no more a watch dog. The late Indian leader Rajagopalachari used to say that as long as the people are dumb, the rulers will be deaf. But where are the people? Their tongues are tied, their hands are manacled, and their minds are frozen. They move around like zombies talk in whispers while the country goes to rack and ruin. Is it that no one seems to care, or that no one dares to care?

Is the country once known as 'Paradise Isle' steadily moving towards anarchy? What portents do they offer for the immediate future? The real issues are not provincial councils, autonomy and merger, ceasefires and accords. The ones that really matter are much more malignant. There is a deeper human malaise, a total collapse of values.

The country, the rulers, the people are sitting on the top of a volcano. The erupting lava could envelope the whole country and could well make the preceding 11-year violence seem like schoolgirl picnics.

JULY 1988



PRABAHARAN HELD IN AWE AND ADMIRATION EVEN BY THE SINHALESE

I.Kumar, Manor Park, London

I wish to quote from a weekly column "Men and Matters" written by a Sinhalese journalist, *Kautilya for The Island* (8.5.88), in which he refers to Mr. Velupillai Prabaharan, leader of the LTTE:-

On the run, his LTTE's military capability greatly reduced, Mr. Prabaharan remains nonetheless the central figure in a Sri Lankan conflict which even the most cussed Sri Lankan militarist was finally forced to accept as a politico-military struggle, with an important external aspect...

"... he is a born guerrilla, this man. Dislodged from his main base, the peninsula, and unaccustomed as he is to this new scrub-and-jungle terrain, he is prowling and probing the most sensitive 'border' areas (Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim), grasping instinctively the 'politics' of the current situation, and his own enhanced capacity for deadly mayhem and de-stabilisation.

"He is a strategist too. Militarily the LTTE is perhaps at its weakest since the early 80s Yet, he knows weakness and strength are both relative to that of the opponent's, in this case, and right now, both the Indian and Sri Lankan governments....."

As a Tamil, I am proud to read that appreciation coming from the pen of a Sinhalese journalist, who certainly has no love for Prabaharan. Kautilya would no doubt like to see Prabaharan captured, dead or alive, as would a few of our ex-battle-'scarred' (sorry, battle-'scared' would be more appropriate!)

militant groups.

LETTER

I am sure that the awe and admiration with which Kautilya sees Prabaharan in his column is indicative of an unconscious yearning in his mind about the need to have a similar great leader for the Sinhalese people. May be it is true. Prabaharan is doing a far better job for the Tamils, being a fierce guardian of their rights even at the cost of his life, than what J.R is doing, or what Mrs.B could do, for the Sinhalese, or what Rajiv Gandhi himself is doing for India.

I am not, and I have never been, biassed towards Prabaharan, but my respect for him and his judgment in political matters has gone sky-high since the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Whereas, some other militant groups had rushed in to register themselves as political parties with the Elections Commissioner of Sri Lanka, and then gone on to join the United Socialist Alliance, Prabaharan and the LTTE have proved that it is not political power for themselves that they are seeking, but the genuine rights of the Tamils and Muslims of Eelam towards which they are prepared to continue sacrificing their lives. I am sure that very soon every Tamil, whichever part of the world he lives in, would realise this and throw his full weight behind Prabaharan and the LTTE.

WORLD OPINION MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE CAUSE OF THE TAMIL PEOPLE

Political Committee of the LTTE.

In July 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived in Sri Lanka ostensibly to protect the people of Tamil Eelam and to implement the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord. In reality, however, the IPKF has violated the most important provisions of the peace accord. It has failed to prevent recurrent atrocities against the Tamil people by the Sri Lankan armed forces. It has taken no measures whatever to disarm the racist Sinhala homeguards and other Tamil traitor groups. In fact, it has given no protec-

tion to the Tamil people.

Instead, it has sought to disarm the LTTE to the core despite the fact that the LTTE had already surrendered large quantities of arms and ammunition to the IPKF. To cover up its atrocities against the Tamil people, the IPKF has destroyed the sole means of communication between the LTTE and the civilian population in the North and East by blowing up the printing presses producing the newspapers 'Murasoli' and 'Eelamurasu', as well as the TV station 'Nidharshanam'. **Having silenced the voice of Tamil resistance the IPKF has cynically substituted it with its own Goebbelsian propaganda machine with the aim of deceiving world opinion and justifying its criminally repressive policies.**

The Tamil people state, sincerely and unambiguously, that they desire peace. They want the cessation of all Indian military activities and they urge the Indian government to begin serious peace negotiations with the LTTE.

The people of Tamil Eelam, the international Tamil community and Indian public opinion are demanding an end to the Indian Government's military action; and yet the Indian government continues ruthlessly to pursue its military offensive in Tamil Eelam. Far from abandoning its military activities, the IPKF has intensified its operations and slammed the door shut to a negotiated peace. Worse still, they are co-ordinating their military activities with the murderous Sri Lankan army and are converting the Tamil homeland into a veritable killing-field for the armies of India and Sri Lanka. After ten months of uninterrupted war and repression against the Tamil people by the Indian army we demand that the Indian army cease all military operations and enter into peace talks with the LTTE without any preconditions.

INTERVIEW

TIGERS

SET 3 CONDITIONS ON ARMS

"The Sri Lanka government as well as the government of India are now going back on all major points."

The talks between the government of India and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have reached a crucial stage, with the Tigers laying down three conditions for handing over their arms.

The three conditions are:

First, the Sri Lankan government and the government of India should provide **adequate financial compensation** to the Tamil people in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka for the property destroyed as well as the loss of life suffered during the action by the Sri Lankan and Indian armies.

Second, there must be **substantial devolution of power** to the proposed provincial council and 'not as envisaged in the recent 13th Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution'. (The LTTE as well as all the opposition parties in Sri Lanka have rejected the 13th Amendment as mere eyewash)

Third, the proposed interim government should be formed along the lines agreed on Sept. 28 between the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, J.N. Dixit, and the LTTE. (That agreement envisages a dominant position for the Tigers in the proposed provincial government with the exclusion of all other Tamil militant groups).

A Political Affairs committee member and LTTE spokesman in Madras, S. Subramaniam, told *India Abroad* that "lasting peace in Sri Lanka is possible only if these three basic conditions are met to our satisfaction."

"The LTTE has always been willing to hand over arms", he said. "Handing over of arms has never been an issue with us as it is made

out by New Delhi. But what must be clearly understood is that we will lay down arms only if the three basic conditions are met in full."

Subramaniam was highly critical of the 13th Amendment, saying, "The proposed provincial councils will have the same powers as a municipal corporation. This is what the 13th Amendment has done. We will not accept it under any circumstance."

"The Sri Lanka government as well as the government of India are now going back on all major points which were mutually agreed upon during negotiations on the eve of the accord last year. We sometimes feel we have been betrayed by both governments."

He was categorical in asserting that the LTTE "will not lay down arms unless the conditions set by us are met." While the LTTE wants peace to prevail, "We will not compromise", he said. "If our demands are not met we will continue our struggle. On our part, we are prepared for prolonged guerrilla warfare with both the Sri Lankan and the Indian armies."

Talks not progressing

Subramaniam said that while the talks between the LTTE and New Delhi are continuing, "I would not say they are progressing rapidly. We have made our proposals clear to the government of India. Now it is for them to act on it", he said.

Meanwhile, the former Jaffna commander of the Tigers, Kittu, continues to be under house arrest in Madras. Armed policemen stand guard outside his house in Indira Nagar, and no one is allowed to see him. He is even denied access to a telephone.

- India Abroad - May 27, 1988)

INDIAN FORCES ATTACK CIVILIANS

Immediately after the death of two IPKF men in the hands of the Tigers in Pt. Pedro, the Indian soldiers took revenge on the civilian population mercilessly. They cordoned off the three-mile area surrounding the incident, attacked everyone irrespective of age and sex. Young boys were asked to lie down on the road and soldiers walked over them. They beat them with iron rods and belts and many sustained severe injuries. The headmaster of Katkivalam Junior School, Mr. Amiahpillai Karunanithy, was admitted to the hospital with injuries in his left hand. Before they attacked Mr. Karunanithy they asked him, "Thumare naam kiyahai." When he said Karunanithy they beat him severely. Another person by the name of Arunachalam Sivalingam (48) succumbed to his injuries in the Manthikai Hospital. About 3,000 people were arrested in the Pt. Pedro area and were left on the beach, under guard, several hours without any food or drink by the IPKF after the killing of the two soldiers.

FISHERMEN DEMONSTRATE IN VADAMARADCHI

Fishermen's Association of Vadamaradchi in Jaffna peninsula organised a demonstration on 24th June demanding the withdrawal of the embargo on fishing and an immediate ceasefire between Indian army and LTTE. About 5000 people participated in the demonstration. The procession which started at Valvettithurai went through Polikandy and ended at Nediyaakadu with a mass meeting. A two-point petition was handed over at the IPKF camp at Polikandy. The IPKF did not allow any photographers throughout the procession and the meeting.

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WORLD THAMIL EELAM CONVENTION - IV CONTRADICTS PTI REPORTS

(A letter sent to the Press Trust of India by the Convenor and the Press Secretary, World Tamil Eelam Convention, held recently in New York, complaining of misreporting is reproduced below. A letter on similar lines, signed by twenty out of the twenty seven participants, has been addressed to the LTTE leader, Prabaharan.)

We were distressed to find that the Press Trust of India had misreported the proceedings of the Fourth World Tamil Convention held in Nanuet, New York, on the 2nd and 3rd July 1988.

The reports that have appeared in the Indian newspapers speak about 'A resolution calling for an investigation into allegations of human right violations in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and the IPKF' and about a 'Plea to make Mr. Prabaharan and the LTTE as the sole representatives of Tamils in Sri Lanka (that was) rejected'.

First of all, no resolution was passed at this convention either on the first day or the second. Secondly, no attempt was made to make Mr. Prabaharan or the LTTE as the 'sole' representative of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. It was generally accepted by all delegates present that the LTTE is the premier and de facto force among the Tamil leadership, and as such there was no need to 'make attempts' to enhance their leadership position.

On the question of human rights violations, all delegates understood that the IPKF were guilty of gross human rights violations, and that these should not be let go without inquiry.

All delegates clamoured for an investigation into this by an impartial body such as the Amnesty International. The question of an 'Indian Tribunal' arose only when it was stated that the 'Indian

government will never let a foreign organisation to investigate the actions of its army'. The delegates then agreed that they should, as a second choice, ask for a joint Indo-Sri Lankan Tribunal to investigate human rights violations by the IPKF.

The entire proceedings of the convention were recorded and we can make the recordings available to you if you need to verify what we have stated here.

Further, at the beginning of the convention it was announced that a competent authority had been appointed to issue press statements and that no one else was authorised to do so. We are enclosing herewith a copy of the official press communique that was issued at the end of the convention.

We hope that you would make the necessary corrections and give it equal publicity.

PRESS STATEMENT

The fourth World Tamil Eelam convention held in Nanuet, N.Y., on July 2nd and 3rd, attended by delegates and other Tamil organisations in North America and abroad decided on the following proposals:-

1. That the governments of Sri Lanka and India allow unrestricted access to the International Press, Amnesty International, ICRC to all parts of Sri Lanka, including prisons and detention camps, to monitor and report on alleged serious human rights violations.

2. If, for any reason, Amnesty International and other agencies mentioned above are unacceptable, then as an alternative, a respected Independent Indian Tribunal be admitted to study and report on the Human Rights concerns. This must be undertaken in the interests of the Indian image in the international community.

3. That the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka be repealed to enable all shades of political opinion to participate in the democratic process in the forthcoming elections.

4. That the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord be restructured to accommodate all of the concerns, grievances and the aspirations of the Tamil-speaking minority; and that in this spirit the 13th Amendment be replaced by one that gives effect to the revised accord.

5. That a United Tamil Front be formed by all the politico-military groups, with the LTTE as the dominant group; and that this United Tamil Front participate in the negotiations of the revised Accord.

Issued by the Press Committee of the Convention of July 3rd, 1988; and by Conference order, no other statements will be allowed by individuals or groups to speak on behalf of the Convention. If statements have been issued contrary to the above communique on any one of the above items, they are factually incorrect. (Edward Benedict, Press Secretary, Convention IV).

RAW ATTEMPTS TO BUY EXPATRIATE LEADERS

Indian Secret Service RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) is engaged in influencing the overseas Tamil organisations for its disinformation

campaign. Reporting of the World Tamil Eelam Convention IV held in Nanuet in New York on 2nd and 3rd of July was deliberately doctored by the Press Trust of India. It is believed one or two of the Tamil expatriates were responsible for the false reporting.

PTI reported "a resolution calling for an investigation into allegations of human rights violations in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Govern-

ment, the LTTE and the IPKF", and had a "plea to make Mr Prabaharan and the LTTE as the sole representatives of Tamils in Sri Lanka rejected." Press Secretary to the conference and the convenor, in their joint statement issued to the PTI, which appears elsewhere in this issue, and twenty out of the twenty seven delegates, have signed a letter addressed to Prabaharan, the LTTE leader, denying the news item. TVI

NEWS IN BRIEF

●EROS is continuing with its campaign of blocking roads in support of its demands for a ceasefire and talks between India and the LTTE. Roads were blocked at Vadamaradchi 16th June, Periyaniavanai near Kalmunai on 17th, Mutur 18th, Trincomalee 22nd, Eravur 23rd and Pothuvil 24th.

●All government offices, and commercial banks at Mannar closed from 15th June for 15 days on orders of LTTE.

●One IPKF soldier killed and another wounded at Murikandy on 16/6 as a result of a landmine blast.

●TELO office at Vavuniya blasted on 17/6 by a rival Tamil group.

●On 18/6, at Vavuniya, there was a protest march by parents and spouses of nearly 200 detenus held without charge by the IPKF. Protest march was organised by Citizens' Committee Vavuniya and led by the President Dr. Pararajasingham and other officials. There were nearly 5000 persons including school children. At the first check point the marchers were stopped by the IPKF and armed youths believed to be TELO and EPRLF cadres. Dr. P. ararajasingham had been threatened by the same groups. He has since relinquished office and left Vavuniya.

●Kathankudi 21.6.88 - Kalideen arrested and released earlier by IPKF in connection with the killing of Mr. A-hamed Lebbe ex Chairman T.C. and respected member of area was shot dead. IPKF at Kathankudi is attacked with grenades. IPKF counter attack and kill two militants and arrest about 20 others. Shops and other buildings damaged.

●On 21.6.88 about 25 members of 'Three Star' group cordon Iruthayapuram area in Batticaloa. Residents panic. Nesan of the LTTE trying to escape on bicycle was shot dead.

●Two youths Kandiah Nesan and Pathinathar Babu taken off passenger bus from Colombo to Jaffna and killed

by a group which alleged that the victims were PLOTE members.

●Nagulan LTTE leader was killed in cordon and search operation. Hartal observed to commemorate him in his area - Chavakachcheri, Kodikamam and Pallai on 23.6.88.

●Hartal in Atchuvily, Avarangal and Puttur on 23.6.88 to commemorate S. Rasavarajeeva LTTE leader of the area killed during first week of April.

●On 23.6.88 Arasan and Eeswaran of the LTTE were killed at Mamangam near Batticaloa by the EPRLF.

●At Trincomalee on 27th June, two P.C.s and three Sinhala civilians injured in grenade attack. In a second grenade attack, one sub-inspector and two P.C.s injured.

●600 mothers march and hand over petition to IPKF. Demands - to dislodge colonists from Welioya former Manalaaru; to order a cease fire and enter into talks with LTTE.

●On 25.6.88 Vakisayah detenu shot dead by IPKF allegedly trying to escape.

●Refugees from Tamil Nadu arrived in Sri Lanka - 565 at Kankesanthurai on 18th June, and 508 at Talaimannar on 25th June.

●Two leading Tamils of Akkaraipattu, P. Kanapathipillai (59) and Kariyan Vadivel (60) kidnapped on 21.6.88, whereabouts still not known.

●A teenaged student and a girl from Karaitivu kidnapped and killed allegedly by a Tamil group.

●A Muslim youth, Mohamed Nazeer (26) of Akkaraipattu was stabbed to death by another Muslim of the 'Three Stars' group.

●Drop-outs from the various groups other than the LTTE are roaming the Batticaloa District robbing people, especially at Chenkalady, Kalmunai, Pandiruppu and Akkaraipattu.

●EPRLF, TELO, and PLOTE have jointly opened an office at Tirukovil near the IPKF Camp.

EPRLF IN FR. CHANDRA'S MURDER ?

Reports reaching from Batticaloa indicate that the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) was behind the killing of the outspoken voice of Eastern Province, Fr. Chandra Fernando. They considered Fr. Chandra to be a supporter of the LTTE. Since the IPKF operation in Batticaloa, the EPRLF and other anti-social elements have taken the upper hand with the backing of the Indian forces. Killing of Fr. Chandra is an indication of the extent of support the EPRLF is getting from the IPKF.

IPKF SEARCH AND DESTROY IN JAFFNA

The Indian soldiers have stepped up their search-and-destroy operations in the Jaffna peninsula. A number of hit-and-run attacks on the IPKF posts by the LTTE is a major worry for the IPKF. The Tamil Tigers detonated a landmine under a lorry killing an Indian soldier and seriously injuring another in Kilinochchi. One Sri Lankan Army officer was injured in the Trincomalee sector when LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan logistics column using small arms. Heavy fighting is reported to have taken place in Vavuniya at the police post near Vavuniya G.A.'s residence.

TELO OFFICE BOMBED

The office of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) in Vavuniya was destroyed in a blast by about midnight on Friday, 17th June. According to the security sources, the blast is believed to have been caused by a bomb set off by members of the rival group PLOTE. The office was on the top floor of a two-storeyed building in the Main Street of Vavuniya town. On the following day the body of a TELO supporter was found close to the Poonthoddam tank. It is suspected that he had been shot by the man who had set off the bomb.

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CURFEW RE-IMPOSED

A curfew has been clamped down in the Jaffna peninsula during the past few weeks and the unruly Indian forces have once again started their spree of harassment and humiliation. Under the notorious pretext of 'Search and Destroy' operation, the unbridled Indians continue to commit every manner of antisocial and inhuman crimes in the peninsula. On the 20th July, 1988, five innocent civilians were killed and 25 were injured at Chulipuram when the Indians fired some random shots from a mortar.

RESIDENTS OF VISUVAMADU RENDERED HOMELESS

As a result of the unrelenting onslaught on the Visuvamadu village, in Mullaitivu district, by the Indian forces, the activities of the residents of Visuvamadu have come to a standstill. It is reported that about 75 per cent of the residents have abandoned their homes and moved surreptitiously to other places of safety. The harassment by the Indian forces has reached such intolerable heights that even those who bore up the calamitous happenings with fortitude and remained in their village have now begun to desert their homes.

10 JAWANS KILLED IN MULLAITIVU

According to confirmed reports reaching our news desk, during an operation launched by the Indian forces pursuant to the widely publicised 'Operation Checkmate', ten Indians are reported to have lost their lives when the Tigers took them aback and drove the Indian forces away.

THREE INDIAN SOLDIERS KILLED NEAR JAFFNA KACHCHERI

Three Jawans of the Indian forces are reported to have been killed by the freedom fighters in Jaffna during a gun battle that ensued between the Tamil Tigers and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force.

675 INNOCENT TAMILS OF BATTICALOA TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

The Indian army carried out a 'search

and destroy' operation on a large scale in the Batticaloa district. It is reported that the Indian army took many civilian Tamils to their camps and subjected them to torture and degrading treatment in order to extract confessions and information. It is reliably learnt that on the 16th July 1988, the Indian army which pounced on the village of Kiran, arrested more than 600 civilians and took them to Pulipainthakal army camp. It is further reported that on the 17th July, the Indian army went on a rampage into Murathanai, Koraveli, Pondugalsenai, Morathan Senai, Kattaiyadimadu and took into custody more than 50 farmers.

INDIAN FORCES AND LTTE CLASH - 7 INDIAN SOLDIERS DIE

On the 22nd July 1988, the LTTE guerrillas launched a landmine attack near the 8th Canal in the Trincomalee district on an Indian convoy moving from Pankulam army camp on a search-and-destroy mission. As a result, a military truck of the Indian forces was completely destroyed and seven soldiers were killed on the spot.

DON'T HAVE DEALINGS WITH LTTE !

The IPKF has ordered the people of the Batticaloa and Amparai districts not to have any dealings with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It has further warned them that if they have any kind of relationship with the Tamil Tigers in breach of their order, they would be rounded up and dealt with accordingly. It is said that this order by the IPKF is a 'reactionary' move of the Indian forces in response to an earlier order made by the LTTE requiring the people to refrain from having close dealings with the IPKF.

IPKF RUNS RIOT IN MANNAR

A dusk-to-dawn curfew has been imposed in the Pesalai area of Mannar in the Northern Province and the Indian soldiers under the guise of searching for militants are reported to be indulging in all kinds of revelry and orgies with impunity. According

to very reliable sources more than thirty houses in the Pesalai area have been ransacked, looted and set on fire, while about 32 of the residents of the area have been bundled up in trucks for questioning.

FISHERMAN IN AMPARAI PUT TO DEATH

Reports coming from Amparai have confirmed that Samsudeen, a fisherman, and Jayaseelan, a bus passenger, have been shot dead by a jawan of the Indian army.

TELO KILLS TIGER SUPPORTER

According to reports reaching our news desk, a supporter of the LTTE, Ponnampalam, has been shot to death by a member of the TELO.

THREE TAMILS HACKED TO DEATH

"Unleashing of communal hatred and anti-Tamil terrorism and brutal violence on the hapless Tamils have become a regular feature in Trincomalee" says a newspaper report of 22nd July 1988. It is reported that the Sinhalese army on the 21st July 1988, joined hands with the Home Guards and the Sinhalese thugs of Trincomalee and went on a rampage in the heart of Trincomalee town, burning houses, looting shops and hacking Tamils. According to the news report, Sri Lankan government appears to be acting hand in glove with the Sri Lankan army and thugs.

LTTE SURROUNDS INDIAN ARMY CAMP

According to our correspondent in Tamil Eelam, the LTTE launched, on 14.7.88, a guerrilla attack on one of the Indian camps in Chunnakam which is notorious for molesting civilian Tamils. This attack by the LTTE has belied the claims of the IPKF that Jaffna is fully under the control of the IPKF. It is reliably learnt that the Indian forces have suffered severe casualties during the attack.

CHULIPURAM WITNESSES GUN-BATTLE

On the 16th July, the LTTE is reported to have engaged the IPKF in a gun battle. During the confrontation,

which was a shock and surprise to the IPKF, 3 Indian soldiers were killed and some Indian equipment captured by the LTTE. It is reported that during this confrontation Lt. Saleem of the LTTE was killed.

NEW ARMY CAMPS OPENED IN TAMIL AREAS

According to reports reaching the TVI from Batticaloa district, more Indian army camps are being opened in Iluppaichenai and Uppuveli villages in the Muthur district and in Ramanathapuram in the Kilinochchi district.

INDIAN ARMY'S MARCH HALTED !

Angered by the support given to the LTTE by the Tamils of Eelam in Pesalai village in the Mannar district, the Indian army has started to subject the Tamils of that area to untold hardships and iniquities. On the 18th July, upon seeing the Indian army heading to Talaimannar to massacre the Tamils, the LTTE commandos attacked the Indian soldiers with landmines. During the confrontation at a place called Kudiyiruppu twenty Indian soldiers were killed and many more wounded.

HEAVY SHELLING AT MURASUMODDAI

The village of Murasumodda in the Kilinochchi district was subjected to heavy shelling by the Indian forces during the past weeks according to news reaching London. Though confirmed reports of the extent of damage to property and life are not available, it is reliably learnt that the Indian troops, on their way to their camp, have shot and killed a girl student and four other Tamil civilians.

ARMY TRUCKS BLASTED

The IPKF are reported to be continuing their operations against the LTTE in the Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts. A convoy of four army trucks carrying IPKF soldiers is said to have been mined by Tamil Tigers blasting one of the trucks and killing 20 soldiers.

HARTAL IN THE NORTH AND EAST

During a hartal observed by the people in the North and the East of Sri

Lanka, on the 13th and 14th of July, there were no violent incidents reported except that a Sri Lanka Transport Board bus was intercepted by armed youths while plying between Trincomalee and Vavuniya, the passengers ordered to alight from the bus, and the bus set on fire. All shops and offices remained closed in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

OPERATION CHECKMATE

According to reports reaching from the Vanni district of Tamil Eelam, IPKF seems to have suffered more casualties than the LTTE during the military exercise code-named "Operation Checkmate" (interpreted as 'trapping the king' or, in effect, grabbing Prabakaran). West of Thirumurukandy, two soldiers were killed in an improvised explosives device; and at the 146th milepost on Jaffna-Vavuniya road, another Indian was killed while repairing railway lines. On the same day (16.7.88), four Indian soldiers were killed at Konari, about 52 miles south of Batticaloa on the Batticaloa-Pottuvil road, when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by the LTTE. It is also reported that another three IPKF soldiers were killed and four seriously injured in a separate incident in the Northern Province, on 15th July.

BLACK FLAG DAY ON JULY 29TH.

Jaffna District Social Development Society has appealed to all Tamils to declare 29th July as a 'Day of Betrayal', to wear black badges and to hoist black flags on all commercial and other establishments to mark the anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

JAFFNA ST. JOHN'S SHELLED

"On the 10th day of the IPKF advance they shelled the school. Apparently they had information that Tigers were here. The same night they stormed the school and occupied it. About 30 shells fell in the compound of which 12 scored direct hits. The worst damage was to the Jubilee hall (two hits), Science Block (two hits) and a set of class-rooms opposite the office. Other buildings hit were the Principal's bungalow, library, Pooranampillai Block and the office. Our estimate of the damage to the buildings is about Rs.500,000. For furniture, fittings, laboratory equipment etc., the estimated cost of replacement is about Rs.750,000." From a letter of Principal, Dr. Devasagayam, to an old boy in London

FOUR IPKF MEN KILLED BY LANDMINE

Three soldiers and an officer of the Indian Peace Keeping Force were killed when the vehicle in which they were travelling hit a landmine on the Akkaraipattu road in Pottuvil on July 16, 1988. This brings to eight the number of Indian soldiers killed by the LTTE in the East within the past two days. Eight IPKF personnel were also injured in the past two days. The last 48 hours also saw two terrorists killed, three others injured and six civilians injured in the clash. On Friday an explosion in the west of Thirumurukandy killed two soldiers and wounded four. At Vavuniya one soldier and one terrorist were killed on the same day. By courtesy - "The Sunday Times" - July 17, 1988



ONE YEAR OF INDO- LANKA AGREEMENT

by JUSTICE SATCHI
PONNAMBALAM COMMENT

(Being an address delivered at a Meeting on the occasion of the First Year of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement held on 30th July 1988 at Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey)

One year ago, on 29 July 1987, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement or the Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord was signed by these two men in Colombo. It was said to be an Agreement 'to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka', and so the news media has christened it the 'Peace Accord'. The first year of its operation has brought neither peace or normalcy, but instead war by the Indian army on the innocent and defenceless Tamil civilians in their homes, towns and villages, all over North and East Sri Lanka.

Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene signed the Agreement, worked out in secret talks the weeks before in New Delhi and Colombo. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamil people and also the Sri Lankan and the Indian news media were kept in the dark. There was no mandate whatever by the Sinhalese or the Tamil people for the Agreement and the calling in of the Indian army into the country. In fact, the Tamil leader Prabhakaran was under guard in a New Delhi hotel after he had described the Agreement to the Indian authorities as a 'stab in the back'. In Colombo, there was rioting by angry Sinhalese mobs and over 70 people were killed as police and soldiers resorted to rifle fire to contain the rioting. All island curfew was declared and soldiers were mobilised to keep demonstrators from approaching President's residence, where the Agreement was signed. President Jayewardene's vacation home in the South called the 'Red Cliffs' was set on fire and burnt.

Avoids 'colonisation'

The Agreement states that the Tamils are an ethnic group and that the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups. This is some new history that is being written. The

Agreement does not say that the Tamils are a nation or that the North and the East are their traditional homelands or that they are entitled to self-determination. These are unacceptable, however true and real they may be, to the Sri Lanka Government, as it was to its delegation at Thimpu.

The Agreement also does not mention anything at all about the vexed question of state-sponsored and state-aided Sinhalese colonisation of the Tamil areas of the North and East. In fact, any mention of this is scrupulously avoided, for the clear intention, as seen from the provisions of the 13th Amendment is to continue the state-aided and state-sponsored colonisation of Tamil areas. And, we would say that any Agreement or Accord that does not put an end to this state-sponsored and state-aided colonisation of Tamil areas does not even touch the fringes of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. And so it is with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement or the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provided for an interim government, merger first and later separation by referendum of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and Provincial Councils with a Governor, a Chief Minister and a Board of Ministers. The Agreement provided for Tamil and English to be also official languages, along with Sinhala. The Sri Lanka Government has already gone back on this official language agreement in regard to English. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, passed in November 1987, provided for Tamil also to be an official language, but in regard to English it said, 'English shall be the link language'. What that means is anybody's guess.

India underwrites

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provided that within 48 hours of the signing of the Agreement, a ceasefire will come into effect all over the island. All arms held by the militant groups will be surrendered to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the ceasefire and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Sri Lanka army will be confined to barracks in camps. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of army to barracks will be completed within 72 hours of the ceasefire coming into effect. Sri Lanka Government will give a general amnesty and free all political prisoners and combatants held in custody.

The Agreement contained that if the Government of Sri Lanka re-

quests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals, the Government of India will give such military assistance.

The Agreement also provided that the two Governments will ensure the physical security of all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The Government of India agreed to underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and cooperate in the implementation of the proposals of the Agreement.

In entering into this Agreement, it did not matter to Jayewardene that he was bringing in foreign military intervention, so long as he could achieve his objective of decimating the Tamil liberation struggle and putting the Eelam demand to rest. To achieve these, he had earlier obtained the assistance of the British ex-SAS and the Keenie Meanie Services (KMS) mercenaries, who were hired by Rhodesia's Ian Smith and South Africa. The Israeli involvement in Sri Lanka Government's brutal war with the Tamils started with the opening of the Israeli Interests Section in the US Embassy in Colombo. Then came the Israeli Mossads and the Shin Bet, the Israel's domestic Intelligence Agency. These were responsible for the atrocities of the Special Task Forces against the Tamils in the Eastern Province. When all these could not tame the Tigers, Jayewardene felt he had nowhere to turn except to India.

Rajiv's optimism

Rajiv Gandhi felt that the Agreement provided India with an opportunity to succeed in its peace-making mission and to bring to end the ethnic strife in neighbouring Sri Lanka. But he left the chances of success not to the written provisions in the Agreement but to the good intentions of President Jayewardene. Hence, his optimism was not well founded, although he articulated them with enthusiasm. On 31 July 1987, in the Indian Parliament, he said:

'This Agreement meets the basic aspirations which animated the Tamils' struggle, namely, the desire to be recognised as a distinct ethnic entity; political autonomy for managing their political future; and appropriate devolution of governmental power to meet this objective, the recognition of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka as areas of historical habitation of the Tamils and the acknowledgement and designation of Tamil as an official language...'

At a public meeting in Madras, explaining the Agreement, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said:

'The Agreement secures everything that the Sri Lankan Tamils had demanded, short of breaking Sri Lanka's unity. In fact, it goes well beyond the initial demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Under the Agreement, approximately one-third of Sri Lankan territory will be made a single province, where the Tamils will have a clear majority. They will have regional autonomy, comparable to the State Governments in India.' (THE HINDU, I.E. 8/8/1987.)

It is on this view of the Agreement that the Government of India signed the Agreement without consulting the representatives of the Tamil people, who were protecting the Tamil people and fighting the Tamil cause. When it found that they were unwilling to accept the Agreement, then it forced them to accept, denying them the right to disagree. Then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave several assurances that the Agreement will be implemented safeguarding the interests of the Tamils. Because of these assurances, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) accepted the agreement (vide Prabhakaran's Interview, INDIA TODAY, 15/8/1987)

LTTE's unequivocal acceptance of the accord

At a public meeting in Jaffna, LTTE leader Prabhakaran said:

'Even though the Accord does not fulfil our demands, we hand over our arms in the presence of the IPKFs because we want to respect India, which we love and also show our regards to the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister. But, at the same time, as we hand over our arms in the presence of the IPKFs, we hand over responsibility of protecting our people also, which we were doing all these days, to the IPKFs.'

The LTTE was the only liberation organisation to publicly hand over a substantial stock of its arms and ammunitions to the IPKF in terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. The LTTE had publicly committed itself to surrendering all its arms to the IPKFs. Its acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement had become unequivocal. However, before the hand over of all arms could be completed, there were armed attacks on LTTE cadres by other groups and by Sinhala

Home Guards on the Tamil people. This derailed the surrender of arms, leading to conflicts over nomination to the interim administration and finally the peace process being overtaken by Thileepan's Fast Unto Death. Thileepan's death and the arrest, detention and death of two regional commanders and 10 senior members in the hands of IPKF brought about discord and estrangement between LTTE and India.

The interim government, in which the LTTE was assured a major role by India was not formed. The merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into one administrative unit, envisaged by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement did not take effect. The interim government was not put in place because the persons nominated by the LTTE from the Eastern Province were found unacceptable to President Jayewardene and he proceeded to nominate his persons to fill the LTTE names.

The Provincial Council constitutes the centre-piece of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

We do remember that in the past 35 year political history, the Tamil people and their political parties have earlier advocated and demanded a federal structure of government and later a separate state of Tamil Eelam. In the 'Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact' of 1957, as a compromise agreement, the Tamils accepted Regional Councils, with the widest powers of devolution and amalgamation.

There has never been any demand by any Tamil or for that matter by anyone in Sri Lanka, for Provincial Councils. Yet, in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, to Sri Lanka and Indian governments, Provincial Councils have been found to be the solution to put an end to the bloody war to create a separate state.

Perpetuates unitary system

The law to bring the Provincial Councils into effect has been enacted by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which came into force in November 1987. But no Provincial Council election has been held in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Hence, the Provincial Councils for the Tamil areas have not come into operation.

The present constitution of Sri Lanka, which was enacted by the Jayewardene Government in 1987, perpetuated the hitherto existing unitary system and introduced a highly centralised executive presidential government with a devalued parliamentary system. It is upon this

constitution, which proclaims Sri Lanka a 'unitary state' and having a highly centralised and authoritarian presidential system that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the 13th Amendment engraft the Provincial Councils with devolved powers. On the face of it, one can only see mutually antagonistic and conflicting concepts and institutions brought together in a hotchpotch, for the sake of political expediency to end the stalemate than devising viable and durable institutions representing structures of compromise, recognising Tamil national identity so as to launch the united nation-state on a course of nation-building. In the scheme that is bound to emerge, the Provincial Councils, as presently devised will be stunted at birth, crippled in growth and deformed at old age.

The devolution of power to the Provincial Councils under the 13th Amendment, is the same for the Councils in the Sinhalese and Tamil areas. Therefore, it cannot be contended that any special dispensation or concession has been made to the Tamils. The devolution of power to the Provincial Councils is a very miniature form, in no way comparable to those of the States under the Constitution of India. The existing unitary system and centralised presidential government preclude a genuine devolution of power.

Although every legal provision effectuating this reform is textually based upon a comparable provision in the constitution of India, nevertheless subtle changes and departures have been incorporated in certain places which make the Sri Lankan provisions differ from their Indian counterparts. Most of such Sri Lankan mutations will go to further constrict and cripple the miniature devolution of power and prevent the Provincial Councils from growing and developing into genuine institutions of autonomy and internal self-government.

How much of a sham the devolution of power to the Provincial Councils can be seen from the sensitive subject of land. It is instructive to see how the subject of land has been dealt with in the constitution of India. Land is in the State List. It is stated as: 'Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.'

The land question

Under the 13th Amendment, 9.1 of Provincial Council List states: 'Agriculture, including agricultural extension, promotion and education for provincial purposes and agricultural ser-

vices (other than inter-provincial irrigation and land settlement schemes, state lands and plantation agriculture). 18.1 of the Provincial Council List states: 'Land - Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenure, transfer and alienation of land, land use, land settlement and land improvement, to the extent set out in Appendix 11.'

Appendix 11 states: 'State land shall continue to vest in the Republic and may be disposed of in accordance with Article 33(d) and written law governing the matter.'

Subject as aforesaid, land shall be a Provincial Council Subject, subject to the following special provisions:-

1. State land:-

1:1 State Land required for the purposes of the Government in a Province, in respect of a reserved or concurrent subject may be utilised by the government in accordance with the laws governing the matter. The Government shall consult the relevant Provincial Council with regard to the utilisation of such land in respect of such subject.

1:2 Government shall make available to every Provincial Council State land within the province required by such Council for Provincial Council subject. The Provincial Council shall administer, control and utilise such State land, in accordance with the laws and statutes governing the matter.

1:3 Alienation or disposition of the State land within a Province to any citizen or to any organisation shall be by the President, on the advice of the relevant Provincial Council, in accordance with the laws governing the matter.

2. Inter-Provincial Irrigation and Land Development Projects

2:1 Such projects would comprise irrigation and land development schemes:-

(a) within the Province initiated by the State and which utilise water from rivers flowing through more than one Province: a Provincial Council however, may also initiate irrigation and land development schemes within its province utilizing water from such rivers;

(b) within the Province which utilizes water through diversions from water systems from outside the Province; and

(c) all schemes where the command area falls within two

or more Provinces such as the Mahaweli Development Project.

2:2 These projects will be the responsibility of the government of Sri Lanka.

In the Concurrent List are:

17. Irrigation

17:1 Water storage and management, drainage and embankments, flood protection, planning and water resources:

17:2 Services provided for inter-provincial land and irrigation schemes, such as those relating to rural development, health, education, vocational training, co-operatives and other facilities.

From a consideration of the totality of the provisions concerning land, we can see that the nominal power over land given to the Provincial Councils by item 18:1 of the Provincial Council List is substantially circumscribed and limited by the introduction of the arbitrary concept of State Land and the so-called inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects. Land and land development is usually the first item to be devolved in any scheme of regional autonomy. But in the Sri Lanka's scheme of devolution, the distrust of the Provincial Council to be vested with power over its land is manifest. The reason is obvious. And that is colonisation. State-aided and state-sponsored Sinhalese colonisation of the Tamil areas by the Government of Sri Lanka will continue. That is just what is hiding behind the so-called State land and inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects.

No neutral machinery

Although the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was drafted and signed, no independent and neutral machinery was put in place to usher in the ceasefire, the surrender of arms by all fighting groups and set up the interim administration. All these were left to the existing lines of political command in Colombo and newly set up Indian military command in Jaffna. The peace Agreement was not negotiated by the combatants or by their representatives, but almost overnight they were required to restore status quo ante. This proved formidable and difficult in the circumstances. A number of initial minor problems were allowed to snowball into confrontation between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE. The death of the two regional commanders and 10 senior members of the LTTE in the hands of the IPKF worsened the situation. With the confrontation fast escalating, the Indian Peace Keeping Force resorted to a military offensive

in Jaffna from 10th October 1987 for six weeks. The deaths, destruction and devastation and the brutalities, indignities, sufferings and oppression suffered by the innocent and defenceless Tamil people - our fathers, our mothers, our brothers, our sisters, - as a result of the military offensive have been told and retold many times. I do not propose to recount them here.

For about a quarter century, the small Sri Lankan Tamil nation has been oppressed by its own State. The Tamils were deprived of their individual and collective fundamental rights to language, education, employment and finally even representation in Parliament. They were discriminated, terrorised and bullied by their own State. They were driven to fight for their survival. It is to the help of such a nation that the Indian forces went as peace-keepers. They were welcome as friends and saviours. History will never absolve the taking of arms against such a nation of people as the Tamils by the Indian peace-keepers. Such act, violated the trusted neutral role of peace-keeping in a foreign land. 'Peace-keepers have a place and a role in international law. That has been violated. I will leave the matter at that.'

The events of last year have brought about many changes in the external character of the Tamil problem. The actors have changed. The Indian forces have taken the place of the Sri Lankan forces. The Tigers who are holding their ground openly have gone underground. The focus has changed. Earlier, it was confronting the Tigers indirectly and not openly. Now, it is finding the Tigers in their jungle hideouts and disarming them. All these changes do not add even a wee bit to solving the Tamil problem. Indeed, the problem remains totally untouched by all these changes. It is misplaced belief in the power of military might to solve the Tamil problem that has brought all these irrelevant changes to the forefront. The Tamil problem has not been and will not be solved by any superior armed military might. It is a problem of a nation created by the denial of equality, justice and dignity. What the Tamil people want is to live in equality, justice and dignity. Restoration of these to them do not need any armed military might.

The restoration of these in the various forms cannot be done in vacua. It must be done in consultation with and in agreement with the representatives of the Tamil people. Such a settlement will bring about a lasting and durable solution to the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka.

AFFIDAVIT

VIJAYALEGCHUMY, widow of Nithyanantharajah, 3rd lane, Arasady, Nallur, Jaffna.

My beloved husband Ratnam Nithyanantharajah was the sole bread-winner of the family and the entire family depended on his income.

On 5.7.88 my husband Ratnam Nithyanantharajah aged 48 years, Mechanic was returning home from his place of work and unfortunately he got caught in between the cross firing and a shot having attacked him succumbed to his injuries.

There are four children in the family and myself and our children were depending on his earnings.

Since the death of my beloved husband the entire family is driven into utter starvation, without none to provide.

Name of the Deceased: **RAYAPPAN JESURAJAH**, son of **S. RAYAPPEN, ALANKERNY, KINNIYA** Husband of **T. VIJAYASIRI, KOONITHIEVU** Muthur of Trincomalee District.

Detail History: Arrested by IPKF on 11.7.88 at Soodaikudai which is 3 miles off Koonithievu and detailed at IPKF Camp.

On 16.7.88 he complained of fever, vomiting and passing dark coloured urine. Admitted to Camp medical centre and treated by Dr. Narang of the IPKF. He has diagnosed as 'Hepatitis' (Jaundice) and treated for it. He also advised the higher officers to evacuate him to Trincomalee hospital for further management. But they delayed it by giving reason as 'Transport difficulty'.

Under these circumstances he died there in 18.7.88 at 3.30 a.m. Magistrate along with doctor visited the scene on 19.7.88 at 8.30 a.m. They were surprised to see that the detention camp is a small corridor behind an unfinished house (around 12' x 5'). No permanent roof, a small tent cloth was covering 2/3 of the roof. In this camp 6 males and one female were kept at that time.

After visiting the scene they visited the Muthur hospital mortuary to see the body. Magistrate requested the doctor to conduct the postmortem.

There were multiple abrasions and contusions present all over the body. There were laceration injuries present in the both buttocks due to dragging.

The body was deeply 'Icterus' - yellow in colour.

The important postmortem finding was there was big contusion injury measuring 4' x 3' present in the lower part of the right lobe of the liver. This injury is only causative factor for the jaundice. Parts of the Liver, Kidney & stomach along with blood sent to Govt. Analyst, Colombo for report.

During Magistrate inquiry father & wife of the deceased strongly mentioned that he died due to IPKF assault. They also mentioned that when he was taken into custody he was healthy & did not have any disease. Detention in charge officer IPKF Camp & IPKF doctor refused to give statement at the magistrate inquiry & walked out as requested by their higher authorities. The magistrate gave an open verdict and asked the police to investigate.

SUBRAMANIYAM SATTANATHAPILLAI (48)
Ward No. 5, Thiriyai Trincomalee

I was residing with my wife and two children at the above address for the last four decades. In October 85 the whole village was attacked and burnt by the Sri Lankan Security Forces. All the residents left Thiriyai and went to Mullaitivu as refugees.

After the signing of the Indo Sri Lanka Agreement on 29th July 1987 I returned to my native village of Thiriyai with other families in October 1987.

On 30.6.1988 I heard an explosion which I came to know subsequently as a land mine in which a few Indian Soldiers lost their lives.

On 02.07.88, 10 Indian Soldiers came to my house at about 11 a.m. and took me to the Indian Army Camp at Thiriyai. Through fear I did not protest or ask the reason for such arrest. At about 5 p.m. on the same day, I was taken to a room and I was asked to raise my hands and I was assaulted with a baton on the hip and buttock. They asked me only one question. 'Did you supply food to 3 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam?' I told them that I did not supply food. I was kept in the Indian Army Camp till 13.7.1988. I was assaulted by the Indian soldiers every evening. I was subjected to electric current treatment on six occasions. I was later asked to work in their camp as their labourer. There were nearly 12 detainees like me who underwent the same agony. I was released on 13.7.88.

● ● ● *File in the file*

MUTTAN SELLI (46) Puttur East, Puttur.

The deceased Muttan Kuganandamoorthy (27) was my son.

On 24.7.88 at about 10.00 a.m. during the IPKF search operations in Puttur my son M. Kuganandamoorthy who was at home was shot dead by IPKF personnel.

The dead body of my son was taken away by the IPKF to the Puttur camp.

The dead body of my son was collected from the IPKF camp at 3.00 p.m. and cremated on 25.7.88.

IPKF personnel who searched our house removed a bicycle and 2 wrist watches which have not been returned.

My son M. Kuganandamoorthy was not involved in any anti Government activities. He was a Farmer.

I am a widow and Kuganandamoorthy was only son. I have two daughters both unmarried aged 24 and 18.

Kuganandamoorthy was the only earning member in the family by whose death my two daughters and I have been made destitute.

● ● ●

MRS. KANTHAPPILLAI THANKAM, Navatkadu South, Atchuvally

I have two children and one of whom known as "KANESAMOORTHY" is my eldest son and the bread winner of my family was shot dead by the IPKF on 30.7.88.

My husband Mr. Kanthapillai is disabled and the deceased who was my son was shouldered with much responsibility to look after us as well as his unmarried sister.

His unfortunate death caused me to undergo untold hardship to keep my head above water.

B-B 2310

CRP

4 Sinhalese colomists were killed at Welioya on 28.7.88 by persons suspected to be Tamil militants.

The SLFP is receiving American funds from big California businessmen. What tune they will call in return remains to be seen.

Sinnathamby Tharmalingam of Tellippallai detained under the PTA for the past 4 years and 5 months is sentenced to two weeks simple imprisonment on a charge of having failed to divulge information re some terrorists.

Several new Sinhala colonies are being set up in haste in the Trincomalee District. Incentives and army protection are being provided.

Mamaduwa a Sinhalese village in Vavuniya was attacked on 29.7.88. Two Sinhalese were killed. Several houses were damaged.

Ganesh of Atchuvally was arrested by the IPKF on 24.7.88. His father was informed on 31.7.88 that his son is dead. Some ash said to be the remains of his son are given to him.

அமைதி காத்தல்! 1987 ஐப்பசி

ஸவப்து

எங்கள் வீதிகள் ஒழுங்கைகள் வழியே
எத்தனை காலம் அஞ்சி நடந்தோம்
எங்கள் வேலிகள் சுவர்களின் நடுவே
எத்தனை நாட்கள் பதுங்கி மறந்தோம்
எங்கள் வீட்டு இளைஞருக் காக
எத்தனை இரவுகள் நித்திரை மறந்தோம்
எங்கள் வாழ்வை எமக்கென மீட்க
எத்தனை ஆண்டுகள் கடுத்தவமிருந்தோம்.
வந்தது போரின் முடிவெனச் சொன்னார்
வந்தது நல்ல தீர்ப்பெனச் சொன்னார்
வந்தவர் அழையா விருந்தினரெனிலும்
வாசல்கள் யாவும் விரித்து திறந்தோம்
வந்தவர் நண்பர்கள் என்று நினைந்தோம்

வீதிகள் தோறும் தோரணம் இழைத்தோம்
வந்தனை செய்தோம் வாழ்த்தி மகிழ்ந்தோம்
வந்தது குறையின் கண்ணிடை அமைதி.
கடற்கரை வயல்கள் வீதிகள் வெளிகள்
காணுந் திசைதொறுங் கவச ஊர்திகள்
இடியென விழுந்த பலபெரும் வெடிகள்
தொடரும் பறிமுதல் கொள்ளைகள் கொலைகள்
படைகளின் ஒதுங்கி நாடிய நிழல்கள்
பெருஞ்சிறை ஆயின ஆலய மதில்கள்
கடலையின் மோனம் சூழ்ந்திட எங்கள்
அமைதியைக் காத்தன ஆயுதப் படைகள்.
இருளாய் விடிந்த பொழுதில் விழித்தோம்
கனவு கலைந்தோம் போரில் எழுந்தோம்
எங்கள் வாழ்வை எமக்கென மீட்க
எத்தனை ஆண்டும் போரிடத் துணிந்தோம்.

THE DAY OF BETRAYAL AND SERVILITY

LONDON: Britain's
Tamils Decrie the Accord



Over 200 angry protesters greeted Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa and his wife when they visited Springvale, Australia. The protesters members of the Ceylon Tamil Association gathered outside Springvale City Hall, on 30.7.88 waving placards and chanting slogans. Dr. Rajan Rasiah, Vice President of the Association said that the protest was organised to drive home to the P.M. their grievances with the Sri Lankan Government which had not treated the minority Tamils reasonably.

Demonstrations all over the world against the Accord

The Eelam Tamils living all over the world have, on the first anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 29th July 1987, successfully organized and launched protest marches and demonstrations condemning the ill fated Accord and highlighting the utter failure in its execution.

The International Tamil Community has driven home to the several non-governmental organisations that the Indian government which had firstly failed to recognize the basic principles of Tamil nationalism, Tamil homelands and the right to self determination of the Tamils in the Accord, has subsequently, through its unbridled and indisciplined army of illiterate and inhuman soldiers, killed and maimed thousands of innocent children, women, men and students besides having raped and indecently assaulted and outraged the modesty of many hundreds of Tamil women and girls of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

With a view to attracting the attention and focussing the concentration of the civilized nations of the world many of which still appear to be labouring under the delusion that India, the land of the Mahatma "Can do no wrong", the internationally scattered Tamils have held Seminars, Discussions, Exhibitions, Demonstrations, Rallies and Protest Marches in many parts of the world.

Given below are brief accounts of the mournful anniversary activities:-

U.S.A.

The Tamils living in the USA with the support and guidance of Miss Karen Parker of the Association for Human Rights, Rev. Father Thomas Amalathas of the World Tamil Movement, Mr Veeramany, of the Dravida Kazhagam and Mr. Wakely Paul, constitutional law expert and attorney-at-law, launched a protest march in Washington on the 29th of July 1988,

condemning the shameful Accord of July 1987 and urging the American government to intervene to ameliorate the sufferings of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The protest-march which lasted for about three hours and covered a distance of two miles ended at Larian Park in front of the White House. The protest march was followed by a meeting in the Park during which many speakers spoke. At the end of the meeting it was resolved to urge the American government to recognize the LTTE as sole representatives and leaders of the Tamils and to request the American Government to use its good offices to ask the Indian government to declare a cease fire forthwith.

CANADA

On the 29th of last month the Tamils of Canada organized an exhibition in Toronto, Canada commemorating the ignominious Accord of last year and highlighting the gap between the words and deeds of the Rajiv government. Many hundreds of photographs and sketches depicting the atrocities and iniquities and orgies perpetrated and indulged in by the Indian forces were displayed at the Exhibition.

The organizers of the Exhibition had also issued several thousands of pamphlets and leaflets in the English and French languages decrying the hollowness of the Accord.

AUSTRALIA

The Tamil residents of Melbourne and Canberra in Australia organized and participated in mammoth meetings condemning the Peace Accord of 1987 and demanding that the Accord should be annulled forthwith. On the 30th of July the Tamils of Sydney observed a day of fasting protesting against the Accord which has resulted in widening the discord between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

FRANCE

The liberation organizations and the Social Service institutions of France together with the Tamils living in France staged a procession on the 29th July 1988, in remembrance of the signing of the Accord of July 1987

which has in its wake brought untold hardships and misery to the Tamils living in Sri Lanka.

WEST GERMANY

The Tamil residents of West Germany observed the 29th of July 1988 as a day of mourning, wearing black badges and bands. On the 30th, the Tamils living in the town of Dussel Dorf staged a protest march at Stausenplatz, passing through the streets wherein the embassies and High Commissions of Argentina, Denmark, Canada and Sweden and situated.

NETHERLANDS

On the first anniversary of the signing of the despicable Accord of 29th July 1987, the Tamils living in Netherlands organized a big rally to voice their dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Accord has been implemented during the last 12-months. A big crowd assembled before the Indian High Commission in the Netherlands and chanted slogans describing the inhuman and beastly behaviour of the Indian forces in Sri Lanka.

NORWAY

The Tamils living in the towns of Oslo, Bergen, Drammen, Romso and Arendal together with the various human rights organizations staged a protest rally at Oslo on the 29th. At the end of the rally, they handed over a Memo to the Indian High Commissioner to be given to the Prime Minister of India.

BRITAIN

In commemoration of the signing of the much criticized Accord of July 1987, the various Tamil Organisations of London staged a Protest Demonstration and March in London. The march which started at Tyburn Way near Oxford Street covered a distance of about 3 miles and ended at Temple Place near the Indian High Commission.

More than 10,000 pamphlets and notices exposing the hollowness of the Accord and the criminal intentions of Rajiv Gandhi were distributed to the various sections of the communities all over England.

CONFRONTATION

1

COLOMBO, July 1.

At least seven IPKF soldiers and two Tamil militants were killed in separate incidents of mine blast and exchange of fire in the North-Eastern Province during the last 36 hours.

Elsewhere in the Southern Province, the Chairman of a District Development Council (DDC), said to be a Government supporter, and two policemen were killed in two separate incidents during the period.

At least four IPKF personnel were killed in mine blast and few others including a JCO were injured in the Eastern Province yesterday. In another incident of exchange of fire with the militants at Nedunkerni in Mullaitivu district yesterday, three IPKF soldiers and a militant were killed. Three militants were injured in the incident, a spokesperson of the Indian High Commission said here today.

The IPKF went on search operation through the villages Puliyanankulam, Nelukulam, Sharathipuram, Rajendrakulam, Chekkadipulavu, Iyankavur, Maniyankulam, Paratkulam, enquired about the tigers and assaulted them heavily till their innocence was proved. Two civilians, Bala and Dharmu were shot dead. Gripped with fear more than 400 families shifted to Vavuniya town as refugees.

2

IPKF personnel were killed in a landmine attack by LTTE in Jaffna between Palai and Eluthumathuval.

3

MADRAS, July 3.

In the continuing Indian Peace Keeping Force operations in Sri Lanka, Selvam, a hardcore LTTE member, was killed and another, Raju Mahalingam, was apprehended in Palali area yesterday, according to an official press release. A shopkeeper and his wife, who harboured militants, were also apprehended and a gun and a few cyanide capsules were recovered from them, the release said.

In Batticaloa sector, searches yielded a cache of heavy arms which included SMC guns, 60 mm and 83 mm bombs besides spare parts.

LTTE commandos ambushed an army convoy in between Viswamadu and 11th post. 9 IPKF soldiers killed. A LTTE girl, Maria lost her life.

In retaliation the IPKF shot dead 3 civilians at Viswamadu and burnt down 15 houses.

In another encounter at Thanneermurippu the IPKF suffered heavy casualties. Then IPKF madly shelled the populated areas of Thanneermurippu, Thakaravadi, Kumulamunai, Andankulam. Helicopters strafed and a plane raided with 250 kg bombs.

Mrs. Arumugam and her child were dead and several others wounded.

4

COLOMBO, July 4.

At least six IPKF jawans, three militants and two civilians were killed in different incidents of ambush laid by the LTTE on IPKF patrol in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island during the last 36 hours.

Three jawans were killed and two others injured when an IPKF patrol was ambushed by the LTTE militants northeast of Nedunkerni in Vavuniya sector yesterday. One woman and a child were also killed in the incident as the militants had been firing "indiscriminately" a spokesperson of the Indian High Commission said here today. — PTI

5

In Pothukulam jungle area at Trincomalee 7 IPKF were killed in a LTTE landmine blast.

In consequence the IPKF shelled indiscriminately at Kudumimalai, Pulipainthakal, Miankulam, Aliaodai, Erulaikulam, Pluthumanodai, and caused extensive damages to the public offices, school and market. Most of the affected families went to Kiran Si'handi, Santhiveli as refugees.

6

COLOMBO, July 6.

One Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan was killed and two were wounded in encounters with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka's North and East yesterday, a spokesperson for the Indian High Commission said today.

She said one jawan was killed in an encounter at Kuchchuveli in Trincomalee district while two others were wounded in exchange of fire with the LTTE at Puthur in the Jaffna sector and Eravur in Batticaloa.

She said a number of incidents had been reported where LTTE men had attacked IPKF patrols with guns and grenades but there were no other casualties on the IPKF side. — UNI

9

3 civilians and 4 IPKF men were killed in an encounter between LTTE and IPKF at Pudukudiyiruppu, when a bus carrying IPKF soldiers.

In a Claymore mine attack on IPKF at Kilinochi, LTTE killed 5 IPKF soldiers and wounded many.

3 IPKF men killed in a cylinder attack by LTTE in Mudur, Trincomalee.

The IPKF fired on civilians and killed S. Ponniah (60) and his son P. Sasikumar (12) and wounded many in Trincomalee Dt.

10

Two killed in ambush: Tamil rebels killed two passengers and wounded 15, including five Indian soldiers, in a bus ambush in northern Sri Lanka on Saturday, witnesses said.



They said LTTE guerrillas attacked the bus, carrying some 40 passengers from Jaffna peninsula to Mullaitivu in the north-east, at Anandapura.

The witnesses said the bus driver drove to the nearest hospital without stopping. There were 20 soldiers on the bus but they did not return fire.

12

COLOMBO, July 12.

Three LTTE militants and two Indian Peace Keeping Force officials were killed and two IPKF jawans wounded in an exchange of fire at Chelai in Mullaitivu district yesterday, a spokesperson for the Indian High Commission said today.

She said the two officers were killed and the two jawans wounded when the LTTE militants fired at a boat in which they were travelling. Other IPKF men in the boat returned the fire, killing three militants.

She said one LTTE detenu, Vigneswaran, was shot dead by the IPKF when he tried to escape from a detention centre in the northern Vavuniya sector, while three others were apprehended in Batticaloa, Vantharamoolai and Dharmapuram. — UNI

13

The IPKF went on a search mission to Manthuvil village, razed down most of the huts and burnt it. People went to nearby villages and forest as refugees.

One IPKF soldier was shot dead by LTTE near Vilavidai, Kilinochi dt.

14

20 IPKF personnel were killed in a landmine blast set by LTTE at 10th post, Akkarayankulam. The truck was smashed in to pieces. 6 IPKF men were killed in Kokavil by LTTE landmine attack.

In Jaffna, at Sunnagam many IPKF men were shot dead by LTTE. Many wounded.

15

The Indian soldiers fired indiscriminately in Murasumodda village. Four civilians including a school girl were fired.

The IPKF encircled the villages Kaddaiparichen, Kadarachenai, Sambur and arrested 20 civilians including four women. They were taken away. Till then nothing was heard about them.

3 IPKF soldiers at Paranthan junction and 4 soldiers at Mangulam were killed and many got injuries by LTTE attacks.

16

The IPKF shot dead Sumsudeen while he was fishing in the river. Another civilian, Jayaseelan was dragged out from bus and killed.

Kasim, a LTTE Lt. fought with IPKF bravely and died at Sulipuram.

3 IPKF men shot dead by LTTE at 60th post, near Pothuvil in an encounter. In Pulipainthakal 2 more IPKF lost lives and many injured.

17

PTI reports from Colombo:

Six IPKF soldiers and one Tamil militant were killed in different incidents of mine blast and exchange of fire between the IPKF and the LTTE in the north and eastern provinces during the last 36 hours.

A spokesperson of the Indian High Commission here today confirmed that four IPKF soldiers were killed when their vehicle was involved in a mine blast near Konari in Batticaloa sector yesterday morning.

She said in another incident of exchange of fire with the LTTE near Manipan in Jaffna, one militant was killed and seven IPKF soldiers were wounded. Two of the wounded soldiers later succumbed to injuries.

A militant was apprehended at Eranpettikulam, and over 30 kilos of explosives and an improvised explosive device (IED) was recovered by a police patrol from a place near Paranthan, in the Vavuniya sector.

At Trincomalee the IPKF recovered one IED, five hand-grenades, large quantity of ammunition and a generating set, she added.

At Uppuvil, Trincomalee dt, some civilians were arrested and taken away. In the IPKF camps they were tortured severely. Raghavan succumbed to his wounds in their custody.

Near Mallagam, LTTE charged with hand grenades on a IPKF truck. Damages not known.

The IPKF infantry caught in landmines set by LTTE in Alagulam, Mannar and lost 4 men, got many injured.

18

Two Indian soldiers killed: "Tamil militants killed two Indian soldiers and wounded five in an ambush in Sri Lanka's Northern province, officials of the Indian High Commission said today. They said one rebel was injured in the clash at Manipay on Sunday.

19

COLOMBO, July 19.

Five Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed and one was wounded when their vehicle was blown up yesterday after hitting a landmine planted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at Pesalai in Sri Lanka's North-Western Mannar district.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission, however, said they had no reports.

Travellers from the Northern Jaffna town said that the LTTE leadership had issued orders to their cadres at all levels to launch attacks on the IPKF men in their areas. They said the recent attacks, in which more than 15 IPKF men have reportedly been killed, was a sequel to the order.

The IPKF was in full control in the Jaffna peninsula, and the militants were not in a position to attack them. However, they were seeking to prevent the people, including grama sevakas (village headmen) and other Government employees, from having any contact with the IPKF, the travellers added. — UNI




YOUTH DIES UNDER IPKF CUSTODY

IPKF based in Navatkuli recently arrested a youth from the same area for interrogation. His body was later handed over to the Jaffna Hospital with severe wounds. The name of the victim is Rajkumar (16).

7 IPKF SOLDIERS KILLED

The LTTE, in a statement issued to Reuters on June 11, claimed that they had killed seven Indian soldiers and destroyed their jeep by one of their landmines in Panichankerni in the eastern province of Batticaloa. No one from the Indian High Commission was forthcoming to comment on this report.

TVI



JEAN-PAUL WALRAVENS (PICHA)/Belgium



At Mangeni village LTTE guerrillas attacked IPKF truck by setting landmines and killed 11 soldiers and wounded 4. At Mudur near Kattaiarichan bridge, one soldier killed, two wounded in the same kind of attack by LTTE. In Trincomalee, Kutchaveli 2 IPKF men were caught in the mines and dead.

IPKF shot dead two Sinhala civilians, P.H. Sumantilaka (18), M.H. Austin Fernand (25) who ran out of fear.

20

Express News Service

Madras, July 20: In fighting between LTTE guerillas and IPKF soldiers in eastern Batticaloa district on Monday, 11 soldiers including an army major were killed, the Tigers said here on Wednesday.

The guerillas had an encounter with IPKF at Kirumichai when soldiers going from Madurankulam for search operations surprised them. In the ensuing fighting, a major and 10 soldiers were killed. Four soldiers were seriously injured, while a jeep and a truck were destroyed.

The Indian soldiers went on a search and destroy mission through the villages Thalvupadu, Erukalam-piddy, Pesalai. They razed and burnt down some 75 houses. They took away 300 civilians to their camps and tortured them, enquiring about LTTE. In Eechangulam at Vavuniya a shop was looted by IPKF and the shop keeper's wife with 6 months baby were abducted along with 17 civilians to the camp. Their fate still not known.

4 civilians were abducted by IPKF at Sammanturai in Batticaloa. 3 were shot dead and 1 women wounded.

22

On the 22nd quisling group, who were protected by the Indian Army, killed Jyothi, a LTTE fulltime helper at Kanguveli in Muthur District.

23

Express News Service

Madras, July 23: Indian troops on Saturday smashed the LTTE-Mullaitivu base camp, three km south of Nittukaikulam in thick jungles, killing seven militants and losing three of its own men.

A defence spokesman said here that the camp, occupied by 30 men, had 12 bunkers and heavily booby trapped, captured by the IPKF after heavy fighting. A large cache of arms and explosives was seized from the camp.

At Sastrikulam, northwest of Vavuniya, five "hardcore" LTTE men, including Ravi and Mohan, were captured in an IPKF operation. LTTE men Vijay Kumar and

Dayaparan were held in northern Batticaloa, while one militant, Vasant was captured in southern Batticaloa. Another man accompanying him was shot dead.

24

MADRAS, July 24.

The IPKF have captured another heavily booby trapped LTTE camp with ten bunkers during the follow-up operations in the Mullaitivu jungles, according to an IPKF press release. Two militants were killed in the operation.

The press release says "the captured documents revealed that this camp was the headquarters of Balraj, who is the military leader of Mullaitivu. The IPKF is combing the area for those who have fled into the jungle. It is not known if Balraj is wounded. In Jaffna, one militant was shot dead and Ratna Singham and Ganesh of Nesam group were captured with a large amount of explosives. Two militants, Murthy and Poonathan, were captured in Kilinochchi area.

Seven LTTE militants and three IPKF soldiers were killed when the Indian Peace Keeping Force hit upon a major LTTE camp, three km south of Nittunkaikulam in the thick jungles of Mullaitivu district. Nine other LTTE militants were wounded.

According to a Defence Ministry press release, the camp contained 30 militants and had 12 bunkers and was heavily booby-trapped. This was being set up as a LTTE headquarters in Mullaitivu district. The camp was attacked and captured after heavy fighting. A large cache of explosives and ammunition had been captured.

In Shastrikulam, north west of Vavuniya, five LTTE hardcore militants, including Ravi and Mohan, were captured in a swift operation. In Northern Batticaloa, LTTE militants Vijay Kumar and Dayaparan have been captured in cordon and search operations. In Southern Batticaloa one LTTE militant was shot dead and another named Vasant captured. In Vavuniya 15 PLOT militants have been apprehended.

25

Seven IPKF men were killed in a landmine attack by LTTE in between Alangulam and Madu, Mannar Dt.

One of IPKF was killed in an ambush by LTTE at 7th Block.

In Direct confrontation with IPKF who were coming along Nedunkerni - Maruthoodi, the LTTE killed 4 soldiers and wounded 3.

26

Four thousand Tamils left their dwellings and escaped into the jungles of Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, and Kilinochchi due to IPKF blind attack with more than 400 shells in the villages of Mullaitivu dt. The casualties among the civilians in this intensive attack are not known.



The Indo-Sri Lankan accord saved this country, my government from more disasters. Indian soldiers have died and Indian money has been spent on our behalf. We should be grateful to them.
—J R Jayewardene

27

Rita Sebastian, Express News Service, reports: Four members of the LTTE were killed in three separate incidents in Jaffna yesterday, according to Indian High Commission sources.

In the Mullaitivu district, three bunkers and three trenches were reported destroyed.

The same sources reported that according to an LTTE intercept, five LTTE members were killed and three wounded on July 21.

In eastern Batticaloa district, 25 LTTE sympathisers were taken into custody by the IPKF yesterday and a large cache of arms and ammunition recovered in Akkar-aipattu.



NO COURT ACTION AGAINST IPKF-DIXIT

Since the IPKF is a foreign force operating in Sri Lanka under the terms of the Indo-Lanka accord the question of local citizens filing habeas corpus applications against Indian Army officers does not arise according to Indian High Commissioner, J.N. Dixit.

The Indian High Commissioner was replying to a question as to whether Brigadier Manjid Singh of the IPKF intends to seek legal immunity in a case filed against him by Parameswaran Sumathy in the Court of Appeal.

In her habeas corpus application Mrs Sumathy of Cheddikulam states that her brother Parameswaran Kenga (22) was arrested by IPKF officers attached to the Vavuniya camp on April 5th.

She has cited Brigadier Manjid Singh and the Attorney General as respondents.

Brigadier Manjith Singh of the Vavuniya IPKF camp has been cited as a respondent in a Habeas Corpus Application filed in the Court of Appeal registry challenging arrest of one Parameswaran Kenga (22). The application was filed by Attorney-at-Law Mr. A. Vinayagamoorthy on behalf of Kenga's daughter Sumathi, for her father to be produced before a Court of Law.

28

The Indian Peace Keeping Force has destroyed another fortified LTTE base in the jungles of Sri Lanka's Mullaitivu district. A Defence Ministry press release said the base had 12 bunkers with all administrative facilities for the militant leaders.

During the last 48 hours, troops had raided two camps, one at Pankulam in the Trincomalee area in which a large quantity of medical stores including over 1,000 vials and 69 bottles of drugs were recovered.

The press release said that in search operations in various places during the last two days, as many as 12 LTTE hard core militants had been killed, six wounded and eight others captured alive. A militant leader of Jaffna, Nedunkuna Raj alias Kannan was among those killed. Among the captured, Ganeshmurthy, Theevan and Udaiyan were prominent in the Batticaloa area. The IPKF lost one soldier.

Colombo, July 28: Fourteen Sinhalese farmers were massacred on Thursday morning allegedly by the LTTE in Welioya in Anuradhapura district. Two others were seriously injured.

29

Two IPKF men were killed and many wounded at 12th check post in Paranthan - Mullaitivu Road by LTTE attack. The villages at Killinochchi and Mullaitivu were under IPKF attacks, heavy artillery and helicopter gunships have been used. Civilian casualties are not known.

Gandhi a LTTE cadre, was killed in an encounter between LTTE and Sri Lankan forces near Vilcunvikarai Camp.

30

Two militants killed: The IPKF operations continued unabated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In the Jaffna sector, eight hardcore militants were captured and two 60 mm mor-

tars, recovered. The LTTE militants were also tracked down in the Vavuniya sector, where two were shot dead and another seven captured.

A hide-out was raided in the Nedunkeni area and 200 kg. of ration items were recovered among other things. Raids in the Trincomalee sector recovered a walkie-talkie radio set, a 35 HP OBM and other explosive devices used by the militants, including claymore mines.

31

MADRAS, July 31.

The IPKF continued relentless operations against the LTTE and during the last 24 hours have captured ten hardcore militants in the Jaffna and Vavuniya sectors including Thurian, Ranjan, Theevaraja and Kumara Singam and have recovered two explosive devices, according to a IPKF release.

A militant camp was raided in Omantai area near Vavuniya and a militant was captured along with ammunition and warlike stores.

In the Batticaloa sector, IPKF patrols located a hideout and recovered a sniper rifle, a 12 bore rifle and some quantities of ammunition and equipment, the release said.

Over 500 jawans killed: The IPKF had so far lost 537 soldiers and 1,400 were wounded. According to the radio intercepts of the LTTE's conversation, the LTTE had lost more than 1,000 boys. "In fact, 1,500." About 1,120 LTTE militants were apprehended and 198 had voluntarily surrendered to the IPKF. From July 16 to 25 this year, 39 LTTE militants were killed and 28 captured. They included "Capt." Martin, "Lt." Kasim, Jayakody and Kabilavan.

After the IPKF had gone to Sri Lanka, it had totally protected the Tamils from any atrocity or physical damage from the Sri Lankan armed forces, police or paramilitary. The Sri Lankan armed forces had remained confined to the barracks. The other "belligerent" party viz the LTTE did not hand over the arms fully. When the IPKF went looking for those arms, its personnel were shot at. The IPKF had to defend itself and it resorted to the use of weapons with "no malice". After Jaffna was captured, the IPKF men took full part in relief work.

The LTTE made one demand after another to achieve its "diabolical purpose". What was at stake was the principle that no group, fighting for any rights, in whatever form, could think it could get away with force of arms. The common Tamils of Sri Lanka should not be "subjugated to a fascist kind of system where they are told what they should do at the point of a gun," the IPKF spokesman said.





	KILLED		WOUNDED		KILLED		WOUNDED		KILLED		WOUNDED		KILLED		WOUNDED	
	IPKF		LTTE		S.L. ARMY		OTHER MILITANTS		CIVILIANS							
claims																
IPKF	7		2	2	2				1							
LTTE									2							
MEDIA									2							


2																
	5															
	1														34	

3			1	1 ^C											2 ^C	
	9		2												5 ^C	
	7	2	3	1											2	

4	6	3													2	
		1														
							2									
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5																
	7															
															11	

6	1	2														



8																
	6														1	100 ^C

9																
	12														2	
		5													4	11

10		5													2	10

12	2		3													
	2	16	3													

13																
	1															

14																
	26															

15																
	7													4	20 ^C	
	1	1												6		

16																
	5		1												2	
	6		1												2	

17	6	5	1													
	4		1													

18	2	5		1												
	6															

19	5	1														
	14	6	1												2	

20																
	11														3	321 ^C

21																

22																
	1															

23	3		7	8 ^C												
	1															

24																

25																
	12	3														



27			4	25 ^C												
			1													

28				16	12 ^C										14	2

29																
	2		1													

30			2													
			1													

31																

TOTAL	32	18	39	11		2									3	12
	25	25	32	32											2	2 ^C
	115	9	10												15	346 ^C
	31	24	22												29	56
																100

புலிகளின் தாகம் தமிழீழத் தாயகம்



END